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Abstract
British press opinion concerning the Soviet Union in the 1930s contributes to an 
understanding of the failed cooperation, prior to 1941, between the British and Soviet 
Governments.
During the trial of six British engineers in Moscow in 1933, the conservative 
press jingoistically responded by demanding stringent economic action against the Soviet 
Union and possibly severing diplomatic cooperation. The liberal and labour press 
expected relations to improve to prevent similar trials of Britons in the future.
Despite the strain in relations and ideological differences, between 1934 and 
1935, Britain and the USSR worked for collective security. The quality conservative 
press was willing to support a closer relationship, though popular conservative 
newspapers remained anti-Soviet. The liberal and labour press, though hoping for more, 
expressed relief that Britain was improving relations with the Soviet Union.
The Spanish Civil War led the conservative press to resume its non-collective 
beliefs and to become ideologically critical of the Soviet Union. The provincial 
conservative newspapers were the exceptions. Liberal and labour papers were annoyed 
with the British refusal to cooperate with the USSR over Spain and became disappointed 
by the Government's decision to support appeasement rather than collective action.
While the British Government reviewed the benefits of collective security, the 
Moscow show trials damaged Britain's belief in the stability of the USSR. All papers 
realised there was something seriously wrong in the Soviet Union. The conservative 
press advocated avoiding cooperation with a country weakened by purging. The liberal 
and labour press, though concerned about the image of the USSR, realised that Britain 
required an East European ally and called for an improvement of existing relations.
In 1939 nearly every newspaper demanded the British Government form an 
alliance with the USSR against Hitler's aggression and criticised both governments for 
wasting time. Condemnation of the Soviet Union's signing of the Nazi-Soviet pact and
urole in the partition of Poland was relatively limited as hope remained that Britain and the 
USSR would collaborate to defeat Hitler.
However, the Winter War strained these hopes and led to intense press 
condemnation of the Soviet attack on Finland. Nevertheless, in July 1940 newspapers 
became interested in the emerging conflict of interests between Germany and the USSR. 
Despite criticism of Soviet expansion in Eastern Europe, the press accepted that Britain's 
security depended on the Soviet Union. All newspapers welcomed the alliance in 1941 
and ignored ideological issues.
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Preface
This thesis investigates British press attitudes towards the fluctuating relationship 
between Britain and the Soviet Union from 1933 to 1941. Fleet Street's opinions 
concerning the Soviet Union are important as newspapers were the primary source of 
information and thus major opinion developers for the British public in the 1930s. The 
Political and Economic Planning Report on the British Press, conducted in 1938, 
concluded that often the views adopted by the people reflected the papers which they 
read. Therefore, the newspapers and journals examined in this work were organised in 
relation to their political outlook - conservative, liberal, or labour. In the 1930s, the 
conservative dailies were The Times, the Daily Telegraph, the Daily Express, and the 
Daily Mail. Two conservative provincial dailies, the Yorkshire Post and the Scotsman, 
were examined because they had a significant local readership and offered some 
pronounced views on the Soviet Union. The liberal dailies consulted were the News 
Chronicle and the Manchester Guardian, the latter, although provincial, enjoyed an 
international reputation similar to The Times. The Daily Herald represented the labour 
daily press. Of the Sunday newspapers, the Observer and the Sunday Times, both 
conservative in political outlook, were consulted. Two evening papers, also 
conservative, the Evening Standard and the Evening News, were examined, though 
often their views reflected the opinions of their respective parent dailies, the Daily  
Express and the Daily Mail. Three weekly political journals, the New Statesman and 
Nation, the Spectator and the Economist, the first labour and the second two liberal in 
outlook, were examined. Britain's only daily communist newspaper, the Daily Worker, 
was also consulted for its views which were consistently pro-Soviet, Other journals, the 
Illustrated London News, Contemporary Review, and Foreign Ajfairs, were also 
referred to for the very occasional article.
This is not a complete study of newspapers or journals but it is a representative 
cross section of the British press in the 1930s. Although there appears to be an 
overwhelming representation of the conservative press, this reflects the then existing
situation as the majority of newspapers published in the 1930s were conservative in 
outlook. Furthermore, the Daily Herald commanded the market for the labour reader. 
Even though newspapers can be conveniently divided into political outlooks, it did not, 
however, follow that the opinions of an individual newspaper were consistently 
conservative, liberal or labour in perspective. Thus the explanation of anomalies in press 
attitudes features as significantly as does the consistency of a newspaper's views. This is 
in fact one of the most fascinating issues, that the British press often did not know how to 
respond to the Soviet Union's people, Government, politics, social and work ethics. 
Thus Fleet Street's dilemma makes this study fundamental to explaining why there was 
such delay in the cooperation between Britain and the Soviet Union not only prior to the 
Second World War, but also in the first two years of the fighting.
The issues affecting British-Soviet relations in the critical years before the Second 
World War received frequent coverage and debate by the British press. From 1933, the 
argument as to whether or not the British Government should strive for closer 
cooperation with the Soviet Union assumed greater attention in the British press. Such 
discussions had existed prior to 1933, but in that year circumstances heralded a change in 
the foreign policies of all major European countries, the most significant event being the 
coming to power of Hitler's National Socialists in Germany. By the time the Germans 
withdrew from the Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations in October 1933, 
Europe's statesmen were beginning to respond to Hitler's activity.
The British press only gradually recommended a closer relationship between 
Britain and the Soviet Union. Conservative newspapers reflected, or at the least 
concurred in point of view with, the British Government’s fear of and hesitancy in 
seeking a more regular association with the Soviet Union. The liberal and labour press, 
being less ideologically motivated against the Soviet Union, advocated closer 
cooperation, initially in the form of economic agreements but as the 1930s progressed, 
these papers favoured rapid development in political relations.
Discussion by Fleet Street concerning the possibility of improved British-Soviet 
relations was mixed and inconsistent in the 1930s. Various circumstances provided
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strong arguments in the press as to why the Soviet Union was an unsuitable and 
unnecessary political ally or commercial partner for Britain. One such event was the trial 
in Moscow of six British engineers of the Metropolitan-Vickers Company in 1933. As a 
consequence, trade and diplomatic relations between the two countries suffered. Soviet 
domestic issues also led to the British press questioning the Soviet Government's ability 
to help Britain against aggression. The most prominent Soviet internal issue for Fleet 
Street became the purges and show trials held between 1935 and 1938. The trials 
exhibited an apparent lack of stability as either the Soviet Government was purging 
innocent people whose views opposed Stalin's or there was a large subversive element 
threatening to destroy the USSR. Either option led the British press to see the Soviet 
Union as a potentially weak ally.
Events occurring outside the Soviet Union also contributed to the discussion by 
British newspapers on the relationship between Britain and the USSR. As Hitler's 
ambitions became more obvious. Fleet Street increasingly debated the assets and 
drawbacks of collective security. Though the majority of British newspapers recognised 
the benefits of collective action, some found it difficult to support British-Soviet 
cooperation because the Soviet Union was communist and authoritarian. However, some 
events, such as Eden's visit to Moscow or the Soviet Union becoming a member of the 
League of Nations, were markedly discussed by the press for their merit in offering peace 
and trust in Europe and advancing closer, possibly reliable British-Soviet cooperation. 
Other issues, such as the Spanish Civil War, added to the debate on the potential benefits 
o f collective security against the British Government's growing preference for 
"appeasement" in resolving Europe's crises. For some conservative politicians and 
newspapers, appeasement had the added benefit of excluding the Soviet Union from 
participating on major decisions concerning Europe, such as those made at the Munich 
Conference.
It was not until the summer of 1939 that the majority of the British press 
acknowledged that the Soviet Union could help Britain avert a war. Although there were 
sceptics who continued to suggest the Soviet Union was weak following the vast purging
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of its political and military leadership, most newspapers admitted that Britain could not 
deter Hitler alone, nor could the British fight Germany effectively without Soviet 
assistance in Eastern Europe. Even when the Soviet Government formed an agreement 
with Germany in August 1939, Fleet Street did not abandon its hope that some form of 
cooperation between Britain and the Soviet Union could exist. Nevertheless, the Winter 
War which began in December, severely strained the possibility of better relations. 
Between December 1939 and the spring of 1941, the British press was uncertain of the 
direction in which the Soviet-German partnership was moving. Furthermore, newspapers 
increasingly wondered if it was possible for Britain to work with the Soviet Union 
following the latter's expansionist moves in Eastern Europe throughout 1940.
Due to the time and space limitations of a Ph.D. thesis, it was not possible to 
discuss more than a small selection of events which affected British-Soviet relations in the 
1930s and the early years of the Second World War. Thus several items reported by the 
British press have not been included in great detail. The Five Year Plans, the religious 
atrocities, the famine, the Stalin Constitution and the Soviet elections of 1937 have only 
been mentioned in passing. Similarly, British domestic issues, such as the Abdication of 
Edward VII in December 1936, distracted British press attention from foreign affairs.
Other important topics have not been examined, such as the Italian occupation of 
Abyssinia and the re-militarisation of the Rhineland, simply because the British press 
made little or no reference to the Soviet Union in connection with these events. Likewise, 
discussion on the Spanish Civil War does not include the later years of the conflict, 
firstly, because the war itself faded from international importance in the British press as 
other events in Europe superseded it and, secondly, because the Soviet Union at the same 
time reduced its involvement and concern for Spain.
The years between 1933 and 1941 saw a largely varied response in Britain to the 
Soviet Union. The British Government, the people, and Fleet Street were all attempting 
to understand a country ideologically very different from their own. The fact that some 
papers were able to overlook these ideological distinctions and to recognise|^hat the ^
Soviet Government wanted peace as much as Britain meant the Soviet Union received
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regular, objective press coverage. However, as a result of the more critical judgement of 
other newspapers, suspicion of the Soviet Union remained to hinder relations even 
though both countries desired international stability. In years of calm, improved 
friendship may not have been so necessary, but in the last five years of peace and the first 
two years of war, cooperation was vital. Thus the British press, though attempting to 
inform and direct public opinion concerning international affairs, also reflected the mood 
of the country and the Government, and provides a new assessment of why Britain and 
the Soviet Union failed to cooperate before June 1941, even in the face of Nazi 
aggression.
Chapter 1 
Introduction
The main source of information on foreign issues in the 1930s was the 
newspaper, with radio and newsreel only emerging as important methods of 
communication. Statistics showed that Britain was a nation of newspaper readers - 
between 1930 and 1936 the estimated average circulation of all daily newspapers rose by 
around 1.44 million to 9.05 ^  and in 1939 it was 10.6 million.^ "No other people on earth 
are such avid readers of newspapers as the British".^ Thus Fleet Street's reaction to the 
relationship between the Soviet Union and Britain had a direct bearing on the way the 
public viewed the USSR in such a crucial period. Furthermore, because Ministers were 'f'
: V ., .accountable to the public who elected them, the British Government had to heed press j
. i, vopinion as it was the medium which most easily informed and swayed public opinion
However, at the same time, the British Government developed methods for ; “ 
manipulating the press. The Foreign Office created the News Department which released ^ j
y ;information to the Diplomatic Correspondents and Downing Street formed a rival Press \
Office to provide its own version of news for the media. When Chamberlain became Ï
Prime Minister in 1937,^he exceptionally manipulated the British press into supporting his  ^
policies without question.^ Though the press was virtually subservient to Chamberlain '  
on issues relating to Germany and Italy, its opinion on the Soviet Union was not nearly ^
as regimented by the British Government and newspapers, therefore, had relatively 
greater freedom in reporting on Soviet matters. There were occasions when the 
Government attempted to influence news concerning the Soviet Union, most notably i
during the Metropolitan-Vickers trial in 1933. However, Fleet Street was generally left to
 ^ Political and Economic Planning Report on the British Press, for 1938, p. 2. The source, |
presumably in error, gives the figure of 19.05 million.
 ^ Curran and Seaton, Power without Responsibility, states that between 1920 and 1939, the I
combined circulation of the national daily rose from 5.4 to 10.6 million, p. 51. I
 ^Frmxcis'Williams, Dangerous Estate, p. 1. I
 ^ More detail will be given later in this chapter concerning the British Government's efforts to {
control the British press.
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form its own opinions concerning the Soviet Union since British foreign policy was I 
frequently unresponsive towards Moscow. That was especially the situation when ; | 
Chamberlain became Prime Minister in 1937 as his mistrust of the communists led to an 
indifferent attitude concerning press criticism or support for the Soviet Government. 
Thus when compared to Fleet Street's views towards Germany or Italy in the 1930s, 
British press opinion concerning the Soviet Union showed more variety of expression in 
the same years.
Communism, especially in the Soviet Union, held a fascination in the British 
press similar to that felt for Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. When the Bolsheviks 
assumed control of Russia in 1917, few in Fleet Street believed Çômmunism could /  
survive. With Lenin's death in 1924, newspapers expressed concern as to who the new 
leader would be and were generally relieved that Stalin, the proponent of "socialism in 
one country", had succeeded over the far more revolutionary Trotsky and Zinoviev.^ 
While Stalin was cementing his authority in the Soviet Union, Britain's domestic affairs 
were hit by economic depression due to the Wall Street Crash, leading to rising 
unemployment and falling standards-of-living. Britain required new outlets for trade and 
the Soviet Union provided a relatively untapped market in the 1930s. Furthermore, the 
USSR was enjoying a degree of economic success as a result o f the Five Year Plans 
which had industrialised the country to a significant extent. Thus the British press, 
increasingly recognising the potential trade opportunities with the Soviet Union, devoted 
more coverage designed to inform the British public of the internal nature of the USSR.
At the same time. Fleet Street recognised that European stability was being affected by the 
rise of National Socialism in Germany and that the Soviet Union could have a potential 
impact on Europe's affairs as the antithesis of Nazi Germany.  ^ "
The "popular" conservative press,^ consisting of the Daily Express, the Daily 
Mail, the Evening Standard, and the Evening News, generally refused to admit there
 ^For information concerning members of the Soviet Government, see chapter 5.
 ^The information in this paragraph concerning typology comes primarily from the Political and 
Economic Planning Report on the British Press, for 1938. Also, in this thesis, popular conservative 
press is used interchangeably with Beaverbrook and Rothermere press, representing the proprietors of the 
newspapers which are used.
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were any benefits for Britain through increased cooperation, economically or 
diplomatically, with the Soviet Union. Preferring a more insular, Empire approach in 
trade, these newspapers saw little of advantage in what the Soviet Union offered for not ^  
only Britain but also for Europe. The liberal press - comprising the M anchester \ 
Guardian, the News Chronicle, the Economist, and the Spectator - with the labour press 
- the Daily Herald and the New Statesman and Nation - recognised the benefits of 
cooperation with the Soviet Union and thus supported closer British-Soviet relations.
The newspapers, as a group, with the most varied attitudes towards the USSR belonged 
to the "quality" conservative press, which encompassed The Times, the Daily Telegraph, 
the Sunday Times, the Observer, the Scotsman, and the Yorkshire Post. Although the 
London based newspapers retained a suspicion of Soviet intentions, these papers 
normally gave reasonable consideration to issues concerning the Soviet Union. The 
provincial quality newspapers regularly presented a more balanced view of the USSR and 
often argued in favour of closer British-Soviet relations.
Though explained in terms of political outlook, press attitudes towards the USSR 
were rarely consistently liberal, labour or conservative since the Soviet Union's 
involvement in Europe was perceived to have varying degrees of significance. It became 
increasingly rare for Fleet Street to ignore any internal or external affair involving the 
Soviet Union as the 1930s progressed and the fate of Europe moved rapidly towards war.
In this period, the press increasingly debated the value of the Soviet Union as an ally for 
Britain.
The Soviet Union became a contentious issue between the Left and Right in 
Britain. The Left, generally represented by the labour and liberal press, welcomed a new 
state based on an impressive social experiment, though the unpleasant and sinister nature 
of the techniques used were often criticised by these papers. Although support for the 
Soviet Union was sometimes reserved, the liberal and labour press often expressed views 
which were not necessarily of a pro-Soviet outlook but more opposed to the anti-Soviet 
attitudes of the Right. In contrast, the conservative press criticised the communist social v 
experiment though with varying degrees of dislike and distrust for the Soviet Union. The
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Daily Mail and the Observer were exceedingly anti-Soviet. Rothermere, the proprietor 
of the Daily Mail, was alleged to have been almost unstable on the issue of communism 
and believed Hitler would save Europe from the threat in the East.^ The other 
conservative newspapers took a more objective view, though those newspapers were not 
apparently open-minded on issues concerning the Soviet Union.
The British Press^
The Quality Conservative Press 
The Times
The Times was one of the oldest British newspapers, founded in 1788. During 
the 1930s, the chief proprietors were Major the Hon. J. J. Astor, MP and Mr. John 
Walter. The paper's editor fro t^ l923  to 1941 was Geoffrey Dawson and the assistant 
editor was Robert BarringtonAVs^d whose primary interest was in foreign affairs. The 
political outlook of The Times was "independent" Conservative though it usually 
supported the National Government. In 1930, the paper's circulation was 187,000 and 
rose to 204,491 in 1939, with a readership almost exclusively belonging to the upper and 
middle classes as it cost 2d.
Despite its price, heavy layout and limited readership, The Times was considered 
to be the most prestigious British newspaper of the 1930s and had the reputation, both 
abroad and domestically, for being the mouthpiece of the British Government. This was 
due to the views of the paper's editor, which were very similar to those of the British 
Government. Dawson had near total control over the policy of the paper in the 1930s, 
was an intimate friend of both Halifax and Chamberlain, and was very supportive of the 
policy of appeasement. This did not mean The Times excessively admired Germany,
 ^F. R. Gannon, The British Press and Germany, pp. 24 and 25-26.
® This section is heavily dependent on the Political and Economic Planning Report on the 
British Press, for 1938; Lord Camrose, Newspapers and Their Controllers: and Gannon, The British 
Press and Germany, 1936-1939. Chapter 2, "The British Press: 1936-1939", pp. 32-88.
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though there was a bias in favour of placating Hitler because the paper believed Britain 
needed to cooperate with the Germans for peace in Europe.
In contrast, the opinions of The Times during the 1930s showed no great concern 
with the Soviet Union. The paper supported Stalin's success as it signalled the end of 
expansion and an increasing concern with domestic policy.^ Though allegedly not anti­
communist, The Times believed agreement with the Soviet Union was impossible for 
Britain while Comintern activity reportedly continued.^® This was a main reason why the 
paper did not advocate or support attempts at greater British-Soviet cooperation. 
Barrington Ward asked of a friend in February 1938, "Are we to commit ourselves to an 
ideological campaign in the untrustworthy and compromising company of Stalin?". Thus 
he suggested that association with the Soviet Union ought to be kept to the minimum 
amount necessary to restrain German aggression, I
In addition. The Times was repeatedly criticised for not having a resident |
correspondent in Moscow. In 1932, A. L. Kennedy, a leader writer and special j
correspondent from 1911 to 1942 specialising in foreign affairs, explained the paper's |
position to the Foreign Office - a correspondent would only be sent to Moscow when the I
journalist was free to report what he liked and in his own s t y l e .  Thus, in the 1930s, the I
nearest correspondent for The Times was based in Riga, Latvia. However, Robert Urch \
shrewdly served The Times/i\s he read most Soviet newspapers and was, therefore, able j
to send uncensored information. The left press, especially the News Chronicle, the New  I 
Statesman and Nation, Spectator, accused Urch of being biased in his dispatches |
as he sent only what the Soviet press printed. However, contrary to the argument, Urch j
actually reported official news and could comment freely in any manner he wanted, I
without fear of censorship or exp u lsio n , Unlike the popula^conservative press which {
also had no resident correspondents in Moscow, Urch's reports were usually not I
 ^Alan Foster, "The Times and Appeasement", p. 444.
The History o f The Times, Vol. IV, pp. 910-911.
Gannon, p. 27.
12 Ibid, p. 23.
1^  The History o f The Times, Vol IV, pp. 911-912. See the Spectator, 13 February 1934. The 
New Statesman and Nation, 11 May 1935.
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distorted by an anti-Soviet prejudice. Urch moved from Riga to Warsaw in November 
1938 and eventually reported the Winter War from Finland. James Holburn became the 
first permanent correspondent in Moscow for The Times in the summer of 1939. 
However, from June 1941, the Russian war effort was covered by Ralph Parker who 
ultimately became very pro-Soviet in his views,
Daily Telegraph
In 1927, the Daily Telegraph was purchased by Lords Camrose, Kemsley, and 
Diffe from Lord Burnham whose family had founded the paper in 1855. The interests of 
the three men were split in January 1937; Camrose became the proprietor of the Daily 
Telegraph and bought \h& Morning Post in October 1937. During the 1930s, the Z7û//y 
Telegraph was the largest selling quality daily - in 1930, the paper's circulation was. 
222,000,15 and had risen substantially by 1939 to 763,557. One reason for the increased 
circulation was the cheap price for a quality paper, \d, which was read predominantly by 
the upper and middle classes.
Though Camrose acted as editor-in-chief, the Daily Telegraph's editor was 
Arthur E. Watson. XlnWkQ The Times, \h& Daily Telegraph had a resident correspondent 
in Moscow, A. T. Cholerton. Although the political outlook of the Daily Telegraph was 
conservative and fully supported the National Government, the paper had reservations on 
the policy of appeasement. These, however, were minimally expressed because Camrose 
felt there was no reasonable alternative to Chamberlain’s policies. Though not anti­
communist, the paper's editor and proprietor did not expect the British Government to 
look towards the Soviet Union for an alternative policy. However, in the summer of 
1939, the Daily Telegraph moved further away from the Government over Germany and 
Camrose's support for Chamberlain declined while backing for the Soviet Union
noticeably i m p r o v e d .
The History of The Times, Vol. V, pp. 84-85.
5^ This figure includes the circulation of the Morning Post.
Duff Hart-Davis, The House the Berry's Built, pp. 95 sand 118.
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The Conservative Provincial Press
Yorkshire Post
There were several important provincial newspapers of which the Yorkshire Post, 
founded in 1754, was the leading conservative daily. In the 1930s, it belonged to the 
Yorkshire Conservative Newspaper Company with the Hon. Rupert Beckett as 
Chairman. Arthur Mann was the editor from 1919-1939 and in that time he revised the 
Yorkshire Post's fortunes primarily by keeping the paper and his views independent of 
the British Government's influence. Though loyal to afe>nservative philosophy, the ; 
editor claimed he was patriotic to his country rather than the Government. 12 Thus Mann 
strongly opposed appeasement and during the Munich Crisis, the Yorkshire Post was the 
only paper to take a strongly anti-Chamberlain line despite the views of the paper's 
shareholders. The paper often differed from the rest of the conservative press in 
advocating greater friendship between Britain and the Soviet Union through collective 
security and the League of Nations. In November 1939, the Yorkshire Post and the 
Leeds Mercury amalgamated in recognition that the London daily press was reaching 
more people in the North and therefore two dailies printed in Leeds were unprofitable.!® 
At the same time, Mann retired as editor and was replaced by William Linton Andrews.
Scotsman
In Scotland, the Scotsman, which became a daily in 1855, was considered to be 
the national newspaper even though the Glasgow Herald had a larger c irc u la tio n .T h e  
Scotsman was edited and owned by the Findlay and Law families and in the 1930s, the 
paper's readership numbered 60,000. To provide foreign news coverage, the Scotsman 
often used the same correspondents as the Morning Post. Like the Yorkshire Post, the 
Edinburgh based newspaper frequently differed from the London conservative press in its 
attitudes towards appeasement and the advantages of the Soviet Union's involvement in 
Europe as a means of securing peace. It appeared that the further a daily was from
12 Andrews and Taylor, Lords and Labourers o f the Press, p. 126. 
1® Gibb and Beckwith, The Yorkshire Post, p. 90.
1^  Camrose, p. 137.
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London, the less control the British Government could exert on the provincial press 
despite the conservative outlook of these papers.
The Conservative Sunday Press
Observer
The Observer was another venerable newspaper, established in 1791. It was 
bought by Lord Northcliffe in 1905 but sold to Lord Astor in 1911. J. L. Garvin was the 
editor from 1908 to 1942 and it was he who made the paper famous to the extent that 
many people equated the Observer with Garvin.20 In the 1930s, Garvin had near total 
control of the paper and thus editorial policy reflected his own views. To Garvinf nazis 
and£0mmunists were equally hateful and though he believed Hitler would begin a war, 
he did not trust the Soviet Government enough to treat them as allies.21 In addition, 
Garvin did not want another war for Russian or East European interests and thus he 
supported the policy of appeasement.22 In 1932, the Observer's readership numbered
201,000 and, despite Garvin's influence, the newspaper's circulation had only marginally 
increased to 214,000 in 1937. This was not enough to win the circulation war with its 
main quality Sunday competitor, the Sunday Times.
Sunday Times
The Sunday Times was founded in 1822 and bought by Lords Camrose, 
Kemsley, and Diffe in 1915 when the paper's circulation was only 50,000. Camrose was 
the editor for twenty-two years but when the partnership split in 1937, Kemsley retained 
control of the Sunday Times. The paper's circulation grew rapidly - in 1932, its 
readership numbered 187,000 but had risen to 270,000 by 1937, more than sufficient to 
overtake its rival, the Observer. W. W. Hadley became the editor of the Sunday Times 
in 1937, though the major spokesman on foreign affairs, until 1940, was Herbert 
Sidebotham, also known as "Scrutator".
20 Ibid, p. 87.
21 David Ayerst, Garvin of the Observer, p. 263.
22 Gannon, p. 26.
Introduction 9
Lord Kemsley strongly believed in the desirability of a British-German 
rapprochement and therefore used his newspapers to smooth the path for such an object, 
though not all his staff was as convinced by the policy of appeasement.23 Kemsley 
believed communism was the real enemy and even hoped that Hitler could be encouraged 
to turn his aggression towards the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, Alexander Werth, who 
also worked for the Manchester Guardian as a correspondent in Europe, was allowed to 
argue against Kemsley's policy as Werth favoured an alliance with the Soviet Union. 
Following the German invasion in 1941, Werth was sent to Moscow as correspondent 
for both the Sunday Times and the B.B.C.2^
The P opular Conservative Press 
Daily Mail and Evening News
The Daily Mail was founded in 1896 by Alfred Harmsworth, later Lord 
Northcliffe. The paper was prosperous from the beginning and became the most 
profitable paper in Britain^S as well as being the first British newspaper to reach a million 
in circulation. On Northcliffe's death in 1922, his brother. Lord Rothermere, assumed 
control until 1937, at which time his son, the Hon. Esmond Harmsworth, became the 
proprietor. In 1930, the circulation of the Daily Mail was 1,845,000 but had fallen to
1,580,000 in 1937, thus losing the circulation battle with its rivals the Daily Express and 
the Daily Herald. The Daily Mail's appeal was popular and its political outlook was 
"independent" right-wing conservative. It was the only popular daily to have a 
predominantly upper and middle class readership, though the average wage earner also 
read the paper.
During the 1930s, several editors worked on the Daily Mail though Rothermere's 
views were dominant in editorial policy.2^  The paper frequently carried interviews with 
continental statesmen, especially the dictators. Thus in the 1930s, the Daily Mail
23 Hobson, Knightley, and Russell, The Pearl o f Days, p. 207.
24 Ibid, pp. 210 and 219.
25 Camrose, p. 50.
2  ^Editors in the 1930s were: W. L. Warden, 1931-1935; A. L. Cranfield, 1936-1938; and R, J. 
Prew, 1939-1944.
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admired Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy's internal accomplishments though the paper 
expressed disgust with nazi "excesses" and brutality. One of Rothermere's greatest fears 
was a communist invasion of Britain. Though both Lords Beaverbrook and Rothermere 
opposed collective security, Beaverbrook did so because he regretted increasing British 
commitments while Rothermere unreasonably feared proposals introduced by or 
involving communists.^?
The Daily Mail was associated with the Evening News which was established in 
1881 and bought in 1894 by Northcliffe. The editor from 1924-1944 was F.L. Fitzhugh. 
In the 1930s, under Rothermere, the paper had the largest sale of any evening paper in the 
world which was attributed to the paper's popular following.^®
Daily Express and Evening Standard
The Daily Express was founded in 1900 by Arthur Pearson as a rival to the Daily 
Mail and was acquired in 1915 by Sir Max Aitken, MP who later became Lord 
Beaverbrook. By the end of the First World War, Beaverbrook had taken vigorous 
control of the paper and turned a losing property into a profitable mass circulation paper. 
The success of the Daily Express was due to Beaverbrook's inspiration and drive though 
Arthur Christiansen was one of the most competent editors of Fleet Street. The paper's 
appeal was popular and its political outlook was "independent'! conservative, opposing 
collective security and favouring high tariffs. The paper's readership came from all 
income groups but particularly from the average wage earner. In 1930, the D aily  
Express's circulation was 1,693,000, topped 2,000,000 sales in 1936, and had risen to
2,329,000 by 1937 thus making it the largest circulated newspaper of any daily in 
Britain. Politically, the Daily Express was accused of not nieasuring up to its huge daily 
sales but its appeal to the broad public remained a testament to the paper's success.29
22 Alan Foster, "Beaverbrook and Appeasement", p. 16. Stephen Koss, The Rise and Fall of 
the Political Press in Britain, Vol. II, p. 547. Beaverbrook was the proprietor of the Express chain of 
newspapers.
2® Camrose, p. 54.
29 Ibid, pp. 40-41.
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Optimism was intentionally a keynote of the D aily Express.^^ Due to 
Beaverbrook's strong belief in isolationism, press coverage of Europe's affairs was kept 
to a minimum, apart from the Spanish Civil War. Furthermore, Beaverbrook was 
devoted to the Empire and hoped to increase ties with the United States. Though 
understanding France's fears of Germany, the proprietor of the Daily Express did not 
want Britain involved in Europe and advocated that Germany be left alone despite the 
unpleasant aspects of Hitler's regime. Beaverbrook's hatred of the Locarno Treaties and 
the League of Nations was legendary as they risked dragging Britain into the quarrels of 
the wider world and increasing British commitments. For example, on 27 October 1934, 
the headlines of the Daily Express read "When Will There Be Another War?" and under it 
was listed the three things which Beaverbrook believed would cause that war: (1) Balance 
of Power; (2) Alliances; (3) the League of Nations.^i
Like many western newspapers, the Daily Express welcomed Stalin's triumph in 
the struggle for power in the Kremlin because the Soviet Union finally appeared to have a 
leader devoted to domestic needs rather than international revolution.52 Though opposed 
to the Soviet Government's plans for Britain in collective security issues, the Daily 
Express was not as hostile towards the Soviet Union as its rival, the Daily Mail. Though 
generally ignoring the Soviet Union, during the show trials and the Spanish Civil War the 
paper demonstrated a strong anti-Red bias. However, in 1939, Beaverbrook's 
newspapers led the calls for cooperation between Britain and the Soviet Union. 
Furthermore, during his visit to Moscow in September 1941 as Minister of Supply, 
Beaverbrook became so impressed with Stalin that his papers in the 1940s appeased the 
Soviet Union's aims in Eastern Europe.53
Beaverbrook also owned several other papers including the Evening Standard 
which he acquired in 1923. There were several notable editors of the paper in the 1930s: 
Percy Cudlipp, 1933-1938; R. J. T. Thompson in 1938; and Frank Owen, 1939-1942.
R. Allen, The Voice o f Britain, p. 64.
Allen, p. 56 and Foster, "Beaverbrook and Appeasement", p. 9. 
52 Foster, "Beaverbrook and Appeasement", p. 13.
55 Ibid, pp. 17-18 and 7.
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The newspaper was considered to be more of a quality evening paper than its rival, the 
Evening News. Thus, due to its limited class appeal, the Evening Standard's circulation 
was lower than that of the Evening News?^ However, the paper was noted for its social 
gossip and the brilliant political cartoons by David Low.
Low was a New Zealander who arrived in Britain in November 1919 and 
originally worked as the cartoonist for the Star, an evening paper belonging to the Daily 
News group. The Star was liberal in outlook, but supportive of Labour policies, which 
was thus similar to the political views of Low.35 Beaverbrook, recognising Low's 
talents as a political satirist, after several attempts prevailed on the cartoonist to join the 
conservative Evening Standard in 1927. Low only agreed on the condition that he was 
given total independence of expression - rarely did Beaverbrook prevent a cartoon from 
being printed.36 The cartoons actually caused the paper to be banned in Germany and 
Italy as they offended both dictators.^? The British Government, responding to Hitler's 
complaints, also tried to interfere, though ultimately unsuccessfully, with Low's anti- 
German cartoons because such satire allegedly jeopardised delicate negotiations and 
peace.^® In contrast, Low was sympathetic and supportive of Litvinov's collective 
security proposals, though he was critical of the repressive actions of the Soviet 
Government, especially during the show t r i a l s . ^ ^  These attitudes did not prevent the 
cartoonist from becoming good friends with the Soviet Ambassador in London, Ivan 
Maisky. Low was stridently anti-appeasement and throughout 1938 and 1939, he 
demancjdd cooperation between Britain and the Soviet Union."^ ®
34 Camrose, p. 41.
David Low, Low's Autobiography, p. 102.
Low, p. 197. Peter Mellini, "Why Didn't They Listen? Political Cartooning and British 
Foreign Policy, 1933-1940." p. 31. Adrian Smith, "Low and Lord Beaverbrook". p. 11.
Low, pp. 252-254. Mellini, p. 32.
38 Richard Cockett, Twilight of Truth, pp. 43 and 45-46. Mellini, p. 33.
39 Low, pp. 255 and 317.
40 All cartoons used in this thesis are printed in Low's Europe Since Versailles or his Europe 
At War. Both are compilations by the cartoonist, arranged in January 1940 and February 1941 
respectively, and are therefore Low's own choice of some of his most important cartoons. Also, although 
there were many good cartoonists in the 1930s, only Low is included in this work since he alone had the 
freedom to express his own controversial opinion. The Daily Herald's editors moderated Will Dyson's 
cartoons and Jimmy Friell, "Gabriel" of the Daily Worker, was expected to be radical. Sidney Strube, 
cartoonist for the Daily Express though reaching a far larger audience than Low, "reassured his viewers 
rather than challenging them" and was considered by the British Government to be an "ambassador for 
peace". Strube, because of his "glowing confidence" in Britain, was popular with the public, but Low
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The Liberal Press
Manchester Guardian
The Manchester Guardian was one of the most famous papers in the world with 
the widest distribution of any provincial d a ily .41 Before the Second World War, the 
paper's circulation was not above 50,000 though it doubled after 1945. It was founded 
in 1821 as a weekly, but established a world wide reputation under C. P. Scott, the editor 
and principal proprietor of the paper from 1872 to 1929. Scott used his contacts with the 
many British Governments in that period to give the paper its national and international 
reputation and thus transformed the Manchester Guardian from a provincial Lancashire 
Whig newspaper into a respected liberal paper of news and opinion. In addition, the 
Manchester Guardian Weekly was printed for the United States and there was a German 
edition until it was supressed in 1933 by the Nazis. With the decline of the Liberal Party 
after the First World War, the paper developed increasingly independent views. In the 
1930s, the Manchester Guardian did nof portray Liberal Party policy, as the News  ^
Chronicle did, though it remained a newspaper withf a liberal outlook due to its staff and
readers.42 1I
Though understanding Hitler's criticism of Versailles, the Manchester Guardian I
detested the racial theory and barbarous practices of National Socialism. The editor from 
1933 to 1944, W. P. Crozier, made it the paper's special mission to keep Jewish and 
Christian persecution and concentration camps in Germany in the public eye.43 The 
paper similarly explored the famine in the Soviet Union in the early 1930s and the 
religious persecution by the Soviet leadership. Of the British press, the Manchester 
Guardian was the firmest advocate of collective security for Europe and therefore clearly 
supported Litvinov's efforts towards increased cooperation between Britain and the 
Soviet Union.
clearly, consistently, and effectually explained the dangers threatening peace in Europe through the 
medium of cartoon. Mellini, pp. 28-30.
41 Camrose, p. 116.
42 Gannon, pp. 74-75.
43 Ibid, p. 76.
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The paper's Moscow Correspondent in the 1930s was Chamberlin, author of 
Russia's Iron Age. However, when Chamberlin was on a six months' leave of absence, 
he was replaced by Malcolm Muggeridge who went to the Soviet Union as an "idealist, in 
search of faith" but became rapidly disillusioned by what he saw.44 It was his reports, 
smuggled out of the Soviet Union in a diplomatic pouch, which described the famine in 
the Soviet Union and reported in the paper on 25, 27, and 28 March 1933. However, 
rather than believing an eye witness account, popular reaction in Britain was abusive and 
vilified Muggeridge. At the same time, the Manchester Guardian refused to print his 
version of the events concerning the arrest of the British engineers of the Metropolitan- 
Vickers Company. Therefore, Muggeridge resigned his position, before the trial began, 
claiming that the British people would not be told the real story in M o sc o w .45
News Chronicle
The News Chronicle was created in 1930, by the Cadbury family, as an 
amalgamation of two liberal newspapers, the Daily News and the Daily Chronicle. The 
intended purpose of the News Chronicle was to support the liberal cause, and generally 
the Liberal Party. However, as the party's fortunes declined, so too did the fortunes of 
those newspapers with a liberal outlook. Thus in 1930, the News Chronicle's 
circulation was 1,4000,000 but fell slightly to 1,324,000 in 1937. The popular appeal of 
the paper meant it was favoured by the average wage earner though other classes read the 
News Chronicle because it took foreign news seriously and presented "well balanced" 
leading articles .46
Sir Walter Layton, a dedicated Liberal,4? was in control of the News Chronicle 
as chairman, and in effect, the paper's editor-in-chief, though the Cadburys also offered 
their viewpoints. In 1933, Alymer Vallance came from the Economist to become the 
News Chronicle's editor. He was very left wing and sometimes mistaken as a supporter
44 David Ayerst, The Guardian: Biography of a Newspaper, p. 511.
45 Ian Hunter, Malcolm Muggeridge: A Life, pp. 80-85. Ayerst, The Guardian: Biography of a 
Newspaper, p. 512.
46 David Hubbeck, No Ordinary Press Baron, p. 132.
47 Ibid, p. 131.
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of the Communist Party.48 There were fears, by the Cadbury's and older liberal staff 
members, that the paper was becoming socialist, especially since many of the younger 
journalists were sympathetic to labour plans.49 In contrast, much of the new staff felt the 
Cadbury family had become "Tory wolves in Liberal sheep's clothing",50 thus revealing 
a disparity between the paper's radical staff and moderate directors. However, Layton 
made a determined effort to keep the paper independent of either a socialist or 
conservative outlook. Gerald Barry replaced Vallance as editor in 1936 and one of his 
most interesting additions to the paper was the publishing of Gallup opinion polls, which 
began in 1937.
Vernon Bartlett was the News Chronicle's Diplomatic Correspondent and the 
political editor was A. J. Cummings, one of the most "influential, important, and well- 
informed radical journalists" of the 1930s.^^ He built his reputation around special 
coverage stories like the Reichstag and the Metropolitan-Vickers trials. Cummings was 
extremely pro-Soviet which thus influenced the way in which the News Chronicle 
generally reported favourably on issues concerning the Soviet Union. Unless there was a 
major news event in the Soviet Union, the paper used dispatches by Cholerton, the Daily 
Telegraph's Moscow Correspondent.
Liberal Journals
Economist
The Economist was founded in 1843 as a weekly business journal though it also 
surveyed international affairs. Sir Walter Layton was editor between 1921 and 1938, 
though he was also an executive director of the News Chronicle. Geoffrey Crowther 
succeeded Layton as editor in 1938 and inherited a journal which was financially 
successful and well respected in Europe and America. The journal's circulation doubled 
from 5,000 in 1922 to 10,000 in 1938, to which Layton partially attributed the economic
48 Ibid, p. 88.
49 Ibid, pp. 135 and 136-137.
60 Gannon, pp. 38-39.
61 Ibid, p. 40.
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crisis of the 1930s.62 Because Layton's political outlook was liberal, the Economist had 
a similar viewpoint, though unlike the News Chronicle, the journal did not necessarily 
support Liberal Party policy .63  The editorial charter of the Economist gave the editor
0  complete power, to the exclusion of the board, and in Layton's words, "It allowed the
; editor to run the paper as though it belonged to him".64 He was careful, however, to
I keep the Economist from becoming too left wing and therefore asserted a degree of
caution in many leading articles.65 Layton also wrote special supplements on the 
economies of individual countries which repeatedly included the Soviet Union.
1
I; Spectator
The Spectator was founded in 1828 as a weekly journal which reviewed current 
affairs. Though not exhibiting a strong political outlook, the journal displayed attitudes
i consistent with the liberal press in the 1930s and appealed to "enlightened" conservatives. 
This was largely due to the Spectator's editor from 1932-1943, Henry Wilson Harris,
I who strongly favoured the League of Nations and became a "genuinely" Independent
M P . 6 6  In the inter-war years, most weeklies disappeared though the Spectator's 
■ circulation increased.67
The Labour Press 
Daily Herald
The Daily Herald was founded in 1912 by several members of the Labour 
movement, had a precarious existence for many years and, in the early 1920s, was 
accused of being supported by the Bolsheviks. In 1923, the Labour Party officially 
assumed control of the paper but with little success. Thus in 1929, J. S. Elias, later Lord
62 Hubbeck, p. 88.
63 Ibid, pp. 86 and 88.
64 Ibid, p. 87.
66 Ibid, p. 91.
66 A. J. P. Taylor, English History, p. 388.
67 Camrose, p. 148. In 1926, the circulation was given as 21,500 (Thomas, Sir William Beach 
The Story of the Spectator, 1828-1928, p. 102) and in 1947 Camrose placed the circulation at nearly 
50,000.
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Southwood, the head of Odhams Press Ltd, acquired a 51 per cent interest in the Daily 
Herald while the Labour Party retained the other 49 per cent. Odhams assumed full 
editorial control though the Labour Party expected the paper to continue to support official 
Labour policy. However, Southwood was a business manager rather than a journalist or 
a politician and therefore, to attract new readers, he initiated the circulation wars whereby 
canvassers were sent out with free insurance and gifts. Though proving costly, by 1939 
the Daily Herald had reached a consistent circulation of over 2 million. Nevertheless, 
this did not meet with the universal approval of the Labour Party which complained that 
the paper was too much like other dailies and did not sufficiently back the party. The 
Daily Herald's appeal was popular, and because its official political outlook was labour, 
nearly 95 per cent of the paper’s readership was from the lower middle and working 
classes.
W. H. Stevenson and Francis Williams, editors from 1931 to 1937 and from 
1937 until 1940 respectively, were faced with the conflicting responsibilities of selling a 
popular newspaper while expressing a supposedly labour viewpoint. This was made 
even more difficult since the Labour Party was itself divided on issues like the Popular 
Front, the League of Nations, armaments, pacificism, and a policy towards Germany. 
As a result of the Soviet Government's domestic activities and those of the Comintern, 
Williams supported the Labour Party's move to prevent the British Communist Party's 
affiliation with Labour. This was one reason why the Daily Herald, a left-wing paper, 
was not unduly supportive of an alliance with the Soviet Union prior to 1939. This 
attitude frequently led the Daily Worker to denounce the Daily Herald as a traitor to the 
socialist cause.68 The paper's Moscow Correspondent was R. T. Miller who was very 
sympathetic to the Soviet Government, even during the purges.
68 For examples of the Daily Worker's criticism of the Daily Herald, see articles during the 
period of the great show trials: 25 January 1937, "The 'Herald' Defends Spies and Assassins'* by the 
Political Correspondent.
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New Statesman and Nation
The New Statesman and Nation had the largest circulation of the political 
weeklies with a readership representing the "intellectual Left". In 1933, the journal sold 
nearly 14,000 copies a week and by 1936, it had a circulation of 24,000.69 in the 
1930s, the Moscow Correspondent was Louis Fischer and the journal's editor was B. 
Kingsley Martin, who was an "intellectual socialist of Radical stock".60 Although the 
New Statesman and Nation's political outlook was distinctly Left, it did not officially 
support Labour Party policy as criticism was frequent. Although the journal's approach 
towards the Soviet Union was not always consistent, in general the New Statesman and 
Nation made greater allowances for the Soviet Union^i than any other British paper 
except the Daily Worker. The "apology for" the Soviet government's actions was 
particularly strong during the purges. Martin suggested that the shocking behaviour of 
the Soviet Government might well be nothing but capitalist propaganda and therefore, at 
no point did the New Statesman and Nation accept or reject Stalin's case against the Old 
Bolsheviks.62 Martin respected the Soviet Union's attempt to solve unemployment and 
build its industry, especially when Britain was suffering under the strains of the Great 
Depression. Though Martin did not justify the excesses of the Soviet Government, he 
sincerely believed that the failures of the economy and the repression would be eliminated 
after a short period of strain. 63
The Communist Press 
Daily Worker
The Daily Worker, the descendant of the Sunday Worker founded in 1925, 
became a daily newspaper in January 1930 as a protest against the "betrayal" of the Daily 
Herald to the capitalist Odhams group. The paper's political outlook was unmistakably
69 Edward Hyams, The New Statesman, p. 183-184.
60 Taylor, p. 389.
6^  See for example, comment by Hyams, pp. 130-132 on the fact that Martin allowed the 
journal to be too committed to the far Left
62 Hyams, pp. 146 and 197.
63 Kingsley Martin, Editor, pp. 59 and 62-63.
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communist. Though classed as a national daily, it had difficulty maintaining that 
distinction because, until the advertisers began to see the paper's potential, it usually had 
to ask for subscriptions from readers to keep it printed. Originally the Daily Worker was 
seen by the British Government as an organ of propaganda for the Communist Party, 
though the paper increasingly printed more articles of news than rallying cries as the 
1930s p r o g r e s s e d .64 Its circulation in 1937 was 150,000 on Saturdays and over 100,000 
on other days.
The Daily Worker's most prominent editor in the 1930s was William Rust who 
had been the paper's correspondent in Spain during the Civil War. His reports on that 
war were allegedly well respected since the paper "persuasively demonstrated" that non­
intervention was a s h a m .65 The paper's specialist in foreign affairs, Claud Cockburn, 
who used the pen name Frank Pitcairn, joined the Daily Worker from the Washington 
office of The Times in 1935.66 The Special Correspondent in Moscow was Reg Bishop. 
The paper's most infamous incident was its closure in January 1941 by the Home 
Secretary, Herbert Morrison, for not supporting the war effort when the Soviet Union 
was officially neutral as a result of the Non-Aggression pact with Germany. The paper 
only reappeared in September 1942, well after Hitler invaded the USSR.
R adio and  Newsreel
The British Broadcasting Company was founded in 1922 as a business enterprise 
and only in 1927 did it become the British Broadcasting Corporation. In the 1920s, it 
struggled against the powerful and established interests of the p r e s s .6 7  However, in the 
1930s, the B.B.C. began to demonstrate its popular position as a provider of news and 
entertainment, and though it was not on a par with the press, it offered a new source for 
reflection and forming o p i n io n s .6 8  As with newspapers, the B.B.C. was accused of 
biased broadcasting. The controllers defended their position by pointing out that right-
64 Camrose, p. 76.
65 William Rust, The Daily Worker, pp. 39 and 41.
66 Rust, pp. 33, 37, and 38.
67 Asa Briggs, The Birth of British Broadcasting, Vol I., pp. 3-4.
68 p. M. H. Bell, John Bull and the Bear, p. 18.
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wing opinion claimed the B.B.C. showed a left wing viewpoint while trade unions 
accused radio broadcasts of having a conservative outlook. Thus the director-general of 
the B.B.C., Sir John Reith, argued there was a balanced portrayal of events.69 In further 
reply to those accusations, Reith alleged the agenda for broadcasting was set for "the 
national good", though that tended to follow fashion which in the 1930s preferred caution 
and Conservative Party policies.70 Nevertheless, the Daily Mail and the Daily Express 
fervently campaigned against what they called the "Menace of Red Bias in Radio" which 
attempted to undermine social order, family life, morals and "national consciousness". 
For example, during the Spanish Civil War, Catholic Tory MPs supported the Daily 
M ails assault on the B.B.C. S supposed "pinkness" in its attitude to the "red murderers" 
in Spain.7i Also in the 1930s, the Government, behind the scenes, ensured that its own 
requirements and views received special attention.72
Newsreels were a potentially influential medium for providing news as they had 
the scope for reaching vast numbers of people. In 1934, there were 4,300 cinemas in 
Britain which averaged a weekly audience of 18.5 million in paid admissions. In 1940, 
this attendance reached 21 million with the urban working class was the main patron of 
the cinema.73 There were five major newsreel companies - Gaumont, Pathe, Movietone, 
Paramount, and Universal - which each distributed two newsreels a week.74 A newsreel 
was a film which was composed of items of "up-to-the-minute" news or "matters 
germane thereto". It could also include current events of "such importance" that they 
warranted a special edition on that particular topic.75 Newsreels, in their effort to report 
current affairs before Fleet Street, gave out false information on occasion. Similarly, 
newsreels sometimes embellished or manipulated their reports.76 Despite the high 
attendance at cinemas, in the 1930s newspapers maintained the advantage over newsreels
69 Seaton and Pimlott, The Media and British Politics, p. 136.
70 Ibid, p. 138 and 140.
71  «  t A f \71 Ibid, p. 140,
72 Ibid, p. 140.
73 Aldgate, p. 56.
74 Ibid, pp. 23 and x-xi.
75 Ibid, p. 26.
76 Ibid, pp. 40 and 43.
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as Fleet Street offered more varied and detailed news as well as a diverse range of
opinion.77
Style of Reporting
Only the Daily Worker, a communist paper with a minimal circulation and 
restricted influence, opposed the prevailing political culture. It was the only paper to 
follow strictly its own party, far more than any of the profit-oriented newspapers it 
d e n o u n c e d .7 8  Thus no paper claimed a monopoly on the favours of any party nor could a 
party impose strict discipline on any newspaper. Even the Daily Herald diverged from 
official Labour policy despite the fact that the Trade Unions owned nearly half of the 
paper. Similarly, although the News Chronicle retained a liberal inclination, it was also a 
sympathetic source for labour n e w s .79
Newspapers did not always reflect the opinions of the people who produced 
them. For example, the Daily Herald, under the editorship of Francis Williams, would 
have been more critical of Chamberlain if Southwood had not intervened to prevent 
editorial policy from moving in that direction. The News Chronicle was similarly 
restrained by its cautious proprietor, Layton.^o However, press barons did not always 
use their positions to control the policies of their papers. For example, though 
Beaverbrook was pro-appeasement in the Daily Express, in contrast, the Evening 
Standard urged a coalition against fascism.81 Nevertheless, the proprietors' perceptions 
of their readers set the tone for their papers. Thus the Beaverbrook press was aimed at 
"the character and temperament which was bent on moving upwards and outwards". The 
Daily Mail projected a more static, hierarchical system, in keeping with Northcliffe's 
more traditional style of conservativism and catered for "people who would like to think 
they earned £1000 a y e a r " .8 2
77 Bell, p. 18.
78 Koss, p. 532.
79 Ibid, pp. 552-553 and 556.
80 Ibid, pp. 546-547.
81 Curran and Seaton, Power without Responsibility, p. 52.
82 Ibid, p. 55.
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Editors defiantly refused to print everything they knew in the 1930s, not because 
they were ignorant, but because they misguidedly wished to play down the growing 
threat of war and the anxiety,that Britain would suffer through defeat. In an effort to 
avoid or hinder the increasing inevitability of war, editors and proprietors took 
responsibility for calming prevailing fears. Thus they acted to various degrees as 
appeasers or collaborators to the politicians who practiced appeasement. Fleet Street was 
frightened of increasing the tension in Europe by making dire predictions which might 
prove true, especially since the tone of newspapers was believed to have been one factor 
in inciting the outbreak of war in 1914. Thus the press was "a Frankenstein which 
cowered before the monster it created". Though the paper's correspondents might object 
to this overly optimistic view, editors had the last word, especially since many dispatches 
by foreign journalists were perceived to be gloomy and thus ultimately bad for circulation
and advertising.83
Stereotypes were frequently found in the foreign affairs coverage of the British 
press, such as the "neuroticism of the Russian, the phlegm of the British or the instability 
of the French". Furthermore, foreign nations were often simply portrayed as an ally or 
enemy of Britain, though a country's position as one or the other often changed from 
decade to decade and it was relatively easy for the press to change public perceptions 
when necessary.84 This was especially true of the Soviet Union. In the First World 
War, Russia was an ally but with the Bolshevik seizure p f  power in 1917, the Russians 
became an ideological enemy which the British public feared and disliked throughout the 
1920s. By the beginning of the 1930s, the threat of communist revolution in Europe had 
declined and the Soviet Union was perceived to be relatively harmless towards Britain. 
However, the exposure by the Manchester Guardian of the religious atrocity campaign, 
the trial of six British engineers in April 1933, and the great purges from 1936-1938 
served to make the British public more suspicious of the Soviet Union. In hindsight.
83 Koss, pp. 542-544.
84 Kingsley Martin, The Press the Public Wants, p. 82.
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Fleet Street was accused of not treating the Soviet Union as a subject for "serious or 
objective" reporting.
One compares the readiness with which the press accepted every atrocity story 
from Russia with the genuine reluctance displayed by almost all the British press 
to believe or to report the terrible facts about Hitler's concentration camps and 
anti-Semitic atrocities.
Finally, when Germany invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941, the character of the 
Soviet Government and its people transformed from "fiends to heroes" of the Allied cause 
and no praise was too rapturous.85
Normally the press at home was urged to uphold "the quarrel" in order to 
demonstrate to the world and its own public that the Government's cause was just. Thus 
the role of the press in an international crisis could not be exaggerated.86 For example, 
the British press campaign against the Soviet Union during the Metro-Vickers trial saw 
the reappearance of idiosyncratic phrases and concepts not heard since the First World 
War.87 Furthermore, seemingly harmless stories concerning the Soviet Union could 
assume the most derisive tone. In October 1934, The Times cynically described the 
increasing threat of foreign capitalism in a leading article entitled, "Soviet Shaving". The 
paper alleged that "razors were blunt" because the "paternal" government was protecting 
its people from getting capitalism into their pores. Thus the paper sarcastically suggested 
that the Russian people were not allowed the bourgeois notions of cleanliness and 
comfort.88 The Manchester Guardian in November 1935 found it amusing that golf was 
being introduced into the Soviet Union. The paper's correspondent reported that 
Russians thought it absurd that such a small ball, hit with so much effort, only went a 
short distance though they were very impressed when an American hit the ball two 
hundred yards. Thus the Manchester Guardian wondered if the Five Year Plan could
85 Ibid, p. 92.
86 A. J. Cummings, The Press, p. 48.
87 Martin, The Educational Role of the Press, pp. 30-31.
88 The Times, 19 October 1934. Leading article, "Soviet Shaving".
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stand up against capitalist America's imports.89 The British press was also concerned 
that the Soviet Government's attempts to show Shakespeare's plays with "Soviet realism" 
distorted them until they were unrecognisable. The Manchester Guardian alleged that it 
made for strange productions when Shakespeare was adapted to Marxist beliefs so that 
anti-capitalist morals could be extracted.90
The press exploited public ignorance and sometimes wilfully failed to provide a 
partially accurate sketch of international affairs. This could be due to the commercial 
interests of the paper or because the editor believed the reader did not have the time, 
education, or inclination to read instructive articles about foreign affairs.9^ For example, 
Dawson, the editor of The Times, believed "the public required soothing" and thus 
advocated serious and steady reporting.92 Editors and proprietors wanted to aid recovery 
following the Great Depression by creating a good "psychological atmosphere" and thus 
emphasised articles portraying contentment at home and security abroad. The Times, 
often singled out for describing an optimistic picture of the international situation, was in 
reality no worse than its rivals and more honest and consistent in its approach.93 
However, the assumption that all new ideas inevitably provoked fear was an alarming 
comment on the mood of the 1930s94  which A. J. P. Taylor characterized as a 
"discordant decade".95
The method of presenting news was usually based on the two extremes of popular 
and sober stories. A survey undertaken by Lord Northcliffe in the early 1920s 
established the "news value" or "reader interest" of the British public. A formula for the 
selling value of news items was created: the British public liked to read about war, sex, 
crime, sport, and domestic health and happiness.96 It was this survey on which most of
89 The Manchester Guardian, 12 November 1935. Leading article, "Soviet G o lf.
99 The Manchester Guardian, 23 November 1935. Leading article, "Shakespeare and the 
Soviet". The Scotsman pointed out that Shakespeare was used to illustrate the wickedness of the 
bourgeois through the decadence of court life. 3 January 1934, leading article, "Shakespeare and the 
Bolshevik". See also, the Spectotor, 10 September 1937. "Soviet Drama" by Basil Wright.
91 Martin, The Press the Public Wants, p. 93.
92 Gannon, p. 69.
93 Koss, p. 544.
^4 Asa Briggs, The Golden Age o f Broadcasting, Vol II, p. 43.
95 Taylor, English History, p. 317.
96 Martin, What the Public Wants, pp. 57-62.
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the popular press based their articles, demonstrating that these papers did not believe the
education of the reader was of primary importance. Thus when disaster threatened, the
public allegedly discovered that none of the things it really needed to know had been
e x p l a i n e d . 9 7  Popular news worked on the premise that something was happening
somewhere, and whenever possible that information should appear startling or unusual.
"Make the news exciting even if it was dull. Make the news palatable by lavish
presentations. Make the unreadable r e a d a b l e ."98 However, that did not mean all news in
the popular press was unusual or "sensational", but such features were pulled into the
forefront of the story and efforts were made to discover such details. Similarly, even
important events, if they occurred regularly, had no popular v a lu e 9 9  unless they were
given an extra dimension by some startling fact, often of an emotional e l e m e n t .  190 The
Daily Express had a habit of emphasising that Stalin was seriously ill. For example, in I
September 1934, the paper's Warsaw Correspondent reported that the Soviet leader
required five injections to reduce his blood pressure and thus the Seventeenth Comintern
Congress was p o s t p o n e d . i9i Occasionally, the popular press devoted its main news
story to international politics. The quality press primarily reported sober news,/|vhich
\was concerned with domestic and international affairs, though some of thÔse-neWspapers 
periodically printed whimsical stories on its main news p a g e .  192
The press was found by the Political and Economic Planning Report, carried out 
in 1938, to be the principle agenda-making body in the everyday conversation of ordinary 
people concerning public affairs. The press could turn obscure topics into items of great 
importance through publicity. Because papers could easily whip up popular emotion.
97 Martin, The Educational Role of the Press, pp. 32-33.
98 Arthur Christiansen, Headlines All My Life, p. 144.
99 Economic and Planning Report on the British Press, for 1938, pp. 95-96.
199 See for example, the Daily Express, 3 and 10 March 1938 and the Daily Mail, 3 March 
1938 which detailed the sexual theme of the evidence against Bukharin in the third Moscow show trial. 
Also see, the Daily Express, 26 August 1936, which described how Zinoviev wept and fainted before his 
execution, though the paper's nearest correspondent was in Warsaw.
191 The Daily Express, 27 September 1934. "Stalin's Illness Worse; Doctors in Constant 
Attendance" by the Special Correspondent in Warsaw. See also, 12 June 1937, "Stalin Goaded by Heart- 
Attacks" by the Vienna Staff Reporter. Lenin's widow, Krupskaya, also reportedly suffered from heart 
trouble; 3 September 1936, "Stalin Shoots Lenin's Brother-In-Law" by the Warsaw Correspondent.
192 Political and Economic Planning Report on the British Press, for 1938, p. %.
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public opinion was easily coloured by the manner in which Fleet Street presented news, 
with an extra degree of danger if the press ignored topics in which it felt the reader was 
not interested. 193 Thus, due to newspaper coverage, by 1936, the influence of public 
opinion over foreign affairs had enormously increased. The government recognised that 
it required popular support behind them to fight wars and even to conduct daily affairs 
because the press raised expectations of success. 194 For example, Anthony Eden the 
Foreign Secretary admitted in 1937 that Britain could not fight on behalf of 
Czechoslovakia or Austria because it went
far beyond where the people of this country were prepared to go. There could be 
no greater danger than for the Government to declare themselves in favour of a 
policy which did not command the general support of public opinion at hom e. 195
Governmental influence on the British press
The Government exerted an ever larger degree of control over Fleet Street as the 
1930s progressed. Initially, the Foreign Office created the News Department, to meet 
with privileged, and ultimately loyal, journalists, to give them political information. The 
head of the department between 1935 and 1939, Rex Deeper, made the journalist a 
"willing extension" of Foreign Office policy by using flattery, openness, and coercion.
The view given by the News Department often differed from Downing Street's press 
office, directed at the time by George Steward who was very loyal to Chamberlain. Thus V 
the British press appeared to be receiving two sides to British policy which 1 I  
correspondents appreciated as it made their reports appear individual and independent of ‘ / 
Government policy. However, other correspondents believed information by the News 
Department and Downing Street encouraged narrow views and turned the newspaper into
193 Ibid, pp. 18-19.
194 The Listener, several broadcasts on public opinion and foreign affairs by Lord Elton in June 
and July 1936.
195 BeU, p. 5.
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the mouthpiece of the Foreign Office or the Prime Minister, thus destroying the 
independence of the British press. 196
However, when Deeper became an opponent of appeasement, Chamberlain 
believed the Foreign Office News Department was his main opponent in Whitehall and 
therefore took action to silence this o p p o s i t i o n .  197 Thus in 1938, the Downing Street 
press office became, in practical terms, the only source of official information for the 
British press. Unlike the News Department which made contact with diplomatic 
journalists. Downing Street preferred to court editors and proprietors to ensure that Fleet 
Street was sympathetic to Chamberlain and his policies. This approach stifled any 
independent views by foreign correspondents until March 1939.198
Chamberlain's aim was to exploit the press and to defend Government thinking 
by manipulating Fleet Street into supporting his policy of appeasing the dictators. Any 
newspaper which did not report favourably of Chamberlain's policies was not privy to 
the Prime Minister's plans and thus lacked the important news coverage which its rivals 
printed. Chamberlain, in hindsight, was notorious for exaggerating the truth as he made 
misleading and inaccurate statements to give the impression that his policies were credible 
and s u c c e s s f u l .  199 In addition, Chamberlain used his Cabinet colleague's personal 
relations with editors and proprietors to influence editorial policy. For example, because 
Dawson knew all the Prime Ministers of the 1930s and was thus privy to many Cabinet 
secrets, it was unsurprising that The Times was assumed abroad to be the semi-official 
mouthpiece of the British Government's thinking. Chamb^j*lain was a close friend of  ^
Lord Kemsley, owner of the Sunday Times, while &e Asto^:(, proprietor^of the / \  
Observer, were keen admirers of the Prime Minister's approach to foreign affairs. In 
contrast. Lord Camrose of the Daily Telegraph had little contact with members of the
196 Richard Cockett, "The Foreign Office News Department and the Struggle Against 
Appeasement", pp.74 and 76-77. Robert Dell, the Geneva Correspondent for Manchester Guardian, 
especially objected to the style of the Foreign Office News Department
197 Cockett, "The Foreign Office News Department and the Struggle against Appeasement", 
p.75 and 73.
198 Cockett, "The Foreign Office News Department and the Struggle against Appeasement", 
p.84 and James Margach, The Abuse of Power: The War between Downing Street and the Media from  
Lloyd George to Callaghan, p. 53.
199 Margach, p. 50.
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Government and therefore, the paper was less editorially^^servative than The Times. 
The Yorkshire Post was unique in the late 1930s because it was the only conservative 
newspaper openly opposed to the policy of appeasement. Mann's ability to write in 
opposition to the Government's plans was due to his incomparable position amongst 
editors. He declined all honours and refused to be on very close terms with any 
politicians in or out of government as both threatened his independent outlook.iii
Thus by the summer of 1938, the majority of British newspapers were controlled 
by a small group associated with the Government, who were distancing themselves 
further from the majority view of their own staff and more importantly from public 
opinion. Mann's primary complaint, and one which Garvin and Astor, staunch 
supporters of Chamberlain, increasingly shared, was that the government was forcing the 
press to write views out of touch with the people of Britain. Garvin wrote in August 
1938 that "the daily press no longer gives any true idea of the feeling of this country. 
There is at last - wide anxiety - a slow, eating anxiety, though silent and feeling helpless." 
Astor acknowledged in May 1938 that "although the newspapers might have been 
silenced now... there was widespread uneasiness and this was likely to show itself 
s o o n . "112 Vansittart, a former Permanent Under-Secretary between 1931 and 1937, 
warned in the summer of 1938 that the press was "by its optimism misleading the public. 
The people would have a rough shock soon."H3
One such area where the public was not given entirely accurate information 
concerned the Soviet Union. For example, the press had been willing to ignore the 
Soviet Union's calls for collective action against Germany in 1938 because the British 
Government had confidently given the impression that all was under control in Europe 
and that Germany was only being given what it rightfully deserved. However, as the 
euphoria of Munich disappeared in the face of further German aggression. Fleet Street 
increasingly suggested the Soviet Union would have to be approached by the British
^ 9^ Cockett, Twilight o f Truth, pp. 12-13 and Margach, p. 53.
Cockett, Twilight of Truth, pp. 62-64. Andrews and Taylor, p. 126.
^ 2^ Cockett, Twilight of Truth, pp. 64-65 and 83.
^^ 3 Anthony Adamthwaite, "The British Government and the Media", p. 286.
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Government, a plan for which Chamberlain remained unenthusiastic. Thus press support 
for the British-French-Soviet negotiations in 1939 went beyond what the British 
Government demanded. Even during the negotiations in 1939, Chamberlain still 
harboured a degree of distrust for the Communists who controlled the Soviet Union. 
However, instead of reflecting Chamberlain’s concerns, the British press criticised his 
failure to secure an agreement regardless of ideological differences.
With the outbreak of the Second World War, the British Government established 
the Ministry of Information (Mol) which was meant to provide Fleet Street with 
information concerning the war. However, the organisation experienced problems in 
performing this task because Departmental Ministries refused to give the Mol any news. 
This encouraged the press to by-pass the Mol and to deal directly with ministers and civil 
servants as before the war. Thus it became the view within the press that "it is hard to 
discuss seriously something which the world has decided to regard as a rather poor 
joke".ii4 In 1941, the Mol was slow to acknowledge the position of the Soviet Union as 
Britain's ally despite Churchill's broadcast on 22 June offering immediate and 
unconditional support for the Soviet Government against Germany. An illustration of the 
British Government's nervousness of the USSR and Communism was demonstrated in 
the decision not to allow the B.B.C. to play the "Internationale", the Soviet Union's 
national anthem. 1^ 6 However, the Government and Mol adopted this attitude from fear 
that Communism would increase in Britain. Thus the Mol's policy was to praise the 
"Russian" ally with as little reference toCommunism as possible, thereby preventing the 
British Communist Party from gaining any benefits from the Soviet Union's victories. ^ 6^ 
Although the British press recognised that Britain's success against Germany was 
dependant on the Soviet Union not succumbing to defeat too rapidly, most papers did not 
want to see communism spread and therefore accepted the cautious approach by the
114 w .N . Ewer, "The Ministry of Information", pp. 94-97. Ian McLaine, The Ministry of 
Mora/e, pp. 24,28, and 35. See the News Chronicle, 3 July 1941. Leading article, " Battle of Mol"; 21 
July 1941, leading article, "Too Many Bites".
116 McLaine, pp. 196-197.
116 Ibid, p. 201.
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Government and the Mol. Thus early victories in the Soviet Union were reported in 
terms of glorious "Russian" heroism.
Prior to the outbreak of the Second World War, the degree to which individual 
newspapers and journals advocated closer relations varied depending not only on political 
persuasions, but also on international affairs, the Soviet Union's domestic repression and 
the foreign objectives of the British Government. The British press responded to these 
influences and accordingly presented a variety of opinions on the Soviet Union which 
provided a new dimension as to why Britain and the USSR failed to cooperate closely 
before June 1941.
31
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The Metropolitan-Vickers Trial
On 12 and 13 March 1933, six British engineers employed by Metropolitan-
Vickers, a British company with offices in Moscow, were arrested by th^ Ogpu. They,/and twenty Russian employees, were charged with economic espionage, bribery, and 
sabotage. After varying days of interrogation, five of the six British men were released 
on bail, a privilege never granted to Russian citizens. Despite protest from the British 
Government, the trial was held between 12 and 19 April. Ultimately, two Britons 
confessed, W. L, MacDonald, who had not been released on bail, and Leslie Thornton, 
who, however, withdrew his confession on the first day in court. The trial was held with 
very little substantial evidence apart from confessions, and those were mainly from 
Russians. The result was that MacDonald and Thornton were found guilty of organised 
wrecking, of collecting secret information and of bribery, and as a result of their 
confessions received two and three years imprisonment respectively. Three other 
engineers, Allan Monkhouse, Charles de Nordwall, and John Cushny were found guilty 
on variations of the above charges and received immediate expulsion from the USSR. 
The sixth defendant, J. D. Gregory, was declared innocent though he too returned to 
Britain.
The Metro-Vickers trial was not an isolated event straining the diplomatic and 
economic dealings between Britain and the Soviet Union though it was one of the most 
serious incidents to affect relations in the interwar period. From the time Britain officially 
recognised the Soviet Government in 1924, relations had been greatly strained as a result 
of the Zinoviev letter in October 1924; severed by the Conservative Government 
following the Arcos Raid in May 1927; and resumed by the Labour Government with a 
trade agreement in 1930.^ However, it was allegedly the termination of the 1930
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commercial agreement, in October 1932, by the Conservative dominated National 
Government which increased the tension between Britain and the Soviet Union. The 
British Charge d'Affairs in Moscow, William Strang, stated that signs of a case being 
formed against the Metro-Vickers company were evident almost immediately^ as various 
Russian employees of the company were arrested and questioned, while Stalin also called 
for greater vigilance against wrecking inspired by foreigners.3
However, the potential implications, which the detaining of British citizens could 
have, appeared to have been lost on the Soviet Government. There was even some 
discussion that the Soviet Foreign Commissar, Maxim Litvinov, had not been informed 
of the arrests until after the event. Thus he and the Soviet Ambassador in London, Ivan 
Maisky, were unable to explain the nature of the charges or evidence in the days 
immediately following the arrests.4 The detainment and trial of the six British engineers 
of the Metro-Vickers company had a profound effect on the general impression which 
Fleet Street presented to the British public about the Soviet Union. Initial British press 
reaction was unanimous in its expressions of criticism^ and a great amount of coverage 
was committed to the representation of the trial which no paper, apart from the Daily 
Worker, suggested was fair. There was, however, far less unanimity amongst the press 
in its response towards the British Government's conduct in trying to discover the facts 
of the case and its efforts to free the six British engineers. Furthermore, Fleet Street was
2 See Documents on British Foreign Policy, (hereafter D.B.F.P.), Second Series, Vol. VII, no.
253.
3 William Strang, Home and Abroad, pp. 80 and 116-118. See D.B.F.P., Second Series, VII, 
chapters IV and V. See also Donald N. Lammers, "The Engineers’ Trial (Moscow, 1933) and Anglo- 
Soviet Relations", pp. 258-259 and G. L. Owen, "The Metro-Vickers Crisis: Anglo-Soviet Relations 
between Trade Agreements, 1932-1934", pp. 97-98. The Times, 16 March 1933. Leading article, 
"Soviet Scapegoats".
4 See early telegrams in D.B.F.P., Second Series, VII, Chapter IV, such as no. 209; Owen, 
p.99; Lammers, p. 259.
5 See all newspapers starting 13 March 1933, with the exception o t the Daily Worker,
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divided in its opinion as to the effects which a retaliatory embargo on Soviet goods would 
have on the fate of the prisoners, the British economy, and the general relations between 
the two countries. Conservative newspapers called for a cessation of trade while the 
liberal and labour press increased demands for stronger economic ties to prevent similar 
misunderstandings in the future.
Reaction and retribution
The British Government, immediately deciding that the charges were groundless, 
assumed a tough attitude and referred to "unfortunate consequences to Anglo-Soviet 
relations".^ Though the Cabinet refrained from threatening a diplomatic breach, the 
British Ambassador in Moscow, Sir Esmond Ovey, repeatedly suggested that strong 
action by the British Government would secure the release of the British engineers.^ 
Thus the British Government suspended existing commercial negotiations which were 
being conducted to replace the 1930 economic agreement. Furthermore, when it became 
evident that the trial was going to take place, the British Government introduced a bill 
which would entail the imposition of an embargo on goods from the Soviet Union 
pending the outcome of the trial. Litvinov reacted to Ovey's immoderate interviews and 
subsequent economic threats with surprise and suggested "too much noise" was being 
made by Britain.® The Foreign Commissar was also within his rights when he warned 
the Ambassador against making threats before the evidence against the accused was heard 
and criticised British interference in Soviet domestic affairs.9 Litvinov also refused to 
listen to Ovey when the former was informed of the bill permitting the e m b a r g o .^9 This 
type of response by the Foreign Commissar led The Times, the Yorkshire Post, and the
6 Curtis Keeble, Britain and the Soviet Union, p. 114. The conservative press supported the 
Government's strong line. See for example, the Daily Express, 16 March 1933. "Mr. Baldwin Warns 
Soviets". The Evening Standard, 15 March 1933. "Mr. Baldwin Warns Moscow; 'Grave View of 
Arrests'; No Justification of Charges".
7 D.B.F.P., Second Series, Vol. VII, nos. 207, 222, 253. Strang, p.84.
8 D.B.F.P., Second Series, Vol. VII, no. 239. An American Correspondent, Eugene Lyons, 
recalled that Ovey "lambasted" Litvinov with the most "undiplomatic vigour" and distasteful "flaming 
indignation". Lyons, Assignment in Utopia, p. 563.
9 D.B.F.P., Second Series, Vol. VII, no. 243.
19 D.B.F.P., Second Series, Vol. VII, nos. 297, 298.
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Daily Telegraph all to suggest it was "incredible" that Litvinov, firstly, called the arrests 
a "trifling episode" and, secondly, refused to believe the British Government would sever 
relations following Ogpu activities if the prisoners were not released.! i Although the 
News Chronicle agreed with the Conservative newspapers that the Soviet Government  ^
did not understand British concern for the safety of its nationals, the liberal paper warned 
that such anxiety should not be allowed to impede the understanding between two great 
states who needed friendship. However, because the News Chronicle accepted 
Litvinov's argument that Britain was "dictating" to the Soviet Government and interfering 
in Soviet domestic issues, the paper demanded of both countries "cool reasoning" and a 
degree of mutual understanding. 12
Early articles in the conservative press were very outspoken in their discussion of 
the impropriety of arresting British citizens and claimed there was a national feeling of 
indignation and of anxiety in Britain for the fate of the e n g i n e e r s .  13 The Daily Express 
suggested the arrests were a direct insult to the British nation and declared that
the Russian Government is treating British subjects as no Government before ever 
dared to... The Russian Government is contemptuous and insolent in disregarding 
all decencies of international relations. This country expects and demands the 
[British] Government to make a protest which the Soviet leaders can 
understand. 14
In contrast, the labour and liberal press were concerned about the effects of 
"misplaced Ogpu actions" on the opinion of a Conservative dominated British 
Government and thus urged that the situation should be cleared up quickly. 15 Though 
recognising that the British engineers could be guilty, these papers protested no less
11 The Times, 23 March 1933. Leading article, "A Warning to Russia". The Yorkshire Post. 
8 April 1933. Leading article, "Soviet Justice". The Daily Telegraph, 11 April 1933. Leading article, 
"The Soviet and Their Prisoners".
12 The News Chronicle, 31 March 1933. Leading article, "Wanted - A Gesture".
13 The Daily Telegraph, 15 March 1833. Leading article, "Moscow's British Prisoners". The 
Times, 16 March 1933. Leading article, "Soviet Scapegoats".
14 The Daily Express, 16 March 1933. Leading article, "Russia's Insults".
16 The Daily Herald, 21 March 1933. Leading article, "Moscow Arrests".
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vigorously than the conservative press against Ogpu methods and the lack of immediate 
evidence or an explanation by the Soviet Government. However, the M anchester 
Guardian refused to assume, as the conservative newspapers did, that the Soviet 
Government was less anxious than Britain's to see justice achieved. Moreover, in the 
paper's opinion, it was possible and necessary to maintain good relations despite the 
arrest of British citizens. 16 In noticeable contrast to the above view by the Daily Express, 
the News Chronicle sarcastically suggested that if similar charges were made against 
British citizens in a "more civilised country such as Germany or France", then the 
Conservative dominated British Government would not protest to such an extent. The 
paper recognised that there was "inveterate suspicion and hostility" amongst a great 
section of British opinion towards the "whole Russian experience", and because the 
Soviet Government maintained an air of secrecy with their proceedings, suspicion 
increased in Britain. Nevertheless, the News Chronicle warned against the British 
Government hurrying into "extravagant" statements. 17 Th& Daily Worker was likewise 
highly indignant of the attitude towards the Soviet Government: "We recall that the 
British Government did not find the arrest of British subjects in other countries of such 
'grave concern' as to utter threats against the Government without hearing the evidence 
for the arrests."i8
Thus with the exception of the Daily W o r k e r , the majority of Fleet Street 
agreed the cessation of commercial negotiations was necessary until further details of the 
arrests were available or, in the opinion of the Sunday Times, the "Soviets see fit to take 
a reasonable attitude".20 However, divisions of opinion amongst the press arose with the 
British Government's efforts to raise emergency powers which entailed the imposition of 
an embargo. Conservative newspapers supported these efforts, expecting the Soviet
16 The Manchester Guardian, 16 March 1933. Leading article, "The Russian Arrests".
The News Chronicle, 16 March 1933. Leading article, "Common Sense and Russia". See 
also, the New Statesman and Nation, 25 March 1933.
18 The Daily Worker, 16 March 1933. "Baldwin Threatens Soviet Union" by the 
Parliamentary Correspondent
19 The Daily Worker, 20 March 1933. Leading article, "Against the Interventionists".
29 The Sunday Times, 19 March 1933. "Trade Talks with Soviet Suspended". See British 
newspaper articles from 19-21 March 1933.
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Government to capitulate to such an economic threat and to abandon the idea of staging a 
trial. The labour press, however, found the intended embargo to be as damaging to 
British industry as it was to Soviet commerce. Furthermore, labour and liberal 
newspapers and journals rationalised that the Soviet Government had a right, under 
international law, to try anyone suspected of sabotage or espionage. While the 
conservative newspapers claimed the embargo would assist in the early release of the 
British engineers, the labour and liberal press voiced very convincing doubts that an early 
release would be effected through a ban on Russian goods. Instead, these papers believed 
the trial merely provided an excuse for "die-hard Tory" opposition to advocate the 
suspension of further co-operation with the Soviet Union.
The Times and the Daily Telegraph reported that British public opinion endorsed 
the suspension of negotiations and that further attempts at talks while Soviet faith was 
"suspect" would be "a waste of time".2i The Daily Telegraph warned that "those in 
authority in Russia are well advised to count the cost of trumped-up charges against 
British subjects".22 The paper further suggested that if the Soviet Union had common 
sense, it would not devise problems when the country found British markets and capital 
so necessary.23 Thus it appeared to the Sunday Times that the Soviet Foreign Office 
was "burning their bridges".24
The News Chronicle, like the Conservative press, recognised that British public 
opinion was outraged and reasoned that the Soviet Government had only itself to blame 
for the uproar in Britain. "If they arrest Britons with strange charges, the British public 
is bound to leap to conclusions which may not be justified when the acts are known." 
However, this also proved that the paper differed in opinion from the Conservative press
The Times, 23 March 1933. Leading article, "A Warning to Russia". The Daily Telegraph, 
20 March 1933. Leading article, "The Moscow Prisoners". See also the Daily Express, 16 March 1933. 
"Mr. Baldwin Warns Soviets". The Evening Standard, 15 March 1933. "Mr. Baldwin Warns Moscow; 
'Grave View of Arrests'; No Justification of Charges".
22 The Daily Telegraph, 16 March 1933. Leading article, "A Reckless Abuse of Power".
The Daily Telegraph, 20 March 1933. Leading article, "The Moscow Prisoners". See also 
The Times, 23 March 1933. Leading article, "A Warning to Russia".
24 The Sunday Times, 19 March 1933. "The Soviet's Prisoners" by the Moscow  
CorrespondenL
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and warned the British Government against making "similar blunders" before the 
evidence was seen. The liberal press maintained that the Soviet Government would wish 
to see a fair trial but the British Government, with its "hectoring" attitude, was placing 
Moscow in a very difficult position.25 In addition, the News Chronicle saw nothing in 
the arrests to justify the "hazards" of suspending commercial negotiations which, though 
harming the Soviet Union a little, would inevitably hurt the British economy in addition 
to provoking ill-will between the two countries and threatening stability in Europe. "The 
British Government has a duty to watch the Moscow events. Its duty also is not to be 
swept by prejudice into hasty action which we may have heavy cause to repent. "^ 6
The labour press, though holding a similar outlook on the arrests to the liberal 
press, was more severe in its denunciation of the Conservative leadership and 
newspapers. In a leading article, the Daily Herald warned that the "Tory wild men" 
shouting for a break in diplomatic relations had not paused to consider the interests of the 
accused men or the rest of Britain. Instead, the paper alleged that the situation provided 
"an opportunity to satisfy their own insensate hatreds". The Daily Herald agreed with 
conservative and liberal papers that the British Government had a duty to see that British 
citizens received a fair trial, but the "mad [economic] measures for which the die-hard 
press clamours" would not be an advantage for the engineers and would only achieve 
incalculable damage to British trade and the general cause of p e a c e . ^ 7  Following Ovey's 
critical representations to Litvinov, the New Statesman and Nation accused the British 
Government of "behaving in a manner it would not think of adopting with another 
country which had made similar arrests". The journal believed the incident would have 
"harmlessly blown over", but due to British threats, the tone of official protest, and the 
abuse in the conservative press over the arrests, the New Statesman and Nation felt the
The News Chronicle, 21 March 1933. Leading article, "The Soviets’ Prisoners". The 
Manchester Guardian, 18 March 1933. Leading article, "Arrests in Russia".
The Wews Chronicle, 21 March 1933. Leading article, "The Soviets’ Prisoners".
The Daily Herald, 21 March 1933. Leading article, "Moscow Arrests".
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situation had developed into a "serious international imbroglio" since the Soviet Union, 
like any other country, would not wish to appear to be yielding to intimidation.^
Although the Daily Telegraph alleged in March that the Cabinet deliberately 
refrained from acts which would cause a complete rupture with the Soviet Union,29 in 
April the British Government adopted an uncompromising economic approach as it 
became more obvious the Soviet Government would not be coerced from trying the 
British engineers. The bill permitting an embargo on Soviet trade was thus hurried 
through parliament on 3 April enabling Britain to prohibit all imports of Russian goods at 
a week's notice. In the opinion of the Daily Express, by applying the "rod of economic 
sanctions" to the Soviet Union, Britain's leaders were taking "wise, justified, and 
effective" action in exacting "respect for British nationals from a Government of 
savages".30 The Daily Mail similarly welcomed the Emergency Bill for an embargo: "the 
Government - not before it was time - has determined to take vigorous action for the 
release of the six Britons". The paper believed Britain had shown far too much patience 
in dealing with the "bad faith and deplorable record" of the Soviet Union.31
The British Government declared it was primarily concerned with the fate of the 
British engineers and was therefore reticent about other motives for the e m b a r g o .3 2  
However, the Conservative press openly alleged that the Embargo Bill also provided the 
opportunity for redressing the one-sidedness of the 1930 trade agreement with the Soviet 
Union which was accused of exporting far more than it imported. Conservative 
newspapers supported the speech to the House of Commons by Sir John Simon, the 
Foreign Minister, which called for the control of Russian imports since, in the opinion of 
these newspapers, it. appeared to be the only method of proving to the Soviet Government
28 The New Statesman and Nation, 25 March 1933. "Comments'*. See also, the N ew s 
Chronicle, 21 March 1933. Leading article, "The Soviets' Prisoners".
29 The Daily Telegraph, 24 March 1933. "No Prohibition of Imports" by the Political 
Correspondent
The Daily Express, 4 April 1933. Leading article, "Well Done, the Government".
The Daily Mail, 4 April 1933. Leading article, "Vigorous Action".
32 D.B.F.P., Second Series, Vol. VII, no. 311.
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that Britain meant business in rectifying commercial i s s u e s .3 3  A new agreement was 
required to regulate Russian imports and until such a settlement was reached, The Times 
assumed the uncompromising view that there was little reason to conduct trade with the 
Soviet U n io n .3 4  Thus the embargo, as explained and rationalised by the Conservative 
press, was not intended purely as a means of securing the release of the British 
engineers. Strang, in contrast, stated that his, and the Foreign Office's, only concern at 
the time was the release of the six British men. He pointed out that the immediate 
cessation of the embargo upon the release, in July, of the two imprisoned Britons proved 
that it was intended for no other purpose than to help the detained m e n .3 5
However, the labour and liberal press were correct to ask if the purpose of the bill 
would help the British engineers awaiting trial. The Daily Herald argued that "economic 
sabre-rattling" was "very dangerous folly" as it had no means of helping the prisoners 1
and merely ensured that greater evils would f o l l o w .3 6  The New Statesman and Nation 
claimed that the debate on the embargo showed the House of Commons at its worst, j
where an "orgy of prejudice and passion" had been released. The journal claimed the |
British Government "has behaved with an insolence towards the Russians which it would Ï
not dare to do to other nations". The New Statesman and Nation did not accept the I
iForeign Secretary's statement that the bill was intended only to help the prisoners and not i
proposed to cause a breach with the Soviet Union. In the journal's opinion, there were i
too many "infatuated anti-Bolsheviks" venting their spite without regard to lost trade or ji
the safety of the engineers. The journal thus found it ironic that there was a suggestion
from Ithat "Russians suffer form  morbid hysteria... when any visitor to the House of |
Commons might have made the same complaint of Britain". Therefore, the N ew  |
33 The Times,- 6 April 1933. Leading article, "The Moscow Prisoners". See also, the Daily 
Telegraph, 6 April 1933; The Yorkshire Post, 4 April 1933; The Daily Mail, 4 April 1933.
34 The Times, 4 Aprü 1933. Leading article, "Trade with Russia".
35 Strang, p. 113.
35 The Daily Herald, 4 April 1933. Leading article, "Bad to Worse"; 5 AprU 1933, leading 
article, "Towards Paralysis".
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Statesman and Nation pleaded for the "mischief to be stopped before it was too late.37 
The. Daily Herald described events as a "tragedy of folly and clumsy diplomacy" by both 
Moscow and London. The paper conceded that the way in which the Soviet Government 
had handled the affair was only calculated to arouse suspicion and resentment in Britain, 
though the British Government was achieving similar damage with its public warnings of 
"unfortunate consequences". The Daily Herald alleged that "prestige" had unfortunately 
been called into effect so that the threat of an embargo only made it more difficult for 
Moscow to be "reasonable or conciliatory".^^
The Manchester Guardian similarly indicated that the British Government was 
mistaken if it thought its "bullying" action would prevent the trial. The paper argued that 
the Government could insist on the rights of the engineers but believed fewer threats 
would be more helpful since the fate of the Britons could be jeopardised by such efforts 
of coercion.39 The Manchester Guardian accused the British Government of pretending 
to act nobly, when in reality it appeared to have abandoned the interests of those facing 
trial. The embargo would not help the British men because the Soviet Government 
perceived it to be an attempt at intimidation which only increased Soviet suspicion of 
capitalist diplomacy. In the paper's view, the purpose of the trial had become political 
with the British Government's attempt to redress trade differences through economic 
warfare rather than negotiation.40 Thus the Manchester Guardian implied that Simon 
was speaking hypocritically when he claimed he wished for trade between Britain and the 
Soviet Union to continue.41 The News Chronicle accepted that the British Government 
was being pressed by public opinion^^ but the paper accused the Foreign Office of taking 
actions designed to ensure the Soviet Government refused to change the Ogpu's blunder
37 TheTVew Statesman and Nation, 8 April 1933. Leading article, "The Russian Embargo". I
The Manchester Guardian also called for an end to the hysteria in Britain: 3 April 1933, leading article, i
"Bad Advice". i
38 The Daily Herald, 4 April 1933. Leading article, "Bad to Worse". !
39 The Manchester Guardian, 3 April 1933. Leading article, "Bad Advice".
40 The Manchester Guardian, 4 April 1933. Leading article, "Diplomacy by Threats".
41 The Manchester Guardian, 6 April 1933. Leading article, "The Russian Debate". î
42 The News Chronicle, 4 April 1933. Leading article, "The Government and the Soviets".
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since Britain's demands were such that no government could y ie ld .4 3  The Economist 
suggested the British Government should use tact when dealing with Moscow but feared 
that "inflammatory nationalist feeling" was ready to explode. The journal believed the 
Cabinet went far to rival the original lack of wisdom by the Soviet authorities and that the 
bill was thus a further "unfortunate s t e p " .4 4  The Spectator warned that the British 
Government could not afford to alienate the Soviet Union as it was "too large and 
influential" in the Far East and Europe. As the journal pointed out, nothing could be 
easier than to break-off relations, though that was a "short-sighted and irresponsible" 
move by statesmen who hailed this as an opportunity for a break similar to the Arcos 
incident. The Spectator reasoned that the Soviet Union must realise that the trial 
antagonised Britain and therefore would only hold it if there was sufficient e v id e n c e .4 5
The trial
Discussion concerning the type of trial and the possibility of justice being issued 
occupied a considerable amount of news coverage by Fleet Street in April 1933. Though 
the liberal and quality conservative press admitted that the Soviet Union had the right to 
investigate and punish British citizens if they so deserved, these papers argued that the 
British Government would need to be satisfied that justice along British standards was 
being upheld.45 The popular conservative press, however, was not so accommodating. 
The Daily Mail argued that because Soviet courts were "tribunals for working deliberate 
wrongs and for providing the Soviets with victims and scapegoats", the safety of the 
British men rested on pressure by their own govemment.47
The methods employed by the Ogpu were frequently discussed by Fleet Street. 
The Daily Telegraph alleged that it was with "typical Soviet cruelty" that MacDonald's
43 The Ngwf Chronicle, 6 April 1933. Leading article, "A Desperate Remedy". The Spectator, 
7 April 1933. News of the Week.
44 The Economist, 8 April 1933. Leading article, "Britain and Russia".
45 The Spectator, 7 April 1933. Leading article, "The Trial at Moscow".
45 The Sunday Times, 2 April 1933. "Russian Law that Is Not Justice; Courts Subservient to 
Policy; Part of Machine of Government; Can Englishmen Get Fair Trial?" by a Russian Legal Expert. 
Also, the Manchester Guardian, 4 April 1933 and the News Chronicle, 4 April 1933.
47 The Daily Mail, 4 April 1933. Leading article, "Vigorous Action".
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confession was used by the Ogpu in an attempt to implicate and obtain confessions from 
the other British m e n / 8  The Evening News alleged that to the Russian mind, an 
admission of guilt wrung from the prisoner by torture was as valuable as any other, a 
tactic not used by Britain since the sixteenth century. In the view of the paper,
it is idle to pretend that the civilised West has anything in common with the 
Russian outlook... A person is either a humbug or a fool to pretend to understand 
or to sympathise with Soviet methods or the Soviet mind.49
MacDonald's withdrawal of his plea of guilty in the first court session and subsequent 
reaffirmation of guilt following a short recess, appeared to confirm the allegations by the 
British press that cruelty was in use. Thus the Daily Telegraph called MacDonald's 
testimony "heartbreaking and revolting" in a trial which was an "insane parody of judicial 
process".50 The Scotsman suggested he confessed out of fear since
fear is the most potent emotion in Russia... The Soviet Union is in the grip of 
terror such as never known before, to the extent that even innocent men are cowed 
by it and incapable of asserting their manhood... It shows much for British 
phlegm and endurance that five of the six pleaded 'not guilty'.51
Nevertheless, the conservative press expressed satisfaction that there were "certain truths 
and unplanned deviations" in the trial since five of the British engineers refused to plead 
guilty and Monkhouse even declared in court that the charges were trumped up.52
48 The Daily Telegraph, 11 April 1933. Leading article, "The Soviet and Their Prisoners". 
See also the Daily Express, 11 and 12 April 1933. The Daily Telegraph, 12 April 1933. "Why Mr. 
MacDonald Is Isolated; Prosecution’s Tactics" by the Diplomatic Correspondent. The Scotsman, 11 
April 1933. Leading article, "The Russian Trial".
49 The Evening News, 18 April 1933. Leading article, "Bench and Barbarism". The Daily  
Mail, 13 April 1933. Leading article, "A Travesty of Justice"; 18 April 1933, leading article, "The 
Sinister Frame-Up". The Daily Telegraph, 18 April 1933. Leading article, "Moscow’s British 
Admirers".
5® The Daily Telegraph, 15 April 1933. Leading article, "A Ghastly Travesty of Justice". For 
other similar views, see the News Chronicle, 18 April 1933. Leading article, "An Outrage". The Daily 
Mail, 17 April 1933. Leading article, "Tragic Interlude". The Evening Standard, 17 April 1933. 
Leading article, "Moscow’s Purpose".
51 The Scotsman, 13 April 1933. Leading article, "The Russian Trial".
52 The Yorkshire Post, 18 April 1933. Leading article, "Moscow Truths and Fictions". See 
also. The Times, 15 April 1933. "The Moscow Trial’; ’A Frame Up'; Mr. Monkhouse’s Declaration". 
The Evening News 13 and 15 April.
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The Manchester Guardian agreed with the conservative press in its assessment of 
the trial as "make-believe, alien to Britain, and without evidence or real charges", though 
the paper was less prejudiced in thinking that the Moscow court tried to be conciliatory 
during the case. Though acknowledging that the trial was "farcical", the Manchester 
Guardian continued to recognise that there was a political side to it, in which passions in 
both Britain and the Soviet Union had become inflamed.53 Although the paper claimed it 
was preposterous for British citizens to be made into "political catspaws of the state", the 
Manchester Guardian nevertheless pointed out that anyone who worked in the Soviet 
Union understood the risks involved. With this in mind, the paper expected the British 
Government to maintain relations, contrary to conservative press opinion, to protect other 
Britons who worked in the Soviet Union.54 Although the News Chronicle conceded the 
trial was an attempt by Moscow to convince the world that Soviet criminal law was not a 
travesty of justice, the paper, nevertheless, sarcastically suggested that the Soviet 
Government should have "gagged" Vyshinsky before his "brutal assault" against the
defendants.55
When the verdict was announced, the quality conservative press was surprised, 
though relieved, and therefore less condemnatory in its opinion of the Soviet Union than 
in earlier articles. The Times was convinced the "mild" sentences were most likely due 
to the British Government's swift pressure^^ and the Scotsman suggested that the 
judgement was a half hearted attempt by the Soviet court to avert British anger.5? The 
Daily Telegraph also conceded that the verdict fell short of the paper's worst fears 
though it expected the British Government to secure the release of the two remaining 
engineers by taking any necessary measures.58
53 The Manchester Guardian, 19 April 1933. Leading article, "The Moscow Verdict".
54 The Manchester Guardian, 20 April 1933. Leading article, "Verdict and Embargo". The 
Spectator, 21 April 1933. Leading article, "The Moscow Verdict".
The News Chronicle, 18 April 1933. Leading article, "An Outrage". Vyshinsky was the 
Soviet prosecutor.
55 The Times, 20 April 1933. Leading article, "The Moscow Prisoners".
57 The Scotsman, 19 April 1933. Leading article, "The Russian Trial".
58 The Daily Telegraph, 19 April 1933. Leading article, "Moscow Delivers Sentence".
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The popularConservative press, despite the relatively lenient sentences, continued >. 
its criticism of the Soviet Union. The Daily Mail and the Daily Express claimed that the 
trial had ended as "shamefully" as expected. Both papers stressed that the British public 
would never tolerate the imprisonment of the two men, on such "flimsy" evidence, in the 
"ghastly cells of the Lubyanka" and therefore expected swift retribution by the British
Government.59
The liberal press, like the quality conservative newspapers, was relieved with the 
verd ict. However, rather than expressing indignation over the imprisonment of two 
Britons or calling for further punitive measures, the liberal papers warned against 
excessive British actions. The News Chronicle believed the relatively mild sentences 
suggested that the Soviet Government could be approached since the verdict 
demonstrated that the Kremlin was clearly not looking for trouble. Therefore, the paper 
argued that Britain should refrain from further threats and work calmly for a solution.50 
The Economist found the punishment unpredictably mild, considering the results of 
previous trials of foreigners when "sensational" sentences were passed.51 Though 
finding the verdict unexpectedly light, the Spectator alleged the trial of the British 
engineers was as fair as anyone in the Soviet Union could receive. Foreigners living in 
the USSR knew it was very easy to break the law through innocent actions and therefore 
generally exercised caution in relations and transactions with Russians.52
The Daily Worker was the only British paper to say the prosecution established 
guilt, thus demonstrating the vigilance of the Soviet Government in "protecting the rights 
and property of the workers". The paper also suggested that it was not surprising the 
British Government had feared the trial after the revelations in the espionage case.53 The 
Daily Worker was convinced the investigation and the sentences were more fair than
59 The DaUy Mail, 19 April 1933. Leading article, "Mockery of Justice". The Daily Express, 
19 April 1933. Leading article, "Guilty".
5® The News Chronicle, 19 April 1933. Leading article, "The Moscow Sentences", The 
Economist, 22 April 1933. Leading article, "Moscow and After". The Spectator, 21 April 1933. 
Leading article, "The Moscow Verdict".
51 The Economist, 22 April 1933. Leading article, "Moscow and After".
52 The Spectator, 21 April 1933. Leading article, "The Moscow Verdict".
53 The Daily Worker, 19 April 1933. Leading article, "Soviet Justice and Its Enemies".
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those in a capitalist state. Furthermore, the paper believed that the men deserved no 
leniency and therefore, the act of clemency by the Soviet Government showed m e r c y .5 4  
Although the British Government denied there was any substance to the charges 
of e s p i o n a g e 5 5 ,  Strang, in charge of the Embassy when Ovey returned to Britain at the 
end of March, was aware that several foreign correspondents in Moscow considered 
there to be some truth in the Ogpu’s c a s e .5 5  Many resident journalists believed the 
British engineers confessed to the lesser crimes of wrecking to conceal the larger ones of 
espionage, though the reporters admitted that the confessions may have been made with 
no greater intention than to protect loved ones. Although several correspondents 
acknowledged that no case was made and no evidence provided, many firmly believed 
that the real story was never made public, even with the return of the men to B r it a in .5 7  
However, the newspapers and political journals in Britain, despite any misgivings by 
their correspondents in Moscow, loyally reported that the British engineers were in no! 
way guilty of any of the accusations. It was simple, and potentially the truth, for the 
press to explain that charges of bribery were merely gifts or loans to less fortunate# 
Russian colleagues. Fleet Street was also able to state that responsible engineers of anyj| 
nationality would not sabotage their own work. As to the accusations of espionage,| 
editors and journalists had no means of verifying the charges apart from statements by the? 
British Government. Conservative newspapers flatly denied the possibility of espionage 
while the liberal and labour press thought it unlikely. The fact that two of the British men 
had confessed and that one had pleaded guilty in no way forced the British press to accept 
the charges. Instead, Fleet Street suggested the engineers were saving Russian colleagues
54 The Daily Worker, 20 April 1933. Leading article, "Answer the British Diehards".
55 Keeble, p. 115.
55 D.B.F.P., Second Series, Vol. V ll, nos. 330, 404,411, 451.
57 Lyons, pp. .565-568. Jonathan Haslam (The Soviet Union and the Struggle fo r  Collective 
Security in Europe, 1933-1939, pp. 17-18) and Owen (p. 100) suggest that Thornton's inability to make 
a clear denial against the evidence was especially confusing for foreign correspondents and diplomats in 
Moscow. Furthermore, the British Government relied on the type of economic information which a 
company like the Metro-Vickers could provide to fill in gaps on conditions in the Soviet Union. Thus, 
though not technically members of the Intelligence Service, the company did assist that department yet 
the Foreign Office could have remained ignorant of the role played by certain members o f the Metro- 
Vickers company. See also Lammers, pp. 264-265.
The Metropolitan-Vickers Trial 46
or that third degree methods had been used, such as sleep deprivation. 58 In the end, 
newspapers and journals of all political persuasions could state that the improbable 
charges were unproved by the Soviet court.
The British Government, recognising the patriotic feelings of the British press, 
used it to incite public opinion in support of the accused and against the Soviet U n io n .5 9  
Furthermore, on 11 April, Strang recommended to Simon that an "intentional leakage" be 
made to the London Press to soften the impact of MacDonald's "bombshell" 
confessions.70 Collier, in the Foreign Office, replied to Strang on 12 April that the 
newspapers were already suggesting MacDonald's testimony meant he was "throwing 
himself on the mercy o f the Court", though "barbarous methods" of extracting 
confessions were also being reported. Nevertheless, Collier stated that further hints had 
been given to the national press.^i Thus, there was evidence that the British Government 
was subtlety attempting to manipulate the press into supporting His Majesty's 
Government's response to the arrests and of encouraging negative opinions towards the 
Soviet Union.
Strang also complained to Simon that A. J. Cummings, the political 
correspondent and special representative for the News Chronicle sent to Moscow to 
cover the trial, reported favourably towards the Soviet judicial system. Strang feared this 
would give a false impression to the British public of actual events in M o s c o w .7 2  In 
contrast, the New Statesman and Nation was concerned that the British public was not 
being given a balanced view of the Moscow trial since the "anti-Bolshevik" press in 
Britain printed "all sorts of nonsense" which led the public to believe "Soviet Russia was
58 The Times, 20 April 1933. Leading article, "The Moscow Prisoners".
59 D.B.FP., Second Series, Vol. Vll, nos. 211, 222 and 239. Haslam, p. 18. Lyons noted that 
"the arrests caused a storm of patriotic anger in Britain", p. 563.
70 D.B.F.P., Second Series, Vol. V ll, no. 381.
71 D.B.F.P., Second Series, Vol. VII, no. 381, fn 2. See for example, the Scotsman, 11 April 
1933. Leading article, "The Russian Trial". The Daily Telegraph, 14 April 1933. Leading article, "Tlie 
Moscow Trial Opens".
72 D.B.F.P., Second Series, Vol. Vll, no. 388, fn 2. Strang did not really need to worry since 
the majority of British newspapers, including the News Chronicle, were firmly sceptical of the merits of 
the trial.
73 The New Statesman and Nation, 22 April 1933. Leading article, "Moscow and the Big
Stick".
74 D.B.FP., Second Series, Vol. VII, no. 341.
75 D.B.F.P., Second Series, Vol. VII, nos. 348 and 368.
75 The Daily Telegraph, 20 April 1933. Leading article, "A Prompt Answer to Moscow".
77 The Times, 21 April 1933. "The Moscow Charges" by the Riga Correspondent. The Daily 
Telegraph, 20 April 1933. Leading article, "A Prompt Answer to Moscow". The Scotsman, 20 April 
1933. Leading article, "The Russian Embargo". The Sunday Times, 23 April 1933. Leading article, 
"Justice fOT Trade".
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particularly a w f u l" .7 3  A further demonstration of the Government's subtle, though 
admittedly unnecessary, manipulation of the British press was indicated with Simon's 
suggestion that Strang ask Cholerton, the Moscow Correspondent for the D aily  
Telegraph, to appeal to the Soviet Government for the expulsion of the six engineers in 
place of a trial. Simon explained that Cholerton's idea should appear to be "independent" 
of the Foreign Office because if Litvinov discovered it was a proposal by the British 
Government, the plan would be ig n o r e d .7 4  Strang replied favourably to the suggestion 
since Cholerton was a "man of intelligence and discretion". The correspondent willingly 
accepted the task on behalf of the British Government even though he did not expect i \
success because the Soviet Government was determined to carry out thb trial.75 Thus it ■ \C -
: ■ I .was evident that some journalists voluntarily and naturally acted in accord with the British
Government’s wishes. \
The em bargo
The quality conservative press generally wrote very similar articles supporting 
Britain's rapid reaction to the verdict - "not a day or an hour was lost by the 
Government".75 These papers expected the embargo to have a "sobering" effect on the 
Soviet Union since it hit the "soft spot of Russian needs" and could allegedly ruin the 
Soviet economy. Furthermore, the quality conservative press believed that such prompt 
action demonstrated the British Government's determination to assist in the release of 
Thornton and MacDonald, especially since Britain also required foreign trade.77 The 
Scotsman hoped the Soviet Government had "gratified its vanity" by condemning the 
accused, but argued that it should show its "magnanimity" by releasing the two
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engineers.78 In addition, the quality conservative press recognised that the embargo 
could help clear up international trade relations, not only by protecting the rights of 
foreigners in the Soviet Union, but by settling the imbalance in British-Soviet trade.79 
Although these newspapers allegedly desired a return to some form of commercial 
relations with the Soviet Union,80 they admitted there were problems. For example, the 
Observer accused the Soviet Government of a "morbid suspicion and susceptibility" 
which made trade difficult,^! though the paper conveniently forgot similar suspicions and 
prejudices by several members of the British Government. The Scotsman likewise noted 
the difficulty in conducting business with a country which maintained a "poor moral 
code" and therefore, although the Metropolitan-Vickers incident was technically 
concluded, the paper claimed it would not be forgotten.82
The Yorkshire Post took a view surprisingly similar to the popular conservative 
press in suggesting even stronger measures than an embargo which the British population 
would allegedly support. The paper implied that since trade relations had been halted, 
perhaps the British Embassy in Moscow was no longer viable.83 The Beaverbrook and 
Rothermere press also called for a complete severing of relations. The Evening Standard 
and the Evening News, though commending the Government's promptitude in passing 
the embargo, hoped Britain would have nothing more to do with such a country. 
Furthermore, these papers argued Britain would not suffer by the embargo since the 
balance of trade with the Soviet Union had for so long been unfavourable to Britain.84
78 The Scotsman, 20 April 1933. Leading article, "The Russian Embargo".
79 Ibid. The Sunday Times, 23 April 1933. Leading article, "Justice for Trade".
See for example. The Observer, 23 April 1933. Leading article, "Moscow and Common 
Sense". The paper reported that Thornton and MacDonald would be released within a week tlius 
preventing a trade war which no one wanted. The Daily Express also reported that the two imprisoned 
men were going to be released within a week; 22 April 1933.
81 The Observer, 23 April 1933. Leading article, "Moscow and Common Sense".
82 The Scotsman, 20 April 1933. Leading article, "The Russian Embargo". The D aily  
Telegraph, 19 April 1933. Leading article, "Moscow Delivers Sentence".
83 The Yorkshire Post, 20 April 1933. Leading article, "After the Moscow Trial".
84 The Evening Standard, 19 April 1933. Leading article, "No Truck with Russia". The 
Evening News, 19 April 1933. Leading article, "The Moscow Mummery". The Daily Mail, 13 April 
1933. Leading article, "A Travesty of Justice".
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The liberal and labour press, however, were opposed to the "precipitate" use of 
the embargo.85 In the opinion of the Manchester Guardian, its enforcement raised 
doubts as to whether or not the British Government was acting on behalf of the two 
prisoners or for its own political purposes. 8 5 In contrast to conservative newspapers, 
none of the liberal and labour press believed the sentences of imprisonment would be 
commuted because of the embargo87 though the Manchester Guardian thought it would 
be a "wise and prompt act by the Soviet Government to cut the ground from under the 
feet of the [Tory] die-hards".88 The Spectator argued that without the threat of a ban on 
Russian goods, the sentences might have been even lighter89 but, in the view of the New 
Statesman and Nation, Soviet prestige had been forced to contend with British 
arrogance.90 The News Chronicle regretted the "habitual use of trade for political 
reprisals" because it was "too expensive"9i especially since the Soviet Government 
enforced its own embargo of British g o o d s . ^2 Furthermore, despite assurances by the 
Foreign Minister, the Economist was concerned there was no guarantee that once the two 
British engineers were released, the British Government would agree to end the
embargo.93
Explanation for the trial
Why did the Soviet Government arrest six British citizens who worked for a 
responsible engineering company, especially at a time when the Soviet Union required
85 See for example, The Manchester Guardian, 20 April 1933. Leading article, "Verdict and 
Embargo". The News Chronicle, 20 April 1933. Leading article, "A Dangerous Weapon". The 
Economist, 22 April 1933. Leading article, "Moscow and After".
The Manchester Guardian, 20 April 1933. Leading article, "Verdict and Embargo".
87 Ibid. The Spectator, 21 April 1933. Leading article, "The Moscow Verdict". The D aily  
Herald, 21 April 1933. "Moscow Appeal for Exile of Sentenced Britons". The New Statesman and 
Nation, 22 April 1933. Leading article, "Moscow and the Big Stick". The News Chronicle, 20 April 
1933. Leading article, "A Dangerous Weapon". The Economist, 22 April 1933. Leading article, 
"Moscow and After".
88 The Manchester Guardian, 21 April 1933. Leading article, "Hope and Peace".
89 The Spectator, 21 April 1933. Leading article, "The Moscow Verdict".
The New Statesman and Nation, 22 April 1933. Leading article, "Moscow and the Big
Stick".
The Vewf Chronicle, 24 April 1933. Leading article, "The Return from Moscow".
^2 The Manchester Guardian, 24 April 1933. Leading article, "The Russian Trade War".
93 The Economist, 22 April 1933. Leading article, "Moscow and After".
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trade and allies? The USSR needed foreign capital to increase its industrial capacity and 
furthermore, the Great Depression was a problem facing all of Europe in 1933, so no 
country would have taken actions which threatened trade relations. A common 
explanation in most of the British press for the arrest of the British engineers was the 
alleged failure of the Five Year Plan. For example, the Daily Express feared that the 
search for foreign scapegoats had led to "the vile charges trumped up against them by a 
bankrupt Bolshevik Government" for the failures of "Soviet schemes of s o c i a l i s m " . 94  
The Daily Telegraph, with less ideologically motivated references, suggested that the 
staging of sensational treason trials was a "time-honoured resource" of the Soviet 
Government when failures and breakdowns had to be c o n c e a l e d .^ 5  Though the 
Manchester Guardian warned the British Government to look further than its own 
prejudices, the paper also suggested that the Soviet Government was trying to divert 
attention in the USSR from economic p r o b le m s .9 5  Since the Economist found it difficult 
to imagine that a company which had worked in the Soviet Union for ten years would 
sabotage its own work, the journal suggested the arrests were more likely to be used as a 
screen for official Soviet in c o m p e t e n c e .^ ^
However, Fleet Street offered other explanations, such as the Sunday Times's 
suspicion that the Metropolitan-Vickers trial was held so the Soviet Government could 
default on its payments to Britain. The only evidence for this explanation, in the opinion 
of the paper, was that the Soviet Union was never a power which could be trusted. Its 
"code of honour" was not like other civilised nations because it had no "moral 
s c r u p le s " .9 8  The Observer referred to the Soviet Government as a "tyranny as merciless 
and capricious as Ivan the Terrible" since there were no guarantees of liberty or life. 
"Where there is no humour, people p e r i s h . "99 As the Scotsman argued, in order to 
understand the Soviet Union, the British public had to remember that the psychology of
^4 The Daily Express, 17 March 1933. Leading article, "Send Us a Man!".
^5 The Daily Telegraph, 15 March 1833. Leading article, "Moscow’s British Prisoners". 
^5 The Manchester Guardian, 18 March 1933. Leading article, "Arrests in Russia".
^7 The Economist, 18 March 1933. "The Arrests in Russia".
^8 The Sunday Times, 23 April 1933. Leading article, "Justice for Trade".
The Observer, 23 April 1933. Leading article, "Moscow and Common Sense".
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the Russian was "eastern" and therefore allowances had to be made.^^ Most ironically, 
it was the News Chronicle and the Manchester Guardian who, despite their liberal 
pedigrees, displayed attitudes which sounded very similar to conservative attitudes. 
These papers, for example, accused the Soviet Union of being less civilised than Britain. 
"We are dealing with a 'fanatical' people, and circumspection as well as firmness is 
needed in our a c t i o n . " I n  the opinion of the Manchester Guardian, the Embargo Bill, 
which ignored Russia's sovereign rights, proved that Britain did not understand that the 
Soviet Union "lived in a world outside 'ordinary' c o n s i d e r a t i o n s " . ^ ^ 2
Eugene Lyons, an American correspondent in Moscow for the United Press, 
admitted that he and other journalists failed to understand why the trial was staged since it 
merely emphasised to the Soviet population and the world at large that Russian industry 
remained ineffective and living conditions continued to be poor despite the first Five Year 
P l a n .  103 However, Lyons acknowledged that the trial succeeded to a limited extent in 
diverting attention abroad and at home from the growing catastrophe in the countryside. 
Lyons admitted that press correspondents in Moscow "made a deal" with the Soviet /censor - news of the famine in the countryside would not be covered in exchange for 
relatively free expression on the Metropolitan-Vickers trial.
Strang suggested that not only was it possible that the trial was held to hide 
internal problems, but potentially of more importance, a statement was being made 
concerning Soviet foreign relations. Strang believed the Soviet Government selected the 
British engineers in an effort to teach the British Government that it could not pursue anti- 
Soviet activities with impunity, whether economic or diplomatic in nature. By 1933,
1 ^  The Scotsman, 19 April 1933. Leading article, "The Russian Trial".
The News Chronicle, 4 April 1933. Leading article, "The Government and the Soviets".
®^2 The Manchester Guardian, 5 April 1933. Leading article, "The White Paper".
193 Lyons, p. 568.
194 Ibid, p. 564. Several papers, nevertheless, maintained that their correspondents were finding 
it difficult to send detailed and correct reports; see for example, the Manchester Guardian, 16 March 1933. 
Furthermore, some correspondents were initially refused visas into the Soviet Union to witness the trial: 
see for example, the DmVy Express, 12 April 1933 and Da/Vy AfmV, 7 April 1933. D.B.F.P., Second 
Series, Vol. VII, no. 232 describes the troubles the foreign correspondents, specifically mentioning 
Lyons, had in sending information home and that to avoid the censor, they were phoning their reports to 
London.
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British policy in Europe had appeared to the Soviet Government to have assumed a 
"definite anti-Soviet bent", especially with the Ottawa Agreement of August 1932.195 
Moscow viewed these changes with suspicion and began an anti-British campaign in the 
Soviet press at the end of 1932. Furthermore, Strang suspected that the stage was being 
set for greater action against Britain, and the Metro-Vickers organisation proved an easy 
target. The company had been in the Soviet Union for several years, had engineers in 
important areas of industry, and men who had potential access to machines for wrecking 
and saw information for economic espionage. Thus Strang argued the Metro-Vickers 
employees were convenient scapegoats in the Soviet Government's attempt to show the 
British that the Soviet Union was a country which deserved respect. 195
Several papers admitted to being confused as to whether or not the Soviet 
Government had achieved anything beneficial by holding the trial. The Daily Express 
and the Daily Mail alleged that the Soviet rulers desperately staged the trial because the 
Five Year Plan had failed, though only "the starving peasants who received a blood 
sacrifice instead of the bread they are crying for" were d e c e i v e d .  197 The Economist 
wondered why the Soviet authorities should have risked and even incurred a political 
breach with Britain at a time when the Soviet Union was pursuing a conciliatory foreign 
policy and feared attack by Japan in the Far E a s t . i9 8  The Daily Telegraph, the Spectator, 
and the Sunday Times admitted, following the conclusion of the trial, that they remained 
baffled as to its clear purpose. The papers recognised that there were political motives 
and the necessity of covering up domestic problems but this did not explain why British 
engineers were accused. These papers felt that until this trial, the Soviet Government's 
policy had been to improve its position and favour with Britain. However, with no
195 This commercial agreement gave the Dominions most favoured nation status which 
conflicted with the 1930 trade agreement between Britain and the Soviet Union.
195 Strang, pp. 80 and 116-118. See D.BP.P., Second Series, Vol. VII, chapters IV and V. 
See also Lammers, pp. 258-259 and Owen, pp. 97-98. The Times, 16 March 1933. Leading article, 
"Soviet Scaœgoats".
197 The Daily Express, 17 April 1933. Leading article, "The Terror Tribunal". The D aily  
Mail, 20 April 1933. Leading article, "Welcome Action".
198 The Economist, 22 April 1933. Leading article, "Moscow and After".
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warning or purpose, the "most detested aspect of the Soviet Union" was displayed in a 
way in which each paper alleged shocked and outraged British public o p i n io n .  199
The impression that the Soviet Government was forced to carry on and to repair 
an error made by the Ogpu without the loss of prestige was held by several papers, 
journals and the British Embassy in Moscow, The Daily Telegraph and the Economist 
thought that someone in the Ogpu had probably "blundered" 119 and the New Statesman 
and Nation hoped that an "honest mistake" was made by the secret police without the 
Soviet Government's knowledge.m The Yorkshire Post wondered if the entire Soviet 
Government was as "obtuse" as the Ogpu since the Kremlin seemed intent on ignoring 
the effect of the trial on British public opinion.112 Strang believed the relatively early 
release of the two British men in June was an effort by the Soviet Government to restore 
favourable, calm, and stable relations following the questionable action by the secret 
police. 113 However, Western observers in Moscow in April 1933 attributed the arrests 
to Stalin's orders,H4 though the British press made no significant comment to this effect. 
This may have been because of the censor or because a rumour was circulated by the 
Soviet Government that the Ogpu had acted on its own initiative. Stalin, in May 1933, 
used this as an excuse to purge the secret police of its more dangerous members - 
dangerous because they were a threat to Stalin's dictatorship. 115
Resumption of trade
In June 1933, when there were rumours of a trade rapprochement and the release 
of the two British engineers, Fleet Street was nearly unanimous in its support for an end
199 The Daily Telegraph, 19 April 1933. Leading article, "Moscow Delivers Sentence". The 
Spectator, 21 April 1933. Leading article, "The Moscow Verdict". The Sunday Times, 16 April 1933. 
Leading article, "Black Work at Moscow".
The Economist, 18 March 1933. "The Arrests in Russia". The Daily Telegraph, 15 
March 1933. Leading article, "Moscow’s British Prisoners". See also. The Times, 16 March 1933. 
Leading article, "Soviet Scapegoats". The Daily Express, 16 March 1933. "Sentence without Trial?" by 
the Diplomatic Correspondent Strang, pp. 80 and 116-118. See D.B.F.P., Second Series, Vol. VII, 
chapters IV, V, and VI. See no. 484 dated 8 May 1933.
The New Statesman and Nation, 18 March 1933. "Comments".
112 The Yorkshire Post, 6 April 1933. Leading article, "The Russian Dispatches".
115 Strang, p. 120.
114 Owen, p. 97 and D.B.F.P., Second Series, Vol. VII, no. 219.
115 Owen, pp. 97 and 103. D.B.F.P., Second Series, Vol. VII, no. 484.
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to the commercial war. Ultimately the hostility caused by the Metro-Vickers affair 
declined as the need for stable commercial relations increased, and curiously, the 
atmosphere improved as a result of the trial. When the Soviet Government released 
MacDonald and Thornton on 2 July, the conservative press felt the British Government's 
embargo policy had been vindicated. The Daily Telegraph's leading article on 3 July 
was entitled "The Embargo Effects Its Purpose", a view supported by other conservative 
n e w s p a p e r s .  115 in the opinion of the Daily Telegraph, the affair had provided a useful 
lesson - an embargo was a good weapon in securing the release of a country's nationals. 
Furthermore, the Soviet Government's reprisals were in comparison allegedly 
impotent. 117 Nevertheless, although the Sunday Times reported that the British 
Government felt vindicated in its embargo policy, the paper admitted that the outcome had 
as much to do with "Russian" common sense and commercial values which had 
triumphed over political dogma.H8
The liberal and labour press, in contrast, argued that the two Britons would in all 
likelihood have been released sooner had the British Government not disregarded the 
Soviet Union's honour. Furthermore, the Manchester Guardian, the News Chronicle, 
and the New Statesman and Nation were concerned that the British Government had 
undervalued trade with the Soviet Union at a time when British unemployment was 
high. 119 Thus the Daily Herald was generous in its praise of Simon and Litvinov for 
achieving a "victory for common s e n s e " .  129 The Economist pointed out that "prestige is 
very largely a matter of time" and that after two months of the embargo, tempers had
115 See for example, the Scotsman, 1 July 1933. Leading article, "The Russian Embargo"; 3 
July 1933, leading article, "British Prisoners Released".
117 The Daily Telegraph, 3 July 1933. Leading article, "The Embargo Effects Its Purpose". 
The Times, 3 July 1933. Leading article, "Trade with Russia".
118 The Sunday Times, 2 July 1933. Leading article, "The Russian Statement".
119 The Manchester Guardian, 26 June 1933. Leading article, "Mr. Baldwin and Russia". The 
News Chronicle, 30 June 1933. Leading article, "Who Is Holding It Up?". The New Statesman and 
Nation, 1 July 1933. Leading article, "Russian Pride and British Prejudice".
120 The Daily Herald, 3 July 1933. "Moscow Prisoners Exile; Trade and Jail Shackles 
Smashed; Englishmen Home Again this Week" by the Diplomatic Correspondent. See also 26 June 
1933, leading article, "Sabotage".
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cooled, common sense had re-emerged, and honour had been satisfied unfortunately by 
sacrificing trade. 121
In contrast, the Daily Worker claimed that protest against the embargo by the 
British population meant that the Tory diehards had finally been forced to give in .  122 i n  
addition, the paper alleged the release of the "two worthless individuals" was not even a 
"face-saver" for the British Government. Though the embargo was lifted, the Daily 
Worker reported that the Britain's workers would carry on the fight against the anti- 
Soviet policy of British i m p e r ia l i s m .  123
The release of the British engineers and the end of the embargo meant that 
commercial negotiations, which had been suspended in March, were resumed in July. 
None of the British press expected the talks for a new trade agreement to take l o n g i 2 4  
though the New Statesman and Nation warned against the "characteristic pettiness of die­
hard T o r ie s " .  125 The conservative press primarily wanted a commercial contract which 
was less one-sided, though an agreement was required quickly so the British economy 
could benefit. 125 The Economist also hoped that the future trade accord would not 
allow loopholes for further discrimination or embargos. 127
However, the expected and much sought after commercial agreement did not 
materialise until 17 February 1934 and was greeted with vaiying degrees of enthusiasm 
by Fleet Street. During the months of negotiation, the liberal and labour press noted that 
despite the folly of the embargo, talks for a new settlement "drift slowly". The Daily 
Herald alleged that this was due to those who
121 The Economist, 1 July 1933. "Sir J. Simon and M. Litvinov".
122 The Daily Worker, 27 June 1933. Leading article, "Anti-Soviet Embargo Must Go".
123 The Daily Worker, 3 July 1933. Leading article, "The Embargo Goes".
124 See for example. The Times, 26 June 1933. Leading article, "Anglo-Russian Trade"; 8 
July 1933, "Trade with Russia; Talks to be Resumed on Monday" by the Parliamentary Correspondent. 
The Scotsman, 3 July 1933. Leading article, "British Prisoners Released".
125 The New Statesman and Nation, 8 July 1933. "Comments - Mr. Litvinov's SuccessfulVisit".
125 The Times, 3 July 1933. Leading article, "Trade with Russia". The Scotsman, 3 July 
1933. Leading article, "British Prisoners Released". See also, the Manchester Guardian, 4 July 1933. 
"Russia Buying from US" by the NY Correspondent.
127 The Economist, 8 July 1933. "Soviet Diplomacy".
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were so influenced by a blind hatred of Soviet Russia that they wish for no trade 
agreement, no trade, and no relations with Moscow... Yet these stupid ones, 
adding a class-hatred of the Soviet system to an inherited Disraeli-cum-Victorian 
hatred of Russia, would bedevil and break both economic and political
relations. 128
The paper further accused the National Government of having a
genius for creating deadlocks... Its conferences march from breakdown to 
breakdown... Its ineptitude is masterly... The British people are tired both of 
mischief and of silliness in their r u le r s .  129
When the agreement was finally concluded, there was scepticism in the British 
press that the British Government had achieved the best result possible. For example. 
The Times wrote a short, dry leading article which stated that "it is satisfactory that an 
agreement has at length been concluded putting the trade between Great Britain and 
Russia on a regular footing". The paper welcomed any understanding which smoothed 
the path of mutual trade but only as long as Britain was assured of an expansion in 
commerce with the Soviet Union. 159 The Daily Telegraph similarly accepted that there 
was no reason why deep-seated dislike of each other's economic and political systems 
had to interfere with free commerce, especially since Britain required foreign trade.I3i
Labour and liberal newspapers, though relieved an agreement was reached, were 
critical of the British Government's efforts at negotiation. The Daily Herald's leading 
article concerning the trade settlement was sarcastically entitled, "Signed at Last". The 
paper alleged that the delay was characteristic of the British Government, though "when 
there was mischief to be done", such as the enforcing of an embargo, it acted quickly. 
However, the Conservatives "dawdled and dithered" if something "useful" had to be
128 The Daily Herald, 6 September 1933. Editorial, "Stupidity and the Soviets". Further 
article on 18 September. See also, the Manchester Guardian, 5 January 1934. Leading article, "The 
Russian Negotiations". The News Chronicle, 9 January 1934. "Still Splitting Straws".
129 The Daily Herald, 27 October 1933. Leading article, "Folly or Worse".
159 The Times, 17 February 1933. Leading article, "The Russian Trade Agreement".
151 The Daily Telegraph, 20 February 1934. Leading article, "Two-Way Trade with Russia".
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a c h i e v e d .  15 2  The New Statesman and Nation called it a "happy ending to an 
unnecessarily long and foolish chapter" and hoped that no further "political antics" would 
disturb commercial relations. 153
However, two British newspapers clearly opposed the new temporary 
commercial agreement, one a popular conservative newspaper and the other a quality 
paper. The Daily Express was not impressed with the terms of the pact which "visibly 
benefits the Russians" and left several British industries "at the mercy" of a Soviet 
promise to correct the balance of trade. 134 In a leading article, the Daily Express 
asserted, somewhat irrelevantly, that "the work, health and happiness of the British 
people are not likely to increase by reason of the new Russian Trade Agreement" which 
made an attempt to strike a "fake" balance in the trade between the two countries. The 
Daily Express suggested that Britain would find greater advantage if it placed its money 
in trade within the Empire and forgot about endowing the "slave population of 
Russia". 155 The Scotsman was also not "aroused to enthusiasm" over the new 
agreement because the paper felt Scottish industry, and especially the herring fisheries, 
had again been ignored and left to the whims of the Soviet Government. 155
Conclusion
When taken in context with the rest of Europe's major events, the Metropolitan- 
Vickers trial appeared to have less significance. However, domestically it was 
immensely important for the British population as a result of intense British press 
coverage. Furthermore, the British Left was convinced of continuing anti-Bolshevism in 
the Conservative Party while the Right reaffirmed its opinion that the Soviet Government
152 The Daily Herald, 17 February 1934. Leading article, "Signed at Last".
153 The New Statesman and Nation, 17 February 1934. "Comments - The Russian Trade 
Agreement". The Manchester Guardian, 20 February 1934, Leading article, "A Fresh Start". TheNewj 
Chronicle, 20 February 1934. Leading article, "At Last".
154 The Daily Express, 20 February 1934. "Russia Promises to Buy More".
The Daily Express, 20 February 1934. Leading article, "Opinion".
155 The Scotsman, 20 February 1934. Leading article, "Trade with Russia". The agreement 
did benefit the Soviet Union in that several important issues and clauses were ignored by the Soviet 
Government and thus the balance of trade was ultimately not rectified. Owen, pp. 105-107.
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could never be t r u s t e d .  157 Internationally the Metro-Vickers trial displayed the kind of 
tensions which existed between the West and the Soviet Union and demonstrated how a 
seemingly minor incident could easily assume serious consequences. However, these 
issues became less significant as a result of Hitler becoming Chancellor of Germany since 
foreign relations moved into the early stages of revolving around German policies. In 
addition, Britain's major allies, France and the United States, though anxious for the 
safety of French and American citizens in the USSR, were relatively uninterested and 
generally unsupportive of Britain's severing of trade with the Soviet Union. The United 
States actually capitalised on the incident by expanding trade with the Soviet Union, and 
France did not hesitate to continue negotiations with the Soviet Government for a co­
operative alliance. 158
In addition to the election of the Nazi party in Germany, Japan, which had 
invaded Manchuria in 1931, by 1933 appeared to be growing stronger, and was thus 
perceived by the Soviet Government to be a significant threat. Therefore, Soviet foreign 
policy was in the very early stages of a transformation, moving towards collective 
security. Though the trial of six British citizens first provoked Britain into taking strong
Unkt nefrciA-laction and secondly, proved anbenefitial to British-Soviet relations, the Metro-Vickers 
affair did no lasting damage since commercial relations were restored, albeit ten months 
later. The Economist was pleased to report that the embargo dispute due to the Metro- 
Vickers trial had been solved in a "manner acceptable to both [countries]", in a way in 
which the "patriotic press" of both sides was able to say the other had backed down. It 
was with relief that the journal stated that British and Soviet diplomacy was conducted 
impeccably in the last act of the dispute, thus making up for some of the blunders of the 
earlier p r o c e e d i n g s . 5^9  in August 1933, once the situation had become calmer, the
157 Lammers, pp. 266-267. I
158 Th0 Manchester Guardian, 20 November 1933. Leading article, "Britain Lags Behind". j
The News Chronicle, 23 November 1933. Leading article, "Mr. Bennett on Britain". The N ew  
Statesman and Nation, 25 November 1933. "Comments - Russian and the USA". See also earlier 
warnings by the M anchester Guardian, 4 July 1933. "Russia Buying from US" by the NY 
Correspondent. The Scotsman, 3 July 1933. Leading article, "British Prisoners Released".
159 The Economist, 8 July 1933. "Soviet Diplomacy". 1
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Contemporary Review stated that the Metro-Vickers case was merely another in a long 
series of "absurd incidents" produced by the "incompatible temperament" of the Russian 
and British people. 140
The Metropolitan-Vickers trial proved how a relatively small event could damage 
relations between Britain and the Soviet Union and how these relations could take months 
to repair. The incident also highlighted the large role which the British press achieved in 
portraying events and in encouraging or dismissing calls for a resumption in economic 
relations. The press to an extent was harnessed to the British Government’s cause 
though in general newspapers and journals, whether conservative, liberal, or labour, 
were inflamed sufficiently of their own accord to condemn the Soviet Union. Regardless 
of political outlook, most of Fleet Street expressed, at some point, abusive language 
towards the Soviet Union, unjustified especially when the guilt of the accused was 
neither proved nor disproved. The political journalist for the News Chronicle, A. J. 
Cummings, in 1936 wrote of the incident.
The reporting of the trial in the British press was in my judgement one of the most 
disreputable episodes in the history of British newspapers. Nearly every 
newspaper in the land ran amok that astonishing week.i4i
The British press, whether it was right to do so or not, took a determined strong, 
patriotic view of the trial. To the best of its ability. Fleet Street believed it was informing 
the British public of events in Moscow despite expressing a significant degree of ill-will 
towards the Soviet Union. The Metropolitan-Vickers trial and the ensuing trade 
negotiations showed that in quality and popular conservative newspapers, the attitude of 
mistrust remained prevalent. Furthermore, the mistrust expressed by the conservative 
press reflected the emotions and beliefs felt by many conservative politicians and civil 
servants. The exchanges between the British Embassy in Moscow and the Foreign
^40 The Contemporary Review, August 1933. "The Anglo-Russian Comedy". 
^41 A. J. Cummings, The Press, p. 52.
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Office in London, as well as the Foreign Secretary’s speeches in the House of 
Commons, give evidence of mistrust and a desire for strong action. Thus the 
conservative press conformed to Government policy. There were signs that the .
i
Government was making discreet moves to keep the conservative press patriotic, though ' / /
even the Foreign Office recognised that this was unnecessary due to the nature of the ,.Jtrial. ^ 42
In contrast, the labour press primarily expressed disappointment over Soviet 
action in holding the trial since it encouraged mistrust of the Soviet Government in 
conservative opinion. The labour press was also disappointed, though not surprised, that 
the British Government had not conducted itself more professionally during the trial and 
especially in the ensuing commercial negotiations. Liberal newspapers and journals 
accepted the reservations felt in the British Government and by the British public, largely 
encouraged by Fleet Street itself, but the liberal press was disappointed with the British 
Government’s reaction to the events. Equally as distressing for these papers was the fact 
that the Soviet Union was not evolving as rapidly as hoped towards greater freedom and 
economic stability. The labour and liberal press never forgot the plight of the six British 
engineers and campaigned vigorously for a fair trial and the release of these men. There 
were initial signs that the Manchester Guardian was swayed by governmental influence 
and therefore ignored the initial reports on the arrest of the six Britons by its Moscow 
Correspondent, M alcolm M u g g e r i d g e . i 4 3  However, the paper rapidly became 
disillusioned by the British Government's decision to use the embargo to secure the 
release of the British engineers. The labour and liberal press opposed the British 
Government’s attitude towards Moscow and trade issues and thus tended to support calls 
by Labour and Liberal politicians who warned against hasty, and therefore potentially 
damaging, a c t i o n .  1 4 4  Thus the labour and liberal press did not respond as totally as the
142 D.B.F.P., Second Series, Vol. VII, nos. 211, 222, 239, 381, 341.
143 Ian Hunter, Malcolm Muggeridge: A Life, p. 85.
144 The Daily Herald, 6 April 1933. "Excited MPs in Anti-Russian Debate", by the 
Parliamentary Correspondent. The New Statesman and Nation, 8 April 1933. "Comments - The 
Russian Embargo". The News Chronicle, 6 April 1933. "Moscow Drama in the Commons", by
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conservative newspapers to the government's wishes for support which caused some 
concern in the Embassy and the Foreign Office. 145 Nevertheless, no British newspaper 
or journal, apart from the Daily Worker, accepted or question the possibility that the 
British engineers were guilty. Thus Fleet Street concurred with the Foreign Secretary's 
speech to the House of Commons on 5 April which declared the Metro-Vickers engineers 
were not members of the Intelligence Services. This fact alone demonstrated the 
influence which the British Government held over the British press.
Trade and political co-operation could only proceed slowly following the large 
scale setback caused by the Metro-Vickers trial. The conservative press accepted the 
Temporary Trade Agreement in 1934 with some satisfaction while the liberal and labour 
press desired further cooperation to prevent other misunderstandings from hindering 
future relations. Nevertheless, the Metro-Vickers incident was the last unfavourable 
encounter between Britain and the Soviet Union between the two world wars. 
Furthermore, the Temporary Trade Agreement of 1934 remained the official economic 
regulator for the two countries for over forty y e a r s ,  4^6 Also, 1934 marked the year in 
which the Soviet Union seriously began to support the policy of collective security and 
expected to work with Britain and France against the threatened aggression of Nazi 
Germany.
Parliamentary Correspondent, E. Clephan Palmer. The Manchester Guardian, 6 April 1933. Leading 
article, "The Russian Debate".
145 D.B.F.P., Second Series, Vol. VII, no. 388
146 Keeble, p. 123.
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Chapter 3 
The Indivisibility of Peace
In 1933, the Soviet Government recognised the implications of Hitler's coming to 
power in Germany since one of the avowed aims of the Nazi leader was the intention of 
increasing the living space, lebensraum, of the Third Reich with territory jfrom the Soviet 
Union. In response, the Soviet Government's foreign policy became less isolationist and 
increasingly supportive of the principles of collective security.^ While the Soviet Union 
recognised the need to become more involved in European affairs, primarily due to 
Germany, the rest of Europe was likewise forced to question and to react to the direction 
of German foreign policy. David Low's cartoon on 12 October 1933 depicted Hitler as 
an "Unintentional Cupid" who was bringing the formerly isolated states of Europe 
together.^ The West increasingly assessed the possibilities of cooperation with Moscow 
as Soviet foreign policy actively promoted the "indivisibility of peace". The idea of 
collective security became popular in the 1930s as a means of preventing a second major 
war since it was based on the premise that if all states acted together, collectively, then 
conflict of interest could be minimised. European countries hoped that through a 
collective system, disarmament would be achieved and the need for bi-lateral pacts would 
be replaced by multilateral cooperation. The main problem with collective security was 
that it relied on states submitting their sovereignty to the group's interests, as was 
epitomised by the League of Nations where individual goals were allegedly yielded to the 
grand alliance. The British Government initially supported collective principles, as long 
as Britain's commitments abroad did not increase, but gradually adopted a policy of 
appeasement in an effort to avoid antagonising Hitler who refused to participate in
1 The Soviet Union, prior to 1933, already enjoyed better relations with many Western States 
though primarily with a focus on commercial interests. This had been necessary for the fulfilment of the 
Five Year Plans which required foreign capital.
 ^See Figure 3.1. The Evening Standard, 12 October 1933, "Unintentional Cupid".
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collective agreements, especially those offered by the Soviet Government. As 
appeasement increasingly dominated British foreign policy, it naturally conflicted with the 
Soviet Union's plans for collective security. Thus, although Litvinov and Stalin strongly 
preferred a collective system, at no point did the Soviet Government ignore the 
possibilities of forming stronger partnerships with individual nations if events called for 
that course of action. Hence when collective agreements appeared to be unsuccessful, the 
Soviet Union formed alliances with France and Czechoslovakia but also kept its options 
open towards Germany.
Fleet Street devoted significant coverage to European affairs and events which 
concerned the Soviet Union as the Kremlin's activity increasingly influenced Britain's 
course in Europe. Newspapers and journals regularly debated on whether or not Britain 
could ignore the Soviet Government's calls for collective security and if any measures 
suggested from Moscow were of benefit to Europe or would merely lead Britain closer to 
war. The popular conservative press considered any suggestions from the Soviet Union 
to be mischievous and clearly intended to draw Britain into war against Japan and
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Germany, with the secret aim of advancing communism and destroying Western 
democracy. In slight contrast, the quality conservative press cautiously welcomed the 
direction in which the Soviet Union's foreign policy was moving since it suggested less 
desire by the communists to incite unrest. Some of these newspapers urged the British 
Government to work more closely with Moscow. Other quality conservative papers 
retained the traditional wariness of communism and thus rarely offered more than moral 
support to the Soviet Government's proposals since they enlarged Britain's role in 
Europe and, after 1935, increasingly conflicted with German aims. Sometimes, 
individual quality conservative newspapers offered a mixed opinion depending on the 
circumstances at the time. The Daily Telegraph, for example, was often inconsistent 
with its views of the Soviet Union's collective security proposals. However, the liberal 
and labour press, on the whole, welcomed the Soviet Government's attempts at creating a 
collective system as these papers believed it was the best means of preventing war. This 
section of the press most clearly recognised the unreasonableness of Hitler's attitude 
towards communism and therefore criticised the British Government for its hesitancy in 
cooperating with the Soviet Union.
The League of Nations
Until 1933, the Soviet Union's foreign policy was primarily based on economic 
and political cooperation with Weimar Germany.^ Although Hitler reversed the Weimar 
Government's relationship with Moscow, in the early months of Nazi power, both 
Germany and the Soviet Union pretended there would be no change in policy towards 
each other.4 The British Embassy in Moscow was unable to confirm if Germany and the 
Soviet Union were truly cooperating, though Strang suggested in August 1933 that the 
Soviet Union would prefer to have a stronger relationship with France.^ The Times 
noted that early speeches and interviews by Hitler suggested there was cooperation and in
3 Weimar Germany and the Soviet Union had originally come together in the 1920s as a result 
of neither being invited to Versailles or into the League of Nations, and because both required trade.
^ E.H. Carr, German-Soviet Relations, p. 109. Jonathan Haslam, The Struggle fo r Collective 
Security , 1933-1939, p. 23. Robert Tucker, "The Emergence of Stalin's Foreign Policy", pp. 580, 585. 
 ^ D.B.F.P., Second Series, Vol. VII, no. 532.
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May 1933 the Nazi Government even re-ratified the 1926 German-Soviet Treaty of 
Friendship and its protocol.^ In the Soviet Union, Izvestia confirmed the friendship 
while the Soviet Government retained a cautious policy towards Germany and spoke of 
good relations.^ However, the first signs of disagreement were evident in Litvinov's 
speech in December 1933, in which the Manchester Guardian noted the Soviet 
Government was "dissatisfied" with the course of German-Soviet relations.^ Papers as 
politically diverse as the News Chronicle, the Daily Telegraph and the New Statesman 
and Nation believed Litvinov was warning the Nazi Government that Moscow 
recognised Germany's aggressive intentions and thus formerly good relations were about 
to change significantly. Furthermore, in the same speech, these papers noted the Foreign 
Commissar's positive but cautious overtures to the West.^
The British press of all political outlooks acknowledged that Litvinov was a 
respectable statesman despite his firm adherence to communism. The New Statesman 
and Nation suggested that there were few in the Soviet Union or abroad who failed to 
recognise Litvinov's "wisdom, knowledge of international affairs, and ability as a 
negotiator". Journalists in Geneva and Moscow thought highly of him but were often 
frustrated by his desire for secrecy.^® Even the Daily Express, generally cynical towards 
the Soviet Union, recognised "Litvinov's diplomatic coup" following the formal 
recognition by the United States of the Soviet Union in November 1 9 3 3 . The News 
Chronicle reported that the Foreign Commissar had been very active in 1933 and thus 
deserved congratulations on being able to add an agreement with the United States to his
 ^ See for example, The Times, 6 May 1933. "Soviet-German Relations" by the Riga 
Correspondent
7 The O bserver, 19 March 1933. "Soviet Russia and Germany; Friendly Relations to 
Continue" by the Moscow Correspondent.
® The Manchester Guardian, 30 December 1933. "War Menace in Far East; Plain Speaking by 
Litvinov" by the Moscow Correspondent
 ^The News Chronicle, 30 December 1933. "Litvinov's Grave Charges: He Accused Both 
Japan and Germany". The Daily Telegraph, 30 December 1933. "Soviet Warning to Japan; Blunt Words 
Also to Germany" by the Moscow Correspondent. The New Statesman and Nation, 6 January 1934. 
"Comments - Warnings from Moscow".
The New Statesman and Nation, 23 November 1935. "Miscellany - Maxim Maximovitch
Litvinov".
11 The Daily Express, 18 November 1933. "US Restores Diplomatic Rights to Russia" by the 
New York Correspondent
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other diplomatic achievements of the y e a r .  12 Litvinov was the acknowledged architect of 
the Soviet drive for collective security and his first major activity in that field was the 
Soviet Union's participation in the unsuccessful Disarmament Conference which 
convened in February 1 9 3 2  and quietly dissolved in June 1 9 3 4 .1 3  However, a 
significant consequence of the conference was the proposal by the Soviet and French 
Governments for an Eastern Locamo Pact contingent on the Soviet Union's entry into the 
League of Nations.
Germany's withdrawal from the League of Nations in October 1933 and 
increasingly aggressive tone was an aspect which the British press alleged helped to 
remove the Soviet Union's traditional attitude of hostility towards that organisation, i^ 
Speeches against the League of Nations had decreased in 1933,1^ much to the approval 
of France who was growing more concerned by the advent of National Socialism in 
Germany. 1^  The British press cautiously approved of Litvinov's speech in December 
1933, which was the first by a Soviet statesman to express the "beneficial influence" of 
the League of Nations, thus heralding a change in attitude not only to that organisation 
but to the rest of Europe. 1^  Thus newspapers and journals, from conservative to labour, 
supported Litvinov's hopes for improved relations with the rest of Europe. 1® The new 
British Ambassador in Moscow, Lord Chilston, also cautiously recommended that the 
British Government attempt to strengthen connections with the Soviet Union.i^ In May
1  ^The Newf Chronicle, 18 November 1933. Leading article, "Mr. Roosevelt and the Soviets".
3^ Haigh, Morris, and Peters, Soviet Foreign Policy, the League o f Nations, and Europe, 1917- 
1939, p. 15.
See for example. The Times, 17 October 1933. "Moscow Critical of Germany" by the Riga 
CorrcspondenL
13 Though comments against the League of Nations had decreased, the Soviet Government's 
attitude was not entirely clear. See for example. The Times, 8 March 1933 for an article by Reuter 
which pointed out that the Soviet Union remained unwilling to join an advisory committee of the League 
to arbitrate their disagreement with Japan.
1^  David Dunn, "Maksim Litvinov: Commissar of Contradiction", p. 225.
1  ^ The Manchester Guardian, 30 December 1933. "War Menace in Far East; Japan 
'Provocative'; Plain Speaking by Litvinov; Anglo-Russian Trade" by the Moscow Correspondent. The 
Times, 30 December 1933 by the Riga Correspondent. The Economist, 6 January 1934. Stalin had 
also given a private interview to the New York Times, reported by the British press on 29 December 
1933, in which he too hinted that the Soviet Union might join the League o f Nations.
1* The Daily Telegraph, 30 December 1933. "Soviet Warning to Japan; Blunt Words Also to 
Germany" by the Moscow Correspondent. The Times, 1 January 1934, by the Riga Correspondent. 
The New Statesman and Nadon, 6 January 1934. "Comments- Warnings from Moscow".
19 D.B.F.P., Second Series, Vol. VII, nos. 548, 549, and 550.
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1934, Fleet Street reported what it considered to be an amazing development in European 
affairs. The Soviet Union, with the support of the French Government, was seriously 
considering making an application to join the League of Nations at the September meeting 
of the Assembly, a plan which was received with varying degrees of enthusiasm by the 
British press.
Initial reports by the quality conservative press revealed scepticism. Though The 
Times recognised the importance and the benefits of Soviet membership into the League 
and hoped the USSR was changing for the better, the paper short-sightedly suggested in 
May 1934 that the British Government should not bargain for the Soviet Union's entry 
since Britain itself would gain nothing.^o The Daily Telegraph took a more cynical 
interest in "Soviet Russia's disposition to join the League of Nations" and was concerned 
because Moscow "deemed it expeditious to change its tone". Nevertheless, the paper 
believed the British Government should support the Soviet Union's application since 
"Moscow's contemptible and abusive language" towards the League had ceased.^i In 
contrast, the popular conservative press expressed suspicion of Litvinov's plans for the 
Soviet Union's future in Europe. The Daily Express, for example, clearly hoped the 
British Government would avoid becoming involved in Moscow's plans even if the 
Soviet Union joined the League of Nations.^
Contrary to conservative press opinion, the majority of the liberal and labour 
press expressed unreserved approval and found hope for Europe in the Soviet 
Government's proposal to join the League. The Economist and the New Statesman and 
Nation argued that the British Government should take an active role in securing the 
Soviet Union's entry into the League of Nations because there were some obstacles 
which Britain's status as a world leader could overcome. For example, these journals 
wanted the British Government to ensure that the USSR was given a permanent seat on 
the Council.^^ The News Chronicle not only welcomed the Soviet Union's application
The Times, 23 May 1934. Leading article, "Russia and the League".
21 The Daily Telegraph, 24 May 1934. Leading article, "Russia's Terms for League".
22 The Daily Express, 23 May 1934. Leading article, "In Europe".
23 The Economist, 26 May 1934. Leading article, "Russia Takes a Hand". The New Statesman 
and Nation, 26 May 1934. "Comment - Russia and the League". f"
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to join the League of Nations, but also pointed out that it meant the League still had
something to offer, despite its increasing number of critics, since "great nations do not
irnppfeni’voluntarily associate with 'important talking shops'". The News Chronicle did not 
believe that the Soviet Union was joining "for the cynical reason that she has nothing to 
gain and much to risk in war", as was often suggested by the conservative press. The 
paper, instead, reported that the Soviet Government simply wished to join in a genuine 
desire to promote p e a c e .2 4
Surprisingly, the Daily Herald's Geneva Correspondent appeared to have 
misinterpreted the international situation in May and therefore, the paper did not respond 
as favourably as expected. Though the majority of Fleet Street was stating exactly the 
o p p o s i t e , 23 the Daily Herald's correspondent reported that "Litvinov had poured cold 
water on the idea of Russia joining the League of N a t i o n s ".2^ By July, however, the 
Daily Herald held the same opinion as the rest of the British press in recognising the 
Soviet Union seriously intended to enter the League. Though the paper was pleased that 
the British Government was finally supportive of the Soviet Government's efforts to gain 
entry into the League of Nations, the paper could not refrain from censuring the 
Conservatives for their allegedly biased policy against the Soviet Union.
For the past few years, the Labour Party, in the face of abuse and 
misrepresentation, urged in the name of sanity and common sense, that the Soviet 
Union be recognised formally and also welcomed as a great power in the comity 
of nations. Gradually common sense has prevailed over p r e j u d ic e .2 2
In September 1934, it was generally agreed by Fleet Street that the Soviet Union 
would be accepted into the League of Nations although there remained an unwillingness 
by the popular conservative press to see the "wolf" welcomed into the fold. However,
24 The News Chronicle, 23 May 1934. Leading article, "Re-enter Russia?" The paper's 
attitude contrasted to that of The Times, 23 May 1934. Leading article, "Russia and the League"; and 
ihe Daily Telegraph, 24 May 1934. Leading article, "Russia's Terms for League".
23 See for example The Times, 29 May 1934. The Manchester Guardian, 28 May 1934. The 
Sunday Times, 27 May 1934. The Scotsman, 26 May 1934.
2  ^The Daily Herald, 30 May 1934, article by the Geneva Correspondent 
2? The Daily Herald, 14 July 1934. Leading article, "Pact and League".
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the majority of newspapers and political journals were rational in their assessment of the 
value of the Soviet Union's membership - most noted obvious benefits and pointed out 
that at the very least, it was easier to watch the wolf from inside.28
Although the quality conservative press welcomed the Soviet Union's 
membership into the League of Nations, favourable comment was tempered with cautious 
appraisals of what Britain could expect from such an event. For example, the Yorkshire 
Post warned against raising hopes to unrealistic expectations since the USSR alone could 
not turn the League into a powerful organisation.29 Although the Sunday Times 
suggested that it was not "virtue, but necessity" which forced the Soviet Government to 
the line" towards the League, the paper was not expressing opposition since it saw 
the merits of the USSR's membership. "Whatever we think of Stalinist Russia, it is 
better to have her inside the League than out." Furthermore, the paper alleged that the 
French, as their friendship with the Soviet Government improved, were taking the correct 
approach by insisting the Soviet Union entered the League, thus "regularising" the 
association.30 In a similar attitude, the Scotsman admitted that even though the Soviet 
Union was not the most desirable candidate for the League of Nations after years of 
subversive activity, the paper recognised that it was very important to involve the Soviet 
Government in international affairs or else the League might collapse. The paper 
conceded that despite economic and political differences, the Soviet Union could no 
longer be ignored and it was better to secure Soviet cooperation rather than to leave such 
a large country isolated in Europe and Asia. However, equally as important to the 
Scotsman was the possibility that Germany would be unable to remain outside the 
League as to do so would demonstrate an increasing desire to alienate the world.3i
In contrast to the evolution in opinion of the quality conservative newspapers, the 
popular conservative press remained unreservedly opposed to the Soviet Union joining
28 The idea of "the w o lf  came from the Daily Mail, 6 September 1934. Leading article, "Wolf 
in the Fold" and the Manchester Guardian, 12 September 1934. Leading article, "The League and 
Russia".
29 The Yorkshire Post, 11 September 1934. Leading article, "The League, Russia, and 
Germany".
3® The Sunday Times, 9 September 1934. Leading article, "Moves of the Powers".
31 The Scotsman, 11 September 1934. Leading article, "The League of Nations".
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the League of Nations and devoted an unusually large amount of press coverage to the 
issue. The Beaverbrook and Rothermere papers were especially critical of the way in 
which the Soviet Union had joined and therefore, international affairs and the Soviet 
Union received detailed, and generally irrational, reporting. The Daily Express and the 
Daily Mail described with dismay how Britain had joined France in supporting the Soviet 
entry to the extent that "good nations", such as Switzerland, were "snubbed" by the West 
for showing hostility towards the Soviet Union. The Daily Express accused the French 
of pursuing an anti-German policy and cheered the Swiss for their opposition.32 The 
Daily Mail also encouraged the Swiss Government to do more since "no good will come 
to the League or its members if the USSR is admitted".33 The Evening News 
condemned the behind the scenes efforts at Geneva where the "Big Stick" was being 
wielded to hush opposition. The paper alleged that "Poor Switzerland has such an honest 
and well-founded aversion to Russia and its methods. It feels like asking the League to 
move so its air is not fouled by the Bolsheviks." In addition, the Evening News 
suggested that since the League "has decided to sup with the Devil, it will need a very 
long spoon for the broth. "34
The Daily Express, in a leading article, accused "some unthinking people", 
which could refer to other newspapers, of being gravely wrong when they said that the 
Soviet Union's entry was not a danger to Britain. In the opinion of the Daily Express, it 
was incorrect to assume the Soviet Union wanted to join the League for peace because 
"Russia is filled with the desire for w a r " .35 In the Daily Mail's view.
The latest Muscovite manoeuvre is so obvious that it is incredible that Moscow's 
hypocritical professions of good faith could be accepted at face value... For years 
the Soviets refused to join the "coalition of brigands" at Geneva and tried to break
32 The Daily Express, 11 September 1934. "Soviet Russia Invited to Join League" by the 
Geneva Correspondent; 18 September 1934, "Russia Lashed in League Battle" by D. Sefton Delmer, the 
Special Correspondent at Geneva.
The Daily Mail, 6 September 1934. Leading article, "Wolf into the Fold".
34 The Evening News, 12 September 1934. Leading article, "Mudlaiking at Geneva".
The Daily Express, 13 September 1934. Leading article, "Russia in the League".
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it up... but the wolf has ceased to snarl out of the fold and wears sheepskin to 
hold council with the lambs in s id e .3 6
Both the Daily Mail and the Evening News alleged that "Russia's presence can only 
bring further discredit to the League" since the Soviet creed remained one of "sedition and 
revolution" and therefore, the USSR sought admission simply to make mischief.3?
In addition to disparaging the Soviet Union, the Beaverbrook and Rothermere 
press condemned the behaviour of the British Government in permitting the Soviet Union 
to join the League of Nations, giving the impression that these papers believed the 
organisation to be sacred. This was ironic since the popularéonservative press rarely 
supported the League's work, nor did these papers wish to see British participation in the 
League as more than minimal since it was deemed to be beyond Britain's sphere of 
interest.38 Nevertheless, the popular conservative press exaggerated the theme of the 
British Government's "humiliating" abandonment of Christian faith in allowing the "Red 
gangsters of Moscow" to join the League of Nations.39
What mockery when Christian powers rush out to bring Russia in and Russia 
dithers on the doorstep... Russia's entry brings an element of atheism and anti- 
Christianity which is contrary to the whole spirit of the League or whatever spirit 
may be left. All Christian members should defend the faith and resign 
forthwith.40
The Evening News pointed out that the leaders of the Soviet Union were the "sworn 
foes" of Christianity and "arch-conspirators" against all that was "stable and decent" in 
Western life. The paper alleged that "decent people" would be disgusted by the 
"inconceivable folly" at Geneva and concluded that "no good can come of it, and Britain, 
because a part of it, has lost the opportunity of striking a blow for international honour
36 The Daily Mail, 6 September 1934. Leading article, "Wolf into the Fold".
32 Ibid. The Evening News, 12 September 1934. Leading article, "Mudlarking at Geneva".
38 The Evening Standard, 13 September 1934. Leading article, "Geneva". The Daily Mail, 12 
September 1934. Leading article, "War-Mongers of Geneva".
The Daily Mail, 12 September 1934. Leading article, "War-Mongers of Geneva".
49 The Daily Express, 15 September 1934. Leading article, "Russia or the Faith?".
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and d e c e n c y "  41 The Evening Standard bluntly stated that "a farce was being played out 
in Geneva" since the paper had been led to understand that the League was based on 
Christian principles. However,
Now British statesmen give all their effort to a nation whose policy is conducted 
in a most thorough and ruthless campaign against Christianity... In its short 
history, the Soviet Union has violated, through secret and subversive acts, the 
fundamental principles the League professed to stand for.
The evening paper saw no reason to believe the Soviet Government would change and 
therefore found it "extraordinary" that Britain was so eager to oblige the Soviet U n io n .4 2  
Thus, although the popular conservative press supported the British Government's 
foreign policy, in this event, these newspapers were not afraid to oppose His Majesty's 
Government's support for the Soviet entry into the League of Nations.
Low's cartoon on 14 September 1934, "New Member", depicted pretentious anti- 
Communist club members criticising France and Britain for allowing Litvinov, with his 
"vulgar disarmament ideas", into a "gentlemen's" league. Thus Low was critical of the 
paper which printed his cartoons, the Evening Standard, expressed his dissatisfaction 
with the lack of action by those with authority, and welcomed Litvinov's new collective 
security ideas .43
The liberal and labour press devoted its coverage to the recognition of the positive 
role which the Soviet Union intended to play in Europe. The Manchester Guardian was 
relieved that so many member states accepted the need to include the Soviet Union in 
international affairs. Likewise, the paper was satisfied that the Soviet Government 
appreciated the importance of the League of Nations, though the paper warned it was a 
"small organisation steadily losing credit". However, the Manchester Guardian 
conceded there must be "something of value" in it if the Soviet Government wished to 
join. Furthermore, the paper disagreed with the Daily Mail's suggestion that the Soviet
41 The Evening News, 12 September 1934. Leading article, "Mudlarking at Geneva".
42 The Evening Standard, 13 September 1934. Leading article, "Geneva".
43 See Figure 3.2. The Evening Standard, 14 September 1934, "New Member".
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Union was a lone wolf disguised as a sheep. In the liberal paper's view, there were 
"already others in the League wearing sheep's clothing".44 The News Chronicle and the 
Daily Herald similarly believed the Soviet Union's entry into the League was opportune 
because the organisation needed an act of faith and goodwill to restore its declining 
authority.43 Although the Soviet Union was a communist state, the Spectator argued 
that "in the main Russia is for peace" and therefore, Europe would benefiL46
The Daily Worker called the invitation issued by the West a victory for the 
USSR, a "great champion for the cause of world peace". The paper alleged that the 
capitalist states were compelled to recognise the outstanding and powerful role the Soviet 
Union occupied in the world, a role which could no longer be ignored. The Daily 
Worker suggested that the invitation was a "bitter pill for the rabid imperialist 
warmongers and intriguers", such as the Daily Mail and to a lesser extent The Times.
44 The Manchester Guardian, 12 September 1934. Leading article, "The League and Russia".
43 The Ngyyj Chronicle, 11 September 1934. Leading article, "A Bright Spot at Geneva". The 
D aily Herald, 17 September 1934. "Soviet Entry to League Is Now Settled" by the Special 
Correspondent to Geneva, W. N. Ewer; 17 September 1934, leading article, "A Word to the League".
46 The Spectator, 7 September 1934. Leading article, "The Real Issue at Geneva".
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However, the communist paper conceded that the British Government, despite a lingering 
"hatred", had at least recognised that the situation in Europe had changed and that the 
Soviet Union represented peace.47
Nevertheless, despite the general welcome in the majority of the British press for 
the Soviet Union's membership into the League, a degree of apprehension over the 
changes for Europe remained. The quality conservative press was naturally uneasy since 
it retained an attitude which was sceptical of 6m m unism . Primarily, The Times 
remained anxious that the Soviet Union had only joined for security reasons which would 
unfortunately involve the rest of Europe, possibly in war. Secondly, The Times felt that 
the end of subversive activities should have been made a condition of Soviet entry and 
feared that those schemes would continue despite the apparent goodwill expressed by 
Litvinov.48 The Yorkshire Post expressed similar concerns and stated that it was only a 
"change of face, not a change of heart" since the Soviet Government continued to follow 
the Marxist dogma. Though it appeared that Soviet propaganda against capitalism had 
declined, the Yorkshire Post alleged that world revolutionary doctrines were only 
"shelved" until more applicable. Thus the paper, irrationally, proposed that if Stalin and 
Litvinov were truly sincere to the League, they would have "thrown over" the teachings 
of Marx and Lenin.49
However, not only did the Conservative press admit to some reservation, but the 
labour and liberal press likewise did. Regardless of the paper's positive support for the 
Soviet entry, the Daily Herald surprisingly voiced its concern over the future of the 
League following the Soviet Union's membership. Although the paper hoped that 
Moscow's efforts at collective security would decisively influence the organisation and 
offset the loss of Germany, the paper was concerned that the League was becoming a 
place where states came to prepare for war, not to prevent it.30 The Manchester Guardian
42 The Daily Worker, 13 September 1934. Leading article, "Soviet Union and the League". 
See also 17 September 1934, leading article, "Why Soviet Union Enters the League".
48 The Times, 20 September 1934. Leading article, "Russia at the Council". See also 10 
September 1934.
49 The Yorkshire Post, 19 September 1934. Leading article, "Russia at Geneva".
30 The Daily Herald, 19 September 1934. Leading article, "Geneva's Future".
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also admitted to having fears that the Soviet Government was acting purely for its own 
benefit.3i The Spectator expressed "satisfaction rather than enthusiasm", which it 
alleged was the general feeling in Britain, towards the Soviet Union's entry into the 
League. The journal pointed out that the USSR, despite joining, continued to be an 
autocratic police state where murder was semi-legalised, famine abounded, and religion 
was persecuted. Although the Spectator condemned the Soviet Government for these 
aspects, the journal pointed out that the same conditions had existed under the Tsars and 
therefore, the British Government could provide no significant reason to hinder Soviet
membership.32
It was the Daily Telegraph, not noted in 1934 for its accommodating attitudes 
towards the Soviet Union,33 which devoted a large amount of press coverage concerning 
the advantages which Europe could expect from cooperation with the Soviet 
Government. "The impossible six months ago is now an actuality of the present... It was 
a pariah of its own choosing until now but it is not right to keep her so," especially since 
the "logic of the situation" meant it was better for the Soviet Union to join to promote 
peace. The Daily Telegraph believed in the Soviet Government's promise to be loyal, 
and though that did not necessarily mean a "change of heart, it is a change of attitude" 
which had to be grasped by the West since "Russia needs the League and the League 
needs Russia. "34
The Eastern Locarno Plan
The general support by the British press for the Soviet Union's membership 
the League of Nations occurred during the height of a thaw in British-Soviet relations 
which lasted from the spring of 1934 to the end of 1935.33 It was during that period that
31 The Manchester Guardian, 20 September 1934. Leading article, "Russia into the League".
32 The Spectator, 21 September 1934. Leading article, "Russia at Geneva".
33 See for example, the Daily Telegraph, 24 May 1934. Leading article, "Russia’s Terms for
League".
34 The Daily Telegraph, 18 September 1934. Leading article, "Russia at Geneva". There 
remained hints of sarcasm towards the Soviet Union in the paper. For example, the headline for 19 
September read "Russia Joins the League; Litvinov Arrives Too Soon".
33 Curtis Keeble, Britain and the Soviet Union, 1917-1989, pp. 122-129.
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the British Government was adapting its foreign policy to meet the changes caused by 
Nazi Germany and thus collective activity appeared to be the correct policy to adopt. 
Because Germany had withdrawn from the League, the Soviet Union was accepted as a 
suitable replacement to strengthen the organisation and with the further hope that the 
Germans would be encouraged to return. Furthermore, by being admitted into the 
League, the Soviet Government's plans for Europe were allegedly given the proper | 
international recognition and mark of r e s p e c t a b i l i t y .36 One plan had already been 
suggested by the French and Soviet Governments in May 1934, the idea of an Eastern ' 
Locamo pact which was intended to guarantee, against aggression^jhe_e?dstence of / 
Eastern Europe's frontiers by the major European powers. The French Government 
intended to reinforce its alliance with the Little Entente thereby improving France's 
position in Eastern Europe. Germany, who had alleged aggressive designs on the small 
countries to its east, was also invited to join as a key member. Most states in Europe 
would not consider the plan while the USSR remained outside the League, which was 
one reason why France was intent on securing the Soviet Union's membership into the 
organisation. The British Government, though eventually supporting the idea of 
Germany, France, and the Soviet Union acting as guarantors to Eastern Europe, refused 
to be actively involved in such a commitment. More serious, however, was the lack of 
support from the rest of Europe. Germany and Poland refused outright to join and the 
smaller East European states, such as those in the Baltic region, were suspicious of 
Soviet intentions and unwilling to support a project which might antagonise Hitler.32
Fleet Street reacted with varying degrees of enthusiasm to the idea of an East 
European security system, thus reflecting the degree to which each newspaper or political 
journal wished Britain to be committed in Europe. The Eastern Locamo plan retumed the 
issue of pre-war alliances, which had been in the form of bi-lateral pacts as opposed to 
collective agreements, to the main news pages. The majority of the British press
36 Haigh, p. 27.
32 For British press sympathy towards Baltic and Little Entente fears see for example, The 
Times, 15 June 1934. "'Eastern Locamo' Plan; Attitude of Baltic States" by the Riga Correspondent; 12 
April 1935, "New Soviet Pact Proposals" by the Riga Correspondent The Manchester Guardian, 7 May 
1935. Leading article, "The Baltic States".
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recognised that bi-lateral alliances had contributed to the outbreak of the First World War 
and therefore had to be avoided.38 There was, however, a difference of opinion amongst 
newspapers as to the extent to which Britain should be committed to collective 
agreements. The liberal and labour press wished to see the country involved in a large 
collective coalition while conservative papers, with the exception of the Scotsman and 
the Yorkshire Post, thought Britain ought to remain outside alliances, even if collective, 
so as to avoid the conditions of 1914.
The Eastern Locamo plan was met with cautious support by the British press 
when it was first proposed by Litvinov in the spring of 1934 at the Disarmament 
Conference. Although the New Statesman and Nation welcomed the "simple and 
promising" plan for Eastern Europe, the joumal pointed out that first reactions were not 
favourable. Germany was suspicious of French and Soviet intentions, while 
conservative opinion in Britain was "shy" of anything offered from Moscow and 
moreover preferred to keep out of European troubles, like America. Despite these 
problems, the New Statesman and Nation, though awaiting further details, felt the 
project offered renewed efforts for peace on potentially realistic lines.39 The Economist 
was relieved to see the Soviet Union active in the security of Europe and welcomed the 
Franco-Soviet plan for an Eastem pact which invited Germany to join thus preventing a 
return to pre-war alliances. However, the joumal was less supportive of Britain's 
participation in the jplan. The Economist called for the British Govemment to wait for 
further details before it accepted a role in Eastem Europe.60 in addition, the press argued 
that Britain could not become involved in a security plan offered by the Soviet Union
38 See for example, the reaction of the British press to the signing of the Franco-Soviet Treaty i
of Mutual Friendship and Non-Aggression in 1935. Most papers expressed concern that another bi-laterri !
pact was contributing further misunderstanding in Europe. See later in this chapter. See also other random I
articles: The Daily Herald, 22 February 1935. Leading article, “Visit to Moscow”. The New Statesman
and Nation, 23 February 1935. "Comments". The Manchester Guardian, 22 February 1935. Leading
article, “London and Moscow”. The News Chronicle, 28 March 1935. Leading article, "The Berlin "
Talks".
39 The New Statesman and Nation. 2 June 1934. Leading article, "The Russian Plan". j
69 The Economist, 26 May 1934. Leading article, "Russian Takes a Hand". I
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until that country became a member of the League of Nations thus regularising its 
relations with the West.6i
In July 1934, Fleet Street was, on the whole, more optimistic and supportive of 
an Eastem Locarno plan. Although the Foreign Secretary, Sir John Simon, gave 
Britain's "support" to the "Franco-Soviet" idea for an Eastem Locamo Pact, the liberal 
press could not understand his objections to allowing Britain to join and therefore 
accused the Govemment of preferring the old system of selective alliances to collective 
action. Thus the Manchester Guardian and the News Chronicle criticised the British 
Govemment for refusing to act independently of Germany, whose protestations were 
condemned by both papers as unreasonable since the new pact implied German 
participation on equal terms.^2
O f the quality conservative press, the Scotsman, without allowing its 
"imagination to run riot", most clearly believed in July that the Eastem Locarno plan was 
beneficial to not only Europe but also Britain. The paper disagreed with those "Britons 
who see the scheme as a means of embroiling Britain abroad in an all European 
Locamo". In the opinion of the the British Govemment needed to join a plan
for the protection of Europe and thus a collective security system, which included Nazi 
Germany, was far better than bi-lateral pacts. However, the Scotsman recognised that it 
was Germany's attitude which was crucial to the scheme because without German 
participation, the plan would at best be a defensive alliance and at the worst an 
encirclement of Germany by suspicious and unfriendly neighbours. Nevertheless, the 
paper suggested the proposal would provide the "acid test" of Hitler's desire for peace 
since a refusal to join could only be taken in the worst possible meaning. 63 Therefore, 
unlike the rest of the conservative press, the Scotsman laid responsibility for the success 
of the plan on Germany. Low also held Germany accountable for the tension in Europe.
61 The Manchester Guardian, 28 May 1934. Leading article, "The Conference". The Daily 
Telegraph, 24 May 1934. Leading article, "Russia's Terms for League". The New Statesman and 
Nation, 2 June 1934. Leading article, "The Russian Plan". The Times, 23 May Î934. Leading article, 
"Russia and the League". The Economist, 26 May 1934. Leading article, "Russian Takes a Hand".
62 The Manchester Guardian, 14 July 1934. Leading article, "A European Pact?". The News 
Chronicle, 14 July 1934. Leading article, "The New Pact".
63 The Scotsman, 14 July 1934. Leading article, "An Eastem Locamo".
The Indivisibility of Peace 79
/  'IIA I f ' I
k
• \f e i la !  If m o r u le u f  lü ill hi> j u ^ r i b  lf«-, « d e . u iill h e a w u f « 4  Bt/TiT n o t —
H ustoU ni H i tU r B&nho« Litvinov
P L A Y T I M E  I N  T H E  E U R O P E A N  N U R S E R Y
Fig. 3.3
His cartoon on 20 July, "Playtime in the European Nursery", showed Hitler refusing to 
give his building block to the French Govemment to secure the foundation of the Eastem 
Locamo plan.64
In contrast, though appearing more supportive of the East European pact, the 
main consideration of the other quality conservative newspapers was that the British 
Govemment should assume no new responsibilities. For example, the O bserver 
welcomed a "collective" rather than "selective" plan, which encouraged disarmament but 
cmcially "did not require further British commitments". The paper was pleased Britain 
had offered "moral support" to the French Govemment and thus the paper gave "whole­
hearted" thanks and congratulations to France: "Europe looks to France for the lead and 
France gives it with logic and worthiness." There was, curiously, no reference by the 
paper to the Soviet Union’s involvement in the plan.65 The Daily Telegraph made a 
similar comment when it offered its support to "Barthou's scheme for Eastem Europe" 
which involved Germany and the Soviet Union. The paper, somewhat surprisingly,
64 See Figure 3.3. The Evening Standard, 20 July 1934, "Playtime in the European Nursery".
65 The Observer, 15 July 1934. Leading article, "Stabilising Europe".
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assumed "Russia will join". Thus the Daily Telegraph strangely appeared to have 
ignored the fact that the Soviet Union was one of the proposers of the original idea for an 
Eastem Locamo plan. In addition, as with the rest of the quality conservative press, the 
Daily Telegraph was relieved that Britain was taking a "purely benevolent" attitude and 
not increasing its obligations.66 Thus Low’s cartoon, "Playtime in the European 
Nursery", critically noted Simon's lack of participation with the other European leaders in 
building a stable Europe.^?
The popular conservative press condemned the Eastem Locamo plan outright. In 
May 1934, the Daily Express criticised the idea of an Eastem security pact as a move by 
France, with the aid of the Soviet Union, to encircle Germany. However, the paper 
stated with confidence that Britain would never consent to joining because "the people" 
would reject such a proposal.68 In July, even though the Daily Express was forced to 
acknowledge that the British Government approved of the plan, the paper reported that 
the "biggest cheer of the day" in the House of Commons came when the Foreign Minister 
announced Britain would not sign the pact nor commit the country to any new 
undertakings.69 As the rest of Europe "feverishly" rearmed and threatened to isolate 
Germany, the Daily Express alleged that the situation was more menacing for Britain in 
1934 than in 1914 because British commitments had multiplied. Thus the paper 
pessimistically, and irrationally, reported that "death is hurrying this way. Raise your 
voice before it is too late! Protest against war pacts! Agitate! No more war for us! "29
At the same time that the Soviet Union was admitted into the League of Nations, 
thus allegedly providing the Soviet Union with respectability, Germany and Poland 
issued a joint declaration on their peace methods. Both states believed in the benefit of 
bi-lateral pacts as the "best safeguard for peace in Eastem Europe", thus sending a severe 
blow against the Eastern Locamo plan.2i The Daily Telegraph reported without
66 The Daily Telegraph, 14 July 1934. Leading article, "Hope of an Eastem Locamo".
62 See Figure 3.3. The Evening Standard, 20 July 1934, "Playtime in the European Nursery".
68 The Daily Express, 23 May 1934. Leading article, "In Europe".
69 The Daily Express, 14 July 1934. Leading article, "This Peace Pact".
29 The Daily Express, 16 July 1934. Leading article, "Lest We Forget".
21 TheNcwjf Chronicle, 19 September 1934. "Blow to Eastem Locamo", B.U.P. in Geneva.
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disappointment, in a leading article ironically entitled "Germany's Peaceful 
Protestations", that the "Franco-Russian project for an Eastem European Pact on the 
Locamo principles is dead".22 The Daily Mail also did not regret the "untimely demise" 
of the East European plan and even felt that it would be "a good thing if Westem Locamo 
follows it... Germany's rejection of Eastern Locamo means another still-bom pact flung 
on the diplomatic dustheaps".23
Except for the Daily Telegraph, the quality conservative and liberal newspapers 
regretted the failure of the Eastern Locamo proposals though the Yorkshire Post was not 
siuprised by Germany's refusal to join.24 The Scotsman reported that after two months 
of deliberation, the Germans had finally rejected the plans for Eastem Europe out of 
suspicion of a "catch" by the French and Soviet Governments. The paper could not give 
credit to Hitler’s fears of encirclement since the agreement offered reciprocity for all 
involved. Furthermore, the paper suggested that the German preference for bi-lateral 
agreements could potentially rebound on Germany. With the apparent failure of the East 
European plan, the Scotsman felt that in all likelihood it would be replaced by a Franco- ^
Soviet bi-lateral alliance which the paper argued should cause the German Govemment |
I
more concern.25
Eden's visit to Moscow
The British Govemment, hypocritically, did not criticise Hitler's preference for 
bi-lateral pacts. The Soviet press thus found much to condemn in German and British 
attitudes and questioned the British Government's ambivalence towards Germany,
22 The D aily Telegraph, 13 September 1934. Leading article, "Germany's Peaceful 
Protestations".
23 The Daily Mail, 13 September 1934. Leading article, "Britain's Best Course". See also, the 
Daily Express, 14 July 1934. "Germany Upsets Eastem Locamo" by the Foreign Editor. This article 
also criticises British participation in Westem Locamo.
24 The Yorkshire Post, 12 September 1934. Leading article, "Germany as Ishmel".
25 The Scotsman, 12 September 1934. Leading article, "An Eastem Locamo". Liberal press 
reports were very similar: the Manchester Guardian, 12 September 1934. Leading article, "The League 
and Russia". The Vewf Chronicle, 11 September 1934. "Germany's No" by B.U.P.; 14 September 
1934, "Poles Tear Up a League Pact" by Vemon Bartlett.
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declaring that Britain wanted to compromise on the Eastem Security plan.26 in an 
attempt to rectify this misunderstanding of Britain's support for the Eastem Locamo 
proposals and to prove its commitment to collective security, the British Govemment 
announced its decision to send a Minister to Moscow to exchange views with Litvinov on 
the European situation.
In Febraary 1935, it was decided that Simon would meet with Hitler for 
economic talks and to discuss the Eastern Locamo plan. Following the Berlin meetings, 
a group of Foreign Office representatives, though no specific reference was made of the 
Foreign Secretary, would continue to Moscow, Warsaw and Prague for similar 
discussions. The labour press immediately and enthusiastically expressed satisfaction in 
the proposed talks since the visit of a Cabinet Minister would do much to dispel Soviet 
mistrust. The Daily Herald and the New Statesman and Nation, relieved that Britain 
was finally paying a "courtesy" visit, welcomed the positive step towards improving 
British-Soviet relations since the situation in Europe in 1935 made such a trip essential 
for the promotion of a collective arrangement.
Peace cannot be secured by Eastem or Western pacts alone, by encirclement or 
isolation, by alliances or ententes. It requires an all-inclusive system embracing 
regional pacts and also the framework of the League, with the spirit of the 
League.22
However, the liberal and quality conservative press responded with more reserve 
to the proposal. The Manchester Guardian, though warmly welcoming the first official 
^ ^ ) v is i t ,  cautiously pointed out that it would be impossible for Britain to accept any 
commitments of a direct nature in Eastern Europe beyond the Covenant of the League's 
commitments. Nevertheless, the paper agreed with Litvinov that "peace is indivisible" 
and thus hoped the trip would enable a mutual understanding between East and West, a
26 D.B.F.P., Second Series, Vol. XII, nos. 464 and 474. See also. The Times, 27 February
1935. “Moscow and the Pact; Critical of British Policy" by the Riga Correspondent. The N ew s  
Chronicle, 18 February 1935. Leading article, "Is It Peace?".
22 The Daily Herald, 22 February 1935. Leading article, “Visit to Moscow”. See also, the 
New Statesman and Nation, 23 February 1935. "Comments".
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necessity for European p e a c e .2 8  The News Chronicle was even more circumspect than 
the Manchester Guardian in its praise for the visit. The paper thought the idea of sending 
Simon to the Soviet Union was very good "should circumstances make it possible" - the 
Foreign Minister's trip could only take place if he was able to remove the 
misunderstanding between Germany and the USSR.29 Continuing with its supportive 
attitude towards the Soviet Union, established when that country entered the League of 
Nations, the Daily Telegraph believed a senior British Minister had a duty to visit Berlin 
and Moscow. He would thus be able to convince Hitler that the Soviet Govemment 
wanted peace and to discuss with the Soviet leadership the best method of moving the 
Soviet Union into a leading role in Europe.®®
Again, the popular conservative press most intensely opposed the proposed visit 
by Simon to Berlin and Moscow. The Daily Express alleged that Britain only met with 
"disastrous" results when its Ministers went abroad for discussions. In addition, the 
paper objected to the intended visits because
It is 550 miles to Berlin; 290 more to Warsaw; then 720 to Moscow. It is further 
than that from Britain's tme interests. What purpose do the ministers hope to 
achieve by a policy of wilful, wicked interference in the affairs of Europe.
The paper did not wish to see British commitments increase and did not believe that peace 
existed in "Berlin, Vienna, Paris, and Moscow where the war-spider spins its web". On 
the contrary, the Daily Express argued that "Peace lies in the strength and security of the 
Empire".® 1
As rumours circulated at the beginning of March that Simon did not intend to visit 
Moscow, A. J. Cummings, the political correspondent of the News Chronicle, believed 
the British Govemment "lacked courage". In the correspondent's opinion, sending
28 The Manchester Guardian, 22 February 1935. Leading article, “London and Moscow”.
29 ThelVewj Chronicle, 22 February 1934. Leading article, "Wanted, an Honest Broker".
89 The Daily Telegraph, 21 February 1935. Leading article, "Soviet Support for Regional 
Pacts". Also, 23 February 1935, article by the Diplomatic Correspondent
The Daily Express, 26 February .1935. Leading article, "Bad for Britain". See also the 
Daily Mail, end February 1935.
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another member of the Govemment, such as Anthony Eden, the Lord Privy Seal, to 
"explore the situation" would mean delay which
is altogether bad as it would only exasperate the Russians, take all the bigness and 
spontaneity out of a major mission, and probably doom to failure the main 
purpose of building a bridge of goodwill, to be translated into treaty terms, 
between Moscow and Berlin.
Cummings hoped a full diplomatic mission would be sent to the Soviet Union and 
thought the British Government would actually be surprised and delighted with the 
British public's response to such an event.82
However, the British Government announced that Eden would head the 
delegation to Moscow. The labour and liberal press immediately questioned the British 
Govemment's decision:
The choice is a concession to the prejudices and ill-manners of the Diehards in the 
Cabinet. They were compelled to recognise the necessity of a Ministerial visit to 
Moscow, but were unwilling to pay the Russians the compliment of sending the 
Secretary of State... They have gmdgingly agreed to a junior minister, but with 
no Cabinet rank. The discourtesy is lamentable and will be duly noted in 
Moscow, though they will not protest.®^
It was not that the Daily Herald disliked Eden; the paper believed him to be "personally 
more than acceptable". The issue was that he had no authority and would therefore need 
to consult the Cabinet before agreeing to anything. The Manchester Guardian also 
wished Simon was visiting Moscow after his discussions in Berlin simply because "if a 
member of the Cabinet goes to Germany, then he should also go to Russia". As with the 
Daily Herald, the liberal paper did not doubt Eden's competency to negotiate since he 
was a "very able" person. However, the Manchester Guardian did not dwell on the
®2 TheiVeH'j Chronicle, 4 March 1935. "Simon Must Go to Moscow", special article by A. J. 
Cummings.
®3 The Daily Herald, 8 March 1935. Leading article, “Slight on Soviet”.
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"slight", but suggested that "everywhere should welcome the news of the visit - all do 
except Germany." • It was difficult for the paper to comprehend why the German 
Government objected to the trip to Moscow since it was not directed against Nazi
Germany.84
Simon and Eden's visit to Berlin produced no advantages for the Eastem Locamo 
plan, and the majority of the British press was disheartened by Hitler's unreasonable 
desire to prevent the pact. Apart from the Daily Worker, the New Statesman and Nation 
was the most condemning of the press towards Hitler's response to Simon's efforts. The  ^
joumal wondered if Hitler was "blinded by his hatred of Communism" or if it was a i 
desire to be free of commitments so he could attack the Soviet Union which led him to 
refuse to join a collective security system. The Nazi leader's claim that he would join a i ^  
pact which excluded Moscow was useless, in the opinion of the New Statesman and 
Nation, since the Soviet Union was vital to the maintenance of European peace. Thus 
the joumal suggested that Hitler's frank talks with Simon would probably contribute 
more towards a Franco-Soviet understanding and a pact than anything else.®5
The liberal press and some quality conservative newspapers weré lil^ëwise 
disappointed with Hitler's uncompromising attitude towards an assoc ia tm i^ ith  the 
Soviet Union. The News Chronicle accused the Nazi leader of "planning min" in 
Europe if he refused to cooperate with Moscow.®^ Both the Scotsman and the Sunday 
Times were dissatisfied with Hitler's excuses and alleged fears since most of them could 
be removed if Germany acted with the Soviet Union,®2 In contrast, the Daily Telegraph 
adopted a discouraging outlook, comparable to the popular conservative press, and 
suggested that due to the lack of success in Berlin, Eden’s hopes of being able to 
accomplish anything in Moscow were mined.®® There was, however, no complaint by 
the paper conceming Hitler's unyielding opposition to the Soviet Union and the Daily
®4 The Manchester Guardian, 8 March 1935. Leading article, “Mr. Eden’s Visit”.
®5 The New Statesman and Nation, 30 March 1935. "Comments - Hitler and Russia". See 
also the Daily Worker, 26 and 27 March 1935.
®6 The News Chronicle, 28 March 1935. Leading article, "The Berlin Talks".
®2 The Scotsman, 27 March 1935. "Berlin Conversations Concluded" by the Berlin 
Correspondent. The Sunday Times, 24 March 1935. Leading article, "The Visit to Berlin".
®® The Daily Telegraph, 27 March 1935. Leading article, "The Door Is Shut on Eastem Pact".
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Telegraph appeared to have accepted that the Eastem Locamo plan was not going to 
succeed.
The popular conservative press was once again relieved by the "fruitlessness" of 
the visit. The Daily Express wanted the British Government to follow Hitler's 
suggestion that Britain should refrain from becoming entangled in Eastern Europe. 
Involvement there, in the paper's opinion, could lead to a quarrel with Germany and 
therefore, Britain ought to concentrate on the Empire, its tme sphere of interest.®9 The 
Daily Mail found it incredible that a British Govemment would consider entering into 
any sort of pact with Moscow, especially one which increasingly resembled a plan to 
encircle Germany.99 Following the outcome of the Berlin talks and despite the Dailtj 
Mail's appreciation of Eden's "admirable work for peace through tact and judgement", 
the paper felt compelled to ask if the visit to Moscow would serve a practical purpose. 
Though admitting that Eden was an "expert diplomatist", the Daily Mail suggested that 
he would have to deal with very "artful and dangerous people, who will put forth 
blandishments to entangle Britain in commitments of a most mischievous kind". The 
paper further stated that the present European situation was a matter for only Britain, 
France, Germany, and Italy to solve because the Soviet Union had no place in Europe 
since it was an Asiatic state.91
Despite these negative attitudes towards the Soviet Union and collective security, 
Eden's visit took place and was given prominent coverage in the British press especially 
since he was favourably received in Moscow and had talks with Litvinov and Stalin.92 
The Daily Herald suggested that because Stalin, who rarely spoke to foreign statesmen, 
met with Eden for discussions on Europe, trade and Asia, the Soviet Government 
believed the situation in Europe was very serious .93 The Daily Herald felt it "desirable 
to emphasise how deeply important for peace is the maintenance of good and friendly
®9 The D aily Express, 20 and 27 March 1935. Leading article and report by Berlin 
Correspondent respectively.
99 The Daily Mail, 26 March 1935. Leading article, "An Historic Parallel".
91 The Daily Mail, 23 March 1935. Leading article, "The Visit to Moscow".
92 See British newspapers, 28 March to 1 April 1935.
93 The Daily Herald, 30 March 1935. "Eden's Frank Talk with Stalin" by an Exchange 
CorrespondenL
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relations between Moscow and Britain" since both countries were influential states 
belonging to the League and linked by the desire for peace. The paper alleged that the 
slogan "peace is indivisible" had to be the standard of Europe since regional pacts were 
acceptable only if they were within the framework of the League of Nations. 
Furthermore, cooperation between the British and Soviet Governments was essential in 
aiding Europe's quest for peace and thus Eden's visit assumed vital importance.94
Even the Daily Express, which disapproved of the British visit to Moscow, 
recognised that the Soviet Government had greeted Eden with special treatment.95 
Nevertheless, the paper cynically alleged it was done to draw the British in: "Stalin is 
ready to offer Britain a military pact to march the Red Guards by the side of the Grenadier 
Guards for the defence of Britain if Hitler dares to attack us." The Daily Express, 
however, did not expect a German attack and argued that the British would thus be 
obliged to assist the Soviet Union in the far more likely prospect of a Soviet-Japanese 
war. Therefore, the Daily Express suggested that the less Britain had to do with Stalin, 
the "more occasion we shall have to 'Cheer up, smile, and be gay'".96
Though the results of Eden's talks in Moscow were not spectacular, they were far 
more positive than the outcome of Simon's discussions in Berlin. Eden himself noted the 
contrast and hoped that Hitler would take sufficient notice of the improved relations 
between Moscow and London.^^ The British-Soviet communique stressed that the 
"friendly cooperation of the two countries in the general work for the collective 
organisation of peace and security is of primary importance for the furtherance of 
international efforts to this end".^^ Although Eden was sincere in his preference for 
Britain to promote collective security, he recognised that despite Hitler's intransigent
ThQ Daily Herald, 28 March 1935. Leading article, ‘Talks in Moscow".
95 The Daily Express, 28 March 1935. "Russia Greets Mr. Eden with ’Blue Danube"' by the 
Warsaw Correspondent; 29 March 1935, "Litvinov Toasts the King; Moscow Fetes Mr. Eden".
96 Daily Express, 29 March 1935. Leading article, "Cheer Up, Smile, and Be Gay".
97 Anthony Eden, Facing the Dictators, p. 165. The British Ambassador in Berlin reported that 
Hitler was "perturbed" by the Moscow communique and the warmth of the Soviet reception for Eden. 
D.B.F.P., Second Series, Vol. XII, no. 690.
98 Eden, p. 161.
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attitude, many in the Cabinet would remain unenthusiastic, primarily from a distrust of
communism.99
The liberal and labour press accepted the simple results of the talks and especially 
welcomed the improved nature of British-Soviet relations. The News Chronicle called 
the mission an "unqualified" success and pointed out that the greatest result of the talks 
was a promise of "cordial cooperation in the future for the maintenance of peace". 
The Manchester Guardian reported that there was complete accord between Britain and 
the Soviet Union, a benefit for Europe since both countries believed in "collective 
security" though the paper acknowledged this might leave little harmony between 
Germany and Britain. The Spectator pointed out that there were people in Britain 
who feared cooperation with the Soviet Union because of its "barbaric" background. 
However, the journal, in a view identical to Eden's, suggested that the only way to deal 
with Germany, who was appearing more aggressive, was to work with the Soviet 
Government since it held the same attitude towards peace and security as the British 
Government. Thus Britain had to take advantage of the support which the Soviet Union 
could give and furthermore, the Spectator thought that the British Government should 
remember that Eastern Europe was the region in which the Great War had b e g u n ,  
Both the Daily Herald and the News Chronicle argued that as two important European 
and Asiatic powers, Britain and the Soviet Union had to cooperate. Though the papers 
hoped Germany would join the Eastern Locarno plan, both conceded that the British and 
Soviet Governments would work without the Germans if necessary. 1^ 3
The quality conservative press accepted the results of the Moscow visit with 
relief. The Daily Telegraph, despite its negative attitude following Simon's efforts in 
Berlin, believed that Stalin's admiration of Britain would help to smooth the relations 
between London and Moscow and that regardless of economic and political differences,
99 Ibid, pp. 162 and 143.
The News Chronicle, 1 April 1935. "Russia for Collective Pacts" by A, J. Cummings in 
Moscow; 1 April 1935, leading article, "The Eastern Pact".
The Manchester Guardian, 2 April 1935. Leading article, “From Moscow to Warsaw".
The Spectator, 5 April 1935. Leading article, "1914 and 1935". See Eden, p. 143.
The Daily Herald, 1 April 1935. Leading article, “Peace and the Soviet”. The News 
Chronicle, 1 April 1935. Leading article, "The Eastern Pact".
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the two countries could hold "further fruitful w o r k i n g s " .  ^ ^ 4  T h e  Sunday Times and the 
Scotsman were pleased that the visit appeared to have been "most harmonious" and that 
relations were "distinctly improved" as a result of Eden's ability to impress on Stalin that 
Britain was not opposed to the idea of an Eastern Locarno plan.^^S However, in contrast 
to the Daily Herald’s and the News Chronicle’s argument that Britain and the Soviet 
Union could work without Germany if necessary, the Scotsman warned that such a 
move would convert Europe into two armed camps. If collective security failed, then 
Britain's foreign policy could potentially move into an alliance system "reminiscent of the 
old days" which would encircle Germany. The Scotsman, nevertheless, continued to 
place clear responsibility for the success of collective security on Germany even though 
the Berlin discussions did not offer much hope of German c o l l a b o r a t i o n . Low's 
cartoon, "All Quiet on the Eastern Front", on 5 April 1935 showed that Hitler, despite
The Daily Telegraph, 2 April 1935. Leading article, "Mr. Eden's Fruitful Visit".
^95 Sunday Times, 31 March 1935. Various articles. The Scotsman, 1 April 1935. 
Leading article, "Moscow Conversations".
The Scotsman, 1 April 1935. Leading article, "Moscow Conversations".
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Eden's efforts to bring Moscow and Berlin together, refused to join a pact of mutual 
assistance if the Soviet Union was a member.^^^
The coverage of Eden's journey around Eastern Europe in The Times focused on 
Germany's reactions, which were critical especially of the talks in Moscow.^®® 
However, The Times printed an important leading article on 4 April, entitled "The British 
Role", which argued that Germany had been unfairly and irrationally criticised for 
refusing to join the proposed East European pact. Furthermore, the paper wanted 
Britain's position to be restricted to a "mediating and educative" role.^^9 While the article 
rarely mentioned Eden’s efforts in Moscow, it had far reaching consequences on Soviet 
opinion. Eden had noted that wherever he visited, there was suspicion of Britain's 
foreign policy, which had been worst in Moscow where the Soviet Government was 
concerned that the British would concede too much to Germany, Eden assigned to 
The Times a large degree of responsibility for encouraging these doubts since Europe 
widely regarded the paper as an organ of the British Government. His annoyance with 
the attitude of the paper was expressed in a memorandum on 7 April which specifically 
berated the "defeatist" leading article for agreeing too openly with German opinions. 
Eden demanded that the British Government make it clear that The Times did not 
represent Foreign Office opinion as otherwise the paper would "destroy effective foreign 
policy in Europe". More important was his suggestion that Britain adopt a "firm" policy 
of collective peace and stand strong against Germany's growing demands. Eden alleged I 
that to appear "weak and vacillating", along the lines of The Times's suggestions, would 
encourage German demands and depreciate Britain's value in the opinion its friends and 
enemies 111
107 $00 Figure 3.4. The Evening Standard, 5 April 1935, "All Quiet on the Eastern Front".
108 The Times, 21 March and 28 March 1935. “Moscow and British Note” by the Riga 
Correspondent, and “British Visit to Moscow” by a special correspondent at Negoreloe, on the border of 
Poland and the Soviet Union. The Times, 1 April 1935. “Germany Critical o f Moscow Talks” by the 
Berlin Correspondent
109 The Times, 4 April 1935. Leading article, "British Role".
110 Eden, p. 176.
111 D.B.FP., Second Series, Vol. XII, no. 701.
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It was possible that the relative success of the Moscow talks prevented the 
popular conservative press from expressing its usual opposition to the Soviet Union. 
The Daily Mail made little comment on the British visit and when the paper did, its 
articles usually reported on the dress sense of the Soviet leadership, of what the 
entertainment consisted, and what the representatives ate at b a n q u e t s ,  The Daily 
Express also made very few observations during the v i s i t ,  However, once Eden had 
returned to London, the paper claimed that although Litvinov was the "hero of the British 
press", he was not so in the Daily Express since the paper was not impressed with his 
methods of trying to force Britain into fighting with suggestions that "peace is 
indivisible". 11^1
Decline of collective security
As a result of the failure to secure German and Polish acceptance of an Eastern 
Locarno plan, the British Government's fears of bi-lateral pacts were gradually realised 
as the French and Soviet Governments moved closer together. In 1932, a Franco-Soviet 
Pact of mutual friendship and non-aggression was formed though the final signatures and 
ratification were delayed, until May 1935 and February 1936 respectively, while the 
plans for Eastern Europe and the Soviet entry into the League of Nations were given \  
priority. Though the reaction of the British press was generally/of relief that the treaty /  
was not aggressive, there remained some reservations about a new bi-lateral pact, 
especially by those newspapers and journals of the liberal and labour press which hoped 
to see Britain more closely involved with the Soviet Union.
Laval, who replaced the pro-Soviet Barthou as Foreign Minister after his 
assassination in October 1934, visited Moscow in May 1935 to sign a pact which was the 
culmination of a four year Franco-Soviet rapprochement. The labour and liberal press 
expressed concern with the growing number of bi-lateral agreements even though the
’IheD m ly Mail, 29 and 30 March 1935. Articles by the Special Correspondent in Moscow, 
F.W. Memory.
D3 See for example, the Daily Express, 1 and 2 April 1935.
The Daily Express, 11 April 1935. Leading article, "The Indivisible Pact".
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New Statesman and Nation suggested that Europe could benefit from the pact since it 
was within the framework of the League Covenant. Furthermore, collective security 
remained a possibility despite the new bi-lateral alliance.^ 15 However, the Daily Herald 
and the News Chronicle demanded that Britain contribute more to the collective security 
system to prevent further bi-lateral agreements which isolated too many countries and 
made them vulnerable to aggressive designs.^^
The quality conservative press, ignoring the possible set-backs for collective 
security as a result of the Franco-Soviet pact, believed the Soviet Union ^©fitted more 
than France by the agreement. Though it was claimed by the Soviet and French press to 
be a pale substitute to an Eastern Locarno Pact, the Riga Correspondent for The Times 
suggested that the agreement was more than useful for the Soviet Union since France 
would be a strong ally .n^ The Observer, however, recognised that "modern 
industrialist Russia" was a far better partner for the French than Tsarist Russia had 
been.118 The Daily Telegraph believed that the British Government's only concern with 
regards to the pact should be to confirm that it was a defensive alliance within the
League. 119
As expected, the popular conservative press was cynical of the pact between tlie 
French and Soviet Governments. Furthermore, the majority of coverage in these papers 
was not devoted to the significance of the alliance. Instead, the Daily Express reported 
on irrelevant, though highly entertaining, details such as Laval's visit to Lenin's tomb 
and the way in which Moscow's inhabitants "danced with joy" in the streets when the 
pact was signed.12® Two months before the signatures, the Daily Express suggested 
that France was making a senseless choice in allying with the Soviet Union because the
115 The New Statesman and Nation, "Comments - The Franco-Russian Entente".
116 The Daily Herald, 6 May 1935. Leading article, "A Peace Pact". The News Chronicle, 11 
April 1935. Leading article, "Better than Pacts".
117 The Times, 14 May 1935. "Soviet Comment" by the Riga Correspondent
118 The Observer, 12 May 1935. "M. Laval’s Visit to Moscow: Modem Russia as an Ally" 
by the Moscow Correspondent. See also, 5 May 1935, "World: Week by Week - The Franco-Russian 
Pact".
119 The DazVy Telegraph, 15 May 1935. Leading article, "Organising a System of Security".
120 The Daily Express, 14 May 1935. "M. Laval Sees Lenin’s Tomb" by the Moscow 
Correspondent; 3 May 1935, "Moscow Dances with Joy", by Reuter in Moscow.
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Red Army was not "in the habit of winning" due to its lack of organisation. In contrast, 
the paper argued that Germany had selected a better ally in Japan. 121 However, in June 
1936 the Daily Express, though remaining unsupportive of the Franco-Soviet alliance, 
suggested that the Soviet Union was possibly the stronger member of the partnership 
because France was suffering from various domestic crises, especially strikes. The paper 
found it ironic that "whereas once they would have stoked up the troubles", the Soviet 
Government was allegedly lending support to subdue the disorder to prevent Germany 
taking advantage of France's weakened p o s i t i o n .  122 
The pact remained unratified until February 1936 at which time the majority of 
British press opinion echoed the views of the previous M a y .  123 However, The Times 
was further concerned because French ratification was denounced by Germany as 
"encirclement", though the paper believed the agreement was a peaceful settlement aimed 
against no one and formed as a protective measure to thwart aggression. 124 The liberal 
and labour press was similarly anxious but gave cautious approval to the pact since 
Germany was invited to join at any time. The Manchester Guardian feared that Europe 
was becoming increasingly unstable. "As the diplomatic cauldron boils ever more 
threateningly, there is an unprecedented hurrying to and fro of the great ones... Those 
fearing Germany draw closer together. "125
The real concern for Europe in 1936 was caused by the Nazi re-militarisation of 
the Rhineland in March which was alleged by the German Government to be a necessary 
consequence of the Franco-Soviet Pact. All British newspapers, whether conservative, 
liberal or labour in outlook, did not wish to see the Rhineland episode evolve into a war 
and therefore most did not support Litvinov's calls for strong action against Germany's
121 The Daily Express, 19 March 1935. Leading article, "Partners in War".
122 The Daily Express, 13 June 1936. Leading article, "Stalin Has a 'Deal' Too".
123 See for example, The Times, 11 February 1936. Leading article, "The Franco-Soviet
Treaty".
124 The Times, 29 February 1936. Various article by Correspondents in Berlin, Warsaw, and 
Riga. The Daily Herald, 12 February 1936 by Paris Correspondent
2^5 The Manchester Guardian, 12 February 1936. Leading article, "The Franco-Soviet Treaty". 
The New Statesman and Nation, 15 February 1936. "Comments".
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a g g r e s s i o n .  126 Even the Manchester Guardian, though displeased with Hitler and 
usually very supportive of collective action, concurred with the rest of the British press 
and refused to support Litvinov's appeals. 12?
Other non-collective alliances did not lead to an improvement in relations between 
Britain and the Soviet Union. For example, when Italy joined the Anti-Comintern Pact in 
November 1937, which Germany and Japan had signed the previous N o v e m b e r , i 2 8  the 
British Government became more concerned with cooperating with the Italian and 
German Governments who refused to negotiate or work with the Soviet Union. Thus, 
another means of encouraging Britain to work collectively with Moscow was wilfully 
overlooked, the importance of which was not lost on the Soviet Government. Although 
the British press of all political persuasions disliked the Anti-Comintern Pact, suggestions 
that Britain and the Soviet Union cooperate against German and Italian designs were 
limited. The popular conservative press perceived few dangers for anyone since the pact 
was "for show" and meant simply to "keep the brew b o i l in g " .  129 Thus there was no 
need for Britain or the Soviet Union to respond individually or together. The quality 
conservative press also found the pact "unnecessaiy and regrettable", and though directed 
against the Soviet Union and possibly the British Empire, these papers did not believe the 
agreement was aggressive in t e r m s ,  Therefore, suggestions that Britain and the Soviet 
Union should act collectively were not made since such action was considered needless. 
Even the liberal and labour press, which devoted the most interest to the pact, believed 
the agreement "signified next to nothing" and therefore did not require a collective 
response to it.^2i Only the Observer expressed sympathy, and thus a degree of support,
126 See for example. The Times, 10 and 11 March 1936. The Daily Herald, 13, 14, and 17 
March 1936, leading articles.
127 The Manchester Guardian, 13 and 16 March 1936. Various articles.
128 The Anti-Comintern Pact was allegedly designed to prevent the spread of communism in 
Germany, Japan, and Italy but in reality the plan, inspired by Hitler, was a lightly veiled threat against 
the Soviet Union.
129 The Daily Express, 9 November 1937. Leading articles, "Where Is Prague?" and "The 
Anti-Red Axis".
130 The Sunday Times, 7 November 1937. Leading article, "The Shifting Scene". The Daily 
Telegraph, 30 November 1936. Leading article, “Soviet Sabre-Rattling”; 26 November 1936, leading 
article, “The Anti-Bolshevist Pact”.
151 The Spectator, 12 November 1937. "From Axis to Triangle". The News Chronicle, 8 
November 1937. Leading article, “Triple Alliance”. The Daily Herald, 5 November 1937. Leading
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with Hitler's diplomacy in forming the Anti-Comintern Pact. "What else could we 
expect?" when the Soviet Union formed pacts with France and Czechoslovakia and 
meddled in Spain, 152
At the same time that Hitler was making aggressive moves in Europe and offering 
a concerted front against communism, Litvinov, despite his calls for unified action, did 
not wish to see Europe erupt into war as that was contrary to the Soviet Government's 
aims. 155 However, Britain's failure to respond firmly to Hitler's aggression led the 
Soviet Government to reconsider its objectives in 1936, especially since the British 
Government was increasingly cool towards the Soviet Union and more conciliatory 
towards Germany. By September 1936, hopes of new Locarno plans for the West or the 
East were declining due to German obstruction. Litvinov, though still supported by the 
laboiu* and liberal press in Britain, 154 recognised the failure of the Eastern Locarno plan 
and the ineffectiveness of the League of Nations to the extent that his speeches 
increasingly reflected the failure of collective security. 155 Furthermore, the Soviet 
Government, despite its efforts to convince Europe of the "indivisibility of peace" and its 
criticism of the German refusal to participate in an Eastern Locarno plan, recognised the 
need to cooperate with Germany. Thus trade negotiations continued despite the 
remilitarization of the Rhineland, the Spanish Civil War, and the propaganda directed 
against each other. 156 The British press regretted that political relations between 
Germany and the USSR were so bad that there would be no chance of an European
article, "Who Keeps the Law”. The Manchester Guardian, 8 November 1937. “Aims of Enlarged Anti- 
Comintern Pact” by the Diplomatic Correspondent in London. See also Alain Henry, "Le Facte 'anti- 
Komintem' (25 novembre 1936), vu par la press française", p. 413.
The Observer, 29 November 1936. "Drift; The New Alliances and Their Meaning" by J.
L. Garvin.
155 Haigh, p. 57.
The Daily Herald, 29 September 1936. "Litvinov Shatters Hopes of New Locarno” by W. 
N. Ewer, the Diplomatic Correspondent in Geneva. Also, the News Chronicle, 3 August 1936. 
Leading article, "As Russia Sees It".
155 Haslam, p. 93 and 95. Carr, German-Soviet Relations, pp. 124-125. Litvinov’s 
recognition that the League of Nations was ineffective was apparent in September and October 1935 with 
the Italian invasion of Abyssinia and the failure to impose strong sanctions.
156 Dunn, pp. 238-239. Robert Manne, "The Foreign Office and the Failure of Anglo-Soviet 
Rapprochement", p. 746. Though the Foreign Office may have had some fears that a German-Soviet 
rapprochement could be achieved through economic negotiations, the fear was not realised or expressed by 
the British press.
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settlement. The Daily Herald, with startling foresight, had an "uncomfortable feeling" 
that the fate of Europe depended on Soviet-German r e la t io n s .  157
Conclusion
Although Fleet Street recognised and supported, to varying degrees, the Soviet 
Union’s efforts to promote collective security, when it came to important events, such as 
the crises over the Rhineland, Abyssinia and the Anschluss, the British press did not 
wish to see these issues develop into a European war. Fleet Street believed Britain had to 
act collectively with Germany, not against it, and therefore these papers refused to accept 
the Soviet Union's call for firm action because such a move could increase the possibility
of war. 158
The popular conservative press had never supported collective security proposals 
as these papers perceived no value in the concept. The desire for Britain to remain 
isolated from Europe, Empire bound, and non-antagonistic to Germany outweighed all 
considerations for a collective system. Furthermore, many plans for collective action 
were offered by the communists whom the Beaverbrook and Rothermere press 
distrusted. In June 1934, the soviet Government believed that the Rothermere and 
Beaverbrook press, "though not officially inspired, nevertheless must represent the views 
of large numbers o f British Government supporters". 159 Vansittart, the Permanent 
Under-Secretary, denied that the British Government provided an official policy line to 
these newspapers, and even asked Chilston to point out to Litvinov that His Majesty's 
Government was "often bitterly attacked by [the Rothermere and Beaverbrook
157 The Daily Herald, 30 September 1936. Leading article, "Germany Against Russia". See 
also the Manchester Guardian, 14-16 September 1936. The Sunday Times, 13 September 1936. The 
New Statesman and Nation, 19 September 1936.
158 The Manchester Guardian, 18 March 1938. Leading article, "The Russian Proposal". The 
News Chronicle, 18 March 1938, Leading article, "The Only Basis". The Daily Herald, 18 March 
1938. "Powers v. Hitler: Litvinov's Move" by Reuter. The conservative press held a similar opinion 
though it was the traditional attitude that Germany should not be antagonised. See for example. The 
Times, 18 March 1938. "Measures to Resist Aggression" by the Moscow Correspondent. The Daily  
Telegraph, 18 March 1938. "Soviet Offers to Join in Collective Action" by the Moscow Correspondent. 
The Daily Express, 18 March 1938. "Why All the Gloom? Lord Beaverbrook Predicts Years of Peace 
for Us".
159 D.B.F.P., Second Series, Vol. VII, nos. 606.
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p r e s s ]  " . 1 4 0  The popular conservative press often found itself opposing the movements 
of the British Government during the thaw in relations between 1934 and 1935.
Criticism of the Government was often as detailed as that directed against the Soviet 
Union, especially concerning the British support for the Soviet entry into the League of 
Nations. However, because the British Government made no significant move towards 
cementing cooperation between the two countries following Eden's visit to Moscow, the 
attitude of the popular conservative press eventually resumed a reflection on the ideas of 
the British Government whose mistrust of the Soviet Government prevented a closer 
relationship. |
The quality conservative press, though suspicious of Soviet intentions, 
nevertheless cautiously supported the advantages which collective security, even if
I
offered by the Soviet Government, could provide for Europe. However, as appeasement I
gained the support of quality conservative newspapers, the temporary favourable efforts I
i
by the Soviet Union in 1934 and 1935 lost value. The Daily Telegraph presented the i
most variable coverage. Its attitude occasionally resembled the opinions o f the popular jj
conservative press which disliked the Soviet Union's increased involvement in Europe. I
At other times, the Daily Telegraph's articles reflected attitudes which displayed an I
ambivalence towards the Soviet Union's ideas, though without finding it necessary to I
1attack with hostility the Soviet Union's efforts towards collective security. In contrast, î
the Scotsman, and to a degree the Sunday Times and the Yorkshire Post, urged the !
British Government to work more closely with the Soviet Government. Furthermore, I
unlike the rest of the conservative press, these three papers criticised Hitler for frustrating 1
constructive policies aimed at securing European peace. The Scotsman and the Ï
Yorkshire Post succeeded in offering different opinions from the British Government {
because they were provincial newspapers whose editors were determined to remain i
independent of Government influence. In contrast, the conservative London dailies, i
whose editors were often intimate friends of politicians and civil servants, reflected much |
more closely Government beliefs. For example, when Simon finally offered British i
^40 D.B.F.P., Second Series, Vol. VII, nos. 608 and 611.
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support for an Eastern Locarno Plan, the quality conservative newspapers in London also 
made favourable references to the Soviet Union's ideas on the security o f Eastern 
E u r o p e .  141 Thus Eden, though critical of The Times in April 1935 for its pro-German 
attitude which opposed the Eastern Locarno Plan, recognised that the newspaper was 
"unofficially" reflecting the British Government's views on the s i t u a t io n .  142
The liberal and labour press believed it was in Britain's best interest to bring the 
Soviet Union and Germany together as only thus would Europe be saved from war. 
Although these papers did not hesitate to blame Germany for the failure of collective 
security, they also regretted that the British Government failed to take advantage of the 
benefits secured as a consequence of Eden's positive journey to Moscow. As British 
foreign policy increasingly appeased Germany and ignored the valuable ideas offered by 
the Soviet Government, the liberal and labour press deplored the demj.se of collective 
activity by the major states of Europe. Despite the British Government's positive efforts 
towards collective security in 1934 and early 1935, criticism by the liberal and labour 
press occurred though it was often offered in a manner which was meant to encourage 
His Majesty’s Government to do more to secure British-Soviet cooperation. However, 
when the test came over the re-militarisation of the Rhineland, these papers abandoned 
the principles of collective security in the face of German aggression.
Nevertheless,, collective security was given a further opportunity to achieve its 
purpose, before the Second World War, when the Spanish Civil War broke out in July 
1936. Though none of the British press wished to see Britain heavily involved in Spain, 
the issue for Fleet Street became clouded by political bias and the fear of doing too much 
or too little to help the Republican effort. The conservative press wished to avoid 
antagonising Germany and Italy while the liberal and labour press preferred decisive 
action similar to that which the Soviet Union proposed for a concerted effort against the 
rebels and fascists. .
4^1 See articles in July 1934. Also, D.B.F.P., Second Series, Vol. VII, no. 608. 
142 Eden, p. 176 and D.B.FP., Second Series, Vol. XII, no. 701.
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Chapter 4 
"The Spanish Shambles"i
Despite the Soviet Union's apparent change in foreign policy to promoting 
collective security, many British politicians and civil servants remained sceptical of the 
Soviet Government's new aims in Europe. Old fears prevailed that the long term goals of 
the Soviet Union continued to be the destruction of capitalism and democracy. In 1935 
for example, Viscount Chilston, Britain's Ambassador to Moscow, rejected the new 
policy by the Soviet Government as "not a change of heart... but a change of tactics" and 
emphasised that "world revolution remains as ever the ultimate end of Comintern policy." 
Chilston warned that the Soviet leadership's reversal of policy was merely "a change­
over to a far cleverer line of attack, and one which is eventually more likely to bear fruit 
in democratic countries than the former line of preaching open revolution".2 These fears 
increased when France and Spain both elected Popular Front Governments in May and 
February 1936 respectively. Furthermore, neither government seemed to provide 
stability as domestic crises rapidly developed. The Spanish Popular Front Government 
appeared especially vulnerable which caused concern in Britain where it was understood 
that the Soviet Union was offering support to reinforce the government in Madrid. The 
British Government was worried that if  Spain's Popular Front could not survive 
independently of Moscow, then the Soviet Government would gain a base in South- 
Western Europe from which communism could spread. It was assumed that France, in 
its vulnerable condition, would very likely fall to such a threat. Thus, when Spanish 
garrisons in Morocco were seized on 17 July 1936 by General Franco's right-wing 
military officers and fighting spread throughout Spain, the British Government secretly 
welcomed the potential overthrow of the Popular Front as a means of preventing the
 ^Title of leading article in the Spectator, 21 August 1936.
2 Douglas Little, “Red Scare, 1936: Anti-Bolshevism and the Origins o f British Non- 
Intervention in the Spanish Civil War”, p. 293.
The Spanish Shambles 100
spread of com m u n ism  5 Consequently, collective action in Spain was destined to fail as 
a result of the Conservative Government's traditional distrust of the Soviet Union's 
foreign policy.
With the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War, the Soviet Government recognised 
that an opportunity had arisen in Europe for the spread of communism. However, 
because the country was preoccupied with domestic issues, such as the second Five Year 
Plan and preparations for the first Moscow show trial, Stalin preferred to let the 
Republican Government fight with very limited Soviet resources. For example, the 
Soviet Government initially gave indirect assistance by forcing the Russian workers to 
make contributions to support the republican war effort. Nevertheless, as German and 
Italian aid to Franco's Nationalists increased, the Soviet leadership recognised it would 
have to take some action, not necessarily to help the spread of communism, but to hinder 
the success of fascism in Spain. Yet intervention was costly, especially if undertaken 
without France and Britain who appeared resolved to avoid involvement, and therefore, 
the Soviet Union sought to promote collective action with the West through non- 
intervention.4
In the first weeks of the Spanish Civil War, the British press displayed a 
surprising lack of interest in events, though coverage rapidly increased in August. Fleet 
Street was primarily concerned with seeing Britain remain uninvolved in a civil war 
which had the potential to entangle all of Europe in a larger conflict. Thus newspapers 
and political journals focused attention on the successes and failures of the non­
intervention plan and the Nyon Conference as they represented the best means of keeping 
the Spanish war localised. The role of the Soviet Union in promoting or hindering non­
intervention was carefully scrutinised by Fleet Street since all newspapers and journals 
knew the Soviet Government was assisting the Republicans, though the degree of help 
was open to debate. The popular conservative press was, on the whole, irrational in its
5 Little, p. 297 and 299. Cattell, Soviet Diplomacy and the Spanish Civil War, p. 11. For 
examples of Foreign Office fears that Soviet intervention in Spain was intended to spread communism, 
see D.B.F.P., Second Series, Vol. XVII, no. 78 and Vol. XVIII, no. 34.
4 Thomas, The Spanish Civil War. p. 215-216. Carr, The Comintern and the Spanish Civil 
War, p. 15.
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assessment of the Soviet Union's position in Spain. These papers actually attributed the 
outbreak of the war to Moscow and continually stated that were it not for communist 
intervention, Germany and Italy would not have been "obliged" to help Franco. In 
addition, the Rothermere and Beaverbrook press argued that the Soviet Union had no 
reason to be involved in the civil war since Spain was geographically far from Moscow's 
interests. Thus these papers argued the Soviet Government had ulterior motives for 
Europe.
Though the quality conservative press, with the exception of the Scotsman and 
the Sunday Times, was similarly opposed to Soviet involvement in Spain, these papers 
recognised that all major European states had to work collectively to prevent the war from 
spreading. Nevertheless, at times these newspapers accused the Soviet Government of 
inflaming the situation and of pushing Europe closer to war for its own purposes. For 
example, the attitude of the Observer was intolerant of the Soviet Union, thus prejudging 
the situation in Spain. Like the popular conservative press, the paper's editor, Garvin, 
stated that "Moscow's stimulus and aid long before Franco invaded is the cause of 
Spain's war lasting so long and so cruelly. "5 However, the majority of the conservative 
press consistently argued that non-intervention was the only policy to follow, as it kept 
British men from fighting in Spain and prevented the war from spreading throughout 
Europe, an attitude which reflected and found encouragement from the British 
Government.
In contrast, the liberal and labour press, with the Scotsman and the Sunday 
Times, were sympathetic and supportive of the Soviet Union's calls for collective action 
against Germany and Italy. These papers realised that the Soviet Union was assisting the 
Republican Government, but argued that Moscow was merely responding to German and 
Italian aid and attempting to prevent the demise of a democratically elected government. 
The liberal and labour press achieved a balance in their reporting by recognising that the 
republican and the nationalist armies were equally accountable for the atrocities in Spain
5 The Observer, 29 November 1936. "Drift; The New Alliances and Their Meaning" by J. L. 
Garvin. See also, 7 November 1937, "The Truth About Intervention; How Russia Feeds the War; Back 
to Fair Play" by J. L. Garvin.
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and that the Soviet Union was not the only country undertaking foreign intervention. 
Furthermore, these newspapers and journals, though very supportive of non­
intervention, were critical of the British Government for not enforcing the plan more 
vigorously. Thus the liberal and labour press gave the appearance of opposing His 
Majesty's Government though these papers had no more desire to send British troops to 
Spain than politicians or conservative newspapers.
Reds and Blacks
The Illustrated London News printed an astute article by Arthur Bryant, the 
editor of the journal, in August 1936 which acknowledged and explained the early lack of 
interest displayed by the British press in the Spanish Civil War. Bryant pointed out that 
while "neighbouring countries" thought of revolutions or civil wars,
British minds think of the annual holiday... We may scan the papers anxiously 
and shake our heads over the doings of the bloodthirsty Fascists or the wicked 
Reds (depending on our political convictions) but we really do care very little 
what their doings are so long as they do not interfere with ours. Our friends are 
sometimes shocked by this absorption of ourselves in trifles. They accuse us of 
lacking romanticism and lacking in political imagination... and call us a nation of 
shopkeepers.
Bryant, however, believed it was not necessarily bad that "England never stirs for 
anything but her own material interest" since ideals, in practice, frequently assumed a 
different shape from that which was intended. 6
Regardless of this detached attitude, the Illustrated London News was critical of 
prejudiced press coverage by papers which reported that Spanish priests were being 
murdered by "progressively-minded" young communists while other newspapers wrote 
that the same communists were being "bundled against walls" by the army and summarily
6 The Illustrated London News, 8 August 1936. "Our Notebook" by Arthur Bryant. Arthur 
Bryant, also the biographer and confidant of Stanley Baldwin, had visited Spain in the Spring of 1936 and 
recognised that revolution was imminent See Little, p. 296.
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shot.7 The popular conservative press was especially guilty of unbalanced reporting 
against communist involvement in Spain and rarely printed an article which did not 
condemn the evil practices of the "Reds" while praising the honourable work of the 
nationalists to save Spain. The Daily Express's correspondents in Spain - D. Sefton 
Delmer (who became the paper's Moscow Correspondent in 1939), Selkirk Panton, and 
O. D. Gallacher - regularly used "Reds" interchangeably with "Republicans". Sefton 
Delmer, for example, reported from the Northern Rebel Headquarters at Burgos as a 
witness to the nationalist fight for the "Red Army" village of Guadarrama, where he 
claimed to have spent four hours being bombed by "Red" planes.8 Gallacher reported in 
a similar style and alleged Largo Caballero, the Prime Minister of the Republican 
Government from February 1936 to May 1937, was Spain's "Red" boss.9 TheDa/7y 
Mail printed equally sensationalist headlines which alleged the "Rout of the Spanish Red 
Army" while "Red Women Butcher Spanish Priests".
Thus the popular conservative press was in no doubt who was to blame for the 
increased threat of a European war and wrote leading articles which were no more 
objective towards the Soviet Union than reports by their correspondents. For example, 
the Evening News alleged that the "supposedly moderate Left-Wing Government" of 
Spain was powerless to control "these murderous gangs [of Reds]" who were supported 
by Moscow. As the "tide of Red murder" increased, the "anti-Reds" had been forced to 
respond to "save Spain".ii The Daily Mail reported that communist troops and arms had 
been flooding into Spain on the orders of the Soviet Government to throw the country 
into a "reign of murder and rapine". The paper condemned the Spanish Government for 
betraying the country and for arming the "dregs of society", while a communist victory, 
in the opinion of the Daily Mail, would be a "terrible blow to civilisation".12 The
7 The Illustrated London News, 8 August 1936. "Our Notebook" by Arthur Bryant.
8 The Daily Express, 6 August 1936. *Daily Express Bombed By Red Airmen” by D. Sefton 
Delmer, Staff Reporter.
9 The Daily Express, 5 September 1936. “Reds Fight to End” by O. D. Gallacher, Staff 
Reporter.
1® See articles throughout August 1936 for examples.
11 The Evening News, 3 August 1936. Leading article, "Red Spain".
12 The Daily Mail, 4 August 1936. Leading article, "M. Blum’s Choice". The "dregs of 
society" referred to Spanish Communists.
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Evening News even stated that British interests would not be served if the Communists 
won. It was thus with relief that the paper reported, "well-informed witnesses assure us 
the Spanish Reds are certain to lose and the Spanish Patriots are certain to win".i5
A leading article in the Daily Mail alleged British newspapers which attempted to 
present events of the civil war in an impartial manner were "Britain's home-made Reds 
and friends of the Bolsheviks... who continue to pervert the facts of the Spanish W a r " . 14 
In reality, the majority of British newspapers, though concerned by the possibility of 
communism spreading in Spain, 15 refused to believe the civil war was caused solely by 
the Soviet Government. For example, the Daily Telegraph, though generally 
unsupportive of the Soviet Union's involvement in Spain, cautioned that the Spanish 
crisis could not simply be seen as an affair between "Blacks and Reds".16 Only the 
Observer was noticeably "anti-Red" and irrationally critical of the Soviet Union's 
position in Spain.17 At no point did the liberal and labour press advocate Britain joining 
the war though they did demand collective action, preferably at the negotiating table, 
amongst Britain, France, the Soviet Union and Germany if Hitler would participate. 
Liberal and labour papers demanded that the British Government recognise that the Soviet 
Union was not to blame for the new crisis in Europe but that through cooperation, the 
Soviet Government could help Britain prevent the spread of war into the rest of 
Europe. 18 Furthermore, the liberal and labour press censured the Rothermere and 
Beaverbrook newspapers for their partial journalism.
15 The Evening News, 10 August 1936. Leading article, "Keeping the Bull in the Ring".
14 The Daily Mail, 22 August 1936. Leading article, "The Truth Once Again"; 4 August 
1936, leading article, "M. Blum's Choice".
15 See for example, the Daily Telegraph, 3 August 1936. Leading article, “Spain’s Peril form 
Communism”. The Times, 5 August 1936.
16 The Daily Telegraph, 5 August 1936. Leading article, “Europe’s Clear Duty in Spain”. 
The Sunday Times on 11 October 1936 changed its mind and suggested that the fighting was between 
two masses of "Blacks and Reds" rather than two rival parties. Leading article, "Keep Clear!".
17 See for example, the Observer, 29 November 1936. "Drift; The New Alliances and Their 
Meaning" by J. L. Garvin; 7 November 1937, "The Truth About Intervention; How Russia Feeds the 
War; Back to Fair Play" by J. L. Garvin. The Times was also critical of communism in Spain, but to a 
comparatively lesser degree. The History o f The Times suggests that the paper's editor, Geoffrey 
Dawson, was uninterested in the Spanish Civil War, though he had correspondents send daily reports, and 
therefore The Times's opinions on Spain were not always clearly expressed: p. 906, fn. 2 and Appendix 
II, p. 1142.
18 See for example, the Manchester Guardian, 6  and 12 August 1936; the News Chronicle, 3 
August 1936; the New Statesman and Nation, 1 August 1936.
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For example, the Spectator criticised in detail the reporting by the Daily Mail.
There are certain canons of journalistic honesty to which even the Daily Mail 
might be expected to pay some kind of reluctant tribute. After reading its account 
of the fall of Badajoz that illusion is dispelled once for all. The Mail, unique 
among English papers, had a special correspondent in Badajoz. He entered it 
with the victorious insurgent forces. And to judge from his report as printed he is 
unique among special correspondents in his capacity for failing to see what stared 
him in the face. There is a colour blindness which leaves atrocities invisible except 
when Reds commit them which is either a misfortune or a malignity, according to 
whether it is involuntary or deliberate. 19
The News Chronicle was similarly critical of the style of reporting used by the Daily 
Express to cover the events of the Spanish Civil War and denounced the Rothermere 
press for representing the republican struggle in Spain as a "Moscow inspired campaign 
of extermination against Christianity". The paper found it ironic that "the orgy of hate 
and distortion of facts" which flowed from Rothermere’s newspapers claimed Spain 
could only be saved with a fascist victory. Thus the News Chronicle questioned the 
soundness of this hypothesis as it made fascism synonymous with Christianity and anti- 
Bolshevism . 20 The New Statesman and Nation condemned the "sinister, daily 
magnification of atrocities by the Rothermere press" though the journal hoped that 
"thoughtful people" would not believe the tales of horror. The journal was relieved to see 
that the attitude of the "reputable conservative press" had been modified into recognising 
the war was started by an army revolt of "anti-Govemment forces". Suggestions by The 
Times and the Rothermere newspapers that Soviet agents fomented the trouble and 
planned a state of chaos in Spain led the New Statesman and Nation to ask sarcastically 
"Are we to infer that the Bolsheviks deliberately engineered Franco's 'war of liberation 
from Marxism'?".21 T\xq Daily Worker was naturally critical of the popular conservative 
press for allegedly sending correspondents to report, from fascist bases, on atrocities
19 The Spectator, 21 August 1936. "A Spectator's Notebook".
20 The News Chronicle, 4 August 1936. Leading article, “Now We Know”.
21 TheTVew Statesman and Nation, 1 August 1936. "Comments - Spain and the Tory Press".
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against the Republic and communists.22 However, the paper was as unobjective, though 
against the "Fascists", as the Rothermere and Beaverbrook newspapers.25
The non-intervention plan
During the first month of fighting, accusations and counter-accusations of 
intervention were made by the Soviet Union, Germany and Italy.24 Hitler and Mussolini 
initially denied sending aid to Spain, but realising that their assistance could not be hidden 
indefinitely, the German leader explained that it was necessary to prevent the spread of 
communism in Europe.25 The Daily Telegraph acknowledged that evidence of Italy's 
intervention made the Soviet Government more anxious to help the Republicans though 
the paper warned that such action would not help Spain.26 The Observer suggested the 
Spanish Civil War had broken the last vestiges of reserve between the German and the 
Soviet Governments and created a challenge which increased the bitterness between the 
two countries.27 Furthermore, as Germany and the Soviet Union responded to each 
other's involvement in Spain, the fear of a large scale war increasingly became a reality as 
Europe appeared to be dividing into two camps.
To avoid a European conflict, in August the French Government proposed a non­
intervention plan supported by the British Government. Despite Blum's initial sympathy 
towards the Spanish Republic, since both countries had Popular Front Governments, he 
felt that a solution to France's serious domestic problems had to be his first priority or he 
could lose his position as Prime Minister. Also to send assistance to Spain might lead to 
an arms race and develop into a war with Germany for which France was unprepared.
22 The Daily Worker, 24 July 1936. "More Victories for Republic".
23 See for example, the Daily Worker, 24 July 1936. "More Victories for Republic; Fascist 
Face Failure".
24 The Times, 5 August 1936. “German Charges against USSR" by the Berlin Correspondent; 
8 August 1936, “Money for Madrid” by the Riga Correspondent. The Manchester Guardian, 12 August 
1936. “German Press Comments on Spain” by the Berlin Correspondent.
25 Cattell, Soviet Diplomacy, p. 4.
26 The Daily Telegraph, 3 August 1936. Leading article, “Spain’s Peril from Communism”. 
See also, 4 and 5 August 1936. In July, a plane carrying Italian troops to the Nationalist forces crashed 
in Northern Africa providing evidence that Italy was aiding Franco.
27 The O bserver, 30 August 1936. Leading article, "Berlin and Moscow". The British 
Government also feared that German and Soviet bitterness could lead to European wan D.B.F.P., Second 
Series, Vol. XVII, no. 84.
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Furthermore, the French, despite the Franco-Soviet Pact and the association with the 
Little Entente, remained dependent on the British Government's attitude which was 
suspicious of the Soviet Union's motives and goals in Spain and hence E u rop e .28 
Likewise, since the cornerstone of Soviet foreign policy lay in the Franco-Soviet Pact, 
the Soviet Government had to follow France’s lead so as not to alienate British and 
French opinion at a time when collective security remained a key feature of Soviet foreign 
policy. Moreover, the Soviet Union could not afford to send aid to Spain on the same 
scale as Germany and Italy. Therefore, the Soviet Government accepted the non­
intervention agreement on the condition that Germany and Italy agreed to abide by it 
entirely.29
A main focus of interest in the British press concerning the Spanish Civil War and 
the Soviet Union's role in it became the issue of non-intervention and the committee 
established by Britain and France to provide it. The quality conservative press approved 
of the non-intervention plan for the simple reason that it would prevent communist aid to 
the Republic and keep Britain out of a conflict which could potentially lead to European 
com plications.50 However, the Observer understood that the success of the plan 
inevitably depended on the willingness of the German and the Soviet Governments to 
negotiate at the same table.5i Thus quality conservative newspapers were critical of the 
Soviet Government's "reluctant" acceptance of the non-intervention plan. For example, 
The Times and the Daily Telegraph reported that Moscow had attached special 
conditions before accepting the agreement. The Times further claimed that the Soviet 
Government's suggestion that Germany and Italy would refuse to abide by the plan, 
showed that German involvement in Spain and Hitler's attitude to non-intervention were 
"widely misrepresented".52 The Daily Telegraph, seeing nothing wrong in the German
28 Thomas, pp. 215-216. Cattell, Soviet Diplomacy, pp. 6 and 14.
29 Cattell, Soviet Diplomacy, pp. 16, 18, 20. Thomas, pp. 257, 261. Carr, The Comintern 
and the Spanish Civil War, p. 17.
5® See for example, the Sunday Times, 2 August 1936. "France Asks Powers to Ban Arms for 
Spain". The Observer, 2  August 1936. The Daily Telegraph, 3 August 1936. The Times, 10 August
1936.
51 The Observer, 30 August 1936. Leading article, "Berlin and Moscow".
52 The Times, 10 August 1936. Leading article, “Collective Neutrality”. The D a ily  
Telegraph, 6 August 1936. “Soviet Reply to France; Two Provisos” by the Moscow Correspondent.
The Spanish Shambles 108
attitude, suggested Hitler merely required time, which was ironically not acceptable for 
the Soviet Government to have, before he could accept the agreement since aid was 
already en route to S p a in .5 3  These attitudes of the quality Conservative press were a 
reflection of the British Government's o p i n i o n s .54
Though the liberal and labour press welcomed the non-intervention plan for the 
same reason as the quality conservative press, the avoidance of a European war, the 
former papers observed the Soviet Government's compliance in a different light. The 
Manchester Guardian reported that the acceptance of the non-intervention agreement was 
"without reservation" since the plan appeared to promote collective security against 
f a s c i s m .5 5  The New Statesman and Nation and the News Chronicle rationally pointed 
out that not only the Soviet Union, but also Germany and Italy, had delayed before 
accepting the suggestion of a simple neutrality agreement towards Spain.56 The
Spectator felt that the agreement, though beneficial, was belatedly reached by all
proÇT fec>Cinvolved and therefore, the nationalists had prcAtted far more by early intervention than 
the republicans. Nevertheless, the journal felt non-intervention was the best option to 
provide collective activity in Europe.
Disastrous and deplorable as the fate of the unhappy country is, the fate of Europe 
would be tenfold more deplorable if the attempt to isolate the Spanish war failed... 
The Spanish war, lamentable as it is, is a civil war, and it must be kept a civil 
war.57
However, it was almost immediately apparent that Germany and Italy, though 
professing to support non-intervention, were not abiding by the agreement, thus . 
provoking the Soviet press into condemning the "lying nature of the N a z is " .5 8  The Daily
55 The Daily Telegraph, 7 August 1936. Leading article, "The Vital Concerns of Europe”.
54 D.B.F.P., Second Series, Vol. XVIII, nos. 34, 78, and 84.
55 The Manchester Guardian, 12 August 1936. “Non-Intervention” by the Diplomatic 
Correspondent.
56 TheVew Statesman and Nation, 8 August 1936. "Comments". The Vewf Chronicle, 14 
August 1936. Leading article, “How Much Longer?”.
57 The Spectator, 28 August 1936. "The Defence of Democracy".
58 The Times, 29 August 1936. “Soviet Attack on Nazi Press; ‘A Lying Campaign’” by the 
Riga Correspondent
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Worker accused Mussolini of wanting to turn the Mediterranean into an "Italian lake" and 
suggested that Hitler was using every pretext to start a European w a r .5 9  Due to the 
British Government's reluctance to take action against German and Italian intervention, 
for fear of antagonising Hitler, the non-intervention committee became concerned with 
"the murky tide of procedure". What should have been a notable success for collective 
security became the most frustrating aspect of the Spanish Civil War for the Soviet Union 
as procedure prevented any action from being carried out. For the German and Italian 
Governments the non-intervention committee provided the best means of delaying efforts 
against their illegal intervention.^® Thus the liberal press, and unsurprisingly the Daily 
Worker, expressed anger with the British Government for betraying the Spanish 
Republic to the "Fascists" by not enforcing and assisting the implementation of the 
increasingly "farcical" non-intervention plan.41 Furthermore, the Manchester Guardian 
warned that unless the British Government responded to the deliberate contravention of 
the agreement, Moscow would rapidly come to the conclusion that the republicans would 
need to be supported to prevent the triumph of f a s c i s m .4 2
In October 1936, the warnings of the liberal press became a reality when a note 
by the Soviet Government questioned the committee's ability to ensure that countries 
pledged to non-intervention abided by the terms of the agreement. The Soviet Union 
announced its intention of withdrawing from the committee if the situation did not 
change, thus forcing the organisation's first crisis. Moscow felt compelled to issue its 
"ultimatum" to force Britain and France to take a stand against German and Italian 
assistance. If that failed, the Soviet Government wanted to be free of commitments to the 
non-intervention agreement to enable them to send assistance to the republicans who, at 
the time, were near to surrendering M a d r id .4 3
59 The Daily Worker, 8 August 1936. Leading article, "At the Cross Roads".
4® Thomas, p. 277. Carr, The Comintern and Spain, p. 23.
41 See for example, theiVewj Chronicle, 2 September 1936. Leading article, “Still Cheating”. 
The Daily Worker, 8 August 1936. Leading article, "At the Cross Roads".
42 The Manchester Guardian, 15 September 1936. “Russian Policy on Spain; A Change
Possible?” by the Moscow Correspondent.
45 Cattell, Soviet Diplomacy, p.44.
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The British press reacted with opposing opinions as to who was responsible for 
the crisis, with conservative newspapers, despite some exceptions, blaming the Soviet 
Union. In contrast, the liberal and labour press, with the Scotsman and the Sunday 
Times, criticised not only Germany and Italy but also the British Government for the 
failure of non-intervention. Though British newspapers of all political persuasions feared 
the sudden increased threat of Europe wide war, the liberal and labour press argued that 
the easiest means of avoiding such an event was by cooperating with the Soviet 
Government and acting on its complaints. The conservative press also regarded non­
intervention as the best method of keeping Britain out of an European war, but argued 
that the committee had to be maintained even without the Soviet Union if its 
representatives chose to carry out their threat to withdraw.
The quality conservative press received the Soviet Government's announcement 
with attitudes varying from condemnation to understanding. The Daily Telegraph and 
the Observer expressed the most critical opinions towards the declaration, seeing the 
Soviet Union as a potential trouble maker and not as a valuable ally for Britain in the 
maintenance of European peace. Because the Daily Telegraph accepted German and 
Italian denials against the charges of continued intervention, the paper suggested that the 
Soviet Government was "trifling with Europe".44 The Observer blamed Moscow 
entirely for ruining the non-intervention pact45 and Garvin, the editor of the Sunday 
newspaper, criticised the Soviet Union's "mischief making" tactics. Garvin, without 
noting the irony of his argument, condemned the proposed threat of intervention since it 
would require the German Government to increase its involvement. Thus, the 
Observer's editor called for Moscow "to cease for once and for all to meddle with the 
lives of other nations" and warned that British policy had to break free of Soviet 
entanglements.46 Although the Daily Telegraph suggested that the non-intervention
44 The Daily Telegraph, 15 October 1936. Leading article, “ Spain’s Fate on the Eve o f  
Decision”.
45 The O bserver, 11 October 1936. "Moscow Dooms Neutrality" by the Diplomatic 
Correspondent
46 The Observer, 25 October 1936. "Which Flag?" by J. L. Garvin. The Daily Express was 
similarly indifferent to the Soviet Government's threat to leave the committee: 10 October 1936, "Powers 
Squabble on Spain: Italy Threatens Russia" by the Political Correspondent, Guy Eden.
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committee would have to continue without the Soviet Union to prevent Europe form 
dividing into two camps,47 the paper, also ignoring the irony of its suggestion, hoped 
Moscow's threat to intervene was merely "theatrical" since Germany and Italy would be 
forced to respond to increased communist assistance.48
However, two quality conservative newspapers expressed a more understanding 
opinion of the Soviet Union's announcement which demonstrated a balanced 
interpretation of the situation in Spain. The Sunday Times, though critical of Moscow's 
note, appreciated the counter-charges between the "two masses of Blacks and Reds" and 
therefore refused to condemn the Soviet Government for attempting to force the non­
intervention committee to take constructive action. However, the paper was concerned 
that the situation in Spain could deteriorate without the non-intervention agreement, even 
despite its problems, and therefore argued for the continuation of the plan hopefully with 
the Soviet Union as a m e m b e r .4 9  The Scotsman also respected the Soviet Government's 
argument and pointed out that the note was permissible by the rules of the non­
intervention committee. Moreover, the paper feared that the "slow trickle of military aid" 
in the first months of fighting would turn into a "rapid flood" to both sides in Spain if the 
Soviet Union withdrew. This led the Scotsman to express further concern that the 
Soviet Government would be unable to send as much aid as Germany and Italy.5® Both 
papers considered the Soviet Union to be an important member of the non-intervention 
committee because of its belief in collective security and thus hoped Moscow would 
recognise its responsibility to Europe and remain in the organisation. Though not clearly 
laying the blame for the failures of the non-intervention committee on Britain, as the 
liberal and labour press did, the Sunday Times and the Scotsman were concerned that 
the British Government was not adequately responding to the Soviet Government's
47 TheDcdly Telegraph, 26 October 1936. Leading article, “ Russia’s Ambiguous Attitude’’.
48 The Daily Telegraph, 9 October 1936. Leading article, “Russia’s Charges of Intervention”; 
24 October 1936, leading article, “ Russia’s Ambiguous Attitude”.
49 The Sunday Times, 11 October 1936. Leading article, "Keep Clear!; No Intervention in 
Spain"; 25 October 1936, leading article, "The Powers and Spain".
6® The Scotsman, 9 October 1936. Leading article, "Russia's Move".
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complaints to prevent the non-intervention plan from becoming an "empty, tom, scrap of 
paper".5i
The labour and liberal press were supportive of the Soviet Union's grievances 
and denounced Britain's hypocritical indifference towards German and Italian 
intervention. These papers also expressed annoyance with the British Government for 
failing to recognise the importance of the Soviet Union not only in the non-intervention 
committee, but also for the peace of Europe.^^ The Daily Herald and the N ew  
Statesman and Nation demanded that the British Government heed Moscow's grievances 
and warned that delays in the non-intervention committee by Britain merely encouraged 
the Soviet Union to withdraw from an "unholy alliance" which "achieved nothing". 
The Manchester Guardian sympathised with the Soviet leadership's frustration and 
recognised that the violations by Germany and Italy left the Soviet Government no choice 
but to be equally free of such an agreement.^^ Although the News Chronicle held the 
"fascists", and not the communists, in "undoubtable" responsibility, the paper recognised 
that the British Government had played a significant part in the current crisis and despite 
"non-intervention riot meaning much from the beginning", the paper alleged it was 
suddenly proved "to mean nothing".
By November, the Soviet Government had received no satisfactory reply from the 
non-intervention committee to its criticisms against German and Italian assistance, and 
although its representatives did not withdraw, the Soviet Union quietly increased its 
supplies to Republican Spain. Italy and Germany subsequently extended their amount of 
troops and aid. This additional involvement in Spain led to the cynical opinion by the
The Scotsman, 24 October 1936. Leading article, "Russia and Spain". See also, the 
Sunday Times, 25 October 1936. Leading article, "The Powers and Spain".
The D aily Herald, 21 October 1936. “Soviet May Decide to Supply Arms” by the 
Diplomatic Correspondent The Manchester Guardian, 24 October 1936. “Russia’s New Stand on Arms 
for Spain”.
The Daily Herald, 21 October 1936. “Soviet May Decide to Send Arms” by the Diplomatic 
Correspondent. The New Statesman and Nation, 10 October 1936. "Comments - Russia Calls the 
B lu ff. See also, the Daily Herald, 9 October 1936. “Soviet Demand for Speedy Action”; 22 October 
1936, “Hitler Denies Arms Aid to Russia”. Both articles by the Diplomatic Correspondent.
The M anchester Guardian, 24 October 1936. Leading article, “Russia and Non- 
Intervention”.
The News Chronicle, 8 October 1936. Leading article, “ Russia Intervenes”. See also, 15 
October 1936, “Russia Demands Control of Ports o f Portugal” and 19 October 1936, “Soviet 
Withdraw a Matter of Days” by the Moscow Correspondent.
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Contemporary Review that it was due to the "typical diplomatic muddle" of the non­
intervention committee that "five of the six great powers" found it necessary to intervene. 
A small scale civil war had escalated to such an extent, in the view of the journal, that 
"even the Germans accuse the Spaniards of not doing enough in their own war".56 
Low's cartoon on 13 January 1937, "Non-Intervention Poker", portrayed Eden, the 
Foreign Secretary, trusting his opponents in the game to play his hand for him though he 
could easily see they all had cards hidden up their sleeves. Thus Low was critical of 
Britain's notions of honour when dealing with the leaders of Germany, Italy, the Soviet 
Union and also France.^^
The Nyon Conference
By the summer of 1937, the Soviet Union realised that the British and French 
Governments would not confront Germany and Italy about intervention. The Soviet
The Contemporary Review, February 1937. "Foreign Affairs - The Comedy of 'Non- 
Intervention'".
See Figure 4.1. The Evening Standard, 13 January 1937, "Non-Intervention Poker".
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Government recognised that Britain and France only continued with the non-intervention 
cotmnittee to stop the civil war from becoming a European war and to prevent Spain, 
when Franco won, from becoming a German or Italian military base.^® Collective action 
between the Soviet Union and Britain in Spain finally appeared inoperative especially 
since the Soviet Union's major European ally, France, had lost the initiative in Eiuopean 
politics. However, the Nyon Conference in September 1937 offered the Soviet 
Government, and the liberal and labour press, renewed hope that collective security was 
not a lost cause.
The Nyon Conference was suggested as a result of the increasing number of 
merchant ships being sunk in the Mediterranean, predominantly by Italy. Only the Soviet 
Government directly and officially accused the Italians, a charge the British Government 
would rather have overlooked due to its efforts at rapprochement with I ta ly H o w e v e r ,  
the British Government could not ignore the number of British ships being sunk, the 
demands by ship owners for protection, and the insistence by the press, of all political 
persuasions, for the Government to take firm action against such aggression.^ Britain 
and France, therefore, resolved to hold a conference to establish joint action against 
piracy, to be conducted outside the League of Nations since Italy and Germany were not 
members. Nyon's location was also suggested because the non-intervention committee, 
based in London, had become a symbol of procrastination and if the talks were kept 
separate, it was hoped technical issues would be settled in a practical manner without 
recriminations of the past.
The majority of the British press, with the exception of the Beaverbrook and 
Rothermere newspapers, welcomed the Nyon Conference but remained realistic as to the 
possibility of positive results. The Daily Express, though demanding an end to piracy, 
objected to "yet another conference" which would probably expand Britain's already
Cattell, Soviet D iplom acy, p. 88. It was also increasingly obvious that the British 
Government favoured a Nationalist victory over a Communist supported Republican victory.
59 D.B.F.P., Second Series, Vol. XIX, Chapter II.
The News Chronicle, 3 September 1937. “More British Warships For Mediterranean” by 
Phillip Jordan. The Daily Express, 6 September 1937. “Blum Attacks Italy as Conference Is Called” by 
the Political Correspondent The Daily Telegraph, 6 September 1937. “Twelve-Power Conference on 
Piracy” by the Diplomatic Correspondent.
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extremely large role abroad A1 The quality conservative press was again divided in its 
opinion on the benefits of the conference. The Scotsman, continuing to recognise Italian 
and German responsibility for Europe's problems, pointed out that success at Nyon 
would largely depend on Italy's willingness to cooperate.^^ In contrast, although the 
Observer similarly recognised that Italian participation was essential to the conference's 
success, the paper remained unsupportive of the Soviet Government's involvement since 
its interest in the Mediterranean seemed irrelevant.^^ The liberal press favoured the Nyon 
Conference, not only because it would solve the issue of piracy in the Mediterranean, but 
more importantly it marked a step towards increased cooperation between the Soviet 
Union and the West. These papers were, therefore, pleased that Britain proposed to take )
the lead in the discussions.^ |
IAlthough the Soviet leadership saw the Nyon Conference as an opportunity to I
iimprove collective action and to prevent their country from becoming more isolated in j
Europe, Moscow recognised Britain's preference for compromise towards the German ji
and Italian Governments. Thus the Soviet Government set the stage for the talks by j
sending a strongly worded note accusing Italy of sinking two Russian ships, demanding I
compensation and punishment for the offenders. The main aim of the allegation was to |
wound Italy's pride, thereby keeping its representatives away from the conference, while I
at the same time, the Soviet delegation would demonstrate its willingness to cooperate i
with the British and French G o v e r n m e n t s . ^ ^  The note, reported in every British 
newspaper, received mixed opinions and made the conference more important than it was j
originally acknowledged to be by Fleet Street.
The Daily Express, 6 September 1937. Leading article, “Indivisible Bunk”.
The Scotsman, 6 September 1937. Leading article, "Safety of Shipping".
The O bserver, 5 September 1937. "Yesterday’s Consultations" by the Diplomatic 
CorrespondenL
^  See for example, the News Chronicle, 8 September 1937. Leading article, “Courage Will
Pay”.
^5 Cattell, Soviet Diplomacy, p. 93. See D.B.F.P., Second Series, Vol. XIX, no. 139 in 
which it is reported that the French Government did not see the notes as politically motivated
'The Manchester Guardian, 7 September 1937. “Russia Demands Reparation from Italy”. 
Also the News Chronicle, the Daily Express, asiAihe Daily Telegraph for their articles on 7 September
1937.
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The popular conservative press was extremely negative and critical of the Soviet 
Government's activity. The Daily Express sarcastically claimed that the proposed 
Mediterranean Conference on Piracy was going to be a "nice p a r ty " w h ile  the Daily 
Mail believed the note was a "well-calculated move" by the Soviet Governments^ which 
intended to "smash the conference" and keep the discussions ineffective by forcing Italy 
to be absent. The paper even speculated that the Soviet Union was responsible for the 
sinking of a torpedoed British destroyer. However, the Daily Mail was relieved that 
"Russia has blundered at last by showing its hand too clearly" and hoped that Moscow's 
"impudent attempt to blow up the conference" would provide proof of the "Red's 
treacherous and perilous influence" on international affairs. The paper recommended that 
the Italian Government recognise the "malign purposes" of the note, curb indignation and 
attend the conference in spite of "Russian" insults.^9
The attitude of the quality conservative press was again not unanimous towards 
the Soviet Government's actions. The Times merely characterised the note as "stupid" 
since it hindered a beneficial conference which was meant to deal with the degeneration of 
security in the Mediterranean.^^ The Daily Telegraph was also critical of the Soviet 
Union, but willing to ignore the note for the sake of peace in Europe. The paper 
concluded that Soviet diplomacy "must take the heaviest share of blame" for creating an 
"unfortunate atmosphere" because the accusations could only be regarded as 
"uncalculating clumsiness or a deliberate attempt to wreck any joint action". The Daily 
Telegraph suggested that Italy and Germany would show great wisdom in taking their 
places at the meeting, though if they refused to attend, the paper expected the conference 
to proceed as it was an important means of making the Mediterranean safe for neutral 
shipping. In the paper's opinion, the heated accusations served as a useful reminder of 
the "unnecessarily explosive" atmosphere in Europe and therefore, the conference had to
The Daily Express, 1 September 1937. Leading article, “Russia Is Angry”.
The D aily M ail, 7 September 1937. "Italy’s Curt Note to Soviet” by the Rome 
Correspondent
^9 The Daily Mail, 8 September 1937. Leading article, "Moscow At It Again".
The Times. 8 September 1937. "The Meeting at Nyon" by the Rome Correspondent. See 
also a leading article on 6 September.
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meet as it provided a great opportunity for collaboration The Scotsman was again less 
discriminatory in its attitude towards the note from the Soviet Government and 
apportioned blame on all involved - on the "Fascist" powers for refusing to cooperate for 
law and order in Europe; on the Soviet Union, despite the possible substance of the 
charges, because the note was inopportune; and on Britain and France who were held 
responsible for delaying decisions on piracy and intervention. Even if the Italians and 
Germans declined to join the conference, the Scotsman, regardless, expected to see 
Britain and France take definite action in the protection of shipping7^
The liberal and labour press expressed the most surprise over the Soviet 
Government's note and, to a limited extent, was critical of Moscow's efforts as they 
appeared to be hindering collective security. The News Chronicle indicated confusion 
over "Russia's inexplicable move in crashing in with her note to Rome on the eve of the 
c o n f e r e n c e " . ^ 5  German, Italian, and Soviet arguments implied to the paper that each 
country was to blame for the crisis since all three wished to drag "technical" discussions 
back to the "political wrangle".?^ The Daily Herald, though without condemning the 
Soviet Government's tactics, was concerned that the conference would be prevented from 
reaching a settlement since both Italy and Germany refused to join if the Soviet Union 
was present.75 The Spectator, normally sympathetic to complaints or suggestions by the 
Soviet Government, blamed Moscow for threatening the Nyon talks with disaster and 
wondered if Stalin was deliberately angling for war by taking such a strong line.^^ In 
contrast, the Daily Worker argued that the Soviet note, which was backed by "abundant" 
evidence, "struck a severe blow against Fascist war plans" and piracy. The paper could 
not understand why the British Government attempted to "hide the identity of the pirates" 
and criticised the note, which was allegedly within the "ordinary diplomatic rights" of the
The Daily Telegraph, 9 September 1937. Leading article,‘T o  End the Piracy Menace”.
The Scotsman, 9 September 1937. Leading article, "The Nyon Conference".
The News Chronicle, 8 September 1937. Leading article, “Courage Will Pay”. See also the 
Scotsman, 8 September 1937.
The News Chronicle, 9 September 1937, Leading article, “Piracy Must Be Stopped”.
^5 The Daily Herald, September 1937. Several articles expressed concern that Soviet action 
might hinder the conference although the paper does not denounce the Soviet note. The Daily Worker, 
on 10 September 1937, condemns the Daily Herald's attitude for not supporting the Soviet Union.
'5 The Spectator, 10 September 1937. "The Turmoil in Europe”.
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Soviet Government. The Daily Worker suggested that instead of censuring the Soviet 
Union, Britain and France should support Moscow's lead against piracy and the 
"Fascists".77
The majority of the British press expressed acute disappointment when the 
German and Italian Governments refused to join the Nyon Conference. Even those 
papers of the quality conservative press which blamed Soviet diplomacy, such as the 
Daily Telegraph and The Times, recognised that the quarrel was largely irrelevant to the 
purpose of the negotiations and that Germany and Italy should have overlooked their 
pride and joined the talks. Contrary to its usual appeasement of Hitler, The Times 
demanded that British policy would not become "deflected from its course" by German 
and Italian indignation.^® In an attitude slightly more tolerant towards the Soviet Union 
and more critical of Germany and Italy, the Daily Telegraph, hoping for security from 
the Nyon Conference, found it regrettable that the Germans and Italians were unable to 
separate the issue of piracy from politics, especially when it largely concerned 
t h e m s e l v e s . ^ 9  This attitude was similar to the Scotsman which found it difficult to 
understand the logic behind the Italian and German refusals to participate. Even more 
curious for both the Scotsman and the Daily Telegraph was the demand by Germany 
and Italy that the piracy issue be presented to the non-intervention committee. These 
newspapers found the proposal "illogical" since the Soviet Union would simply be able 
to present its case more clearly in London. However, the Scotsman thought that perhaps 
the demand was made because Germany and Italy knew decisions were often postponed 
by the committee. In the opinion of the paper, this demonstrated an unwillingness by the 
German and Italian Governments to cooperate with the Soviet Union.®®
In contrast, the popular conservative press continued to criticise the Soviet Union 
for hindering the conference. The Daily Mail called for the British Government to persist
The Daily Worker, 8 September 1937. Leading article, "Strait from the Shoulder".
®^ The Times, 9 September 1936. Leading article, "The Nyon Conference".
^9 The Daily Telegraph, 10 September 1937. Leading article, “An Illogical Refusal”.
®® The Scotsman, 10 September 1937. Leading article, "Mediterranean Problem". The Daily 
Telegraph, 10 September 1937. Leading article, “An Illogical Refusal”.
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in attaining peace, even in the face of the "malignant plotting" of the "Moscow Reds".®i 
However, there was also a sense of relief in the Rothermere and Beaverbrook 
newspapers that the Nyon Conference would be unsuccessful. Because Germany and 
Italy refused to join the piracy talks, the Daily Express urged that the meeting be held in 
Geneva to minimise British commitments and prematurely called it the "new Geneva 
Conference".®^ Although the paper alleged the discussions would have come to nothing 
even if Germany or Italy were present, the Daily Express persisted in condemning Soviet 
diplomacy towards the Italians. The paper, showing a curious but constant lack of 
understanding towards Germany's goals in Europe, declared that
the Russians would not have attended the conference if Italy had been present and 
I^therefore the Russians intended to use the conference to do the Italians no good, 
as they have done with the League of Nations to do the Germans no good.®^
The British Government, anxious to settle the crisis in the Mediterranean, 1
resolved to meet at Nyon without the Germans or the Italians, a decision which was IIwelcomed by the British press of all political persuasions with the exception of the I
popular conservative press. The Daily Express lamented the "fuss caused between !
I
Mussolini and Stalin" which had frightened the British Government into holding the |
conference at Nyon.®^ The liberal and quality conservative papers were, however, i
relieved that Britain was finally taking action and "meant business". For example, the j
Sunday Times, the Scotsman, and the News Chronicle found the "promptitude" shown 
in convening the Nyon Conference refreshing when contrasted to the "delay and Î
procrastination" of events in recent years. Though the German and Italian absence was ]
The Daily Mail, 9 September 1937. Leading article, "Work for Peace".
®2 The Daily Express, 9 September 1937. Leading article, “Next”. The Scotsman  also 
suggested the conference be moved to Geneva for ease of access and to emphasise the lack o f cooperation 
by the two powers who had withdrawn from the League of Nations. See 9 and 10 September 1937.
®^  The Daily Express, 9 September 1937. Leading article, “Next”.
®‘* The Daily Express, 11 September 1937. Leading article, “Uproar- So What?”.
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regretted, these newspapers believed that the "likeliest procrastinators" were removed and 
expected positive results Britain, France, and the Soviet U n io n .® 5
Within days of meeting, an agreement was signed by the eight members in which 
Britain and France were apportioned zones in the Mediterranean for policing against 
further piracy. The objections of the popular conservative press were immediately 
asserted - the Daily Express deplored a move which, yet again, increased Britain's 
responsibilities,®^ while the Daily Mail found Httle satisfaction in the plan since Italy was 
not a member and the Soviet Union was.®^
However, it was the quality conservative press which expressed the most 
satisfaction with the agreement, an attitude that admitted, to an extent, the beneficial value 
of the Soviet Union in Europe. The Daily Telegraph, dropping its usual critical attitude 
towards the Soviet Government, was pleased to report, that despite difficult conditions, 
those states which met in Nyon had cooperated to reach a "swift but practical" agreement 
to control piracy in the Mediterranean. The paper also hoped there would be further 
advances in collective security after the achievements at Nyon.®® Even the Observer 
admitted that success had been due to the German and Italian absence and the fact that the 
Soviet note, to which the paper remained critical, had been ignored while discussions 
proceeded.®9 For the Scotsman, the "remarkable celerity" of reaching an agreement 
showed that it was a "very childish procedure to humour the dictators".9® The Times, 
however, was satisfied that Britain and France were chiefly responsible for the plan while 
the Soviet Union was not directly involved in the patrol of the Mediterranean. Therefore, 
although recognising that the Soviet Government had contributed to the proposals at the
®5 The Sunday Times, 12 September 1937. Leading article, "A Good Start at Nyon". The 
Scotsman, 11 September 1937. Leading article, "Mediterranean Policy". The Newx Chronicle, 11 
September 1937. Leading article, “The Anti-Piracy Plan”. The Daily Worker also welcomed the talks 
but feared that Britain wanted to form a "backstairs deal" with Germany and Italy: 11 September 1937, 
leading article, "Hiding the Guilty".
®^  The Daily Express, 13 September 1937. Leading article, “Royal (Universal) Navy”.
®^  The Daily Mail, various articles from 10 -1 5  September 1937.
®® The Daily Telegraph, 13 September 1937. Leading article, “A Practical Anti-Piracy Plan”.
®9 The O bserver, 12 September 1937. "Mediterranean Pact Last Night" by the Special 
Correspondent at Nyon.
9® The Scotsman, 13 September 1937. Leading article, "Policing the Seas".
The Spanish Shambles 121
conference, the paper was relieved to see that the Soviet Union's role in Europe had not 
increased.9^
The liberal press was also impressed with the results of the Conference and the 
British Government's apparent awareness of the Soviet Union's value in Europe. The 
News Chronicle called the Nyon Plan a "neat diplomatic job" and expressed pleasure that 
the British Government had not excluded the Soviet Union from the conference as that 
would have conceded the "Italian-German thesis that Russia was a pariah among 
nations".92 The Spectator accepted the Soviet Government's contributions towards the 
"brief, harmonious, and effective" decision reached at Nyon. In addition, the journal 
accused Germany and Italy, and not the Soviet Union which was a change of attitude 
from 10 September, of trying to thwart the success of the conference by staying away.93 
The New Statesman and Nation thought that perhaps the days of international "dilly­
dally and humbug" were finished. The journal, and the News Chronicle, believed 
Britain, by working closely with France and the Soviet Union at Nyon, finally 
recognised the value of collective security and its success against dictators.94
However, regardless of the positive results at Nyon where Britain and the Soviet 
Union had cooperated to reach a practical agreement and despite the British press's 
satisfaction in reporting this increased cooperation, the event did not promote a better 
understanding between the two countries or provide a new move towards collective 
security plans. If anything, the British Government took fright at the success of a 
conference without Germany and Italy which might encourage the two countries to avoid 
future group negotiations. It was thought that further cooperation between Britain and 
the Soviet Union could lead to Hitler and Mussolini working together and ignoring 
British proposals. Thus there was an immediate retreat by Britain, from the strong stance 
against aggression, with an invitation to Italy to join the terms of the Nyon Agreement,
91 The Times, 13 September 1936. Leading article, "Success at Nyon".
92 The News Chronicle, 13 September 1937. Leading article, "The Plan Accepted”. |
93 The Spectator, 17 September 1937. "Nyon and Geneva".
94 The New Statesman and Nation, 18 September 1937. Leading article, "Is It the End of |
Piracy?". The News Chronicle, 16 September 1937. Leading article, “The Duce Declines”. See also the |
Daily Worker for a similar article, though the paper warned that the British Government would have to |
do more against Fascism in Spain: 16 September 1937, leading article, "New Menace".
The Spanish Shambles 122
though the Italians rejected the offer.95 As a result, the News Chronicle admitted that 
Italy's refusal to cooperate was "regrettable but hardly surprising" and therefore, the 
paper conceded it was difficult not to agree with Litvinov's point that cooperation had to 
be confined only to members of the "Peace Front".95 Although Italy's "childishness" 
was not extraordinary, the New Statesman and Nation hoped the "new-found firmness" 
of Britain, France, and the Soviet Union would encourage Mussolini to eventually 
accepting the plan.97 Even the popular conservative press expressed annoyance with the 
Italian Govemment,9® which marked a notable addition to the regular criticism directed 
towards the Soviet Union. However, when Mussolini, alarmed by the Conference’s 
success, altered his decision in November 1937, the British Government eagerly accepted 
Italy into the Mediterranean's control scheme, thus confirming Moscow's fear that 
collective security against aggression was not the first priority of the British 
Govemment.99
C onclusion
The Spanish Civil War received prominent press coverage in Britain because it 
was the first major military conflict in Europe since 1918 and also because there was 
concern that those countries involved in the fighting in Spain would cause the war to 
spread into the rest of Europe. Initially, Fleet Street supported the non-intervention plan 
because it appeared to be the best means of localising the civil war and of preventing both 
fascism and communism from finding a base in South-Western Europe. However, it 
was only a month after the plan was announced that the British press, of all political 
persuasions, knew that Germany, Italy and the Soviet Union were sending aid to Spain 
and intended to continue with their assistance thus rendering the non-intervention plan 
useless. Even the popular conservative press, after the first year of fighting, did not
95 Cattell, Soviet Diplomacy, p. 96.
95 The News Chronicle, 16 September 1937. Leading article, “The Duce Declines”.
9? The New Statesman and Nation, 18 September 1937. Leading article, "Is It the End of 
Piracy?".
9® The Daily Express, 15 September 1937. Leading article, “Italy Says No!”.
99 Cattell, Soviet Diplomacy, pp. 95-96.
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blame the Soviet Government alone, though there was little condemnation of Germany's 
role. "Between the Italians and the Russians, they have blown the smoke screen away 
from the non-intervention committee".i®® However, there was a difference of opinion in 
the British press as to the Soviet Union's overall aims in Spain.
The conservative press, and especially the popular newspapers, was consistently 
hostile to the Soviet Union’s efforts concerning Spain. These papers, with the exception 
of the Scotsman and the Sunday Times, criticised Soviet intervention, which was used 
by this section of the press as an excuse for accepting the need for German and Italian 
assistance to the nationalists. The Beaverbrook and Rothermere newspapers, in 
particular, wanted to see the "Red" influence in Spain reduced to keep the threat of 
communism in Europe at a minimum. Thus the majority of the conservative press 
supported the British Government's lack of cooperation with the Soviet Union, especially 
when the latter called for firm action against Germany and Italy. These papers believed 
Germany was the key to peace or war in Europe and therefore, the supposedly sensible 
foreign policy was for Britain to appease Hitler and to ignore the Soviet Union. Thus 
collective action between Britain and the Soviet Union over Spain received very limited 
support by the quality conservative newspapers and outright condemnation by the 
Beaverbrook and Rothermere press. Once again, the majority of the conservative press 
reflected the attitudes of the British Government which feared cooperation with 
communists and preferred to avoid confrontation with Germany and Italy. As the British 
Government increasingly let it be known that it preferred a nationalist victory, the 
conservative press acted accordingly and its opinions were formed by statements and 
hints from His Majesty's Government.^®!
In contrast, the hberal and labour press warned against trying to "squeeze out"!®^ 
the Soviet Union from future talks on Spain and Europe as exclusion of that nature would 
increase Moscow's suspicions of British intentions in Europe and encourage a return to
1®® The Daily Express, 20 October 1937. Leading article, “Spain: Talk Is Over”.
!®! D.B.F.P., Second Series, Vol. XVII, nos. 34, 78, and Chapter n. See also, Cattell, Soviet 
Diplomacy, p. 88.
1®2 The News Chronicle, 26 October 1937. “Critical Talks on Spain; Move to Oust Russia 
from Committee” by Vernon Bartlett.
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an isolationist foreign policy by the Soviet Government.!®^ Though fearful that the 
events in Spain could lead to a European war, the liberal and labour press, with the 
Scotsman and the Sunday Times, argued that Britain needed to show a strong front with 
the Soviet Government against German and Italian aggression rather than humouring 
Hitler. Especially following the success at Nyon, these papers accused the British 
Government of allowing collective action to fail, thus causing serious implications for 
Europe's future since the Soviet Union would not accept continued indifferent treatment. 
The liberal and labour press, though recognising that the British Government's desire to 
avoid entangling Britain in Spain's affairs was the correct attitude to have, criticised His 
Majesty's Government's official policy which did nothing to prevent the increasing 
intervention by Germany, Italy and the Soviet Union. Therefore, efforts by the British 
Government to secure Fleet Street's unconditional support against involvement over 
Spain failed with the liberal and labour press which was certain that there were too many 
Conservative politicians who feared communism thus preventing a rational policy 
concerning the conflict which saw so many different European countries involved.
Yet another opportunity for collective security failed as Britain ignored the Soviet 
Government's diplomatic efforts during the Spanish Civil War. As the war dragged on 
until 1939, it received less prominent coverage in the British press since the fighting was 
contained in Spain and especially because other European issues, such as the German 
occupation of Austria in March 1938, began to eclipse it in importance. Furthermore, the 
role of the Soviet Union in Spain became less of an issue for the British press because 
Soviet intervention did not match that of Germany and Italy and thus the threat of 
communism in Europe appeared to recede. Also, Fleet Street's interest in the Soviet 
Union increasingly focused on internal issues, such as the three Moscow show trials 
which provided far more interesting news and also caused some concern as to the Soviet 
Union's stability. As Soviet political and military personnel were purged, the visible 
benefits of cooperation between the Soviet Union and Britain decreased and additionally 
contributed to the failure of collective security.
!®3 The News Chronicle, 30 October 1937. “Complete Deadlock on Spain; Worse Muddle; 
More Delay” by Vernon Bartlett
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Chapter 5 
"Stalin’s Necktie"!
The relentlessness of the purges and show trials held in the Soviet Union in the 
1930s received detailed and prominent coverage in the British press, thus contributing to 
British opinion that the Soviet regime was an unstable and unsuitable ally for the West. 
Correspondents had noted throughout the 1920s that arrests and trials of "class enemies" 
in the cities and the countryside were part of the Soviet Government's method of 
providing socialism, centralisation and discipline.^ However, it was in the 1930s that |
newspapers and political journals explained that the trials were not intended to provide |
justice, but to demonstrate to the world and the Soviet people that communism was a |
success.^ Increasingly, it appeared to Fleet Street that all problems within the Soviet ]
Union would be solved by purges. -* !
It was the political show trials, held between 1935 and 1938, which received the I
most prominent press coverage in Britain. Although the early years of Stalin's leadership Î
saw many senior Communists expelled from the party, by 1933 the majority had recanted 1
and declared their willingness to follow Stalin's policies. Thus in the first half of the 1
1930s, it appeared to the British press that Stalin was creating a strong government and I
establishing stability in the Soviet Union. In addition, the period between July 1935 and i
July 1936 gave the impression of being an "idyllic interlude"^ as the harvest was good, I
the Five Year Plans seemed to be succeeding, and Stalin announced a revised 
constitution. A new era was heralded by the British press for the USSR, especially since |
a year after the Soviet entry into the League of Nations, the West accepted, though with a j
degree of reservation, the prospect of cooperation with the Soviet Government since it !
! Title o f leading article in The Times, 26  January 1937.
 ^ See for example. The Times, 13 January 1928. Leading article, "Bolsheviks in Exile"; 15 
November 1929, "New Purge’ of Soviet Officials" by the Riga Correspondent; 14 January 1929, "Class 
War in Soviet Villages" by the Riga Correspondent. The Scotsman, 12 January 1928. Leading article, 
"Bolshevist Exiles"; 6 June 1929, "Soviet Terrorism" by the Correspondent in Berlin.
 ^Max Radin, "The Moscow Trials: A Legal View", Foreign Affairs, October 1937, p. 66.
4 Robert Conquest, The Great Terror, p. 78.
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supported peace through collective security. Although The Times did not believe all was 
perfect in the Soviet Union, the paper argued that purges and trials were "becoming more 
judicial" despite the fact that executions continued.^ Bernard Pares, an expert on Russia, 
in April 1936 wrote for the Spectator suggesting wreckers' trials were no longer 
necessary since the need for scapegoats was declining with the increasing success of 
Soviet economic plans.5
However, in reality December 1934 had indicated a new phase in the Soviet 
Union, one of terror, repression, fear and death. Furthermore, the "idyllic interlude" did 
not lead to the Soviet Government adopting a more humane, "Western" styled approach 
to governing the Soviet Union. Those twelve months were used by Stalin and the NKVD 
to organise the "evidence", on the basis of which most of the original Bolshevik 
leadership, and many ordinary party members and citizens, were purged between 1936 
and 1938. Only in hindsight did the British press recognise that the assassination in 
December 1934 of Sergei Kirov, the Leningrad Party leader, signalled a renewed era of 
terror. Prominent members of the Communist Party, including Zinoviev and Kamenev,? 
were alleged to be responsible for the opposition group which organised Kirov's death. 
Though Fleet Street was generally surprised that such famous men were tried and sent to 
exile for five to ten years, the British press believed that the political trial in January 1935 
was unique.
Thus Fleet Street was unprepared for the first great Moscow show trial in which 
Zinoviev and Kamenev allegedly organised terrorist activities with Leon Trotsky.® The
5 The Times, 10 August 1935. '"Political Crimes' in Russia; Six Persons Executed for 
Murder" by the Riga Correspondent,
5 The Spectator, 24 April 1936. "Moscow After 20 Years: V. Desiderata" by Sir Bernard Pares. 
? Gregory Zinoviev was one of Lenin’s closest associates. Until January 1926, he was the 
chairman of the Leningrad Soviet but was dismissed from the Communist party in December 1927 for 
opposing Stalin's policies. He recanted and was readmitted to the party in 1928 but was again expelled in 
1932 and exiled, only to recant in 1933. Lev Kamenev, after Lenin’s death, originally supported Stalin 
against Trotsky but moved to the Left Opposition and was thus expelled in December 1927 from the 
party. He recanted in 1928 and assumed various senior positions. However, he was expelled from the 
party in 1932 but was readmitted in 1933.
® Following Lenin’s death in 1924, Trotsky, though at one time a possible candidate for 
leadership, increasingly found himself opposed to Stalin’s policies. Trotsky joined Zinoviev and 
Kamenev in the United Opposition but all three were expelled in 1927 and because Trotsky refused to 
recant, he was exiled first within the Soviet Union but was deported in 1928. He lived in Turkey, 
Norway, and finally Mexico where he was assassinated in August 1940. In the 1930s, he wrote volumes
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press recognised belatedly that Zinoviev and Kamenev had been spared in January 1935, 
only to be executed in August 1936 with fourteen others, accused of attempting to 
assassinate Stalin and to overthrow the communist state with foreign assistance. Though 
acknowledging the rumours and reports of further arrests at the time of the trial, British 
newspapers hoped that it would be an isolated event. Nevertheless, the Observer 
astutely recognised that the clearest result of the trial was that
Vigilance and more vigilance will be the order of the day. Trials and executions 
and more trials are certain to follow. The mood in the country is to exterminate 
once and for all the entire opposition and use the evidence to discredit Trotsky and 
his followers.9
Within three months of the first show trial, the Soviet authorities staged another 
political trial, though this time of industrial personnel from Novosibirsk in Siberia. The 
Five Year Plans had provided for the large scale development of heavy industry though 
the emphasis had been on speed not safety. Since much of the new factory work force 
had very little knowledge of how to operate industrial machinery, accidents were 
extremely common. The Novosibirsk trial was important as it marked a new type of 
show trial which provided excuses for the failures of the Five Year Plans and thus 
allegedly offered diversions and scapegoats for economic problems.!® Furthermore, as a 
result of the evidence by the accused, a number of leading economic commissars were 
arrested and subsequently became the defendants at the second Moscow show trial in 
January 1937.ü  Thus the British press was not surprised when eighteen "Trotskyists" 
were accused of "terrorism, wrecking, espionage and conspiring to overthrow the Soviet
explaining the dangers of Stalinism and organised international meetings of communists opposed to 
Stalin. Thus, those who supported him became known as Trotskyists.
9 The Observer, 23 August 1936. "Closing Scene in Moscow Trial" by the Moscow 
Correspondent. See also, the Daily Telegraph, 24 August 1936. Leading article, "The Treason Trial in 
Moscow". The Scotsman, 27 August 1936. "Soviet Clean-Up'"' by the Press Association in Moscow. 
The Yorkshire Post, 24 August 1936. Leading article, "Moscow Treason Trial".
!® J. Arch Getty, The Origins of the Great Purges, p. 128. Conquest, pp. 149-150.
!!  Getty, p. 126,132. Conquest, p. 142. The Daily Telegraph, 21 November 1936. "Poison 
Gas in Soviet Mine" by the Moscow Correspondent. See also, the Scotsman, 21 November 1936. 
"Soviet Trial; Allegation of Poison Gas in Mines" by Reuter in Novosibirsk. The Daily Express, 13 
November 1936. "Moscow Brits Arrested As Great Spy Trial Pends" by the Warsaw Correspondent.
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Government to ensure a return to capitalism and the re-establishment of a bourgeois 
regime. The only unexpected aspect of the second Moscow show trial, which led to a 
degree of surprise in the British press, was due to the fact that four of the accused, 
including Radek and S o k o ln ilo v ,!^  received more lenient sentences of ten years penal 
servitude while the other fourteen were executed.
Thus, although Fleet Street realised in 1937 that purges and show trials were a 
fact of life in the Soviet Union, the secret trial and execution in June of the Red Army's 
eight top commanders, including Marshall Tukhachevsky, came as a considerable 
surprise to foreign correspondents in Moscow. In reality, it was not a sudden attack on 
the army!4 since the first and second Moscow show trials had implicated high ranking 
army leaders. However, the British press, despite noting rumours, had failed to 
recognise that a military purge might follow, though after the trial the Daily Mail 
suggested that "never was the situation in Moscow so tense nor so dramatic". !5
The third Moscow show trial in February and March 1938 was perhaps the most 
expected, though at the same time the most anti-climatic, of all the trials held in the Soviet 
Union. Fleet Street had long expected Bukharin and Rykov^^ to be tried, yet by this trial, 
the British press knew what to expect in the way of accusations and evidence. Genrikh 
Yagoda, the former head of the NKVD, was also a defendant thus raising questions on
!2 The Times, 20 January 1937. “New Soviet Mass Trial; Leninists in Dock; ‘Terrorism, 
Wrecking, and Spying’” by the Riga Correspondent.
!3 Karl Radek was a party publicist in the inter-war period. He was forced to give up his 
positions on the party Central Committee and the Comintern executive committee and was expelled from 
the Communist party in 1927. He recanted in 1929. In 1936, although he demanded the death penalty 
for Zinoviev and Kamenev, Radek was arrested in the same year. Grigory Sokolnikov was a financial 
administrator in the 1920s. Although he held differing views from Stalin, Sokolnikov associated himself 
with the majority position and in 1929 became Soviet ambassador to Britain and Deputy Commissar for 
Foreign Affairs until 1934. He was arrested in 1936.
!4 Conquest, p. 188.
15 The Daily Mail, 12 June 1937. "Eight Soviet Army Chiefs to be Shot; Midnight Sentence: 
Girl Betrays Marshal; Wives Repudiate Prisoners; Stalin Fears for His Life" by the Warsaw 
Correqx)ndenL
!5 Nikolay Bukharin was a leading Bolshevik politician, associate of Lenin, and, in 1924, a 
Politburo member. Bukharin disagreed with Stalin over agricultural policies and lost his seat in the 
Politburo in 1929. Though privately admitting his mistake in supporting Stalin, he publicly offered 
loyalty to Stalin and thus in 1934 was elected to the Central Committee by the Seventeenth Party 
Congress and became editor of Izvestia. He also contributed to the Stalin Constitution. He was arrested 
in 1937. Aleksey Rykov was Lenin's successor as Soviet premier, the Chairman o f the Council of 
People's Commissars. He was associated with the Right Opposition and was thus forced to relinquish all 
posts in 1930 though he served as Commissar for Transport until 1937 when he was arrested.
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the validity of the previous cases. The only deviation came in the first day of the trial 
when Krestinsky!? pleaded "not guilty" to the charges, thus making him the exception to 
the usual pathetic acquiescence of the accused. Nevertheless, he too pleaded guilty on the 
second day of the proceedings. Furthermore, British press coverage of the third show 
trial did not receive such prominent placement in newspapers as it was concluded at the 
same time as Hitler's occupation of Austria. Although not all newspapers found the 
editorial space to comment on the verdict, nevertheless those which contained leaders did 
not fail to suggest and hope, though cynically since no further significant opposition 
members survived, that the show trials had reached an end.
From the first signs of terror, the conservative press adopted a negative attitude 
towards the internal turmoil caused by the purges and became increasingly sceptical of the 
Soviet Union's ability to fulfil its duties in Europe when faced with such internal political 
chaos. Few papers of the quality conservative press attempted to justify Stalin's and the 
NKVD's actions against political opposition. These papers, though expressing a sense of 
outrage, to an extent accepted the trials as the typical result of a Communist regime, 
impressions which were similarly echoed by the popular conservative press. However, 
the Beaverbrook and Rothermere newspapers were far more condemnatory than the 
quality press towards the judicial and domestic system of the Soviet Union and suggested 
that Britain should have no association with such "barbarism". In contrast, the liberal and 
labour press usually argued the purges were an internal issue and thus should not affect 
the Soviet Union's political standing in Europe. Nevertheless, these papers 
acknowledged the damage caused by the trials to the international standing of the Soviet 
Union. Furthermore, because the liberal and labour press, to an extent, sympathised and 
supported the Soviet Government's less repressive socialist policies, these papers were 
particularly disturbed by the trials and questioned why the Soviet leadership pursued such 
an illogical course. While the conservative press found it a natural phenomenon of 
communism, the liberal and labour press offered a variety of explanations and thus 
sometimes contradicted their own views. Thus to all appearances, the liberal and labour
!? Nikolay Krestinsky was associated with several trade missions in the 1920s.
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press appeared to express less consistent attitudes, though in reality conservative 
newspapers were equally confused by the purges and as interested in the trials. This 
confusion was also being experienced by members of the British Government and civil 
service, causing some disappointment but primarily disgust and a desire to avoid 
significant contact with the Soviet Union until greater stability returned.!®
However, the purges were at no point represented by Fleet Street as events which 
merely provided interesting reading for the British public. The show trials were correctly 
identified as having greater significance for European affairs, which was especially 
evident as war became increasingly likely in the late 1930s. The effects of the purges, 
especially those affecting the Red Army, were noted by the British press and contributed 
to the impression in 1938 that the Soviet Union was a weak and, therefore, non-essential 
member of the European community.
The terror
In general, the British press, regardless of political outlook, expressed nearly 
identical and consistent horror against the intensity of the repression between 1934 and 
1938. Following Kirov's assassination, the Sunday Times found it "gruesome" that 
conspiracies against Stalin were "avenged with a ferocity and contempt for human life 
unsurpassed in the worst days of Tsarist oppression".!9 Times, however, 
recognised that the terror and repression which the Bolsheviks had inherited was adapted 
to suit their own needs.^® Though not condoning the use of terror, an article in the Daily 
Herald sympathised with British protesters of Soviet terrorism but suggested Britain did 
not understand that the Russian people were accustomed to the methods of despotism.^! 
Nevertheless, the Daily Herald argued that the Soviet regime in 1934 could not justify the
!8 D .B F P ., Second Series. Vol. XVII, no. 130.
!9 The Sunday Times, 20 January 1935. Leading article, "Soviet Justice". See also The
Times, 4 December 1934 and the Daily Telegraph, 4 and 5 December 1934.
2® The Times, 12 December 1934. Leading article, "A Russian Terrorism"; 8 December 1934, 
“Soviet Revival of Red Terror; A Political Instrument” by the Riga Correspondent.
^! The Daily Herald, 3 January 1935. Special article by Hamilton Fyfe, "Why There Is Terror
in Russia".
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renewed use of terror since "the Russian executions are barbarous and unworthy of a 
regime which professes to be the most advanced in the world".22
The British press clearly believed the use of terror represented a new heresy or 
witch hunt in which "the Revolution, like Cronos, is a monster which devours it own 
children".23 The Scotsman pointed out that prior to the Revolution, the "agitator" was a 
hero and an underground society was a "glorious organisation".24 However, the paper 
suggested in August 1936 that Zinoviev and Kamenev discovered that a "revolution is a 
terrible boomerang that often destroys those who engineer it".25 The Daily Herald 
condemned the Soviet system,
because it is a dictatorship and because the Moscow Trials are essential to 
dictatorship. Had Russia been a democracy, Stalin's opponents would have 
formed a peaceful opposition working for their conception of socialism... rather 
than being devoured.25
Parallels were drawn by much of the British press between the terror of the 
French Revolution and the terror caused by Stalin's purges in the Soviet Union. The 
Daily Mail suggested in January 1935 that Zinoviev was "Russia's Danton" and would 
therefore be guillotined by his colleagues.2? In a similar opinion in 1937, the News 
Chronicle cited Danton on his way to the guillotine in 1792: "When Revolutions have 
consumed all their enemies, they consume themselves." In both France and the Soviet
22 The Daily Herald, 20 December 1934. Leading article, "Terror in Russia".
23 The Economist, 19 January 1935. "The Trial of Zinoviev and Kamenev". See also. The 
Times, 18 January 1935. "Leningrad Trial Sentences; New Heresy Hunt" by the Riga Correspondent. 
The Manchester Guardian, 20 August 1936. Leading article, “The Russian Trial”; 24 January 1935, 
"Moscow Trials Continue; 12 Persons Sentenced" by the Moscow Correspondent; 24 December 1934, 
"Heresy Hunt in Full Swing" by the Press Association Foreign Specialist in Moscow. The D aily  
Telegraph, 19 January 1935. Leading article, "Soviet Terror and Mercy"; 20 August 1936, leading 
article, "The Moscow Trial". The Economist, 22 August 1936. "Trial By and For the People". 
Chilston, the British Ambassador in Moscow, made nearly the same statement in a telegram to Eden: 
D.BP.P., Second Series, Vol. XVII, no. 130.
24 The Scotsman, 19 June 1935. Leading article, "Soviet Justice".
25 The Scotsman, 25 August 1936. Leading article, "Moscow's Verdict".
25 The Daily Herald, 30 January 1937. Leading article, as quoted in Deli, "The Image of the 
Russian Purges in the Daily Herald and the New Statesman”, p. 265.
2? The Daily Mail, 17 January 1935. "Zinoviev Confesses; Will It Doom Stalin?; Red Plots 
May End Soon; Trial Reveals Leaders' Betrayal; Country Split" by the Riga Correspondent; 30 January 
1937, leading article, "The Moscow Sentences".
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Union, regardless of whether the accused were guilty or innocent, the revolution which 
the revolutionaries themselves had striven to create had brought about their own 
destruction.28
Fleet Street believed that as a result of the continued use of terror, the Soviet 
Union which Lenin had intended was very different from that which had actually evolved 
under Stalin in the 1930s. In the opinion of the News Chronicle and the New Statesman 
and Nation, the executions following the first Moscow show trial severed the last 
connection of Soviet Russia to the October Revolution since only Stalin was left and 
Bolshevism as a revolutionary force was dead.29 Though this view was essentially true, 
it was partially inaccurate since the remaining old Bolsheviks were purged in two further 
show trials. The number of people affected by Kirov's assassination in December 1934 
led the Daily Express to claim that all dictators, whether fascist or communist, were 
forced to lean on their armies because there was eternal conflict below the thin crust of 
"solidarity".5® Thus the Daily Mail suggested the Russian Revolution was possibly 
reaching its natural conclusion.31 I f  terror and repression were so necessary after twenty 
years of communism, then the Daily Herald, in June 1937, did not believe socialism 
provided emancipation and happiness.52
The popular conservative press was the most critical of the Fleet Street 
newspapers towards the terror and printed in great detail the number of people suffering 
from the renewed use of r e p r e s s io n .5 3  The Beaverbrook and Rothermere press became 
more sarcastic towards the oppressive nature of the terror as these papers often printed
2® The News Chronicle, 30 January 1937. Leading article, "Devouring Its Children". In a 
special article by Malcolm Muggeridge in the Daily Telegraph - 9 March 1938, "Significance of Soviet 
Trials; Terrorist Regime Must Continue to Create an Excuse for Terror" - he argued that similarities 
between Danton and Stalin's victims could not always be made as Soviet Russia was far different from 
France in the 1790s.
29 The News Chronicle, 27 August 1936. Leading article, "Exit Bolshevism". The N ew  
Statesman and Nation, 29 August 1936. "Comments - The Soviet Purge".
®^ The Daily Express, 7 December 1934. Leading article, "Revolt".
The Daily Mail, 17 January 1935. "Zinoviev Confesses; Will It Doom Stalin?; Red Plots 
May End Soon; Trial Reveals Leaders' Betrayal; Country Split" by the Riga Correspondent.
32 The Daily Herald, 10 June 1937. Leading article, "Crisis in Russia".
33 The Daily Express, 7 December 1934. "Stalin's Purge; First Full Story; Many Ogpu Chiefs 
Face the Firing Squad; Shot within Five Minutes of Being Tried; Women and Children Among the 
Victims; All Enemies Shall Be Buried Before 1935'" by the Warsaw Special Correspondent; 3 December 
1934, "Ogpu Vengeance on Plotters; 10 Officers Executed; Assassin's 8 Shots in Palace; Dying Man 
Fires at Murderer; Conspiracy to Kill Stalin" by the Warsaw Correspondent.
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curious stories. For example, the Daily Express ironically reported that the Ogpu 
executioner had to take a rest after the executions for Kirov's death.34 The paper's 
correspondent in Warsaw cynically described in November 1936 how five Russian 
railwaymen had been arrested, tried, and shot within 19 hours.55 The Evening News 
declared after the second Moscow show trial that the "wheel has indeed swung full circle 
when such a man [Beloborodov, who allegedly naurderer the Tsar] is found to be an 
enemy of the state." The paper had expected that the "hand which had bloodily 
dispatched the last Romanovs" would have enjoyed "sacrosanctity scarcely less 
formidable than that of Lenin himself."^ 5 Following the "grim news from Moscow" of 
the Red Army purge, the Daily Express believed that even twenty years after the 
Revolution, the Soviet Union "presents a dark picture of human hate and fear" .3?
Guilt and Confessions
Though the British press was prepared to believe there was treachery in the Soviet 
Union against Stalin, especially since dictators were usually faced with opposition, the 
implausibility of the accusations made it difficult for Fleet Street to accept the truth behind 
all of the charges. The majority of Western observers rejected the nature of the plots 
which were out of character with most of the accused, especially those condemned as 
enemy agents. Other witnesses found it difficult to accept that the Old Guard would try to 
destroy the country which they had created. Furthermore, the trials occasionally 
produced allegations of meetings, held abroad, between communist leaders and 
Trotskyists. Often those accusations could be verified and were frequently found to be 
fabrications.^®
54 The Daily Express, 1 January 1935. "Ogpu Executioner Takes a Rest-Cure; Killer's Nerve 
Shaken by 100 Deaths; Stalin Forced to Share Power with Red Army Chiefs" by the Warsaw 
CorrespondenL
35 The Daily Express, 20 November 1936. "In 19 Hours; Russians Arrested, Tried, Shot" by 
the Warsaw CorrespondenL
35 The Evening News, 27 January 1937. Leading article, "Another Viper?".
3? The Daily Express, 11 June 1937. Leading article, "Russia Trembles". The Daily Mail, 14 
June 1937. "Russia: Executions, Strikes, Terror; Army Unrest; Plot' to Cede Ukraine; Every Man a 
Spy" by the Special Correspondent in Riga.
3® ConquesL pp. 464-465. See also, Max Radin, Foreign Affairs, October 1937, p. 69.
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In general Fleet Street struggled to believe that so many people could be guilty and 
therefore, it was sometimes easier to assume repression had become a permanent feature 
in the Soviet Union. For example, after Kirov's assassination, the quality conservative 
press refused to accept that everyone who was executed, over a hundred people, actually 
belonged to Zinoviev's opposition group.39 Thus, in the opinion of the Manchester 
Guardian, the trials in the Soviet Union rarely produced justice, though they provided 
"diversionary state holidays" for the workers.^® Inevitably, the Soviet Government 
punished more innocent people than it did guilty, a fact which the Sunday Times found 
difficult to accept. The paper described the essence of the Soviet justice system in one 
critical question: "Is it right that 99 per cent of innocent people should suffer in the Soviet 
system so that it never allows one guilty person to go free?"4i
With the first Moscow show trial, the quality conservative press was sceptical of 
the confessions, especially those which admitted to assisting foreign intervention. For 
example, The Times struggled to understand why the Soviet Government found it 
necessary to introduce a foreign "diabolous ex machina" inspired by Trotsky as such 
allegations did not lend credibility to the trial.42 The Scotsman was concerned that the 
"story of conspiracy so far given is strangely unconvincing. And the probable verdict 
will not be endorsed by fair-minded observers since the whole story bristles with 
improbabilities". Therefore, the confessions "are either made to order or the Soviet 
Government has a fertile imagination".43 Thus the Sunday Times clearly alleged that the 
trial was staged.44
When the same type of confessions were made at the second Moscow show trial, 
the quality conservative press felt its opinions were confirmed - the confessions of the
39 The Times, 18 December 1934. "Kirov Murder; New Expulsion by Soviet; Enemies within 
Party'" by the Riga Correspondent. The Daily Telegraph, 19 January 1935. Leading article, "Soviet 
Terror and Mercy". The Sunday Times, 20 January 1935. Leading article, "Soviet Justice"
4® The Manchester Guardian, 20 August 1936. Leading article, ‘The Russian Trial”.
41 The Sunday Times, 31 January 1937. Special article by 'Scrutator', "The Russian Trials; A 
Grim Psychological Study".
42 The Times, 20 August 1936. Leading article, "Zinoviev Again". The Scotsman, 21 August 
1936. Leading article, "Soviet Justice".
43 The Scotsman, 21 August 1936. Leading article, "Soviet Justice".
44 The Sunday Times, 23 August 1936. Leading article, "The Moscow Trial".
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accused did not signify their guilt. The Yorkshire Post alleged "the Slav loves intrigue 
for tbeh: own sake" thus making the disclosures almost "commonplace". In the opinion 
of the paper, if the indictments were true, then the "Russian paradise" of the Bolsheviks 
had been erected not by "social enthusiasm", but by a "most horrible gang of depraved 
maniacs". However, if the confessions were extorted and part of a series of fantastic 
inventions, then Stalin was trying to ensure his power through the ruthless elimination of 
potentially influential people.45 The quality conservative press argued that the disclosures 
at the second Moscow show trial were even more ludicrous than those of the first trial. 
For example, Beloborodov, the man alleged to have killed the Tsar and his family, was 
on trial for conspiring with Stalin's chauffeur to drive the communist leader over a 
precipice.45 Yet despite the ridiculous nature of the confessions, these papers recognised 
there would never be a way of proving the accuracy of the trials.4? Both the Daily 
Telegraph and the Sunday Times declared that "the imagination boggles" at trying to 
translate the show trial held in January 1937. The Daily Telegraph admitted to being 
astonished that the "Lieutenants of Lenin" conspired to parcel out areas of the Soviet 
Union to Germany and Japan, planned the wholesale murders of the present leaders of 
the USSR, and organised the wrecking of industrial plants without regard to life.4® The 
Sunday Times attempted to explain some of the charges in an "English Translation" 
whereby "Lloyd George promises to give Yorkshire to Italy". The paper wondered how 
much of this "wickedness" Britain was genuinely supposed to believe. The Sunday 
Times suggested the British Government had come to believe both Trotsky and the 
Germans, who called the trial a "frame-up", because "it was easier to damn a system than 
formerly credible men".49
45 The Yorkshire Post, 21 January 1937. Leading article, "The Terror in Russia". See also, 
the Scotsman, 26 January 1937. Leading article, "The Russian Trial".
45 The Daily Telegraph, 27 January 1937. "Arrest of Man Who Executed the Tsar; Alleged 
Plot to Kill Stalin; Chauffeur 'Urged to Fake Smash'; To Drive Premier Over Precipice'" by the Moscow 
CorrespondenL
4? See for example, The Times, 26 January 1937. Leading article, “Stalin’s Necktie”. The 
Sunday Times, 24 January 1937. "Alleged Plot for War with USSR; Amazing Confession Charges" by 
the Moscow CorrespondenL
4® The Daily Telegraph, 30 January 1937. Leading article, "A Farcical Trial".
49 The Sunday Times, 31 January 1937. Special article by 'Scrutator', "The Russian Trials; A 
Grim Psychological Study" . See also, the Daily Telegraph, 28 January 1937. Special article by A. T.
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At the third Moscow show trial, the Daily Telegraph stated it was absurd to think 
that Lenin's friends and former leaders, the "fine-flower of the Bolshevik movement", 
were the paid servants of foreign governments. Furthermore, the charges of attempted 
assassination were especially farcical when it was remembered that only one political 
murder, that of Kirov, had been accomplished by such terrible criminals.50 Thus by the 
third Moscow show trial, the quality conservative press expected the same rituals to be 
performed,5i a "victory parade" where every type of opposition, terror, sabotage, 
treachery, and espionage was publicly merged into a single great c o n s p i r a c y .5 2  The 
Scotsman found it ironic that "with each trial, the ingenuity of the prosecutors is evinced 
anew in the elaboration of implausible c h a r g e s " .5 3  It seemed curious to the Yorkshire 
Post and the Scotsman that the "dubious and fantastic" evidence, which had only 
become available after twenty years of plotting, actually made Bukharin and Rykov "very 
subtle or innocuous conspirators. Or Lenin and Stalin were unusually t r u s t in g ."54
There was only one, curious exception amongst the quality conservative press, 
following the first Moscow show trial, when the Observer's Moscow Correspondent 
suggested it was "futile to think the trial was staged and the charges trumped up. The 
Government's case against the defendants was g e n u i n e .  "55 Though the paper's attitude 
changed after the second Moscow show tr ia l ,5 5  this was one of several examples of non-
Cholerton, the Moscow Correspondent, "Behind the Moscow Trial 'Confessions'; How Prosecution's 
Case Has Developed". The Times, 1 February 1937. Leading article, “Moscow and the ‘Trotskyists’”. 
D.B.F.P., Second Series, Vol. XVII, no. 129.
5® The Daily Telegraph, 9 March 1938. Special article by Malcolm Muggeridge, "Significance 
of Soviet Trials; Terrorist Regime Must Continue to Create an Excuse for Terror"; 14 March 1938, 
leading article, "Moscow’s Grim Assize". The Times, 14 March 1938. Leading article, “The Moscow 
Trial”. John Erickson, The Soviet High Command, p. 464.
51 The Times, 2 March 1938. Leading article, ‘The Russian Trial”. The Daily Telegraph, 9 
March 1938. Special article by Malcolm Muggeridge, "Significance of Soviet Trials; Terrorist Regime 
Must Continue to Create an Excuse for Terror".
52 Conquest, pp. 341-343.
53 The Scotsman, 2 March 1938. Leading article, "Soviet Treason Trial"
The YorksMre Post, 7 March 1938. Leading article, "Moscow Mysteries". The Scotsman, 
2 March 1938. Leading article, "Soviet Treason Trial".
55 The Observer, 23 August 1936. "Closing Scene in Moscow Trial; Death Penalty 
Demanded; 'Mad Dogs Must Be Shot'; Prisoners in Tears" by the Moscow Correspondent.
55 The Observer, 31 January 1937. "Moscow and the Verdict"; 13 March 1938, "World: Week 
by Week - The Moscow Drama".
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socialist foreigners who were present at the trials and who were deluded by the
proceedings.^^
The popular conservative press found the accusations, confessions, and evidence 
unsatisfactory and unjustifiable. These papers first suggested that the personalities of the 
"conspirators" were not conducive to criminal behaviour. For example, after Kirov’s 
assassination, the Daily Express could not accept that Zinoviev and Kamenev had 
anything to do with the murder since the former was "an untrustworthy agitator" and the 
latter was "an inveterate w o b b le r " .H o w e v e r  during the first show trial, the 
personalities of the accused became unimportant when compared to the amount of 
evidence which these papers found simply unbelievable. The Daily Express questioned 
the "facts" which led Stalin to put former Bolshevik leaders on trial for their lives for 
allegedly conspiring with Germany. The paper thought it was unlikely the Germans 
would want to replace Stalin with Trotsky, and thus the Daily Express declared the trial 
to be the "biggest f r a m e - u p " .59
During the second Moscow show trial, the popular conservative press, like the 
rest of Fleet Street, found the evidence even more ludicrous and thus "easily" doubted the 
validity of the confessions.^ The Evening Standard classed the confessions as those of 
"mental home patients"^^ when, for example, some defendants admitted spreading a 
bacterial infection amongst their fellow countrymen, conducting widespread sabotage and 
organising train wrecking on a massive scale.^2 During the third Moscow show trial, the
57 See for example, Joseph Davies, Mission to Moscow. Davies was the United States 
Ambassador to Moscow in the 1930s and firmly believed in the validity of the purges and show trials. 
The Daily Herald's Moscow Correspondent, R. T. Miller, believed in the accuracy of the second show 
trial and therefore wrote a preface to the book providing the verbatim report of the 1937 Moscow Trial, 
The Moscow Trial (January 1937) and Two Speeches by Stalin. See also Conquest, pp. 464-472, for his 
criticism of the way in which many Westerners were deceived by the Soviet Government into believing 
the trials were at least partially true.
5® The Daily Express, 21 December 1934. Leading article, "Russian Clean-Up".
59 The Daily Express, 22 August 1936. Leading article, "Arabian Nights”.
The Evening News, 26 January 1937. Leading article, "A Choice of Evils". See also, the 
Daily Express, 27 January 1937. "Czar Murderer Taken by Ogpu" by the Warsaw Staff Reporter.
The Evening Standard, 30 January 1937. Leading article, "Moscow Mystery".
The Evening News, 26 January 1937. Leading article, "A Choice o f Evils" The Evening 
Standard, 27 January 1937. "Moscow Fury at Wrecking" by a Special Correspondent; 27 January 1937, 
"Organised 3^500 Train Crashes in Two Years; Confession at Moscow Trial by Ex-Railway Chief” by the 
Exchange Telegraph in Moscow. See also, the Evening News which carried as its main headline for 27 
January 1937 "I Organised 3,500 Railway Accidents'" by Central News and Reuter.
Stalin's Necktie 138
Daily Express complained that no one in Britain was capable of understanding charges 
which were "so preposterous, they outstrip the imagination". The paper hoped that one 
day the world would be told why death sentences could "so light-heartedly" be imposed 
and ruthlessly carried out but until then, Stalin's empire "is shrouded".
The liberal press condemned the repetitiveness and lack of originality in all the 
Moscow show trials. The Spectator and the Economist believed the first trial was 
rendered "farcical" by the "abounding evidence and abject confessions" to every 
"imaginable and unimaginable" crime by "completely broken m en".^ Cynicism was 
even more evident following the second show trial, when the liberal press reported the 
amazing stories of large scale train wrecks and mining d i s a s t e r s . ^ 5  Like the conservative 
press, the News Chronicle believed the second Moscow trial was a "frame-up" because 
Radek, a "courageous man", confessed to crimes and plans which his character could 
never commit.®^ Though liberal newspapers found it difficult to accept the evidence as 
anything other than fabrications, since many disasters were too amazing to be true,^7 the 
Manchester Guardian could not entirely discount the fact that amongst all the "evidence" 
there could possibly be "some sketch of truth". However, if there was no factual basis 
for the charges, then Stalin tried innocent people because he "has an insane jealousy and 
a m b i t i o n " . The News Chronicle argued that if after twenty years of communism, 
"there is such disloyalty, inefficiency, corruption, and sedition as the Soviet Government 
declares, what a condemnation of Soviet rule this is!" If, however, the charges were 
unfounded, then the paper believed it was a "revolting exhibition of t y r a n n y " . ^ ^  The 
Contemporary Review bluntly stated that "in Russia, they have reached the stage where
The Daily Express, 12 March 1938. Leading article, "Stalin’s Purge".
The Spectator, 28 August 1936. Leading article, "Twilight o f the Bolsheviks". The 
Economist, 29 August 1936. "Stalin Wins".
5^ See for example, the Manchester Guardian, 28 January 1937. “Russian Railway Disasters; 
Moscow Prisoner Claims that He Ordered Large Numbers”. The News Chronicle, 28 January 1937. 
"Tension as Moscow Trial Ends: Diplomat ’Mr. X’ Named" by the Moscow Correspondent.
The News Chronicle, 1 February 1937. Special article by Cummings, "What the Russian 
Trial Means". See also, 22 January 1937, leading article, "Out-Radeked".
7^ The News Chronicle, 25 January 1937. "Radek Talks of Nazi War Plot; Ex-London Envoy 
Confesses At Moscow Trial" by the Moscow Correspondent
The Manchester Guardian, 1 February 1937. Leading article, “The Moscow Trial”.
The News Chronicle, 11 June 1937. Leading article, "Moscow Enigma".
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politicians simply shoot each other"70 and the Manchester Guardian sarcastically 
admitted that "the work of saving Russia from Trotskyism' was carried out with great 
vigour by Stalin's administration"7 1
The liberal press found the third Moscow show trial a repetition of the previous 
ones, and although perhaps more spectacular,72 the Manchester Guardian claimed the 
only difference between the trials of 1936 and 1938 were the names of the prisoners.73 
Nevertheless, the liberal press found the evidence in the third trial as "bewildering" as that 
previously used. Although the Manchester Guardian was again prepared to concede 
there could be a "substratum of truth",74 the News Chronicle claimed that even more 
than before, the present trial "piques the curiosity" of the outside world which tried to 
find a semblance of truth or logic.75
Within Fleet Street, the labour press was the most unsettled by the possibility that 
Stalin and the NKVD, which appeared to be so strong, found it necessary to fabricate 
evidence. The New Statesman and Nation maintained that the first Moscow show trial 
was wholly unconvincing because an opposition group organised around Trotsky, and 
with the aid of the Nazis, was impossible in 1936. Thus the worst possible interpretation 
of the trial, in the journal's opinion, was that the secret police had invented the whole 
conspiracy to perpetuate its power on the eve of the adoption of the "quasi-democratic" 
constitution. Though the New Statesman and Nation accepted there may have been a 
plot against Stalin, the unconvincing confessions gave the trial a "dubious" value.7^ The 
Daily Herald was similarly concerned "^^the accuracy of the evidence.
70 The Contemporary Review, September 1937. "Foreign Affairs - Human Problems: I.
Russia".
71 The Manchester Guardian, 23 January 1937. Leading article, "The Russian Trial”.
72 The News Chronicle, 1 March 1938. "Soviet Treason Surprises" by the Moscow 
Correspondent
73 The Manchester Guardian, 3 March 1938. Leading article, “The Trial”.
74 The Manchester Guardian, 14 March 1938. Leading article, “The Moscow Trial”. See also 
the Daily Express, 12 March 1938, which siuprisingly offered the same opinion.
75 TheiVewj Chronicle, 15 March 1938. Special article by Cummings, "Arabian Nights in 
Moscow".
76 The New Statesman and Nation, 29 August 1936. "Comments- The Soviet Purge".
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If the charges and the evidence are faked and the confessions extorted, then the 
Soviet Government has committed an act of terrorism worthy of ranking with the 
supreme achievement of fascism. But, if the evidence is genuine, then all who 
once held high hopes of the Russian Revolution will be not less sick at heart.77
Therefore, during the second Moscow show trial, the labour press expected more 
plausible allegations and confessions.^* Thus the ridiculous nature of the charges, such 
as one man being responsible for 3,500 railway accidents between 1934 and 1935, 
convinced the Daily Herald that the trial was s t a g e d . 7 9  The New Statesman and Nation 
also believed the evidence made for a "curious story" and demanded that Stalin explain 
his actions so foreigners could understand the trials.
To doubt the truth of the confessions is to accuse the Soviet Government of a 
disregard for the most elementary principles of justice. But to accept them as they 
stand is to draw a picture of a regime divided against itself, a regime in which the 
leaders are at a deadly feud with each other, a regime in which the only way to 
express discontent is in conspiracy and the only way to suppress conspiracy, 
mass executions. If there is an escape from this dilemma Stalin should tell us 
what it is.*^
Following the third Moscow show trial, the labour press remained confused since 
it could not account for Stalin's creation of such absurd charges and disclosures by the 
accused.
Like its predecessors this latest of Soviet treason trials defies explanation. Belief 
in the charges, the evidence, the confessions is impossible to the sane mind. Yet 
blind disbelief provides no reasonable interpretation either.^^
77 The Daily Herald, 24 August 1936. Leading article, “Soviet Trial”.
7* The Daily Herald, 23 January 1937. Leading article, “Moscow’s New Trial”.
79 The Daily Herald, 28 January 1937. “Confessed He Arranged 3,500 Rail Crashes; Amazing 
Evidence at Soviet Trial” by the Exchange.
The New Statesman and Nation, 30 January 1937. Leading article, "Will Stalin Explain?". 
The Daily Herald, 14 March 1938. Leading article, also quoted in Deli, p. 267.
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It was Yagoda's presence at the third show trial which most baffled the New Statesman 
and Nation,
If logic and justice count for anything, some of these "traitors" for whose death 
Yagoda was responsible, will be posthumously reinstated as martyrs struck down 
by the machinations of the GPU. They cannot have it both ways. If Yagoda is as 
bad as [we are] told, we cannot believe the evidence in the trials he o r g a n i s e d .* ^
When discussing why the accused made such unnatural and farcical confessions. 
Fleet Street referred to the psychology of the people of the Soviet Union. The Daily 
Telegraph ironically suggested that it was the "Russian way to confess and abase 
themselves: they did not lack c o u ra g e " .T h e  Yorkshire Post likewise believed it was 
more exceptional for a Russian not to divulge what he knew.*4 One of the defendants, 
Boguslavsky, reasoned in his evidence at the second Moscow show trial that it was his 
duty to confess "thus providing the best means of destroying Trotskyism".*5 The 
Evening News found it curious that the allegedly guilty men "eagerly" and "cheerfully" 
revealed their intention to lead crimes "ten times more ruthless and horrible than any in the 
annals of ganstcnsm .*6
The British press admitted that perhaps the accused asserted their guilt because 
they were promised a light sentence*^ or that by confessing, they hoped to save the lives 
of family and friends who were being held "hostage".^^ However, the Evening Standard
*2 The New Statesman and Nation, 12 March 1938. "Comments - The Soviet Trial". Also 
quoted by Deli, p. 278.
*3 The Daily Telegraph, 24 August 1936. Leading article, "The Treason Trial in Moscow". 
The News Chronicle, 15 March 1938. Special article by Cummings, "Arabian Nights in Moscow".
*4 The Yorkshire Post, 24 August 1936. Leading article, "Moscow Treason Trial".
5^ The Daily Telegraph, 26 January 1937. "Why Prisoner Confessed; Unhappy Over Trotsky" 
by the Moscow Correspondent. The Manchester Guardian, 26 January 1937. “More Evidence at Moscow 
Trial; Prisoner Explains His Confession”. The Daily Herald, 26 January 1937. “Soviet Accused 
Explains Confession”. The New Statesman and Nation, 30 January 1937. Leading article, "Will Stalin 
Explain?". Teddy Uldricks, "The Impact of the Great Purges on toe People’s Commissariat of Foreign 
Affairs", p. 189.
*6 The Evening News, 26 January 1937. Leading article, "A Choice of Evils".
*7 The Scotsman, 26 January 1937. Leading article, "The Russian Trial".
** Conquest, p. 75. Issac Deutscher, Stalin: A Political Biography, p. 374. The Manchester 
Guardian, 2 February 1937. Letter by A. J. P. Taylor. See also on 2 February 1937, the letter by Dr. J. 
N. Steinberg, formerly People's Commissar of Justice in toe first Soviet Government.
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acknowledged that rarely were defendants let off as a result of revealing their c r i m e s .* ^  
In August 1936, the Dcdly Express thought Zinoviev and Kamenev had finally "bowed to 
Stalin" to save their lives, though in v a i n . 9 0  Nevertheless, following the verdict of the 
second Moscow show trial, Radek and three others allegedly received preferential 
treatment when they were sentenced to five or ten years of penal servitude.91 The 
majority of Fleet Street expressed amazement that Radek escaped the death penalty and 
questioned the consistency of the Soviet judicial s y s t e m . ^ 2  Ironically, the Daily Express 
reasoned, with a degree of logic, that the thirteen executed men were probably the lucky 
ones since there was undoubtedly something wrong in the Soviet Union.93
The British press also seriously suggested drugs and torture were used by the 
NKVD to extract confessions. For example, the Scotsman believed it was more 
plausible that the admissions were given under duress, through torture or drugs, rather 
than because of "a change of heart".94 The uniformity of the disclosures suggested to the 
News Chronicle that the accused suffered "third degree" torture despite denials by the 
Soviet Government and the defendants.95 Th& Daily Mail unrestrainedly maintained that 
the accused "are plied night and day by inquisitors until they give way because they are 
deprived of s l e e p " . ^ 6  The paper's Warsaw Correspondent also suggested the allegedly 
guilty men were hypnotised daily and thus made their admissions while in a trance.97 
The Daily Express stated that some "observers" attributed the "confessions" to a hypnotic 
drug which "petrified the victim's will". Though the paper admitted it sounded fantastic, 
the Daily Express alleged the idea of such drugs was no more eccentric than the
The Evening Standard, 30 January 1937. Leading article, "Moscow Mystery".
The Daily Express, 28 August 1936. Leading article, "The Police Called".
Max Radin, Foreign Affairs, October 1937, p. 77.
See for example articles in newspapers on 30 January and 1 February 1937. The N ew  
Statesman and Nation, "Will Stalin Explain?", The Daily Telegraph, "A Farcical Trial". The Daily 
Mail, "The Moscow Sentences". The Yorkshire Post, "Radek and Sokolnikov Escape Death".
93 The Daily Express, 1 February 1937. Leading article, "Firing Squad".
^4 The Scotsman, 26 January 1937. Leading article, "The Russian Trial". The Contemporary 
Review, March 1937, Leading article, "Foreign Affairs - Mr. Stalin at Bay".
5^ The News Chronicle, 1 February 1937. Special article by Cummings, "What the Russian 
Trial Means". The New Statesman and Nation, 30 January 1937. Leading article, "Will Stalin 
Explain?".
^6 The Daily Mail, 30 January 1937. Leading article, "The Moscow Sentences".
The Daily Mail, 26 January 1937. "Moscow Prisoners in a Trance; Hypnotised Daily" by 
the Warsaw Special CotrespondenL
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disclosures made by formerly strong men who were suddenly abasing themselves.^* In 
Conquest’s opinion, it appeared that foreigners could not accurately imagine the means by 
which the NKVD extracted confessions. Although many of the defendants 
acknowledged that they were wrong and thus simply accepted blame out of loyalty to the 
Soviet Party, torture was more frequently used. A system, known as the "conveyor", 
was employed in which the accused were interrogated in poor conditions, for long 
periods, with very little sleep and food. If a victim managed to withstand these 
pressures, as many did such as Bukharin, then their families were taken as hostages or 
promises of light sentences were offered to make the arrested person confess. Thus all 
methods brought abject self-abasement or else execution without trial.^
Nevertheless, the Yorkshire Post and the Daily Telegraph admitted that although 
torture and drugs were a possibility, not all defendants appeared to suffer p h y s i c a l l y ,  
The New Statesman and Nation was also confused when Radek joked of his coming 
execution as that did not sound like a man who had been tortured. The Daily Worker 
firmly stated that the accused confessed because there was so much evidence gathered 
against them and therefore, drugs and torture were u n n e c e s s a r y .  the paper's
opinion, there was no doubt that the men were caught "red-handed" and thus the 
confessions confirmed their g u i l t . Whatever the reason for the confessions, the 
British press could only speculate as there was no means of discovering the whole trath.
The Daily Express, 25 January 1937. Leading article, "Are They Drugged?"; 25 January 
1937, leading article, "State Trial".
^9 Conquest, pp. 110 and 121-130. See also Roy Medvedev, Let History Judge, pp. 381-383, 
who accepts that depressants could account for the "inert and sluggish" tones used by the accused during 
their trials. Also, Deutscher, p. 374.
The Yorkshire Post, 7 March 1938. Leading article, "Moscow Mysteries". The D aily  
Telegraph, 9 March 1938. Special article by Malcolm Muggeridge, "Significance of Soviet Trials; 
Terrorist Regime Must Continue to Create an Excuse for Terror".
The Vew Statesman and Nation, 30 January 1937. Leading article, "Will Stalin Explain?". 
See Conquest p. 146 fcwr a different view on the health of the accused. Piatakov especially is described as 
being "so weak, he looked like a skeleton".
The Daily Worker, 21 January 1937, "Why Plotters Confessed" by R. P. Amot, the 
Moscow Correspondent.
103 The Daily Worker, 25 August 1936. Leading article, "Guilty"; 1 February 1937, leading 
article, "After the Trial".
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Stalin's responsibility
Prior to the Moscow show trials. Fleet Street held the Ogpu accountable for 
making arrests and organising the evidence for trials, and thus some papers suggested the 
secret police had a large degree of authority in the Soviet U n i o n .  1 0 4  However, in April 
1934, Stalin declared there was no longer a need for the Ogpu due to its own success at 
eliminating the enemies of the Revolution. Officially the work of the secret police was 
taken over by the Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD) which reportedly substituted 
a system of administration for the former organisation of espionage and terrorism. Thus 
the labour press viewed the changes as a sign that stability had returned to the Soviet 
Union and suggested the end of the Ogpu's s u p r e m a c y .  contrast, the conservative 
and liberal press, though hoping for less repression, expected the NKVD to continue its 
previous activities under the new commissar, Yagoda, since nothing truly appeared to 
have c h a n g e d .  1 0 6  indeed, Yagoda organised the first Moscow show trial. Chilston, the 
British Ambassador in Moscow, recognised after the first Moscow show trial that Stalin 
was gaining more thorough control by eliminating those who criticised him and by 
replacing them with "his own men". Furthermore, Chilston was concerned that Stalin 
was "falling entirely into the hands" of the NKVD who did wish to see increased freedom 
as allegedly promised in the new c o n s t i t u t i o n .  i® 7
However, with the "sensational" dismissal of Yagoda as head of the NKVD in 
October 1936, Fleet Street increasingly recognised it was Stalin who unquestionably 
organised the repression and trials. The fact that the head of the NKVD could be removed 
so easily indicated to The Times that Stalin had become very strong as a result of the
^ 4^ The Manchester Guardian, 17 March 1933. Leading article, "O.G.P.U.". The Times, 25 
May 1933. "More Arrests by Ogpu" by the Riga Correspondent.
105 The Daily Herald, 17 April 1934, "Soviet to End G.P.U. and Secret Trials; Stalin 
Bringing Law into Line with West; Emergency Days Are Ended; Prisoners Being Released" by the 
Diplomatic Correspondent. On 13 August 1935, the Daily Herald welcomed an amnesty releasing 
prisoners, though tiie paper cynically recognised that they were replaced by those who had originally 
arrested the victims.
106 The Daily Telegraph, 27 February 1934. “A New Development in Soviet Policy”. The 
News Chronicle, 27 February 1934. "Teeth o f Russia's Dreaded Secret Police Drawn; Duties to Be 
Taken Over; 16 Years' Terror Ended" by Reuter in Moscow. The Times, 15 January 1934. "Communist 
Purge in Russia; 270,000 Members Expelled" by the Riga Correspondent. The Daily Express, 11 May 
1934. “Russia’s Most Dreaded Man Dead; Ogpu Chief Who Despised Mercy” by Reuter.
107 D.B.F.P., Second Series, Vol. XVII, no. 130.
Stalin's Necktie 145
p u r g e s .  1 0 8  His telegram of 25 September to Politburo members demonstrated this 
strength.
We consider it absolutely necessary and urgent that Comrade Yezhov be 
appointed to head the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs [NKVD]. 
Yagoda has obviously proved unequal to the task of exposing the Trotskyite- 
Zinovievite bloc. The OGPU was four years late in this matter. AU party officials 
and most of the NKVD agents in the oblasti are talking about this.i09
A large proportion of the British press, speculating on the probable results of Nikolay 
Yezhov’s appointment, feared an increased number of trials against wreckers and 
opposition group s. ih^ Thus in 1937, the world witnessed "terror and repression... on 
the party and all citizens of the Soviet Union on a scale previously unheard of."in
In January 1937, The Times was under no illusions as to Stalin's leading role in 
the purges. The paper compared Stalin to Stolypin, who as Prime Minister from 1906- 
1911 under Tsar Nicholas II, was responsible for a number of modernising reforms. 
However, his period of office was marked by harsh treatment of rioters in the countryside 
and by a revival of Jewish persecution. As a consequence, this reactionary period was 
referred to as the age of "Stolypin"s Necktie". Thus The Times claimed that despite a 
new constitution, "Stalin's necktie" was similarly tight around Lenin's c o m r a d e s . ^ As 
the Daily Express explained, Lenin's colleagues were quite simply eliminated so that "the 
Revolution, even after twenty years, is a castaway crew on a r a f t .  ^ 3  Thus in December 
1937, the Daily Express was not surprised when it cynically reported that Trotsky was 
"still working hard... Eight more went for the bullet, all high in the hierarchy of the 'most
1®* The Times, 3 October 1936. Leading article, “The Strong Hand in Moscow”.
Medvedev, p. 358. The telegram was quoted in Khruschev’s secret speech to the Twentieth
Congress.
1 See for example, the Daily Herald, the Daily Express, the Scotsman, all 9 October 1936; 
The Times, 12 November 1936; the Manchester Guardian, 25 November 1936.
Medvedev, p. 361.
The Times, 26 January 1937. Leading article, “Stalin’s Necktie”.
^^ 3 The Daily Express, 23 January 1937. Leading article, "Survivors - For How Long".
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free and democratic country in the world'". The paper alleged that soon the country 
would be united though not until "Stalin is the solitary keeper of the cemetery".^^^
With the third Moscow show trial, the Daily Telegraph responded by 
condemning the actions of the "witch-hunting dictator".
The world now knows Bolshevism is rotten to the core. Either the most notable 
men are base and treacherous beyond belief, or the man in Moscow who now 
wields despotic power is a homicidal maniac. In either case, though there is 
nothing much to fear, there is nothing more to hope f o r .  1^ 5
The Daily Express suggested that when Stalin claimed there was a plot against the Soviet 
State, he actually meant the plot was against himself, since "L'État, c'est m o i " .  1 ^ 6  
Another leading article in the paper, entitled "I Had a Comrade", sarcastically claimed 
Stalin had executed, jailed, or exiled all communist revolutionary leaders except Lenin, 
who "had managed to die in time". The paper wondered if there was any leader left in the 
Soviet Union, apart from Stalin,
who will not have 'confessed' to being a traitor, a Trotskyist, a spy, or a saboteur 
within twelve months. Picking 'one' such winner will be harder than picking 
twelve in the football pools h e r e .  ^ 7^
As with conservative newspapers, the liberal and labour press also increasingly 
recognised Stalin's role in the purges following Yagoda's dismissal as head of the NKVD 
in September 1936.1^* Not only did "Russia again become a gigantic question mark,"ii^ 
but the Daily Herald pointed out that the trial provided a warning to all in the Soviet
^^ 4 The Daily Express, 21 December 1937. Leading article, "Trotsky, Naturally".
 ^^ 5 The Daily Telegraph, 14 March 1938. Leading article, "Moscow's Grim Assize".
^16 The Daily Express, 10 March 1938. Leading article, "I Am the State".
^^ 7 The Daily Express, 7 March 1938. Leading article, "I Had a Comrade".
See for example, the Daily Herald, 28 September 1936. "Rykov Released" from Soviet 
Post" by Reuter and Exchange". The Manchester Guardian, 25 November 1936, "New Heresy Hunt in 
Moscow". See also, the Manchester Guardian, 6 April 1937. Leading article, "Darkest Russia". The 
News Chronicle, 7 April 1937. Leading article, "Russia's 'Purge'". Yagoda was officially arrested in 
April 1937.
The Daily Herald, 31 August 1936. Leading article, “Stalin’s Terror”. The Economist, 29 
August 1936. "Stalin Wins".
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Union that Stalin was the master and to oppose him was one of the worst crimes. The 
ruthlessness and the extent of the purge made it clear to the paper that the Soviet Union 
was not moving from dictatorship to democracy, but from one kind of dictatorship into 
another. "And this dictatorship is not 'of the proletariat' nor is it c o m m u n i s t " .  
Though people like Rust, the editor of the Daily Worker, argued Stalin was selectively 
purging the most dangerous old B o lsh e v ik s ,th e  News Chronicle recognised that few 
of Lenin’s comrades remained in January 1937 to defend the R e v o l u t i o n . ^^ 2
Stalin appeared to Fleet Street to be assuming the mantle worn by most dictators. 
Until Zinoviev and Kamenev were arrested for Kirov's assassination, the Daily Express 
stated that Stalin had treated the Old Guard with more respect than Hitler had treated his 
old f r i e n d s . ^ ^ 3  The Yorkshire Post pointed out that until August 1936, the principle that 
"dog does not eat dog" held true and though "[Soviet] hands might drip with bourgeois 
blood, unlike the Nazis they did not kill each o t h e r " .  1 2 4  Low's cartoon on 28 August 
1936, "It's Queer How You Remind Me of Someone, Josef...", showed how much the 
cartoonist believed Stalin had noted and imitated Hitler's successful purge o f the 
opposition. In the Soviet Union, the number of executions far exceeded the degree of 
constitutional c h a n g e .  125
Nevertheless, Stalin was genuinely popular amongst the masses, much as the 
Tsars had been perceived as father figures to the peasants. Both Stalin and the Romanovs 
based their popularity on appearance, on assuming credit for great achievements and by 
assigning scapegoats for any p r o b l e m s .  126 However, in August 1937, the Manchester 
Guardian‘s Moscow Correspondent noted that Stalin had attempted to improve his 
popularity in the Soviet Union by making full use of popular dislike for the NKVD to
120 The Daily Herald, 2 September 1936. Leading article, “Russia”.
121 The Manchester Guardian, 12 September 1936. Letter by William Rust, “The Significance 
of the Russian Trial; A Defence of Stalin’s Policy”. See also, the Daily Worker, 26 August 1936.
122 The News Chronicle, 30 January 1937. Leading article, "Devouring Its Children".
123 The Daily Express, 21 December 1934. Leading article, "Russian Clean-Up". The paper 
was referring to the Rohm purge in the summer of 1934.
124 The Yorkshire Post, 24 August 1936. Leading article, "Moscow Treason Trial".
125 See Figure 5.1. The Evening Standard, 28 August 1936, "It’s Queer How You Remind Me 
of Someone, Josef...". See also, the News Chronicle, 11 June 1937. Leading article, "Moscow 
Enigma".
126 Dmitri Volkogonov, Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy, p. 263. Medvedev, p. 356.
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depose Y a g o d a . 1 2? Furthermore, a decree was issued in 1 9 3 8  by Stalin, calling for the 
halt of mass expulsions and informing against the party. Nevertheless, the Manchester 
Guardian suggested the ordinary person and party member would continue to be 
frightened out of his life" as Stalin's decree was recognised by the paper to be simply a 
means of increasing his popularity. The paper did not believe purging would cease since 
in reality "Stalin, the huntsman, was urging on the h o u n d s " .  128
Seeking understanding
In an attempt to understand Stalin's motives for holding the trials, the British 
press suggested a variety of explanations such as economic failures, fear of foreign 
invasion and Stalin's personal anxieties. There was strong support within Fleet Street for 
the theory that the trials were necessary to provide scapegoats and diversions from the 
internal problems of the Soviet Union. Following Kirov's murder. The Times and the
127 The Manchester Guardian, 18 August 1937. Turnover article by the former Moscow 
Correspondent, Russia Under Stalin: I. Dictatorship; The Struggle for Power; A Fanatical Policeman".
1 The Manchester Guardian, 21 January 1938. Leading article. "About Turn in Russia". The 
Times, 4 October 1937. "Executions in Russia; A Relaxation in Severity" by the Riga Correspondent
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Scotsman thought it reasonable to suggest that perhaps the Soviet Government was using 
the assassination and the consequent resumption of terror as a means of diverting 
attention from economic and social problems. 129 This theory became especially favoured 
after the Novosibirsk and the second Moscow show trial since the accused were 
predominantly economic leaders. Thus it appeared to the quality conservative press that 
those defendants were "sacrificed" to save the economy.130 However, the Yorkshire 
Post questioned the sense of such a policy since workers and managers who feared for 
their own lives if mistakes were punished with death would not give their "best or most 
loyal" service. 131
The liberal press also recognised that the trials were possibly held for economic 
reasons. The Economist argued that the Soviet economy was not nearly as "rosy" as the 
Soviet authorities wished the West to believe since production was not keeping up with 
expectation. The journal, therefore, suspected that the first Moscow show trial was 
intended to provide a "boost" in domestic a f f a i r s .  132 The Manchester Guardian, in 
contrast after the second Moscow show trial, believed the Soviet Union was advancing 
economically though the paper admitted that the purge of industrial personnel was 
potentially very damaging to further economic development. 133
Another possible reason for the show trials, offered by the British press, was the 
recognition that the Soviet leadership was afraid of foreign invasion especially from Japan 
in the Far East and Germany in Europe. The conservative press admitted that this anxiety 
had increased by the first Moscow show trial in August 1936,134 though these papers 
believed such fear had escalated out of proportion by the third show trial. Furthermore, 
the threat of foreign intervention had appeared to much of the quality conservative press
129 xhe Times, 24 December 1934. "The Terror in Russia" by the Riga Correspondent. The 
Scotsman, 26 December 1934. Leading article, "The Russian Purge".
130 The Daily Telegraph, 30 January 1937. Leading article, "A Farcical Trial".
131 The Yorkshire Post, 24 August 1936. Leading article, "Moscow Treason Trial". Conquest,
p. 149.
132 The Economist, 22 August 1936. "Trial By and For the People".
133 The Manchester Guardian, 1 February 1937. Leading article, “The Moscow Trial”.
134 The Yorkshire Post, 24 August 1936. Leading article, "Moscow Treason Trial". The Daily 
Express, 24 August 1936. Leading article, "The Priests o f Baal"; 26 August 1936, leading article, "Mad 
Dog Days".
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to recede as the Red Army had improved, though this view disappeared with the 
execution of its most capable l e a d e r s .  D 5
The liberal and labour press primarily believed foreign intervention was one of 
many convenient excuses for removing "impotent" political o p p o s i t i o n .  136 The Spectator 
alleged that "spies. Trotskyists, wreckers, and foreign powers are only metaphors for 
political opponents whom a dictator must necessarily consider as traitors." 13? After 
Kirov's assassination, the Daily Herald did not believe the threat of foreign interference 
justified a "civilised government in the shooting out of hand of dozens of people, who 
may or may not be guilty". 13* Nor did the New Statesman and Nation believe the threat 
of invasion justified the anxieties which led to the executions after the first Moscow show 
trial. "Much that is disappointing in Russia today is due to fear of invasion and the vast 
military preparations which follow firom such fear." 139
In general, the British press attributed the trials to Stalin's "nervous reaction", 
fears, ambitions, and paranoias. In the opinion of the quality conservative press, fear of 
Trotsky, despite his exile and "apparent impotence", meant he was still perceived by the 
Soviet Government to be the greatest criminal and the most significant threat to the Soviet 
s t a t e .  140 Thus the accused in the first Moscow show trial were alleged to be 
"Trotskyists" and all domestic and foreign problems were linked to those conspirators. 
Nevertheless, the Scotsman suggested that it was unlikely that all "dangerous 
conspirators" were organised by Trotsky. Instead, the paper suggested Stalin had 
discovered a suitable excuse for carrying out a purge of all his critics by labelling them 
Trotskyists even if they were not. 141 The Observer, though critical of Stalin's methods.
135 The Scotsman, 10 March 1938. Leading article, "Britain and the Soviet". The Observer, 
23 August 1936. "Closing Scene in Moscow Trial" by the Moscow Correspondent.
The Economist, 29 December 1934. "Conspiracy in Russia". The A/anc/iejter 7
January 1935. "Kirov Murder; Soviet Press Innuendos against Germany" by Reuter; 17 January 1935, 
leading article, "Moral Lessons".
137 The Spectator, 18 June 1937, Leading article, "The Russian Mystery".
138 The Daily Herald, 20 December 1934. Leading article, "Terror in Russia".
139 The New Statesman and Nation, 5 September 1936. Also quoted in Deli, p. 270.
140 The Daily Telegraph, 24 August 1936. Leading article, "The Treason Trial in Moscow". 
The Times, 25 August 1936. Leading article, "M. Stalin's Purge"; 20 August 1936, leading article, 
"Zinoviev Again"; 28 December 1934, leading article, "The New Russian Terror".
141 The Scotsman, 25 August 1936. Leading article, "Moscow's Verdict".
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nevertheless believed in 1936 that it was wrong to conclude the Soviet state was internally 
shaken or that Stalin's power was declining as a result of fear. Instead, the paper thought 
he had become the acknowledged leader, with unconquerable prestige, of a unified 
p a r t y . 1 4 2  TAe Times also cynically suggested that the Soviet Government had become 
more powerful as a result of the purge of oppositionists, thus making Stalinist policy 
truly "supreme". 143
By the second Moscow show trial, the quality conservative press acknowledged 
that Stalin had definitely consolidated his position as he was able to eliminate, on any 
pretext, all colleagues who allegedly opposed h i m . i 4 4  Following the third Moscow show 
trial, the Yorkshire Post reported that Stalin was a "terrified dictator", engaged in an 
"utterly ruthless campaign" to exterminate every conceivable challenge to his own 
autocratic power. Therefore, the paper believed the outlook was "grim" for the people of 
the Soviet Unioni45 and the Daily Telegraph suggested that "a government ruling 
through fear necessitated that everyone be afraid all the time, thus tending the growth of
morbid hysteria". 4^6
The popular conservative press argued that Trotsky was the key to understanding 
the trials and Stalin's fears. A Daily Express correspondent, Frank Owen, wrote that the 
first show trial was "a big fight, staged today in Moscow... perhaps it would be the very 
last in the vicious struggle between the two men for power". Furthermore, assuming 
Stalin won, Owen pointed out that anyone who continued to support Trotsky would face 
e x e c u t i o n .  1 4 7  xhe Daily Express found Trotsky's influence in the Soviet Union ironic. 
"He must be the most remarkable phenomenon in the world since Mahomet" if he could
142 The Observer, 23 August 1936. "Closing Scene in Moscow Trial" by the Moscow 
Correspondent.
143 The Times, 3 October 1936. Leading article, "The Strong Hand in Moscow". See also the 
Daily Worker, 1 February 1937. Leading article, "After the Trial", which inevitably stated the Soviet 
Union was stronger as a result o f removing the traitors.
144 The Times, 29 September 1937. Leading article, "Malaise in Moscow".
145 The Yorkshire Post, 7 March 1938. Leading article, "Moscow Mysteries".
146 The Daily Telegraph, 9 March 1938. Special article by Malcolm Muggeridge, 
"Significance of Soviet Trials; Terrorist Regime Must Continue to Create an Excuse for Terror".
147 The Daily Express, 19 August 1936. Special article by Frank Owen, "Stalin vs. Trotsky; 
The Thirteenth Round". Frank Owen was an author, journalist, and broadcaster. He was the Liberal MP 
for Hereford in 1929-1931 but joined the Daily Express from 1931-1937 as a correspondent. He became 
the Editor of the Evening Standard in 1938 until 1941. In 1938, he co-wrote Guilty Men with Michael 
Foot and Peter Howard, and in 1940 Owen wrote The Three Dictators.
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organise, from exile, such large scale opposition against S t a l i n .  148 At the second show 
trial, the Daily Express again thought it astonishing that Trotsky commanded the 
assistance of scores of the "most talented and trusted Red leaders". In the opinion of the 
paper, this made him the "most marvellous Soviet leader e v e r " .  149 However, the popular 
conservative press also believed that Stalin and his comrades not only feared Trotsky, but 
everyone and "especially one another". Thus the Evening Standard suggested that 
socialism was not desirable if it could only be achieved through Stalin's method of terror, 
trials, and executions since "those who live by the sword must perish by the sword and 
those governed by fear inevitably succumb to fear."i50
The liberal and labour press also became convinced that Stalin conducted the trials 
out of anxiety for his personal safety. The Spectator recognised that when Stalin won 
the contest for succession to Lenin's position of authority, Trotsky became "enemy 
number one of the Socialist State".i5i In June 1937, the News Chronicle pointed out 
that "hardly a day passes now without some 'revelation' from Moscow of further 
widespread and dangerous plots against the safety of the Soviet r e g i m e " .  ^ 52 The Daily 
Herald suggested that with the growth of power came an increase in fear.
There comes a time - it seems that it has arrived in Russia - where only in the
cutting-off of many heads is there appeasement of anxiety. And that appeasement
is only temporary. That is the lesson of these latest e x e c u t i o n s .  5^3
In 1938, the Manchester Guardian explained that the purges were necessary for the 
consolidation of Stalin's dictatorship as they were the only means of "removing all the 
tallest poppies in the f i e l d " . ^ 5 4  in the paper's view, the show trials proved that any 
opponent to the Government in power was "a traitor, a scoundrel, and a murderer... it
4^8 The Daily Express, 31 August 1936. Leading article, "Wandering Jew".
The Daily Express, 1 February 1937. Leading article, "Firing Squad".
150 The Evening Standard, 30 January 1937. Leading article, "Moscow Mystery".
151 The Spectator, 28 August 1936. Leading article, "Twilight of the Bolsheviks".
152 The News Chronicle, 11 June 1937. Leading article, "Moscow Enigma". The Manchester 
Guardian, 20 August 1936. Leading article, “The Russian Trial”.
153 The Daily Herald, 10 June 1937. Leading article, "Crisis in Russia" also quoted in Deli,
p. 266.
154 The Manchester Guardian, 21 January 1938. Leading article, "About Turn in Russia",
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was dangerous to oppose Stalin, to have independent views, to have travelled abroad, 
and to have known f o r e i g n e r s . " 1 5 5
In contrast to the majority of the British press, the Daily Worker reported the 
Moscow show trials with complete sincerity and entirely believed in the validity of the 
Soviet justice system and thus the guilt of the accused. The paper did not seek excuses 
for Stalin's actions since the Soviet court established that the defendants were traitors 
who "openly" confessed to plotting Stalin’s assassination and the destruction of the the 
Soviet Union. Thus the Daily Worker was critical of those papers, especially the Daily 
Herald, which failed to understand Stalin's simple reason for holding the trials, which 
was to protect himself and thus his country from traitors. 156
Another explanation as to why Stalin held the trials was offered by the popular 
conservative press, though it was virtually unrealistic, even absurd, and not supported by 
the majority of Fleet Street. The Vienna Staff Reporter for the Daily Express alleged that 
Stalin's continual ill-health was "seen in Vienna as partly responsible for his violent 
political attacks". Thus, because Stalin suffered from heart disease, he lived in "peipetual 
fear of extremely painful a t t a c k s " . 1 5 7  Medvedev argued that Stalin's health did not 
provide such an easy, or rational, explanation for the purges. Though Stalin displayed 
signs of paranoia, he was mentally competent and acted with self-control and order. That 
was why he allowed some of Lenin's close associates, such as Litvinov, to remain in the 
g o v e r n m e n t . ^ 5 8  The Vew Statesman and Nation suggested Stalin's psychological 
reasoning was an inexcusable explanation for the trials though "many British newspapers 
suggest that Stalin has a tyrant's diseased mind, like Tacitus and Emperor T i b e r i u s " . ^ 5 9  
Foreign Affairs in October 1937 similarly dismissed the rumour that Stalin was insane 
because
155 The Manchester Guardian, 14 March 1938. Leading article, “The Moscow Trial"; 31 
January 1938, turnover article by a correspondent, "The Russian Purge; Stalin's Policy",
156 The Daily Worker, 25 August 1936. Leading article, "Guilty"; 2 March 1938, leading 
article, "Commonsense about the Trial".
157 The Daily Express, 12 June 1937. "Stalin Goaded by Heart Attacks" by the Vienna Staff
Reporter.
158 Medvedev, p. 543, 545-546.
159 The New Statesman and Nation, 19 June 1937. Leading article, "The European Nightmare".
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Insanity is too simple and neat a way of explaining the acts of a man who controls 
the life of an immense realm containing a population of 170 millions. History 
does not allow absolute rulers - whether sovereigns, dictators, or "leaders" - to do 
anything so banal as to lose their reason. This privilege is reserved for private
citizens. 160
The labour and liberal press never denied there could be a conspiracy against 
Stalin since intrigue was considered normal in dictatorships.i6i The News Chronicle 
and the Manchester Guardian recognised the potential existence o f underground 
conspiracy groups since disagreement was prevented from being expressed freely and 
thus plotting murder was the only way to remove a dictator. 162 The Daily Telegraph and 
the Yorkshire Post likewise accepted that it was possible Zinoviev and Kamenev were 
potentially dangerous rivals to Stalin's leadership and therefore had to be removed despite 
their "traditional sanctity" as Lenin's friends.163 However, the New Statesman and 
Nation did not believe all who were accused were culpable, which thus meant many 
innocent people were tried and executed for being guilty of nothing worse than a critical 
attitude. 164
British admirers of the Soviet Union
In general, the quality conservative and liberal press argued that the trials were 
embarrassing for those people in Britain who admired the Soviet U n io n . 165 Chilston 
made the same comment because he had thought there were encouraging signs that the
160 Max Radin, Foreign Affairs, OcL 1937. p. 44.
161 The Daily Herald, 2 September 1936. Leading article, “Russia"; 24 August 1936, leading 
article, “Soviet Trial". The New Statesman and Nation, 5 September 1936. Leading article, "The 
Moscow Purge".
162 The Manchester Guardian, 1 February 1937. Leading article, "The Moscow Trial". The 
News Chronicle, 25 August 1936. Special article by Cummings, "The Moscow Trial". The Spectator, 
28 August 1936. Leading article, "Twilight of the Bolsheviks".
163 The Daily Telegraph, 19 January 1935. Leading article, "Soviet Terror and Mercy". The 
Yorkshire Post, 24 August 1936. Leading article, "Moscow Treason Trial".
164 The New Statesman and Nation, 19 June 1937. Leading article, "The European Nightmare".
165 See for example, the Daily Telegraph, 24 December 1934. Leading article, "Stalin's Iron 
Hand". The Scotsman, 21 August 1936. Leading article, "Soviet Justice". The Times, 26 January
1937. Letter by F. H. Hamilton, "The Moscow State Trial; Bolshevik Methods; A Dilemma for the 
Friends of Russia".
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USSR was in the process of settling down to the life of a "normal and orderly s t a t e " .  1 6 6  
The Scotsman thought it was paradoxical that people with extreme communist views had 
a better chance of expressing them "with impunity" in conservative Britain than in 
communist Russia. 167 In the opinion of the Manchester Guardian in January 1935, 
"these trials may satisfy the high morality of the Russian Communist Party", yet to the 
outside world, the purges were "pathetic and repulsive". 16* Following the first Moscow 
show trial, the Spectator alleged
The liberal friends of the Soviet Union, who took at face value the new 
'democratic' constitution announced for adoption by the All-Union Congress of 
Soviets next November, and persuaded themselves that the Soviet regime was 
really moving at last in the direction of liberty and toleration, cannot conceal their 
bewilderment. Even the more sceptical have been horrified at this public reversion 
to terrorist methods. 169
The Manchester Guardian thus believed that few but the "faithfully blind" would accept 
the charges at face value and see the confessions as genuine. 170
In comparison, the popular conservative press revelled in the alleged discomfort 
of the British admirers, caused by the trials. In the opinion of the Daily Mail, articles in 
Pravda, which for example declared "The Vipers have been crushed", could only 
embarrass Britain's "credulous dupes of Soviet propaganda". Furthermore, these people 
were "dupes" because they had treated the executed "traitors", especially Zinoviev, as 
"high priests of the Bolshevik cult".i7i The Daily Mail viewed the second Moscow 
show trial of the "very cream of communism" as a
166 D.B.F.P., Second Series. Vol. XVII, no. 130.
167 The Scotsman, 19 January 1935. Leading article, "Soviet Justice".
16* The Manchester Guardian, 17 January 1935. Leading article, "Moral Lessons".
169 The Spectator, 28 August 1936. Leading article, "Twilight of the Bolsheviks".
179 The Manchester Guardian, 20 August 1936. Leading article, “The Russian Trial”.
171 The Daily Mail, 26 August 1936. Leading article, "The Moscow Savages". The Evening 
Standard also quoted Pravda on 25 August 1936. See also, the Daily Express, 12 October 1936. 
Leading article, "The Shadow of Radek"; 2 September 1936, leading article, "Mister Pollitt"; 2 September 
1936, "British Reds Are Split by Stalin's Purge" by a Staff Reporter.
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foul exhibition, miscalled a trial, which exhibits the whole Soviet regime in the 
most revolting light. It should open the eyes of Britain's pitiful Pinks to the 
character of the murderous demagogues whom they profess to admire and
trust.172
The Evening News also stated that
Either Britain's pro-Reds are dupes and disciples of a system whose apostles are 
super-gangsters ready for treason, arson, and murder to fantastic lengths. Or they 
are friends and admirers of a Government which 'frames-up' its enemies with a 
cold criminality of mind as merciless and brutal as the crimes which its victims are 
somehow prevailed on to confess. 173
The Daily Herald's main concern after the first Moscow show trial was that the 
British Communist Party should never permitted to affiliate with the Labour Party. 
The paper argued that the savagery of the show trial offended the majority of democratic 
Labour Party members who were thus determined to prevent the communists from 
joining their party.i74 The paper denounced the British Communists for obeying the lead 
of Moscow, who demanded that its followers abroad "scream for blood" in order to 
please Stalin. The Daily Herald claimed that "under orders they posed as democrats, and 
under orders they suddenly drop this mask to cheer for the secret police." 175 Thus it 
was with relief that the paper reported in October 1936 that the British Communist Party's 
attempts to affiliate with the Labour Party had "fizzled out" in a majority vote against the 
communists. 176
After supporting, for twenty years, the efforts of the Soviet Government "to build 
a new socialist order on the ruins of tsarism", the Daily Herald was dismayed with the 
way in which the Soviet Union was conducting its domestic affairs. The paper finally 
accepted that despite a new constitution, Stalin’s dictatorship was as bad as that of Hitler
172 The Daily Mail, 30 January 1937. Leading article, "The Moscow Sentences".
173 The Evening News, 26 January 1937. Leading article, "A Choice of Evils".
174 The Daily Herald, 24 August 1936. Leading article, “Soviet Trial”.
The Daily Herald, 25 August 1936. Leading article, “Blood Lust”.
176 The Daily Herald, 8 October 1936. Leading article, “Communist Fizzle”.
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or Mussolini, especially since there was still a secret police employing mthless methods. 
The changes in the Soviet Union led the Daily Herald to state:
It is profoundly disappointing, a profoundly disappointing change: most 
disappointing and most disturbing to the warmest sympathisers and warmest 
defenders of the Soviet regime. For it is their hopes which are being
destroyed. 177
As a result of this attitude and because the Daily Herald did not accept the trials at face 
value, the paper was repeatedly criticised by the Daily Worker for being a traitor to its 
political background. For example, the communist paper called it sheer "brazenness" for 
the "socialist" Daily Herald to "viciously attack" the Soviet Government's stem measures 
against a group of deadly workers' enemies. 17*
Although the British press expected most admirers of the Soviet Union to 
abandon their support for the Soviet Government, many expressed their continued 
backing for the USSR and thus believed the trials were accurate. For example, D. N. 
Pritt, a lawyer and the Socialist M.P. for North Hammersmith, repudiated those people 
who wrote to the Manchester Guardian stating that the accused were neither properly 
defended nor proven guilty. 179 Moreover, these admirers stated that the Soviet Union 
was merely becoming stronger and thus more beneficial for Europe’s security, i*®
The Soviet Union's international standing
The resurgence in the use of terror in December 1934 surprised most British 
newspapers because the Soviet state had appeared to be showing signs of economic 
growth and political stability. Moreover, its pacific foreign policy, which included entry 
into the League of Nations, had meant foreign sympathy and a new willingness by the
177 The Daily Herald, 2 September 1936. Leading article, “Russia”.
17* The Daily Worker, 21 December 1934. "The Soviet Union and Its Enemies". See also 26 
August 1936,25 January 1937,1 February 1937, and 15 March 1938.
179 See for example, the Manchester Guardian, 22 September 1936, letter by PritL 
1*9 See for example, the Daily Worker, 1 February 1937. Leading article, "After the Trial". 
The Manchester Guardian, 12 September 1936, letter by William Rust.
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West to cooperate with the Soviet Government, especially as Germany became 
increasingly belligerent. However, the Manchester Guardian was one of the first 
newspapers to suggest that the return to large scale terror was endangering this favourable 
Western opinion.i*i For example, the renewed use of repression caused infinite 
problems for Litvinov at Genevai*^ as world opinion, in the view of the Daily Express, 
became "affronted by Stalin's new t e r r o r " . 1*3 Furthermore, it was not only the 
repression which dismayed the West, but also the allegations that many of the accused 
were the paid spies of various European Governments.
The quality conservative press continually reported that the purges created a bad 
impression in the West especially at a time when Europe's peace and stability was 
threatened by increased rearmament, the Spanish Civil War, and anxiety over German 
and Italian aggression. With the first Moscow show trial, the Scotsman alleged that 
"such charges and elaborate confessions" excited no surprise abroad, but merely renewed 
the bad impression caused by previous cases. In the paper's opinion, the greatest 
surprise was that the Soviet Government chose "this juncture to indulge in an exhibition 
of judicial p e r s e c u t i o n " .  1*4 The Novosibirsk trial included a German engineer as one of 
the defendants, thus causing outrage in Germany and causing other European states to 
look warily at the Soviet Government's intentions. 1*5 Furthermore, accusations of 
espionage against Germany in the second Moscow show trial encouraged the Yorkshire 
Post to acknowledge that "the admitted facts leave it open to Russia's neighbours to urge 
that communism is an infection rather than a creed."i*6
Though the accused in the show trials frequently confessed to being spies for the 
West, charges of espionage peaked in the third trial and Rakovsky, a former charge
1*1 The Manchester Guardian. 7 December 1934. Leading article, "The Terror in Russia". See 
also, the Scotsman, 26 December 1934. Leading article, "The Russian Purge".
1*2 The Times, 12 December 1934. Leading article, “A Russian Terrorism”.
1*3 The Daily Express, 24 December 1934. Leading article, "Red Christmas".
1*4 The Scotsman, 21 August 1936. Leading article, "Soviet Justice". Many newspapers 
compared the trials between 1936 and 1938 to earlier trials and occasionally made references to the 
Metropolitan-Vickers Trial in April 1933. See for example, the Daily Telegraph, 22 January 1937; The 
Sunday Times, 24 January 1937; The Manchester Guardian, 24 July 1937; The Daily Mail, 2  March
1938.
1*5 See various articles by the British press between 11 and 27 November 1936.
1*6 The Yorkshire Post, 27 January 1937. Leading article, "The Terror in Russia".
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d’affairs in London, admitted he had been a British spy since 1924.1*7 The farcical 
nature of the accusations against Britain merely confirmed the quality conservative press's 
view in 1938 that the Soviet Union was unnecessary and undesirable for British 
security. 1** The Scotsman claimed the charges were so absurd that a formal denial by 
the British Prime Minister was hardly necessary since such allegations would not be 
credited outside the USSR. Moreover, such charges did not improve the Soviet Union's 
reputation and prejudiced its relations with the West. Though the Scotsman believed the 
Soviet Government for a time had "posed as good Europeans", willing to share a role in 
international affairs and anxious to promote peace, the paper believed the Soviet 
leadership had adopted an isolationist attitude and had become careless of its standing in 
the eyes of the world. 1*9 The Daily Telegraph warned that as a great power, the Soviet 
Union had become emasculated at a time when those who trusted it were counting most 
on Soviet s u p p o r t .  19 9  France allegedly lost enthusiasm for an ally which had given 
ammunition to every enemy of the Franco-Soviet Pact. 191
From the first Moscow show trial, the liberal press argued that the "Red" terror 
"bewildered" the West and thus "Russia's good name" as an ally of the forces of peace 
and social justice was wilfully being sacrificed. 192 In the opinions of the News  
Chronicle and the Manchester Guardian, the trial advertised to the world the Soviet 
Government's "persecution mania" and its "terroristic system" which was thus bound to 
have a "bad effect on international opinion". 193 In the view of the liberal press, most 
damaging was the probability that the Soviet Union's advocacy of collective security
1*7 The Daily Telegraph, 3 March 1938. "Moscow Trial Prisoner’s Challenge; Trotsky Said to 
Be British Spy" by the Moscow Correspondent; 4 March 1938, "Lone Resister in Moscow Trial 
Surrenders; I Plead Guilty to Everything'; Lord Chilston in Court; Hears Allegations against Britain" by 
the Moscow Correspondent. The Sunday Times, 6 March 1938. Two articles by the Moscow 
Correspondent
1** The Times, 2 March 1938. Leading article, “The Russian Trial”.
1*9 The Scotsman, 10 March 1938. Leading article, "Britain and the Soviet".
199 The Daily Telegraph, 14 March 1938. Leading article, "Moscow’s Grim Assize".
191 The Observer, 13 March 1938. "World: Week by Week - The Moscow Drama". The Daily 
Telegraph, 9 March 1938. Special article by Malcolm Muggeridge, "Significance of Soviet Trials; 
Terrorist Regime Must Continue to Create an Excuse for Terror". The Times, 29 September 1937. 
Leading article, "Malaise in Moscow".
192 The Manchester Guardian, 20 August 1936. Leading article, “The Russian Trial”.
193 The News Chronicle, 21 August 1936. Leading article, "The Zinoviev Trial". The 
Manchester GuarcUan, 20 August 1936. Leading article,‘The Russian Trial”.
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would suffer a setback. Foreigners immediately reacted with dismay to the evident panic 
and hysteria of the Soviet Government and to the increasingly inhumane conditions of the 
USSR's internal p o l i c y .  1 9 4  The Chronicle alleged the spectacular staging of the 
trial merely "excites cynical comment in capitalist countries" at a critical moment in 
international a f f a i r s .  19 5  The paper suggested that "Stalin is strong enough to show 
mercy... Yesterday's shots have helped the N a z i s " .  196 Thus the Manchester Guardian 
acknowledged that if arrests and death sentences were required to keep order within the 
Soviet Union, then its value as an ally declined a p p r e c i a b l y .  197
From the time of Kirov's murder and the repression which followed, the labour 
press found it difficult to believe that the Soviet Government was unaware of the damage 
being caused to its international standing. This suggested to the Daily Herald that the 
Soviet regime was neither as strong nor as stable as the West had thought, 19* since the 
use of terror in the Soviet Union provided an asset to the enemies of the Soviet state. 199 
Following the first Moscow show trial, the Daily Herald again alleged "the reputation of 
the Soviet Government and communism did not improve as a result of the great state 
trial".200 por the New Statesman and Nation, the real puzzle was not who would be 
affected by the trial but why the NKVD, which had long prepared the case, was permitted 
to hold it in August 1 9 3 6 . 2 9 1  However, though regretting the trial, the labour press 
stressed that justice was an internal affair of the Soviet Union and should not affect its 
position in Europe, especially since the Soviet Government did not seek external gain 
through v i o l e n c e . 2 9 2  Nevertheless, after the second Moscow show trial, the N ew  
Statesman and Nation found it curious that Stalin continued to ignore the damaging effect
194 The Manchester Guardian, 25 August 1936. Leading article, “The Russian Sentences”.
195 The News Chronicle, 25 August 1936. Special article by A. J. Cummings, "The Moscow
Trial".
196 The News Chronicle, 26 August 1936. Leading article, "Executions in Moscow".
197 The Manchester Guardian, 25 August 1936. Leading article, “The Russian Sentences”.
19* The Daily Herald, 29 December 1934. Leading article, "Darkest Russia".
199 The Daily Herald, 20 December 1934. Leading article, "Terror in Russia".
299 The Daily Herald, 24 August 1936. Leading article, “Soviet Trial”.
291 The New Statesman and Nation, 22 August 1936. "Comments - The Moscow Trial". See 
also the same impressions in the liberal press, the News Chronicle, 21 August 1936. The Manchester 
Guardian, 29 August 1936.
292 The Daily Herald, 25 November 1936. Leading article, "Praise".
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on Western opinion of his spectacular method of removing his opponents from positions
of influence.293
The secret execution of the Soviet Union's military experts made the greatest 
impact on the British press as it was the most damaging purge in terms of the country's 
international strength and prestige. The Observer suggested in 1936 that as long as the 
Soviet Union had a strong Red Army, the country would have stature and help the 
West.294 Thus Fleet Street reacted negatively to the news of the secret trial of Marshal 
Tukhachevsky and his officers. The Times believed that the eight executed commanders 
had been the "cream of the Red Army". Furthermore, the paper was concerned that their 
replacements were not selected for their military and theoretical abilities but because they 
were "virtual non-entities", chosen for their staunch loyalty to Stalin and the p a r t y .295 
The quality conservative press believed that internationally, a strong Soviet Union was 
required as a principle guarantor of peace against aggressive states. However, the 
Sunday Times wondered if those countries would feel restrained following the execution 
of the Red Army l e a d e r s h ip .2 9 6  Although the Soviet press maintained the purge actually 
harmed the Germans as it deprived them of their spies, thus ensuring the safety of the 
Soviet Union, The Times was sceptical that the USSR was really stronger. The paper's 
correspondent in Riga alleged that
In a few weeks Stalin's purges have done more wrecking in the Army than the 
enemies of Soviet Russia could ever hope to do... The removal of the eight great 
generals has deprived the Army of its b r a in s .2 9 7
The cynical impression which the Daily Express gained from the purge of the 
Red Army was that "Hitler is a great guy if Stalin's story is true because he [Hitler] gets
293 The New Statesman and Nation, 30 January 1937. Leading article, "Will Stalin Explain?".
294 The Observer, 23 August 1936. "Closing Scene in Moscow Trial" by the Moscow 
Correspondent. See also. The Times, 3 October 1936. Leading article, "The Strong Hand in Moscow".
295 The Times, 11 June 1937. ‘The Red Army Purge; Loyalty Before Generalship; Vanished 
Leaders” by the Riga Correspondent.
296 The Sunday Times, 13 June 1937. Leading article, "More Russian Executions; Terror in 
the Army".
297 The Times, 15 June 1937. “Changes in the Red Army; Stalin’s Friends Promoted; 
Bewildered Troops” by the Riga Correspondent.
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so many to betray Russia to G e r m a n y ." 2 0 8  Once the "smoke had lifted" following the 
execution, the Daily Express saw a "Russia very weakened in the eyes of the rest of the 
world", especially France which could not hide its fears that the military pact with the 
Soviet Union would fail.^^ The Daily Mail claimed that "nothing in history parallels the 
shambles made by the demented and grisly regime in Moscow", The paper, noting the 
secrecy of the trial and executions, reported that the inhuman controllers of "Red Russia" 
kept "the ruthless dealings of the Soviet Union in darkness. The grim, familiar sound of 
shooting, once more affronts the outside w o r ld " .210
The liberal press was surprised the Soviet Government chose to destroy not only 
its prestige, but its strength by executing the Red Army experts. Despite the statements 
by the Soviet Government that the country was stronger as a result of the purge, the 
liberal press believed the opposite because the executions had a detrimental effect on the 
Soviet Union's allies. The Spectator alleged no one maintained confidence in a state 
which loudly proclaimed its most gifted soldiers betrayed secrets to a potential enemy. 
Thus the journal believed the purge was a gift from heaven for the enemies of the Franco- 
Soviet pact, though the Spectator acknowledged that if the generals had dissented from 
the party, there would have been no choice but to remove them, thus in theory, making 
the Soviet Union stronger.^n
The New Statesman and Nation called the execution of the Red Army's 
leadership "The European Nightmare".
The latest batch of executions in Russia is likely to have far more serious 
international repercussions than any that have preceded them. Those who look to
208 The Daily Express, 14 June 1937. Leading article, "'If Stalin Is Right'".
The Daily Express, 15 June 1937. Leading article, '"Clean-Up"'.
The Daily Mail, 14 June 1937. Leading article, "Moscow Shambles" It is curious that the 
Daily Mail could specify the exact time of the execution, midnight on 12 June, when other papers such 
as the Observer claimed there was no information to be found, especially since all details were kept 
secret In addition, the Daily Mail's closest correspondent to Moscow was in Warsaw or Riga while the 
Observer used a correspondent in Moscow. (See the Daily Mail, 12 June 1937 for the article by the 
Warsaw Correspondent which gives details o f the execution.)
The Spectator, 18 June 1937, Leading article, "The Russian Mystery ". See also, the 
Manchester Guardian, 14 June 1937. "Execution of Soviet Generals; Red Army and Public Stunned" by 
the Moscow Correspondent. The News Chronicle, 14 June 1937. "Moscow Executions Mystify 
Europe; Fascist Powers See Blow to Soviet Prestige", by the Moscow Correspondent
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the USSR for military assistance are not much perturbed when old revolutionaries 
are put out of the way, and may shrug their shoulders at the execution of officials 
and industrialists. But when eight of the foremost military experts in the USSR 
are put to death at one stroke, serious misgivings inevitably arise about the 
stability of the regime and the reliability of the war machine.^^^
Within a few months, the ’’solid work of years’’ was undone and because Soviet military 
might had declined, so had the effect of the Franco-Soviet pact against the Nazis. With 
the execution of the Soviet generals, the New Statesman and Nation thought the purge 
would inevitably strengthen the position of all in Britain who wished to isolate the Soviet 
Union and who wished to become friends with Nazi G e r m a n y . 2 1 3  The Daily Herald 
similarly declared that "in one sweep the Soviet is rid of its most reliable and brilliant 
leaders of the great Red A r m y " . 2 i 4  jn  1938, the New Statesjnan and Nation continued 
to find it incredible that the Soviet Government remained indifferent to the devastating 
effect of the trials abroad, especially in France where the Franco-Soviet Pact was 
undermined more thoroughly by the purges than any of Hitler’s p r o p a g a n d a .^ 1 5
The effect of the army purge was felt acutely by the British press in 1938. In 
June, The Times became aware of the fact that the Red Army was short of officers due to 
the purges which deprived the army of between a third and a half of its officers above the 
rank of lieutenant.^1^ It appeared that the Soviet leadership ignored the fact that the army 
was seriously weak because in October, despite the crisis over Czechoslovakia, a new 
round of purges removed many of the new officers of the Red Army.^i^
21^ The New Statesman and Nation, 19 June 1937. Leading article, "The European Nightmare". 
Also quoted in Deli, p. 275.
The New Statesman and Nation, 19 June 1937. Leading article, "The European Nightmare". 
Daily Herald, 14 June 1937. Leading article, "Terror in the USSR".
215 The New Statesman and Nation, 12 March 1938. "Comments - The Soviet Trial".
The Times, 13 June 1938. "Red Army Short of Officers; Effect o f Purge; Half-Trained 
Cadets Enroled" by the Riga Correspondent.
The Times, 24 October 1938. "Another Red Army 'Purge'; Arrest of Officers" by the Riga 
Correspondent. The Manchester Guardian, 2 March 1938. “Russia’ Military Efficiency Impaired by 
‘Purge’; Execution of Many Officers" by the Diplomatic Correspondent.
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Conclusion
In August 1937, the Spectator suggested that the majority of people in Britain 
would find it difficult to understand not only the Soviet Government's attitude, but also 
that of the ordinary Soviet citizen.
There is too much Eastern blood in Soviet veins for us in England to understand 
the Soviet people in their present stage of development. Their capacity for 
frenzied hatred, unscrupulous cunning in their relations with internal and external 
enemies, combined with boundless enthusiasm and spontaneous generosity, 
shows friends cannot be measured with an ordinary European yardstick. Add to 
this the fact that the vast majority of Soviet citizens are peasants, still smarting 
under former injustices, and you may begin to realise the power of the emotional 
urge behind these public outbursts.^i*
Thus it was clear that the majority of the British press failed to understand not only why 
the Soviet Government held such trials, but also why the Russian people accepted the 
purges.219 Furthermore, by September 1937, the horrible routine of the trials and the 
execution of "enemies" had become so normal a feature of daily life in the Soviet Union 
that The Times admitted "it is easy to forget or overlook" the p u r g e s . 2 2 0
British newspapers and journals of all political persuasions devoted detailed press 
coverage to the show trials of the Soviet Union. Though recognising that the purges 
were a domestic affair of the USSR, the British press increasingly became concerned that 
the death of so many political and military personnel would become detrimental to the 
security of Europe. It was only two years before the first Moscow show trial that the 
West had finally accepted the Soviet Union as a member of the League of Nations and an 
active participant in the search for peace through collective security. The purges and 
show trials increasingly negated these benefits for Europe.
218 The Spectator, 20 August 1937. "Crime and Punishment in Russia" by H. S. Marchant.
219 See for example, the Evening Standard, 30 January 1937. Leading article, "Moscow 
Mystery". The News Chronicle, 1 February 1937. Special article by Cummings, "What the Russian 
Trial Means". The New Statesman and Nation, 6 February 1937. "Comments - The Moscow Trial". 
The Manchester Guardian, 6 April 1937. Leading article, "Darkest Russia". "The Russian Mystery" by 
Balticus, Foreign Affairs, October 1937.
220 The Times, 29 September 1937. Leading article, "Malaise in Moscow".
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The scale of the purging substantially influenced the opinion of the conservative 
press - the Soviet Union remained a "dark" country and therefore ought not to be heavily 
relied upon as an ally of Great Britain. Such demonstrations of internal instability which 
the show trials provided were viewed as evidence that the Soviet leadership lacked 
control, though it was cynically noted that Stalin was ruthlessly acquiring that control. 
However, in the view of the conservative newspapers, until the Soviet Government 
became stable, the Soviet Union in its weakened position ought to be ignored when 
dealing with Europe's crises as only strong states could provide European security. The 
quality conservative newspapers recognised that the USSR would one day be important 
to Europe, though not while the effects of the show trials could be felt. In contrast, the 
popular conservative press's mistrust for the Soviet Government intensified during the 
purges and significantly influenced their desire to avoid contact with Moscow. 
Furthermore, these papers found it difficult to believe the Soviet Government would ever 
resolve its internal chaos thus allowing the Soviet Union to become an important member 
of Europe.
The liberal press was considerably perplexed by the purges and trials. These 
papers supported stronger relations between the British and Soviet Governments as well 
as a larger role for the Soviet Union in Europe's security. However, the liberal press was 
forced to admit that a country which displayed such internal instability could not possibly 
devote the necessary time, effort, and resources to Europe. These papers and journals, in 
the early stages of the purges, hoped that it was a case of eliminating trouble-makers thus 
ensuring firmer control for the Soviet leadership. However, as the purges increased in 
intensity, the liberal press accepted that the Soviet Union's position in Europe was not as 
beneficial as hoped since the Government was forced to contend with domestic issues. 
This concerned the liberal press more than conservative newspapers since the former 
recognised that Britain's strength in Europe was reduced by the lack of a strong ally in 
Eastern Europe.
The labour press was remarkably disappointed by the trials. Its political leanings 
had led these newspapers and journals to have greater expectations for the social changes
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in the Soviet Union. Thus these papers urged a closer relationship between the British 
and Soviet Governments. Furthermore, the labour press was convinced the Soviet Union 
had a significant and vital role to fulfil in Europe. However, the purges and show trials 
reduced the confidence of labour newspapers towards the Soviet Union as such instability 
could not be ignored by even the most ardent press supporters. The labour press could 
not even believe the show trials were minor blemishes on the record of the Soviet Union 
since the evidence suggested that the Revolution had been corrupt and wrongly pursued. 
Otherwise, these papers were forced to accept that the regime of the 1930s was itself 
corrupt and was thus destroying the Revolution. Either option discouraged the labour 
press from calling for Britain to rely too heavily on the Soviet Union until the crisis was 
complete or until Germany made an East European ally absolutely necessary.
There was no real need for the British Government to have put forward an official 
or unofficial line concerning Britain's reaction to the purges. Dismay, disappointment 
and confusion were common reactions of both the Government and the press. The 
British Government did not know why Stalin chose to eliminate so many of Lenin's 
comrades, prominent people and ordinary citizens. Thus the Government admitted that it 
was speculating.221 Fleet Street was, therefore, portraying a line of thought very similar 
to that of His Majesty's Government, though without requiring direction or subtle 
influence.
At the Eighteenth Party Congress held in March 1939, it was announced that the 
purge had officially e n d e d .222 i n  his speech, Stalin denied that the purges had weakened 
the Soviet system and claimed they had provided a stronger government and prevented 
surrounding hostile powers from gaining supporters within the Soviet U n i o n .2 2 3  
However, the News Chronicle argued that Stalin had been forced to abandon the purges 
because the Soviet people were utterly d e m o r a l i s e d .2 2 4  i n  addition, although the external
221 D.B.F.P., Second Series, Vol. XVII, nos. 129 and 130.
222 jfie  Times, 23 March 1939. "Party Reforms in Russia; End of Purge" by the Warsaw 
Correspondent
223 The Sunday Times, 12 March 1939. "Stalin Defends Purges; Soviet Stronger as Result; 
Secret Service To Be Expanded" by B.U.P. in Moscow.
224 The News Chronicle, 14 March 1939. "Spotlight on Politics" by Cummings,
Stalin's Necktie 167
threat to the Soviet Union appeared to have become more serious, there were, in reality, 
very few of Lenin's colleagues left to be e l im in a t e d .2 2 5  Thus some of Fleet Street hoped 
a milder era had arrived in the Soviet U n io n .2 2 6  However, despite the removal of 
Yezhov and his replacement by Lavrentiy Beria in 1939, doubt remained in the British 
press as to whether or not the purges would decline in frequency. For example, the 
Manchester Guardian called Beria the "little Stalin of the Caucasus", thus suggesting that 
the paper was not deceived by the rumours circulating in Moscow that a more liberal and 
rational policy was to follow the change in leadership of the Soviet secret p o l ic e .2 2 7
In reality, the purges did not end abruptly nor was Beria a "milder" head of the 
NKVD than Yezhov. The purges continued after they were officially concluded in March 
1939, though by this time the British press was devoting the majority of its coverage 
towards Germany's intentions and Britain's efforts to secure allies and prevent a war. As 
negotiations amongst Britain, France and the Soviet Union proceeded in the spring and 
summer of 1939, the press obviously focused coverage on these talks and the hopeful 
outcome of an alliance. In many ways, it would have been inexcusable for the British 
press to try to find evidence of purges even if the papers had the time, resources, and 
interest. However, with the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Pact in August 1939, the British 
press resumed some criticism of the Soviet Union and evidence of purging became news 
again, though attracting far less attention than p r e v i o u s l y .228
225 jfiQ Times, 5 April 1938. "Red Justice Polluted'; Denunciation of Krylenko" by the Riga 
Correspondent.
226 The Times, 8 March 1939. "GPU Purge in Russia" by the Warsaw Correspondent.
227  The Manchester Guardian, 24 January 1939. "'Purge' in Soviet Secret Police; New Chief 
Gets to Work" by the Moscow Correspondent
228 pqj. example, The Times, 14 October 1939. "Bolshevism in Ukraine; Persecution of  
Clergy and Nationalists" by the Bucharest Correspondent
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Chapter 6 
** Chestnuts in the Fire"
In 1938 the Soviet Union was forced to change its approach to relations with 
Europe following the failure of collective security. Spain, the German re-militarisation of 
the Rhineland, and the Italian invasion of Abyssinia all pointed to the difficulties of 
pursuing a policy of collective security, but the event which heralded the demise of that 
plan was the German occupation of Austria, the Anschluss, in March 1938. Again the 
Soviet Government's calls for collective action were ignored by the British Government, 
with which the majority of the British press concurred, including liberal newspapers.^ 
By the time the Munich Conference was convened in September 1938, the Soviet 
Government, which was not invited, was resigned to the failure of collective security and 
elected to play a waiting game.2 While Britain and France hoped their efforts at Munich 
were successful in avoiding war with Germany, the Kremlin quietly re-evaluated its 
foreign policy. Thus the Soviet Union's response to Hitler's occupation of Prague in 
March 1939 reflected caution rather than the vigorous protest and calls for great power 
conferences which followed the Anschluss. The Soviet Government began to question 
whether an alliance with Britain and France was actually better than a partnership with 
Germany. Hence Stalin's speech to the Eighteenth Party Congress in March, with its 
ambiguous hints, left the door open to both sides in Europe with a reminder that the 
Soviet Union would not be used by either in war. However, to say Stalin's speech was 
directed towards Germany or foreshadowed an improvement in Soviet-German relations
 ^ See for example, the Manchester Guardian, 18 March 1938. Leading article, "The Russian 
Proposal".
2 Chilston, the British Ambassador in Moscow, suggested to Halifax in October 1938 that the 
Soviet Government showed no indication of changing its foreign policy or of removing Litvinov as 
Commissar of Foreign Affairs despite the apparent failure of collective security in 1938. However, 
ChUston warned that the Soviet Government would be anxious to avoid future exclusion from European 
counsels and would watch for further developments before choosing a new foreign policy: D.B.F.P., 
Third series. Vol. Ill, no. 217.
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ignored the fact that most diplomats in Moscow, whether German or British, missed the 
message which was delivered at a low point in relations between Germany and the Soviet 
Union.3 It was in this light that the Soviet Government conducted negotiations with 
Britain and France while secretly keeping channels open with Germany. It was 
ultimately the failure of the British and French Governments to recognise the significance 
and truth behind Stalin's speech in March, combined with the Conservative 
Government's traditional distrust of communism, which led to the failure of the tripartite 
negotiations. In August 1939, Hitler seized the opportunity and presented the Soviet 
Union with temporary security in a form which the British Government had refused.
The general lack of support from the conservative press towards the Soviet 
Union's key role in Europe at the end of 1938 radically altered in the spring of 1939. 
Although there remained an element of suspicion towards Moscow's ultimate aims in 
Europe, the conservative press recognised that the prevention of a European war or even 
success in fighting against Nazi Germany was dependant on Britain and the Soviet Union 
becoming allies in the near future. However, it was the popular conservative press which 
altered the most radically in its perception of the Soviet Union with Beaverbrook's 
newspapers assuming a leading position in the advocacy of a Tripartite Agreement. In 
contrast, throughout the negotiations. The Times was only half-hearted in its hopes of 
success^ and was even to a degree pro-German. Nevertheless, during the summer but 
especially in August, the paper was over-confident that a British-French-Soviet pact was 
imminent.^
Disappointed by the Soviet exclusion at the Munich Conference, the labour and 
liberal newspapers presented a more determined view when advocating an alliance 
between Britain and the Soviet Union in 1939. The labour press was particularly 
condemnatory of Chamberlain's apparent lack of interest in the discussions and the
 ^ Geoffrey Roberts, "The Soviet Decision for a Pact with Nazi Germany", p. 59. D.C. Watt, 
"The Initiation of Üie Negotiations Leading to the Nazi-Soviet Pact: A Historical Problem" in Essays In 
Honour ofE. H. Carr, eds., Abramsky and Williams, pp. 156,158-159.
 ^Richard Cockett, Twilight o f Truth, p. 116. Iverach McDonald, The History o f The Times: 
Struggles in War and Peace, 1939-1966, p. 24.
 ^F. R. Gannon, The British Press and Germany, 1936-1939, p. 27.
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consequent delays. The liberal press showed slightly more restraint in its criticism of the 
British Government, which was balanced by disapproval of what these papers perceived 
to be an equally poor effort at negotiation by the Soviet Government.
In March 1939, 84 per cent of people questioned in a British Institute of Public 
Opinion (B.I.P.O.) survey wanted to see Britain and the Soviet Union more friendly to 
each other.5 However, this clear feeling was not echoed by the British Government as in 
April, the Foreign Office was more divided than the country in supporting an alliance 
with the Soviet Union.^ Parliamentary pressure by Opposition and Tory rebels led Sir 
Alexander Cadogan, the Permanent Secretary, to write that the British Government "had 
to move towards Soviet Russia ’in order to placate our left-wing in England, rather than 
to obtain any solid military ad v an tag e 'N ev erth e less , in May more members of the 
Cabinet recognised the need for an alliance with the Soviet Union though there remained 
a degree of hesitation^ which was not reflected throughout Fleet Street. Although there 
was speculation in the British press at the time of Litvinov's retirement in May, the 
majority of newspapers argued that Soviet foreign policy had not abandoned the wish to 
cooperate with Britain.
However, as delays mounted. Fleet Street and the population became more 
anxious. In June, 84 per cent of people questioned by B.I.P.O. continued to favour a 
military alliance between Britain, France and the Soviet Union.^® As the summer passed, 
warnings became increasingly shrill, especially from the conservative press, and though
precLichn^continually prophesizing success, the slowness and fear of failure led to a growing 
barrage of negative opinion by these papers towards the British Government and far less 
condemnation and a greater understanding of the Soviet Union. The British press of all 
political persuasions strongly urged the British Government to form an alliance with the
 ^ British Institute of Public Opinion (B.I.P.O.), Gallup Poll, March 1939, Only 7 per cent 
replied "no" and 9 per cent were "undecided".
2 Michael Carley, "End of the 'Low, Dishonest Decade': Failure of the Anglo-Franco-Soviet 
Alliance in 1939", pp. 318-319.
® Robert Manne, "The British Decision for Alliance with Russia, May 1939", pp 17-18.
 ^ Manne, "The British Decision for Alliance with Russia, May 1939", p. 3 and A.UP. Taylor, 
English History, pp 545-546.
B.I.P.O., Gallup Poll, June 1939. Only 7 per cent said "no" and 9 per cent were "undecided ".
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Soviet Union not only to protect Poland, but primarily to issue a strong deterrent to 
Hitler. The news of military talks in August 1939 did not alleviate the anxiety felt by the 
liberal and labour press which noted the "slow steamer" carrying the military mission to 
Moscow. The conservative press, however, grasped at military talks as a positive and 
conclusive step towards immediate success. Nevertheless in August, only 50 per cent of 
the British public believed the British Government was doing its best to secure a pact 
with the Soviet Union, while 20 per cent believed the opposite.
Ignored a t M unich
In September 1938, Chamberlain made three trips to Germany in an effort to 
prevent Europe from going to war over Hitler's designs on Czechoslovakia. The final 
visit was to Munich, on 29-30 September, where a Four Power Conference was 
convened consisting of Germany, Italy, Britain and France. Most significantly. Hitler 
and Mussolini declared their unwillingness to attend any conference which included the 
Czechoslovak and Soviet G o v e r n m e n t s .  ^ 2  Though most British newspapers noted the 
omission, few cared that such an important country was excluded and also doubted the 
Soviet Government's sincerity in offering to help Czechoslovakia as stated in the Franco- 
Soviet-Czechoslovak pact of mutual assistance. Furthermore, once the Munich 
Agreement^^ was made public, there was too much immediate relief that war had been 
averted to care what the Soviet Government might have done or intended to do. Though 
some newspapers asked if the price was too high, the majority of Fleet Street failed to 
realise that British-Soviet cooperation in September 1938 would have been a safer option 
than British and French appeasement of Hitler.
B.I.P.O., Gallup Poll, August 1939.
^2 Halifax explained to Maisky, the Soviet Ambassador in London, that the British Government 
only agreed to Hitler's condition in an effort to ensure that negotiations at such a critical time would be 
held. Halifax assured Maisky that Britain would continue to inform Moscow of the issues at Munich and 
that the British Government wished to improve existing relations with the Soviet Government. 
D.B.F.P., Third Series, Vol. II, no. 221.
The Munich Agreement stated that the Western territory of Czechoslovakia, the Sudetenland, 
which was inhabited primarily by Germans, was to be ceded to Germany over ten days in October 1938. 
The area was strategically vital to Czechoslovakia, as well as being rich in natural resources.
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Most articles in the popular conservative press mentioned the Soviet Union only 
briefly at the time of the Munich Conference and the tone was generally cynical towards 
the Soviet Government's offers of assistance to the Czechs against German aims. For 
example, the Daily Express pointed out that the Soviet Union’s frontier was over a 
hundred miles from Czechoslovakia and the neutral states in between refused to allow 
passage for the Red Army and Airforce. Furthermore, there was no suggestion that the 
popular conservative press wanted to see increased cooperation between Britain and the 
Soviet Union.
The quality conservative press, though noting the Soviet Union's annoyance and 
frustration at not being invited to any discussions on Czechoslovakia, argued that the 
exclusion of the Soviet Union was necessary to ensure that Hitler attended such vital 
negotiations.!^ Most papers remarked that the Soviet Government offered to honour its 
pledge to Czechoslovakia, though only if France acted first. However, The Times 
pointed out that the Red Army was reorganising, "yet again", following the "slack" 
caused by the purges and therefore, Moscow would be unable to help the Czechs 
e f f e c t i v e l y .  Furthermore, the paper reported that the Soviet Government disclaimed 
any responsibility for the "fatal and inexorable consequences" caused by the talks in 
G e r m a n y . Although the Soviet Union was basically ignored by the quality 
conservative press during the Munich Conference, when Chamberlain returned to 
London, those newspapers finally consider the Soviet Government’s reaction to events. 
The Riga Correspondent for The Times alleged that "Soviet Russia is perhaps the only 
country in the world not rejoicing in the success of the Munich Conference in averting 
w a r " .! 9  Despite accepting the British Government's decision to ignore the Soviet Union,
The Daily Express, 20 September 1938. Leading article, "Good News".
!5 See for example, the Daily Telegraph, 4 October 1938. "Why Russia Was Omitted" by the 
Special Representative at Westminster.
The Daily Telegraph, 21 and 24 September 1938. "Soviet Pledge to Czechs" and "Russia's 
Promise", both by the Geneva Correspondent. The Times, 19 September 1938. "Russia’s Uncertain 
Part" by the Riga Correspondent.
The Times, 19 September 1938. "Russia's Uncertain Part" by the Riga Correspondent,
The Times, 22 September 1938. "No Retreat by Russia" by the Geneva Correspondent.
The Times, 1 October 1938. "Russia Ignores the Conference" by the Riga Correspondent.
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the Daily Telegraph believed that Britain still wished to work with the Soviet
Government. 20
As expected, the liberal and labour press were critical of the Soviet Union's 
exclusion from Munich, yet they too displayed relief that war had been avoided. 
Although the News Chronicle recognised that the Munich Conference was not an 
international meeting since the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia were not invited, the 
paper "heaved a sigh of re lie f  with the rest of the world when war was averted.2! The 
New Statesman and Nation surprisingly made very little comment directly about the 
Soviet Union, though its coverage, to a large extent, disapproved of the British 
Government for refusing to cooperate with M o s c o w .22
It was the Manchester Guardian and the Daily Herald which were the most 
outspoken over the exclusion of the Soviet Union from the Munich Conference. The 
Manchester Guardian was not surprised that the Soviet Government's response to 
Chamberlain's efforts was cynical and isolationist since the British leadership appeared to 
be doing its best to ignore Moscow. Although accepting that the Soviet Union was an 
"enigma", the paper believed the Soviet Government might have helped Czechoslovakia 
if given some encouragement by B r ita in .2 3  The Daily Herald made similar observations 
but also stated that a peaceful settlement could never be effective without Moscow. 
However, the paper cynically recognised that Chamberlain had never before tried to 
cooperate with the Soviet Government, so therefore, why should he have made an 
attempt at M u n i c h .24 The Daily Worker argued that Chamberlain was actually in the 
service of the "war dictators" and thus pretending to the British people that he was a saint
29 The Daily Telegraph, 4 October 1938. "Why Russia Was Omitted" by the Special 
Correspondent at Westminster. See also, the Objerver, 2 October 1938. "What It Means" by Garvin.
2! The Newf Chronicle, 29 September 1938. Leading article, "Force o f Opinion"; 30 
September 1938, leading article, "The Decision".
22 The New Statesman and Nation, 24 September 1938. Leading article, "The Surrender to
Hitler".
23 The Manchester Guardian, 22 September 1938. Leading article, "Seven Days" and "Foreign 
Opinion on Czech Crisis" by the Moscow Correspondent
24 The Daily Herald, 22 September 1938. Leading article, "Shall the Sword Win"; 27 
September 1938, leading article, "One Way To Peace"; 29 September 1938, leading article, "Four-Power 
Conference".
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when really he was the d e v i l .2 5  Low's cartoon on 30 September 1938 depicted Stalin 
arriving at the Munich Conference, asking the four assembled leaders, "What, No Chair 
For Me?". Thus Low astutely recorded that the Soviet Union had been snubbed at 
Munich by the West and that Stalin had taken note.26
As a result of Munich, the Manchester Guardian called for the British leadership 
to decide if it intended to work with the Soviet Government or wished to alienate 
Moscow completely. The paper stated that if there was a war, Britain would need the 
Soviet Union as an a lly .2 7  The Daily Herald similarly warned that by driving the USSR 
into isolation, Britain was "enormously" reducing the forces of collective security against 
aggression in Europe.^* The Daily Worker predicted that the Munich Agreement did not 
provide peace and therefore would ultimately bring about war.29
Devil".
25 The Daily Worker, 26 September 1938. Leading article, "Seems a Saint but Plays the
26 Figure 6.1. The Evening Standard 30 September 1938. "What, No Chair For Me?".
27 The Manchester Guardian, 12 October 1938. Leading article, "Russia and the Crisis".
28 The Daily Herald, 3 October 1938. Leading article, "The Next Step"; 5 October 1938, 
leading article, "Which Policy?".
29 The Daily Worker, 1 October 1938. Leading article, "Surrender to Blackmail Does Not Save 
Peace"; 4 October 1938, leading article, "Munich Terms Mean War Not Peace".
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Thus Czechoslovakia was sacrificed to Germany and the majority of the British 
press rejoiced in the fact that war had been averted. However, it was not long before 
Hitler showed he could not be trusted and that Britain required a stronger relationship 
with the Soviet Union. Although the majority of Fleet Street ignored the Soviet Union 
during the Munich Conference, within months, most newspapers and journals were 
considering the implications of such short-sighted action and hoped it was not too late to 
secure the Soviet Government in an alliance against Hitler.
Litvinov and  B ritish delays
Attempts at an alliance began inauspiciously as the majority of the British press 
failed to recognise the significance of Stalin's speech to the Eighteenth Party Congress on 
10 March 1939. The greater proportion of Fleet Street referred to the foreign implications 
of the presentation sporadically in May and June, though usually as an after thought to 
Molotov's speech on foreign policy at the end of May. Only the News Chronicle, the 
New Statesman and Nation, the Spectator and the Daily Worker mentioned specifically 
Stalin’s references to Soviet foreign affairs. A. J. Cummings, the Political 
Correspondent for the News Chronicle, accused Britain’s daily press of ignoring 
Stalin's "remarkable" speech which did not specifically call for diplomatic overtures to 
the West but neither did it reject them as a possibility. Most importantly, Cummings 
pointed to Stalin's warning that the Soviet Union would not pull the chestnuts out of the 
fire for Britain and F r a n c e .^ o  The Spectator also noted Stalin's warning that if  the 
Western powers failed to work with the Soviet Union, that country had the strength to 
remain isolated.^! The New Statesman and Nation criticised the British daily press and 
the B.B.C. for ignoring the Soviet leader's speech or dismissing it in a few lines. The 
journal suggested that because Stalin made so few public presentations, it was a very 
important statement which expressed the determination of the Soviet Union to "behave as 
a good neighbour to any who similarly showed a desire for good n e i g h b o u r l i n e s s " . ^ 2  As
^9 TheNewj Chronicle, 14 March 1939. "Spotlight on Politics’' by A. J. Cummings.
The Spectator, 17 March 1939. "News of the Week - Stalin on Soviet Policy"
^2 The New Statesman and Nation, 18 March 1939. "Comments - Stalin Speaks".
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expected, the Daily Worker was the most critical about Fleet Street's near suppression of 
the "most important speech by anyone anywhere during this period". The failure to 
acknowledge Stalin's statements was especially noticeable when the Daily Worker 
compared it to the prominence accorded to presentations by "spokesmen of aggressor 
states".33
The lack of coverage by the British press of such a significant speech by Stalin 
was a reflection of the British Government's failure to notice the true implications of a 
presentation by a leader who rarely made public appearances and statements. 
Chamberlain declined to refer to the speech in the House of Commons. Despite debate 
by Members of Parliament on the necessity of joining forces with the Soviet Union 
following the occupation of Prague on 15 March, Chamberlain refused to be drawn into 
firmly supporting improved British-Soviet relations.34 In addition, there was virtually no 
Foreign Office response to the telegram by Seeds, the British Ambassador in Moscow, 
detailing Stalin’s speech. This was especially curious since Seeds clearly warned that 
Britain could not expect the Soviet Government naturally to wish to join the West in an 
alHance.35
However, the attitude of the British press was about to change radically towards 
the Soviet Union. When Germany occupied Prague, the entire British press demanded, 
though with varying degrees of enthusiasm, that the British Government join the USSR 
in a collective security pact to protect Europe from future aggression. The Soviet 
Government suggested an immediate meeting of Britain, France, the Soviet Union, 
Poland, Rumania and Turkey to form a peace front, but the British Government preferred 
to issue its own guarantee to Poland. Such a bi-lateral treaty increased the Soviet 
Government's options and bargaining power36 and demonstrated a lack of foresight by 
the British leadership which was depicted in a David Low cartoon showing the struggle
33 The Daily Worker, 13 March 1939. "Vital Speech Suppressed in British Press"; 14 March 
1939, leading Article, "Dangerous News".
34 House of Commons Debates, Fifth Series, Vol. 345.
35 D.B.F.P., Third Series, Vol. IV, no. 452.
36 Manne, "The British Decision for Alliance with Russia, May 1939", pp. 16-17.
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Litvinov faced to secure collective action,^? Litvinov, however, made a further proposal 
on 17 April 1939 for a tripartite British-French-Soviet agreement for a period of five to 
ten years which would provide for mutual assistance, including military aid between the 
parties involved and also the East European states bordering the Soviet U n io n .3 8  The 
British Government hesitated to commit to an increased association with the Soviet Union 
and took nearly three weeks to respond to the proposal.
The quality conservative press began slowly in representing the case for a 
tripartite agreement and it was not until Litvinov's resignation that these papers became 
firm advocates of an alliance. Prior to 3 May, the quality conservative press focused 
attention on Poland and Rumania^^ because an agreement with the Soviet Union was 
expected, but only on the best terms, and therefore, time was allegedly not a factor. For 
example, although The Times in April called for a defensive bloc based on the principles
37 Figure 6.2. The Evening Standard, 5 April 1939, "A Piece Missing, Tovarish".
38 D .B T P., Third Series, Vol. V, no. 201.
39 The British press primarily focused its coverage towards Poland, Rumania, and Turkey 
because that was the direction in which the British Government was conducting its efforts. The majority 
of telegrams in D .B PP., Third Series, Vol. V, between 1 April and 7 May 1939, were exchanged with 
the embassies in Warsaw and Angora.
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of collective security, the paper suggested Litvinov would need to alter some of his 
demands before Britain could work with Moscow as not all states in Europe wished to be 
^ iS S n tS ^ ' by the Soviet Governm ent/o Other quality conservative newspapers, 
however, appeared to take a more determined approach to an alliance with the Soviet 
Union following the occupation of Prague. The Diplomatic Correspondent for the 
Observer argued the British Government ought to have reached an understanding with 
the Soviet Union prior to the pledge to the Poles as only then would collective security in 
Eastern Europe be successful. Though the journalist thus felt the British guarantee to 
Poland was a "reckless gamble", he assumed that "it is taken for granted that Russia will 
play an important part in the scheme". Furthermore, the correspondent did not urge 
hastiness or panicking into an unsatisfactory agreement since he believed that "at the 
present stage there is held to be no urgent need for a pronouncement on Russia's part. "4! 
Unlike The Times, the Daily Telegraph and the Sunday Times admitted that a political 
and military alliance with the Soviet Union was crucial. Although these papers 
recognised that Moscow was wary in the face of Polish and Rumanian distrust for a 
guarantee by the USSR, the Daily Telegraph and the Sunday Times optimistically 
believed in April that an agreement would rapidly be reached since talks "progressed
favourably ".42
The popular conservative press showed a more immediate and vigorous interest in 
a proposed alliance between Britain and the Soviet Union. As proof of their sincerity 
towards cooperation with the Soviet Government, the Rothermere and Beaverbrook press 
refrained from making their usual disparaging ideological remarks against the USSR. 
For example, contrary to its normally unfavourable opinion, the Daily Mail stated that the 
Soviet Union was one of the "seven mightiest powers" in the world and with its
49 The Times, 11 and 25 April 1939. Articles by the Warsaw Correspondent.
4! The Observer, 2 April 1939. Article by the Diplomatic Correspondent Also quoted by 
Alan Foster, "An Unequivocal Guarantee? Fleet Street and the British Guarantee to Poland, 31 March 
1939", p. 37.
42 The Daily .Telegraph, 15 and 17 April 1939. Articles by Moscow and Diplomatic 
Correspondents. See other articles in April. The Sunday Times, 23 and 30 April 1939. Articles by the 
Diplomatic Correspondent.
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inexhaustible reserves of people, the USSR was a suitably strong ally for Britain 43 As 
soon as the British Government offered a guarantee to Warsaw, the popular conservative 
press pointed out the necessity of making the Soviet Union a partner due to its proximity 
with Poland. However, the Evening Standard feared "Russia is unlikely to join in the 
Guarantee" because of opposition from the Poles44 and the Daily Express warned that 
Britain would find it difficult to fulfil its obligations without the Soviet Government who 
was in a far better position to give Poland effective assistance.45 Thus the Beaverbrook 
and Rothermere press welcomed the start of negotiations between Britain and the Soviet 
Union in April and acknowledged the benefits of Litvinov’s collective security plans.46 
Nevertheless, a degree of suspicion remained in the popular conservative press as to what 
the Soviet Union’s true intentions were and those papers, therefore, advocated a degree 
of caution. Though the Daily Express recognised that "Russia has come down to the big 
table, where the big game is on" and knew what "number the Russians will play", the 
paper was unsure what the stake would be.47 The Daily Mail was concerned that the 
Soviet Union wanted too much in the way of a military alliance, which would force 
Britain to enter into commitments with unknown consequences. More importantly 
however, the paper, against its traditional attitude, demanded that ideologies should not 
become involved in the discussions as that would prevent a security pact.48
Though the liberal press began by criticising the British Government's efforts at 
achieving an alliance with the Soviet Union,49 towards the end of April, these papers and 
journals were generally more optimistic. Though congratulating Britain's leaders for
43 The Daily Mail, 21 March 1939. Leading article, "What of Russia?".
44 The Evening Standard, 31 March 1939. Also quoted in Foster, p. 34.
45 The Daily Express, 4 April 1939. Leading article, "A Peaceful Settlement".
46 The Daily Express, 15 April 1939. Articles by the Political Correspondent, Guy Eden, and 
the Moscow Correspondent, Sefton Delmer. The Daily Mail, 15 and 17 April 1939. Articles by the 
Diplomatic Correspondent, Wilson Broadbent. The Evening Standard, 31 March 1939. Also quoted in 
Foster, p. 34.
47 The Daily Express, 1 May 1939. Leading article, "Russia Watches".
48 The Daily Mail, 1 May 1939. Leading article, "Russia's Plan ".
49 See for example. The News Chronicle, 20 March 1939. Leading article, "Peace Front"; 21 
March 1939 leading article, "Waste No Time". The Spectator, 14 April 1939. "News of the Week - 
Moscow and the Crisis"; Also an article by Walter Durranty, "Russia's Suspicions". The Manchester 
Guardian, 11 April 1939. Leading article, "The Government and Parliament"; See also 14 April 1939.
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taking their first steps,^® the News Chronicle argued that the British Government could 
not expect a military alliance to "fall into its lap" and therefore had to do more to secure 
the Soviet Union in a collective security plan.^i The Manchester Guardian was satisfied 
with the progress of the talks, yet the paper recognised that negotiations were "dragging a 
little" as a result of differences of opinion. Although the British wished for a limited pact 
while the Soviet Government proposed a more comprehensive and theoretical agreement, 
the Manchester Guardian believed a compromise could be found since Litvinov's 
proposal had value. However, the paper warned that Moscow could afford to take its 
time whereas Britain could not following its hasty guarantee to Poland.32
The labour press was regularly critical of the progress of negotiations since these 
papers had called for an alliance between Britain and the Soviet Union to be formed 
immediately after the occupation of Prague on 15 March. The Daily Herald demanded 
that the British Government recognise its failure to establish friendship with Germany 
and redirect its policy in the only channel possible - "immediate collaboration, and if 
possible, a military alliance" with France and the Soviet U n i o n . ^ 3  in view of the fact that 
the USSR was the "greatest power in Eastern Europe", the Daily Herald and the New  
Statesman and Nation stated that British public opinion demanded a collective security 
agreement to provide a strong front against a g g r e s s i o n .5 4  The Daily Herald believed 
British foreign policy was "criminal and foolish" for isolating the Soviet Union. The 
failure even to consult the Soviet Government over the guarantee to Poland led the Daily 
Herald to question the real intentions of the British Government towards the Soviet 
Union. In the paper's opinion, the only way for Britain to prove it seriously intended to 
cooperate with Moscow was for the Foreign Ministers to meet, "unless Chamberlain 
wanted to see Stalin in a real effort at p e a c e " ,^ 5  which was a severe reproof against the
The News Chronicle, 14 April 1939. Leading article, "What of Russia?".
The Newf Chronicle, 15 April 1939. Leading article, "What's the Obstacle?".
52 The Manchester Guardian, 22 April 1939. "Interval for Talks" by the Diplomatic 
Correspondent. The News Chronicle, 1 May 1939. Leading article, "Press Ahead".
53 The Daily Herald, 20 March 1939. Leading article, "What Is Needed"; 21 March 1939, 
leading article, "Joint Action".
54 The Daily Herald, 3 April 1939. Leading article, "The Next Step". The New Statesman and 
Nation, 8 April 1939. "The New Policy"; 15 April 1939, "Mr. Chamberlain and the USSR".
55 The Daily Herald, 5 April 1939. Leading article, "Russia's Part".
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futility of Chamberlain's visits to Hitler in September 1938. The Daily Herald warned 
that Stalin was serious when he threatened to remain independent of Europe because the 
Soviet Union "would not be used as a smoke-screen for the dubious designs of other 
governments or to pull the chestnuts out of the fire for their b e n e f i t " .5 6  Although the 
New Statesman and Nation admitted that Moscow was taking a tough line in the 
negotiations, the journal pointed out that the Soviet Union was the one in a strong 
situation while Britain, through its "presumptuous" guarantees, was in a weak
position.57
The British Government ignored the possibility that the Soviet Union might 
remain neutral or even become allied to Germany in the war, thus demonstrating a 
blindness in British thinking. As a consequence, the quality conservative press failed to 
see anything wrong in the way negotiations were proceeding in April and May. There 
was also limited discussion in these papers over the proposals made by Litvinov in April 
and why the British Government delayed its reply. Therefore, when Litvinov "suddenly 
resigned" on 3 May 1939, the quality conservative press expressed surprise not that 
Litvinov was gone but that he should leave in the midst of important negotiations. The 
Times, the Daily Telegraph and the Scotsman reported that rumours had been 
circulating for some months that Litvinov was to be dismissed, yet these newspapers 
admitted that the timing of his resignation "aroused curiosity" in Europe since Litvinov 
was a "key" and "capable figure".58 There was, however, no suggestion by quality 
conservative newspapers, unlike the liberal and labour press, that Litvinov's retirement 
was in any way due to Britain’s delay in negotiating an agreement. Nevertheless, the 
Warsaw Correspondent for The Times reported the rumour that Litvinov had resigned 
because his peace policy was out of favour with his colleagues.59 The Scotsman,
56 The Daily Herald, 13 April 1939. "Soviet Doubtful o f Britain" by the Diplomatic 
Correspondent
57 The New Statesman and Nation, 22 April 1939. "The New Phase in Europe".
58 The Daily Telegraph, 4 May 1939. "Resignation of Litvinov; Surprise Announcement in 
Moscow Last Night" by the Moscow Correspondent. The Scotsman, 4 May 1939. "Europe Sensation" 
by the Moscow Correspondent. The Times, 5 May 1939. Leading article, "M. Litvinoff Withdraws".
59 The Times, 4 May 1939. "Resignation of M. Litvinov" by the Warsaw Correspondent; 5 
May 1939, leading article, "M, Litvinoff Withdraws".
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showing an unsubstantiated degree of optimism, found it surprising that Litvinov would 
"throw up his task voluntarily just at the moment when what he strove for was in his 
grasp".60 The Yorkshire Post, however, admitted to feeling anxious as to the outcome 
of the negotiations and recognised in hindsight that Litvinov's warnings about Hitler's 
intentions over the previous twelve months were justified. Therefore, the paper "truly 
regretted" the Foreign Commissar's disappearance from the diplomatic stage.6!
To a large extent, the quality conservative press was primarily surprised by 
Litvinov's replacement, Molotov, since he had very limited experience in foreign affairs 
and had repeatedly boasted of the Soviet Union's strength and independence. However, 
correspondents for The Times and the Daily Telegraph pointed out that it was still too 
early to suggest a change in Soviet foreign policy and therefore believed Moscow 
intended to cooperate with Britain and France.62 The Times stated that it was not 
"prudent to assume that the removal of the Foreign Commissar necessarily heralded a 
change in policy. M. Litvinov's position was that of a trusted agent rather than a 
responsible creator of policy. "63 Although Britain's delay in negotiating and Litvinov's 
retirement encouraged rumours suggesting Stalin intended to alter Soviet foreign policy, 
the Scotsman did not believe them to be true. The paper warned that until Stalin's plans 
were better known, the resignation did not "portend a radical departure" in foreign policy 
as the Soviet Union remained opposed to aggression.64
The Daily Telegraph suggested that Litvinov would more likely be missed by 
foreigners rather than by his own people, especially since the paper alleged that Stalin had 
never liked the Foreign Commissar but had been forced to retain Litvinov due to his great 
knowledge, skill, and international respect.65 Fleet Street devoted far more coverage of
60 The Scotsman, 5 May 1939. Leading article, "The Russian Surprise".
6! The Yorkshire Post, 5 May 1939. Leading article, "The Negotiations with Russia".
62 The Times, 4 May 1939. Article by the Diplomatic Correspondent. The Daily Telegraph, 6 
May 1939. "Soviet Premier to Make a Statement on Policy; No Crisis Over the Fall o f Litvinov" by 
the Moscow Correspondent
63 The Times, 5 May 1939. Leading article, "M. Litvinoff Withdraws". See also, the 
Observer, 1 May 1939. "World; Week by Week - Mr. Litvinov Resigns".
64 The Scotsman, 5 May 1939. Leading article, "The Russian Surprise".
65 The Daily Telegraph, 6 May 1939. "Soviet Premier to Make a Statement on Policy; No 
Crisis Over the Fall of Litvinov" by the Moscow Correspondent.
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the Foreign Commissar's resignation than the Soviet press which merely printed an 
"inconspicuous four-line notice on the back pages".66 Litvinov had been genuinely 
admired in the West and by the British press and thus the style of reporting his 
resignation ironically sometimes resembled that of an obituary.67 Sir William Seeds, the 
British Ambassador in Moscow, communicated his early apprehensions to the Foreign 
Office that he would find it increasingly difficult to communicate with the new 
Commissar of Foreign Affairs because Molotov's methods of negotiating were far 
different from Litvinov's.68 The latter was well respected abroad and understood 
Western customs and ways of negotiating. Sir William Strang, the Head of the Foreign 
Office Central Department at the time, suggested that subtlety could be used when talking 
to Litvinov and many successful plans were achieved without wasted effort, whereas any 
proposal made to Molotov had to be unambiguous and purposeful.69 Thus Seeds 
expected more protracted negotiations following Molotov's appointment.
There was genuine regret in the popular conservative press that Litvinov was 
"removed" as he was "one of the most famous statesmen in the w o r ld " .7 0  However, 
these papers were primarily apprehensive that Molotov's appointment heralded a change 
in Soviet foreign policy. The Daily Express was concerned with the effects of Molotov 
becoming Foreign Commissar since he was reputed to favour bi-lateral pacts over 
Litvinov's "dream" of collective security.71 The paper gloomily argued that if the new 
Foreign Commissar chose to become more isolationist, the Soviet Union would survive 
but Britain would s u f f e r .7 2  Curiously, both the Daily Express and the Evening Standard
66 D.B.F.P., Third Series, Vol. V, no. 353.
67 See for example, the News Chronicle, 4 May 1939. Special article by A. J. Cummings, 
"Litvinov, The Man As I New Him". For articles by the British press admiring Litvinov's abilities and 
personality, see chapter 3.
68 D.B.F.P., Third Series, Vol. V, nos. 359, 509, 533.
69 William Strang, Home and Abroad, p. 165.
70 The Daily Mail, 4 May 1939. "Litvinov Hands Stalin His Resignation" by B.U.P. and 
A.P. in Moscow.
71 The Daily Express, 4 May 1939. "Litvinov Sacked by the Red Army" by the Moscow 
Correspondent
72 The Daily Express, 5 May 1939. Leading article, "Take Your Choice".
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reported that Litvinov had been "sacked" by Stalin on the advice of the Red Army.73 
Thus the Evening Standard believed Germany welcomed Litvinov's "fall" as a signal for 
a change in Soviet foreign policy and most significantly, the channels of communication 
were reportedly reopened between Berlin and Moscow thus threatening a British-Soviet 
agreement.74
Unlike the conservative press, immediate speculation in the Manchester Guardian 
suggested that Litvinov’s resignation heralded a change in Soviet foreign policy75 due to 
the unjustifiably slow progress of the talks, especially since Moscow continued to await a 
reply from the British Government on the Soviet proposal of 17 April.76 The Manchester 
Guardian condemned the British for being complacent, for failing to appreciate the 
Soviet Government's point of view, and for inadequately proving its commitment and 
sincerity in the negotiations.77 The Spectator was "far from reassured" by Litvinov's 
resignation since the journal believed that if the "chief negotiator" was replaced, a change 
of policy normally followed. However, the journal pointed out that in the case of the 
Soviet Union, that might not happen.78 Nevertheless, the M anchester Guardian 
sincerely believed that had the British Government been "whole-hearted" in the 
negotiations, Litvinov would have remained the Foreign Commissar.79 The News 
Chronicle, however, preferred to believe there would be no change in foreign policy^o 
since it was "inconceivable that the Russian people" would accept an alliance with 
Germany.81 Nevertheless, like the Manchester Guardian, the News Chronicle believed
73 The Daily Express, 4 May 1939. "Litvinov Sacked by the Red Army" by the Moscow 
Correspondent. The Evening Standard, 4 May 1939. "Litvinov Fall after Protests by Army" by the 
Diplomatic Correspondent.
74 The Evening Standard, 4 May 1939. Leading article, "Litvinov"; 5 May 1939, leading 
article, "Russia".
75 The Manchester Guardian, 4 May 1939. "Litvinov Resigns" by the Moscow Correspondent.
76 The Manchester Guardian, 2 May 1939. "Negotiations with Russia" by the Diplomatic 
Correspondent.
77 The Manchester Guardian, 3 May 1939. Leading article, "How Long?".
78 The Spectator, 5 May 1939. "News of the Week".
79 The Manchester Guardian, 5 May 1939. "Moscow Full o f Rumours" by the Moscow 
Correspondent and leading article, "Mr. Litvinov".
80 The News Chronicle, 4 May 1939. "Litvinov Resigns: Molotov Is Soviet Foreign 
Minister".
81 The News Chronicle, 5 May 1939. "Stalin's Line o f Action" by the Moscow  
Correspondent
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it was possible that Stalin blamed Litvinov for allowing the British Government to 
procrastinate and therefore, Stalin placed ultimate blame for the failure of collective 
security on Britain. Therefore, in the paper's opinion, the resignation appeared to be a 
warning to the British leadership that the Soviet Government would not wait indefinitely 
for an agreement.82
The Daily Herald also noted that the "snail’s pace" of the negotiations caused 
"disquiet and impatience in those who attach high importance to the enlistment of Russian 
power in Europe".83 Thus Litvinov's resignation appeared to support the labour press's 
condemnation of the British Government for moving slowly. Although the Daily Herald 
admitted that it did not know if Soviet foreign policy would change,84 the N ew  
Statesman and Nation warned that Moscow's "edges were sharpened" and therefore, the 
British Government ought to take note.85
The Daily Worker was highly entertained by the "frenzied" speculation of the 
"capitalist press" which created "castles in the air" concerning Litvinov's resignation. 
The paper suggested that the "jitterbugs" did not need to search for excuses concerning 
Litvinov's retirement but should look no further than to the fact that the British 
Government had delayed its answer to the Soviet proposal. In the paper's opinion, 
Molotov became Foreign Commissar, not to alter Soviet foreign policy, but to give it 
clearer direction and firmness.86
M olotov takes over
Though the Foreign Office recognised several reasons for Litvinov's resignation, 
it preferred to believe there was no change in policy by the Soviet Government and 
therefore, Litvinov was merely removed as a result of internal issues, possibly in a new, 
though limited, purge so Stalin could consolidate his authority.87 Because the British
82 The News Chronicle, 5 May 1939, Leading article, "Litvinov".
83 The Daily Herald, 3 May 1939. Leading article, "Britain and the USSR".
84 The Daily Herald, 5 May 1939. "Litvinov: Still a Mystery"; leading article, "Litvinov".
85 The New Statesman and Nation, 13 May 1939. "Comments".
86 The Daily Worker, 5 May 1939. Leading article, "Litvinov".
87 D.B.FJP., Third Series, Vol. V, nos. 398 and 509. Roberts, Soviet Decision fo r  Pact with 
Germany, pp. 60-61; Fall of Litvinov, p. 643.
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Government retained confidence in the success of the tripartite negotiations, regardless of 
Litvinov's departure, the quality conservative press also initially maintained an optimistic 
attitude. For example, in a leading article. The Times reported that the Prime Minister 
was confident talks with Moscow remained friendly as there was a common desire to act 
against aggression in a reciprocal m a n n e r . 88 Without much evidence, the D aily  
Telegraph adamantly believed Molotov was more anxious than Litvinov for a collective 
agreement against â g g r e s s i o n .8 9  Although the quality conservative press reflected the 
British Government's expectations of the negotiations, this was not due to substantial 
manipulation by the Downing Street press office. These papers were genuinely 
optimistic and assumed both the British and Soviet Governments were making the best 
efforts to secure an alliance against aggression.
In May as a result of back-bench pressure, more members of the British Cabinet 
appreciated the need for an alliance with the Soviet Union.90 Anthony Eden, for 
example, wrote to the Sunday Times that he understood the British people wanted an 
alliance with all countries desiring peace. Thus he sought to assure the population that 
delays with the Soviet Union were not due to ideological issues.91 However, there 
remained some in the Cabinet, such as Lord Halifax, the Foreign Secretary, who 
continued to be hopelessly uninformed of public opinion. For example, he told the 
French Government that "half the British population" held the Soviet Union responsible 
as much as the Nazis for "all the troubles of the last ten y e a r s ".92
The Times was similarly out of touch with the British public, though in accord 
with Chamberlain and Halifax. Despite supporting the negotiations out of a sense of duty 
towards the British Government and writing leading articles expressing a desire for an
88 The Times, 4 May 1939. Leading article, "Poland and Russia". See also the Scotsman, 6 
May 1939. Leading article, "The Russian Negotiations".
89 The Daily Telegraph, 11 May 1939. Leading article, "Russia and the Peace Pact". Roberts 
argues that Litvinov had become so disillusioned with collective security that by April 1939 he had 
dropped the policy and that it was Molotov and Stalin who were the leading advocates of the tripartite 
negotiations. See Fall o f Litvinov, pp. 646-647 and 651-653.
90 Manne, "The British Decision for Alliance with Russia, May 1939", p. 3.
91 The Sunday Times, 14 May 1939. "Russian and the Organisation of Peace" by the Rt Hon. 
Anthony Eden.
92 Carley, p. 321.
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agreement, The Times nevertheless remained cautious in supporting the Soviet Union.^^ 
Though not substantiated by B.LP.O. polls,94 several articles in The Times in May 
warned that a large proportion of the British population wished for Britain to avoid 
becoming aligned in an ideological front as that could divide Europe into rivalries. Thus 
a "hard and fast" alliance with the Soviet Government would hamper negotiations with 
other countries who opposed communism.95 The Times argued that negotiations with 
Moscow were neither simple nor purely bilateral as the protection of many states was 
involved. In addition, the paper pointed out that the Soviet Government had recently 
made a significant change in its foreign office so delays were inevitable.96 Thus The 
Times justified the Prime Minister's cautious approach and ignored British responsibility 
for the delays in reaching an agreement. Furthermore, the paper suggested suspicion and 
misunderstanding had hindered the early stage of negotiations, due firstly to Moscow's 
self-imposed isolation and secondly, to the difference in temperament between the Soviet 
Union and Britain. The Times was, therefore, the only paper to suggest that the 
ideological outlook of the Soviet Government required the British negotiators to act 
slowly and cautiously because there was no foundation of trust. 9?
In strong contrast to The Times, the Yorkshire Post reported the British public 
was "mystified" by the increasing number of statements by the Prime Minister which 
announced the rise of what the paper alleged to be "incomprehensible" differences.9* 
Although the Daily Telegraph continued to give the British Government its traditional 
support, the paper expressed a degree of "misgiving" in the delay with the Soviet Union. 
Therefore, the Daily Telegraph called for the British leadership to "reiterate its strong 
desire for an agreement" and to deny that its hesitations were a result of ideological 
differences. Although the paper conceded that it was "better to go slowly than to form a
93 McDonald, The History of The Times: Struggles in War and Peace, 1939-1966. p. 24.
94 See for example, B.I.P.O., Gallup Survey, for March and June 1939. In June, one question 
asked "Which is the country you like least?", 54 per cent disliked Germany while only 5 per cent disliked 
Russia.
95 The Times, 4 May 1939. Leading article, "Poland and Russia"; 11 May 1939, leading 
article, "Britain and Russia"; 9 May 1939, leading article, "Russia and the Balkans".
9  ^The Times, 9 May 1939. Leading article, "Russia and the Balkans".
9  ^The Times, 25 May 1939. Leading article, "Progress with Russia".
98 The Yorkshire Post, 5 May 1939. Leading article, "The Negotiations with Russia".
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hasty agreement which caused problems in the future", it failed to understand why there 
were problems when France and the Soviet Union were allies, France and Britain were 
partners, and therefore, Britain and the USSR were indirectly a l l i e s .9 9  Although the 
Daily Telegraph recognised the Soviet Government wanted a "more rigid and 
comprehensive" scheme, the paper thought the Soviet proposals would benefit Britain 
even if a full military alliance was required,
In contrast to the paper's traditional hostility to Moscow, the Observer in May 
became a strong advocate of an alliance with the Soviet Union. The Sunday paper 
believed it was critical that an agreement be reached without further deadlock. "Either 
Britain and France continue on their chosen path or they tumble the elaborate Peace bloc." 
The paper was critical of the British Government's "fear of overdoing it... by driving 
Germany into a comer 'whence blindly she might plunge the world into war'". The 
Observer stated this ought to be the British Government's policy since Germany needed 
to be encircled and contained "like a house on fire". Thus the Observer, in contrast to its 
views in previous years and to The Times, believed that only a full militaiy alliance could 
convince Germany that British guarantees to Eastern Europe would be honoured,
The popular conservative press was relieved to see talks continuing after 
Litvinov's resignation, though the Daily Mail, like The Times, was satisfied with the 
British Government's reluctance to form a "hard and fast triple alliance" as that could 
involve Britain in areas far beyond Europe, In contrast, the Daily Express suggested 
that "the sooner there was an alliance, the sooner the British Government would be in 
step with the British p u b l i c F o r B e a v e r b r o o k  newspaper, as an advocate of 
isolationism, it was admittedly a difficult line to promote. However, the paper accepted 
that the British population wanted an alliance and therefore, if  there had to be
The Daily Telegraph, 20 May 1939. Leading article, "Peace through Strength".
199 The Daily Telegraph, 11 May 1939. Leading article, "Russia and the Peace Pact".
191 The Observer, 21 May 1939. Leading article, "Russia as the Key; A Critical Week".
192 The Daily Mail, 11 May 1939. Leading article, "A Word to Russia".
193 The Daily Express, 19 May 1939. Leading article, "They Talk of Russia".
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cooperation, the Daily Express preferred to have the best agreement, as soon as
possible. 194
Although the Daily Mail genuinely wanted a pact and therefore regretted delays, 
the paper, unlike the Beaverbrook press, alleged that the Soviet Union was more to blame 
than the British Government for the set-backs. For example, a meeting in Geneva 
between Halifax and Potemkin, the Assistant Commissar of Foreign Affairs, had failed to 
take place in May. As a result, the Daily Mail alleged, hypocritically, that it would be 
"unfortunate if an agreement were again delayed through the absence of a delegate 
charged with full diplomatic powers" as it would be a waste of Halifax's time.195 
Though this was undoubtedly true at the time and a fair accusation against the Soviet 
Government, the Daily Mail would conveniently forget that neither Strang nor the British 
military mission in August had full diplomatic powers. In contrast, the Daily Express 
critically stated that the "arrangements for a marriage between Chamberlain and Stalin are 
moving forward in a mysterious way. So far there is nothing wonderful about the 
performance." However, the paper suggested that the "light is slowly breaking on a 
bewildering series" of proposals and counter-proposals with Chamberlain as the "timid 
suitor who prefers to propose in the d a r k " .  196 The paper optimistically believed that 
"barring an entirely unexpected accident", a full military alliance amongst the three states 
would be concluded "shortly".i97
Throughout May, the liberal press expressed annoyance that an agreement with 
the Soviet Union had not been concluded and thus repeatedly criticised Chamberlain and 
the Foreign Office. The News Chronicle was dismayed that the British Government 
exhibited "no enthusiasm for Russian support" though the British people "unanimously" 
called for it.i98 The paper described Britain's efforts in the negotiations as a "frightening 
delay in the reinforcement of collective security" 199 and condemned British diplomacy for
194 The Daily Express, 11 May 1939. Leading article, "Two Messages"; 19 May 1939, 
leading article, "They Talk of Russia"; 20 May 1939, leading article, "Hesitation".
195 The Daily Mail, 17 May 1939. Leading article, "Why Geneva?".
195 The Daily Express, 22 May 1939. Leading article, "In the Dark".
197 The Daily Express, 22 May 1939. "Halifax Acts".
198 The News Chronicle, 8 May 1939. Leading article, "We WantRussm".
199 The News Chronicle, 8 May 1939. "Russia: Biggest Factor for Peace" by Vernon Bartlett.
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moving haltingly, increasing fears that the talks might end in deadlock.!!® In the opinion 
of the Manchester Guardian, the British Government's reticence explained Moscow's 
suspicion that Britain and France were not to be trusted and were secretly encouraging 
Hitler to attack the Ukraine.!!! The News Chronicle could not understand why the 
British Government was "shy" of a "full-blooded" military alliance with the Soviet Union 
and thus accused a "large section of the Tory party" of retaining anti-Soviet prejudices 
even though the Prime Minister denied it. The paper was, however, relieved that Eden, 
Churchill and the Observer, the "organ of the Clivenden Set" and a notoriously anti- 
Soviet newspaper, favoured an alliance with the Soviet Union.!!2 The M anchester 
Guardian was also unconvinced by the Prime Minister's statement that he was not 
influenced by "ideological" causes and that he did not "despise" the value of "Russian" 
assistance. The paper further accused the British Government of "risking the loss of the 
great advantage of Russia's help to avert war or help us win it". Though Chamberlain 
claimed to be speaking for the people, the Manchester Guardian denied that the Prime 
Minister understood the population and suggested the country realised it stood a better 
chance of peace if the Soviet Union was involved. ü3
In an outspoken article, the Spectator demanded that the "arguing" end so a clear 
agreement could be reached as the situation in Europe was "far too critical for 
finessing".!!4 Though the Manchester Guardian recognised that a major problem was 
due to the Soviet desire to increase the scope of the negotiations while Britain wished to 
limit them, the paper pointed out that regardless, the discussions could not be allowed to 
fail and any form of agreement had to be secured to deter Hitler. The paper alleged that 
the British guarantees to Poland and Rumania were useless without the Soviet Union and
!!9  TheiVew^ Chronicle, 8 May 1939. Leading article, "We Want Russia".
The Manchester Guardian, 11 May 1939. Leading article, "London-Moscow". See also, 
the News Chronicle, 11 May 1939. Leading article, "Clearing the Air".
The News Chronicle, 8 May 1939. Leading article, "We Want Russia". The idea for the 
"Clivenden Set" was created by Claud Cockburn in his weekly newsletter. The Week, to describe a 
fictitious group of plutocrats who collaborated with Hitler to encourage him to move freely in Eastern 
Europe thus saving the West from his aggression. (Gannon, p. 24) The people allegedly belonging to 
the Clivenden Set were Geoffrey Dawson, the Astors, Sir Neville Henderson, J. L. Garvin, and Lord 
Lothian.
!!^ The Manchester Guardian, 20 May 1939. Leading article, "A Poor Case".
! !4 The Spectator, 19 May 1939. "Russia and Peace".
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this alone should have increased the British Government's resolve to conclude an alliance 
with M o s c o w . !!5 The News Chronicle also reported that it was "not so good that the 
most important country, Russia," remained outside the system of guarantees for Eastern 
Europe. Furthermore, in the News Chronicle's opinion, the excuse offered by the 
British Government, that an agreement with the Soviet Union would encircle Germany, 
was poor since the Germans needed to be s u r r o u n d e d . ! ! ^  The paper was also "far from 
reassured" by Chamberlain since "vital weeks are slipping by" without an agreement. ü7 
Though occasionally Moscow received some mild criticism by the labour press, 
m general, the British Government was allocated most of the blame for failing to secure a 
pact. The Daily Herald expressed annoyance that two months after the occupation of 
Prague, misunderstanding and suspicion remained to hinder the negotiations. Although 
the Daily Herald believed the British Government's attitude had change significantly, the 
paper alleged that Soviet suspicions were justifiable as a result o f Chamberlain's 
determination, since 1937, to keep Britain out of a full alliance with Moscow. Therefore, 
the newspaper pointed out that the only way to remove Soviet anxiety was to form the 
alliance which the Soviet Government demanded.ü8 The Daily Herald believed that the 
Soviet Union's "good faith" was established beyond a doubt,!!^ and therefore, the paper 
called for Britain and the USSR to "hurry up and agree"!2® and criticised both countries 
for wasting opportunities.!^i Nevertheless, the Daily Herald reported it could not 
understand the British Government's attitude in rejecting Litvinov's April terms since his 
plan was far more advantageous to Britain than the British Government's own 
proposals!^^ which were based on the participants providing unilateral, rather than 
collective, assistance.
!!5 The Manchester Guardian, 16 May 1939. Leading article, "Time and Russia".
!!5  TheA^ewj Chronicle, 15 May 1939. Leading article, "We Still Want Russia". See a 
comparable article by the Observer on 21 May 1939, thus demonstrating how similar the attitudes of the 
quality con^rvative and the liberal press had become towards the Soviet Union.
!!2 The //gwf Chronicle, 20 May 1939. Leading article, "Still Fencing".
! !8 The Daily Herald, 11 May 1939. Leading article, "The Peace Front".
!!9 The Daily Herald, 11 May 1939. Leading article, "The Peace Front".
!29 The Daily Herald, 16 May 1939. Leading article, "Hurry Up and Agree".
!2! The Daily Herald. 17 May 1939. See also, the New Statesman and Nation, 20 May 1939. 
!22 The Daily Herald, 19 May 1939. "Russia Insists on Triple Pact" by the Diplomatic 
Correspondent, Ewer.
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Optimism in the British press assumed new expectations in late May with the 
anticipation of an agreement!23 since the British Government had finally offered its own 
proposal for a triple alliance linked to the principles of the League of Nations. However, 
the confidence felt by Fleet Street was diminished by Molotov's speech to the Soviet 
Parliament on 30 May. The Times pointed out, with a slight degree of relief, that the 
speech was neither a full acceptance nor a flat refusal of Britain's proposals. Thus the 
paper was confident, reflecting the assurance of the British Government, 124 that 
continued negotiations would remove further misgivings and reservations. ^ 25 xhe Daily 
Telegraph's more realistic interpretation of Molotov's statement acknowledged that the 
Soviet Government believed there was a considerable gap before a pact would be 
finalised despite agreement in principle. The Daily Telegraph admitted that although the 
differences were serious, they "ought not to be insurmountable" as Molotov's speech 
gave the impression of a genuine desire for a joint anti-aggression front. Moreover, the 
Daily Telegraph thought it would be unfortunate to jeopardise the negotiations through a 
lack of mutual confidence or through a failure to understand each other's intentions.!26 
Garvin, in the Observer, continuing with a positive attitude towards the Soviet Union, 
admitted that the "hitch with Russia is unpleasant and not without danger" though he 
stressed there was no reason to hold a "dismal" view. Because there was "four-fifth's 
agreement already", Garvin believed peace would eventually be secured. As for 
Molotov's speech, the editor of the Observer thought it displayed "candour" similar to 
that used by the Western democracies. !27
The Scotsman was very disappointed that an agreement was not reached and 
contrary to its usual understanding and friendliness, expressed more dissatisfaction with 
the Soviet Union than the rest of the quality conservative press, and criticism became
!23 See for example. The Times, 29 May 1939. "Anglo-French Plan" by the Moscow 
Correspondent; 25 May 1939, leading article, "Progress with Russia". The Daily Telegraph, 29 May 
1939. Leading article, "The Encirclement Myth". The Observer, 28 May 1939. Leading article, "The 
Covenant". The Daily Mail, 25 May 1939. Leading article, "Russia Day by Day". The Manchester 
Guardian, 27 May 1939. "Quick Moves in Russian Negotiations".
!24 See for example, D.B.F.P., Third Series, Vol. V, nos. 689, 707.
!25 The Times, 1 June 1939. Leading article, "M. Molotov's Speech".
!26 The Daily Telegraph, 1 June 1939. Leading article, "Moscow and the Peace Front".
!27 The Observer, 4 June 1939. Special article by Garvin, "Russia’s Choice".
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more noticeable as the summer advanced. The Scotsman suggested that an agreement 
was not as near to completion as believed in Britain, though not the fault of the British 
Government, because "once again Russia has left Europe guessing". Therefore, the 
paper agreed with "those who turn Stalin's words and say it is Britain and France who 
are pulling the chestnuts out of the fire for Russia" and questioned the Soviet Union's 
desire to help others. Despite its negative attitude, the paper, bolstered by the British 
Government's confidence, continued to believe an agreement would be concluded if 
Moscow received careful handling and was "made to feel she's leading against 
aggression with Britain and France f o l l o w i n g " . ! 2 8  However, this suggestion was 
unrealistic since the British Government would never consider such an idea. 
Chamberlain particularly believed he was in control of Europe and refused to concede to 
pressure, whether it was from nazis or communists.
Hope was restored to the quality conservative press in June when the British 
Government sent Strang to Moscow as a special envoy to speed up the negotiations. The 
Daily Telegraph believed the civil servant's presence was a convincing effort by the 
British Government to allay Soviet anxieties that Britain was not serious in its efforts to 
achieve an alliance. The Sunday Times even suggested that once confidence returned 
to the negotiations, a Cabinet Minister might go to Moscow to follow up Strang's 
a c h i e v e m e n t s . T h u s  the quality conservative press expected the "dragging out of 
negotiations" to c e a s e . T h e  Observer was critical of all delay, by any of the 
negotiators, but especially accused Britain and France of refusing to consider rationally 
the Soviet proposal. However, the paper reported that they would soon have to listen to 
Moscow in order to secure p e a c e . ! 3 2  Even The Times was concerned that negotiations 
"go very slowly forward and then stop", though the paper was comforted in the fact that
!28 The Scotsman, 1 June 1939. Leading article, "The Russian Negotiations".
!29 The Daily Telegraph, 8 June 1939. Leading article, "The Premier, Russia, and Spain". 
See also, the Observer, 11 June 1939.
!39 The Sunday Times, 11 June 1939. "Minister May Go to Moscow" by a Diplomatic 
Correspondent
!3! The Daily Telegraph, 19 July 1939. "Cabinet Talks on Soviet Pact" by the Diplomatic 
Correspondent. The Sunday Times, 2 and 9 July 1939. Articles by a Diplomatic Corr^pondent. The 
Yorkshire Post, 27 July 1939. "Early Moves in Moscow".
!32 The Observer, 25 June 1939. "World - Talks in Moscow".
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talks at least did not go backwards. However, The Times believed the position of the 
negotiations "is unhappy" because the atmosphere in Moscow "is not favourable for 
frank discussions" due to the "remoteness of the K r e m l i n " .  133 Furthermore, the paper 
was critical of the British Government for giving in too often to the Soviet Government 
on vital points. For example. The Times believed that if the Baltic states refused to be 
g u a iS è ^  by the Soviet Union, then Britain could not force them to act against their 
wül.!34 This was a very remarkable and inexcusable change in attitude when compared to 
the infamous leader of 7 September 1938 which stressed that Czechoslovakia had no 
choice but to accept German d e m a n d s .  !35
Due to their expectations for an agreement, the popular conservative press was 
disappointed that Molotov's speech in May did not accept the plan as p r e s u m e d . !36 The 
Daily Express was concerned that the scope of Britain's activities in Europe was 
expanding, for example to include guarantees to the Baltic s t a t e s , ! ^ ?  and that led to 
renewed suspicion against Soviet aims by the Beaverbrook and Rothermere press. The 
Daily Mail cynically admitted that success remained doubtful because the Soviet Union 
would only agree to its own terms. The paper expressed disappointment because it 
genuinely believed that apart from a few minor points, a pact was a t t a i n a b l e . ! 38 
However, only a week later, the Daily Mail appeared to have lost patience with both 
sides in the negotiations since Potemkin had not gone to Geneva in May and Halifax was 
not going to Moscow in June. "Neither Mohamet nor the mountain seem disposed to 
move in the business of Anglo-Soviet negotiations." Nevertheless, the paper ironically 
continued to praise Chamberlain's "patience and tenacity for succeeding thus far". The 
decision to send a civil servant, Strang, to help the ambassador was considered by the 
Daily Mail to be a "wise" idea, though the paper sarcastically recognised that "to have 
sent a bigger man would no doubt satisfy the dramatic instincts of the Russians".
!33 The Times, 5 July 1939. Leading article, "The Talks with Russia".
!34 The Times, 5 July 1939. Leading article, "The Talks with Russia".
!35 See the leading article in The Times, 1 September 1938.
!36 The Daily Express, 1 June 1939. "Molotov Asks for More".
!37 The Daily Express, 2 June 1939. Leading article, "Liabilities".
!38 The Daily Mail, 1 June 1939. Leading article, "Moscow Is Critical". See also the Daily  
Express, 3 June 1939. Leading article, "Russia Still Hedging".
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However, the paper did not rule out that it might be a good idea to send a Cabinet 
Minister once the ground had been thoroughly explored by S t r a n g , ! 3 9  This attitude was 
extremely different from that of March 1935 when the Daily Mail had strongly opposed 
Eden's visit to Moscow thus proving the seriousness of the s i t u a t i o n .  ! 4 0
Despite rumours in July that Halifax might expedite the negotiations by visiting 
M o s c o w , ! 4 i  the Daily Express presented a more pessimistic attitude towards a pact and 
criticised all participants in the discussions. The paper alleged that neither the Kremlin 
nor the British were anxious or eager for an agreement which had become a "bad egg 
because i t  was addled and stale" after months of n e g o t i a t i n g .  1 4 2  Despite years of 
deriding Litvinov's slogan, "the indivisibility of p e a c e " , ! 4 3  Daily Express concluded 
that the former Commissar of Foreign Affairs had been correct because "peace is
indivisible". !44
There was less consistency in the opinions displayed by the liberal press as to 
when an agreement, would be reached and who was more responsible for the failure to 
secure an alliance. The Manchester Guardian, in an article more critical towards the 
Soviet Union than usual, found Molotov's attitude "on the whole disappointing" as the 
British Government had gone a long way to meeting Moscow's demands in Eastern 
Europe. !45 Furthermore, the Manchester Guardian claimed Chamberlain was justified 
in suggesting that a "wall or veil" continued to exist between the Soviet Union and 
Britain. However, the paper accepted that the British "unsurprisingly" continued to pay 
the price of excluding the Soviet Government from Munich. Therefore, before the 
British Government conceded too much, the Manchester Guardian advised Chamberlain 
"to act fast" to clear up existing misunderstandings.!45
!39 The Daily Mail, 8 June 1939. Leading article, "Courier to Russia".
!40 For example, see the leading article in the Daily Mail, 23 March 1935. Also, see chapter
3.
!41 The Daily Express, 6 July 1939. "Halifax May Go to Moscow" by the Political 
Correspondent, Guy Eden.
!42 The Daily Express, 10 July 1939. Leading article, "A Bad Egg".
!43 See chapter 3.
!44 The Daily Express, 11 July 1939. Leading article, "A Phrase Comes True".
!45 The Manchester Guardian, 1 June 1939. "Refusal by Russia" by the Diplomatic 
ConespondenL
!45 The Manchester Guardian, 2 June 1939. Leading article, "A Sort of Veil".
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In contrast, the News Chronicle and the Economist saw only positive prospects 
in Molotov's speech which "reveals progress towards an agreement", though both noted 
the talks remained "painfully slow" and beset with complications as a result of suspicion 
based on British and French diplomacy since 1937. The News Chronicle suggested that 
the best means of removing these anxieties was to send Halifax to M o s c o w . ! 4 7  The 
News Chronicle and the Economist both found it a "pity" that the Foreign Secretary was 
not travelling to the Soviet Union since "a civil servant instead of a high political figure 
will confirm Russia's suspicion that it will not be treated on equal terms with Britain and 
F r a n c e " .! 4 8  The News Chronicle reported rumours which suggested that Britain's real 
intention in sending Strang was to keep Moscow talking while the British leadership 
made a deal with the a g g r e s s o r s . ! 4 9  However, the paper stated that although there was 
no reason to believe the suggestions, there would be less occasion to listen to them if 
Halifax went to M o s c o w .  !5o Furthermore, as Low pointed out in his cartoon on 9 June, 
"All You Have To Do Is Sit Down", the British formula did not take into account the 
changed atmosphere in the Soviet Union following Molotov's appointment as Foreign 
Commissar. A minor British official could not do Halifax's job and therefore, the Soviet 
Government would be more difficult to p l e a s e .  ! 5 i
As with conservative newspapers, in June the liberal press became more anxious 
over the delays. Though the Manchester Guardian found the "interminable delay in the 
Russian negotiations frankly deplorable", the paper was unsure who was to blame as 
both sides displayed a "flaccid a t t i t u d e " . ! 5 2  The paper reported that the British 
Government "offers more and more" while the "Russians less and less" which made
!47 The News Chronicle, 1 June 1939. Leading article, "Russia’s Answer". The Economist, 
3 June 1939. "Britain and Russia". The News Chronicle, 5 June 1939. Leading article, "Bridge the 
Gulf’.
The News Chronicle, 8 June 1939. Leading article, "Send Lord Halifax". The Economist, 
10 June 1939. "Finding a Formula".
!49 Halifax telegraphed Seeds that he believed Strang would accelerate the negotiations: 
D.BF.P., Third Series, Vol. V, no. 735. There was no communication made to Seeds that Strang’s 
responsibilities including stalling the talks.
!59 The News Chronicle, 13 June 1939. Leading article, "Off to Moscow". See also, the 
Manchester Guardian, 8 June 1939. Leading article, "To Moscow". Halifax had explained to Maisky on 
8 June that it was "really impossible [for him] to get away" and that furthermore, "this kind of business 
was better handled by Ambassadors": D.BF.P., Third Series, Vol. VI, no. 5.
!51 Figure 6.3. The Evening Standard, 9 June 1939, "All You Have To Do Is Sit Down".
!52 The Manchester Guardian, 24 June 1939. Leading article, "Europe Waits".
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Britain look impotent from Hitler's v i e w p o i n t . ! 5 3  The Economist accused the Soviet 
Government of "remaining inscrutably, disappointingly, the same".!54 The journal also 
regretted that Britain had in the past left the Soviet Union out of important conferences, 
such as Munich, since the British Government was, in the end, forced to conclude terms 
which primarily served Soviet interests. Nevertheless, the Economist pointed out that 
Britain required an agreement, even on "unpalatable" Soviet terms, since the alternative, 
the USSR remaining neutral or joining the enemy, would prove more c o s t l y . ! 5 5  
Although the News Chronicle was not as severe against the Soviet Union, the paper did 
find the growing list of states to be guamntlud- 'to meet Russian demands... superfluous 
and an unnecessary c o m p l i c a t i o n " . ! 5 6
!53 The Manchester Guardian, 5 July 1939. "Moscow Talks Again Going Badly" by the 
Diplomatic Correspondent; 24 June 1939, leading article, "Europe Waits"; 6 July 1939, leading article, 
"The Russian Pact".
!54 The Economist, 24 June 1939. "Moscow Manana”.
!55 The Economist, 8 July 1939. Leading article, "England and Eastern Europe".
!55 The News Chronicle, 23 June 1939. Leading article, "The Russian Talks"; 5 July 1939, 
leading article, "Vital Needs".
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The labour press, though critical of delays, found greater fault with the British 
Government's conduct in the negotiations. In June, the New Statesman and Nation and 
the Daily Herald accepted the Soviet Government's need for more time before it accepted 
or rejected Britain's proposal. The former journal warned that if the British Government 
did not prove its sincerity, the Soviet Union would turn to Germany "to avoid pulling 
other people's chestnuts out of the fire".!57 Although the Daily Herald recognised that 
"big business deals take time and care... therefore, this too must take time", the paper 
warned that unnecessary delay was d a n g e r o u s . !5S The paper sarcastically reported that 
Chamberlain had finally realised that an envoy was necessary in Moscow to help 
discussions since "long-range exchanges" had proven unsatisfactory. Though the Daily 
Herald suggested it was "better late than never" that Strang was sent to M o s c o w , ! 59 the 
New Statesman and Nation assumed a very negative attitude towards the mission as "it 
raises immediate suspicion of delay since obviously one o f the principle Cabinet 
Ministers should go".!5®
Confidence in the military mission
In August, Britain and France sent a military mission to Moscow since the 
negotiators believed that the basic points of a political agreement had nearly been 
resolved. The entire conservative press was extremely confident of a positive result. The 
Times stated that Britain and France "promptly" agreed to the Soviet suggestion of 
military talks,!^! though the paper failed to note the irony of sending the mission by 
steamer. The paper also hoped that Strang would be able to return home, again ignoring 
the irony when pointing out that he was required in London after a two month absence, 
though he had not secured a signed agreement. Once more the paradox was lost on The 
Times which reported on 14 August, two weeks after the initial suggestion for military
!57 The New Statesman and Nation, 3 June 1939. "Comments". See also, the Daily Herald, 1 
June 1939. "Britain’s Plan Fails to Satisfy Soviet" by the Diplomatic Correspondent.
!58 The Daily Herald, 1 June 1939. Leading article, "Impatience".
!59 The Daily Herald, 8 June 1939. Leading article, "To Moscow".
!50 The New Statesman and Nation, 10 June 1939. "Comments".
!5! The Times, 5 August 1939. "Missions Sail for Russia" by the Diplomatic Correspondent.
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talks, that the British-French military mission "very promptly" got to work with the 
Soviet d e l e g a t i o n .  1 5 2  The Sunday Times and the Observer, as a result o f their 
unsubstantiated optimism, similarly saw nothing ironic in their reports that a "specially 
chartered steamer" was to take the British and French representatives to the Soviet Union 
while Strang was to return to London by p l a n e . ! 5 3  Both papers believed that the good 
reception and the "immediate" settling to work angered well for future success and that 
tripartite cooperation was a step closer. Furthermore, the papers hoped for rapid success 
since "Russia's strength will undeniably increase Britain's s e c u r i t y " . ! 5 4  There was no 
reference to Britain's strength in helping the Soviet Union's security.
The Daily Express was very optimistic and because of the announcement of a 
military mission, the paper assured its readers that a full agreement was virtually 
c e r t a i n . ! 5 5  However, despite the inclination for an alliance, the Daily Express urged that 
the British negotiators not give in too much to the Soviet Government or it would be the 
Kremlin deciding when Britain should fight.!56 The Daily Mail and the Evening  
Standard, though hoping for a pact, primarily welcomed the fact that the military mission 
allowed Strang to fly to London where he was n e e d e d . ! 57 As with the quality 
conservative newspapers, the irony of the situation was not observed.
Following the announcement that a military mission was going to Moscow, the 
liberal press failed to express the same degree of confidence as the conservative 
newspapers. The News Chronicle cynically noted that "at present we are getting a big 
dose of optimism" after another "long period of depression". The paper found it 
unfortunate that there were "no cheery echoes in Moscow" and therefore, the News
!52 The Times, 14 August 1939. "Two Days' Work in Moscow" by the Moscow  
CorrespondenL See also, the Daily Telegraph, 1 August 1939. Leading article, "Britain's Work for the 
Peace Front"; 11 and 12 August 1939, articles by the Leningrad and Moscow Correspondent
!53 The Sunday Times, 6 August 1939. "Military Missions Leave for Moscow". The 
Observer, 6 August 1939. "Missions Leave for Russia" by the Diplomatic Correspondent.
!54 The Sunday Times. 13 August 1939. Leading article, "Moscow Staff Talks". The 
Observer, 13 August 1939. "World - The Staff Talks Begin"; 20 August 1939, "World -Progress in 
Moscow".
!55 The Daily Express, 26 July 1939. "Britain and Russia Reach Agreement" by Guy Eden. 
!55 The Daily Express, 31 July 1939. Leading article, "Downing Street, Moscow".
!57 The Daily Mail, 1 August 1939. "Strang Back in London This Week" by W. Broadbent. 
The Evening Standard, 5 August 1939.
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Chronicle wondered if British political circles were affecting optimism for domestic 
political n e e d s .  1 5 8  The Economist was equally sceptical that a pact was nearing 
completion - "It is with a jaundiced eye that the rumours of an impending agreement in 
Moscow are read n o w a d a y s . " ! 5 9  Although the Manchester Guardian supported the 
delegation, the paper welcomed Eden’s call for "someone important" to visit Moscow.!^® 
In contrast, the News Chronicle believed that dictators were always impressed by deeds 
not words, so the dispatch of British and French military representatives would help to 
prove to the Soviet Government that Britain meant business. !^i
Although the Daily Herald believed that sending a military mission to Moscow 
demonstrated that the British Government was attempting to make up lost ground by 
putting "teeth in the political talks",!^2 in reality the opposite occurred. The Daily 
Worker correctly stated that because the delegation had no authority to make decisions, 
the British Government was continuing to delay and therefore did not seriously intend to 
finalise an agreement. !^ 3 Britain had pursued an alliance without enthusiasm throughout 
the summer. Thus the military mission was a continuation of British policy since the 
Western representatives were given very restricted instructions which the Soviet 
leadership immediately perceived.!24 As a consequence, the Soviet Government turned to 
Germany for its security and obtained a pact which the British Government had refused 
to believe was a possibility.
!58 The News Chronicle, 29 July 1939. Leading article, "What About That Pact?".
!59 The Economist, 29 July 1939. "Near a Pact?".
!2® The Manchester Guardian, 1 August 1939. Articles by the Parliamentary Correspondent.
!2! The News Chronicle, 1 August 1939. Leading article, "Mission to Russia".
!22 The Daily Herald, 1 August 1939. Leading article, "Teeth in It".
!23 The Daily Worker, 16 August 1939. "Mission Says It Has No Power" by the Diplomatic 
CorrespondenL
!74 See D.B.F.P., Series III, Vol.VI, chapters VII and IX; Vol. VII, no. 34. The Soviet 
Government recognised that the British representatives had no authority and admitted that it had been one 
inducement in the Soviet decision to reach an agreement with Germany: Documents on Soviet Foreign 
Policy, Vol. Ill, 27 August 1939, Press interview by Voroshilov; and 31 August 1939, Speech by 
Molotov to the Fourth (Special) Session of the Supreme Soviet.
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•• IF T H E  B R IT I S H  D O N ' T ,  M A Y B E  WE W I L L ”
Fig. 6.4
The Nazi-Soviet deal
Though the majority of the British press had noted Soviet-German economic talks 
in J u l y ! 7 5  and though some papers, especially the News Chronicle, suggested these 
negotiations could evolve into political d i s c u s s i o n s , ! ^ 5  none of the British press 
genuinely thought the Nazi-Soviet pact was such a strong possibility. -Low's cartoon on 
29 July, "If the British Don't, Maybe We Will", showed the Germans anxiously waiting 
outside Molotov's office, hoping the British would fail to please the Soviet Government, 
thus hinting at what few newspapers dared to say - that political discussions were being 
held simultaneously.!27 Believing the military mission was proceeding successfully. 
Fleet Street was confident an alliance would be reached in merely a matter of time. Thus 
the size of the headlines in the British press on 23 August betrayed the anxiety which 
these newspapers felt with the momentous news of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression
!^5 See for example, the Nev^s Chronicle, 24 July 1939; Daily Herald, 22 July 1939; The 
Times, 22 July 1939.
!^5 The News Chronicle, 24 July 1939. "75 Minute Talk at Moscow" by the Moscow 
CorrespondenL
!'^ 2 Figure 6.4. The Evening Standard, 29 July 1939. "If The British Don'L Maybe We WiU".
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Pact. For example, the headlines in The Times covered two columns which stated "The 
World Astonished at Nazi-Soviet Pact".
The Times admitted that the British press and Government had never taken 
seriously the hints by the Soviet Government that it would turn to Germany if 
n e c e s s a r y . ! 7 8  The Daily Telegraph reported that the world was "startled" by the pact as 
it was a "flat contradiction against the nature of things" since in recent years, Germany 
and the Soviet Union had conducted a tirade against each o t h e r .  ! 7 9  Although Moscow 
declared there was no inconsistency since peace had always been its desired goal. The 
Times, however, observed that "many people believe Russia has tom off the m a s k " . ! 8 0  
The Sunday Times explained that the shock experienced by the "whole world" was a 
result of the "cynicism of two dictators without masks and against their ideologies". 
Though the paper considered Stalin to be slightly better than Hitler, the Sunday Times 
acknowledged that the pact "strips both o f pretences and lip-service" and showed them 
merely to be ruthless politicians.!8i
The Yorkshire Post belligerently stated that a Nazi-Soviet agreement would make 
no difference to British guarantees in Eastern Europe,!82 though The Times admitted the 
pact undoubtedly created greater danger for Poland and the West since the threat of two 
fronts was gone.!83 The Times acknowledged, without irony, that Germany's success 
in obtaining a pact, when Britain could not, was "possibly" due to Ribbentrop's large 
staff which accompanied him to Moscow as compared to "the modest, if highly efficient, 
members of the Foreign Office who went out to assist the Ambassador to Greatfe ita in ". 
Thus The Times suggested that it "must be gratifying to Stalin to have the author of the 
Anti-Comintem pact sitting on his doorstep".!84 Still displaying a latent admiration for 
Germany, the newspaper was contemptuous of Hitler for choosing to work with "people 
ideologically opposed to National Socialism". However, the Soviet Union received its
!^8 The Times, 23 August 1939. Article by the Diplomatic Correspondent.
!29 The Daily Telegraph, 23 August 1939. Leading article, "In the Hour of Crisis".
!80 The Times, 23 August 1939. "The Russian View" by the Moscow Correspondent.
!81 The Sunday Times, 27 August 1939. "Double-Dealing in Excelsis" by J. A. Spender,
!82 The Yorkshire Post, 23 August 1939. Leading article, "Nothing Is Changed".
!83 The Times, 23 August 1939. Leading article, "The Russo-German Deal".
!84 The Times, 24 August 1939. Leading article, "Moscow and Berlin".
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share of criticism in The Times which was not surprised that Britain's efforts at 
negotiation had progressed slowly since Soviet-German discussions were conducted 
simultaneously. Thus the paper placed the blame for the failure of the tripartite talks on 
the Soviet G o v e r n m e n t , ! 8 5  since Stalin was in "no hurry to f i g h t  a g g r e s s i o n " . ! 8 5
In contrast, the Yorkshire Post did not criticise the Soviet Union but instead 
accused British statesmen of once again "showing a woeful lack of imagination" for 
another lost opportunity.!87 Nevertheless, the paper admitted that "Russia forfeits its 
good name for genuinely pacifist interests".!88 Garvin’s article in the O bserver  
concerning the pact was surprisingly restrained towards the Soviet Union. Though the 
paper accused the Soviet Government of signing Poland's death warrant, the Observer 
primarily devoted its coverage to Germany’s "possible" attack on Poland. !®^
The Scotsman was the most critical of the quality conservative press towards the 
Soviet Government for deciding to "run with the hare and hunt with the hounds".!^ The 
Scotsman possibly felt the most betrayed as a result of the pact because the paper had 
supported Moscow’s calls for collective security throughout the 1930s and therefore had 
been the strongest advocate amongst the quality conservative press for an alliance with 
the Soviet Union. The Scotsman alleged that the "tortuous and protracted nature of the 
negotiations" with Britain and France was apparently merely time-wasting until Moscow 
reached a decision as to the safest and most advantageous policy. The paper 
disapprovingly suggested that the Soviet Government had found it "good to pose for a 
time as a champion of democracy and the defender of oppressed nationalities".!^! 
Though the Scotsman admitted that the Soviet Union's cynical actions would surprise 
some, the paper believed that many would see it as consistent with the character of its 
internal policy and general attitude towards other n a t i o n s .  !^ 2
!85 The Times. 23 August 1939. Leading article, "The Russo-German Deal".
!85 The Times, 24 August 1939. Leading article, "Moscow and Berlin".
!87 The Yorkshire Post, 23 August 1939. Leading article, "Nothing Is Changed". 
!88 The Yorkshire Post, 25 August 1939. Leading article, "What the Pact Means". 
!89 The Observer, 27 August 1939. Leading article by Garvin, "Climax".
!^ ® The Scotsman, 23 August 1939. Leading article, "The European Situation". 
!9! Ibid.
!^^ The Scotsman, 25 August 1939. Leading article, "Russia's Treachery".
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Although the Daily Express and the Daily Mail found the Nazi-Soviet pact 
"sensational" and accepted that the tripartite negotiations in Moscow had to be cancelled, 
the Beaverbrook and Rothermere press refused to believe the situation was critical since 
Britain's guarantee to Poland r e m a i n e d .  ! 9 3  The Evening Standard was unconcerned by 
the agreement since the paper alleged it had always stated that once Litvinov was removed 
in May, the Soviet Union wished to be isolated. Rather than seeing the pact as a crisis, 
the Evening Standard believed that Britain could benefit from it by concentrating its 
military efforts with France and the United S t a t e s . ! ^ 4  However, the Evening News 
called the agreement a "bombshell from Russia" and beUeved the worst, even expecting 
Germany to invade Poland the next day.!^5 On the 23 August, the Daily Express's 
comment was reserved, probably out of disgust, to noting that the "world moves 
f a s t e r "  ! 9 5  and the Daily Mail suggested sarcastically that there was a "certain grim 
humour" in the Soviet Union and Germany becoming a l l i e s ,  !^ ^
The liberal press was as surprised as conservative newspapers by the "sudden" 
news that a trade agreement had developed into a pohtical pact between Germany and the 
Soviet U n i o n . ! 9 8  The Manchester Guardian pointed out that a Nazi-Soviet pact 
undeniably made the international situation more critical than before and that the 
"precarious balance between war and peace" would be affected by Stalin’s decision. 
Though the Manchester Guardian acknowledged that the Soviet Government had 
mistrusted British and French intentions, especially after Munich, and that Britain's 
handling of the discussions over four months was "not adroit", the paper found it 
difficult to accept that unresolved issues lead the Soviet Government to abandon its 
beliefs. !99 Thus the paper concluded that Soviet policy "is not as high-principled or
!93 The Daily Express, 22 August 1939. Leading article, "Midnight News". The Daily Mail, 
22 August 1939. Leading article, "Russia and Germany".
!94 The Evening Standard, 22 August 1939. Leading article, "Russia"; 23 August 1939, 
leading article, "Not Yet".
!®5 The Evening News, 22 August 1939. Leading article, "Bombshell from Russia".
Daily Express, 23 August 1939. Leading article, "March of Events".
The Daily Mail, 23 August 1939. Leading article, "Russia's Talks".
!^8 See for example, the Manchester Guardian, 22 August 1939.
! ^  The Manchester Guardian, 23 August 1939. Leading article, "The Russo-German Pact".
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hard-headed as t h o u g h t "  .200 Despite attaching some blame to the British Government, 
the Economist likewise primarily focused its criticism on the Soviet Union's role in the 
pact. The journal reported that the "Bolshevik bomb has a shattering effect... and is the 
biggest single piece of perfidy in history". The journal accused Moscow of betraying all 
its principles, encouraging the aggressors, and of double-crossing those who tried to 
befriend the Soviet U n i o n .201 "No words are too severe for the duplicity of allowing the 
negotiations with Britain and France to advance to the threshold of success while Russia 
was secretly grasping the hand of the a g g r e s s o r "  .2®2
In contrast to the outspoken criticism against the Soviet Government of the 
M anchester Guardian  and the Economist, Vernon Bartlett, the Diplomatic 
Correspondent of the News Chronicle, expressed understanding towards the Soviet 
Union and believed the pact was a result of Stalin’s disappointment in the military talks 
with Britain. The British Government had ignored Soviet plans and allegedly offered 
more attention to Hitler and thus Bartlett was not surprised the Soviet Government also 
considered Germany's offer for a pact to keep the Soviet Union out of war.2®3 The 
Diplomatic Correspondent argued that Britain had been rash to offer guarantees in Eastern 
Europe without Moscow and therefore, no one had a right to be surprised by the turn of 
events. Bartlett sarcastically asked how much Britain would have to pay in "blood, 
money, or humiliation" for the "anti-Soviet prejudices of the British Government and its 
over-loyal s u p p o r t e r s " . ^ ® 4  The News Chronicle also believed that
the fate of Europe is no longer settled in Westminster but in Moscow. The 
initiative of the diplomatic world has passed to Russia for the moment... For good 
or evil Russia has placed herself in a position of great diplomatic strength... 
Russia's national interests are unchanged... and her chief interest is to be left 
alone in peace to work on the socialist e x p e r i m e n t . 2 ® 5
200 The Manchester Guardian, 24 August 1939. Leading article, "What Kind of Pact?".
201 The Economist, 26 August 1939. Leading article, "Double Cross Roads".
2®2 The Economist, 2 September 1939. Leading article, "Twilight Hours".
203 The News Chronicle, 22 August 1939. "Non-Aggression Pact to be Concluded" by V.
Bartlett.
204 The News Chronicle, 23 August 1939. "Moscow-Berlin Axis?" by V. Bartlett.
205 The News Chronicle, 24 August 1939. Leading article, "Russia to Play".
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Though hoping the Soviet Union would not help Germany as much as Hitler 
e x p e c t e d , 2 0 6  the Manchester Guardian and the Spectator admitted that the terms of the 
pact left "no room for optimism" as they were worse than expected. There was no escape 
clause allowing the Soviet Union to help an attacked country thus making it easy for 
Germany to invade P o l a n d . 2 0 7  Nevertheless, repentance and accusations against past 
conduct by the British Government were alleged, by the Spectator, to be unimportant as 
long as Britain and France stood by P o l a n d . The News Chronicle argued it was in 
the Soviet Union's interest not to see Poland disappear and therefore, the paper naively 
hoped the Soviet Government might try to save that c o u n t r y . 2 W
The Daily Herald blamed Germany, Britain, and the Soviet Union for the Nazi- 
Soviet pact. Firstly, the paper alleged it was a shocking reversal of German policy.2io 
Secondly, although acknowledging that "Russia's sudden and cynical pact with Germany 
has no effect on Britain", the Daily Herald pointed out that the British Government had 
to take its share of the blame for allowing the negotiations with the Soviet Union to be so 
protracted. However, despite Britain "being wrong on occasions, that does not justify 
Russia's betrayal of her principles".2u  The New Statesman and Nation was more 
convinced of Britain's responsibility for the conclusion of the pact. The "folly" of 
providing a guarantee for Poland without the Soviet Union and the consequent reluctance 
to conclude a settlement meant Britain "stood alone".
Unsurprisingly, though hypocritically, Britain's leading communist paper saw 
nothing questionable concerning Moscow's agreement with Germany. The Daily Worker 
stated that the Soviet-German pact was simply a "dramatic peace move to halt
2 0 6  The Manchester Guardian, 23 and 25 August 1939. Leading articles, "The Russo-German 
Pact" and "The Issue".
297 The Manchester Guardian, 25 August 1939. Leading article, "Terms Revealed". The 
Spectator, 25 August 1939. "On the Verge" and "Britain's Part". For details o f the Nazi-Soviet pact, 
see D.G.F.P., Series D, Vol. VII, no. 228. For British reaction to the agreement, see D.B.F.P., Third 
Series, Vol. VII, Chapters HI and IV.
208 The Spectator, 25 August 1939. "On the Verge" and "Britain's Part".
2 0 9  The News Chronicle, 25 August 1939. Leading article, "In the Balance"; 5 September 
1939, "Moscow's Policy of Neutrality" by the Moscow Correspondent.
210 The Daily Herald, 23 August 1939. Leading article, "We Stand Firm".
^1! The Daily Herald, 28 August 1939. Leading article, "We Wait Unshaken".
^12 The New Statesman and Nation, 26 August 1939. Leading article, "Ribbentrop at the 
Kremlin".
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aggression".213 The paper claimed that Hitler valued the Soviet Union's military 
strength, whereas Britain did not, and thus Germany realised the Anti-Comintern pact 
was useless. The Daily Worker argued that a British-Soviet pact remained possible but 
only if Chamberlain or Halifax "went by plane" to Moscow. Furthermore, the paper 
alleged the Soviet-German pact was the "logical" outcome of Stalin’s speech in March 
and thus it was left to the British to make the next move.2i4 Of note was the fact that the 
Daily Worker printed its leader on the 25 August with phrases very similar to that of 
Pravda and Izvestia, the daily newspapers of the Soviet Union that portrayed official 
Communist Party policy, which declared the pact accorded with the principles of the 
Soviet Government’s peace policy.2i5 Thus it was obvious the Daily Worker took its 
lead from the official Soviet line and during the righting, would not support the British 
war effort.
The partition of Poland
Germany’s invasion of Poland on 1 September was followed by the British and 
French declarations of war on 3 September and the Soviet declaration of neutrality. In 
the first week, the Soviet Union maintained good relations with Warsaw but on 11 
September, Fleet Street reported "ominous" Soviet press criticism of Poland and the 
partial mobilisation of the Red Army to the Polish frontier, an alleged consequence of the 
rapid advance of the German a r m y .215 The Scotsman believed mobilisation by the 
"Russian vulture" was not good news and suggested the Soviet Union intended to stab 
Poland in the back, though the paper cynically conceded that Stalin might wait for 
Germany to do all the k i l h n g . 2 i 7
On 17 September, the Red Army invaded Eastern Poland allegedly to protect the 
oppressed Ukrainian and Belorussian minorities. The Scotsman, however, called it a
^15 The Daffy Worker, 23 August 1939. "Soviet's Dramatic Peace Move to Halt Aggressors". 
^14 The Daily Worker, 25 August 1939. Leading article, "Soviets' Move for General Peace". 
215 D.B.F.P., Third Series, Vol. VII, no. 240.
215 The Observer, 17 September 1939. "The War" by Garvin. The Times, 15 September 
1939. "Russian Criticism of Poland" by the Helsinki Correspondent.
217 The Scotsman, 16 September 1939. Leading article, "Russia and Poland".
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"wanton act of aggression in keeping with the methods of the Soviet’s new ally" and 
accused Molotov of creating "absurd pretexts for concealing the rapacity of Russian 
policy". The paper alleged that under the circumstances, the Soviet aggression was 
"more dastardly" than that committed by the Germans because Poland was already 
fighting for survival. Thus, in the Scotsman's opinion, the Soviet Union was revealed 
in its true colours rather than as the "peace-loving, enlightened country" it pretended to 
be.2i8 The Times expressed similar horror that the Poles had to fight a new aggressor, 
labelling the Soviet attack a "flagrant act of aggression" and a "stab in the b a c k " .2 1 9  in 
view of the fact that the quality conservative press alleged the partition of Poland had 
been prearranged in a secret clause of the Nazi-Soviet pact,220 The Times claimed the 
issue had never been "would" Stalin invade, but "when". Thus the only surprise for the 
paper was the speed with which the Red Army had attacked, which suggested that 
Britain's peace front was "pallid and uninviting" in comparison to what Germany offered: 
"Germany was to do the murder and Russia was to share the estate."221
Apart from the seven articles in the non-aggression agreement, which basically 
prevented the two countries from attacking each other and kept each neutral in the event 
of war, there was a "Secret Additional Protocol". It divided Eastern Europe into spheres 
of influence, in which paragraph two allocated areas east of the rivers Narev, Vistula, and 
San to the Soviet U n i o n .222  Although Fleet Street had no confirmation of the 
arrangement. Low's cartoon on 2 October, "How Much Can You Give Us On This?", 
was very close to the truth. Not only did Stalin make significant gains in Poland, but the 
Nazis were willing to give him freedom of movement in Eastern Europe in exchange for 
Soviet neutrality during the German war against the W e s t .2 2 3
218 The Scotsman, 18 September 1939. Leading article, "Russia's Aggression".
219 The Times, 18 September 1939. "Red Army in Polish Territory" by the Helsinki 
CorrespondenL
220 for example, the Scotsman, 16 September 1939. Leading article, "Russia and Poland".
221 The Times, 18 September 1939. Leading article, "Stalin Shows His Hand".
222 D.G.F.P., Series D, Vol VII, nos. 228 and 229. See nos. 284 and 353 for amendments to 
the Secret Protocol.
223 Figure 6.5. The Evening Standard, 2 October 1939. "How Much Can You Give Us On
This?".
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Fig. 6.5
The Daily Telegraph expressed a more accommodating attitude towards the 
Soviet Union's invasion of Poland as it saw positive alternatives to the gloom and 
indignant outrage of The Times and the Scotsman. The Daily Telegraph suggested 
Stalin was willing to clash with his new friend for the sake of Soviet interests and 
possibly to prevent Hitler from acquiring all of Poland. Though the Daily Telegraph 
admitted it could be a planned partition of Poland, the paper believed there was also a 
distinct possibility that the Soviet Government decided to act before Germany advanced 
too near to the Soviet U n i o n . 2 2 4  Following the division of Poland, Garvin, in the 
Observer, expressed a degree of admiration for the way in which the Soviet Government 
had forced Germany "to yield every inch of the coveted c o m e r " . 2 2 5  However, following 
the demise of a buffer state. The Times logically wondered if the two countries could 
continue to work t o g e t h e r . 2 2 6  Low's cartoon of 20 September 1939 depicted the 
"Rendezvous" of the two dictators, who though acting courteously to each other.
224 The Daily Telegraph, 18 September 1939. Leading article, "Russia's Rubicon".
225 The Observer, 24 September 1939. "The War" by Garvin.
225 Thg Times, 18 September 1939. Leading article, "Stalin Shows His Hand".
Chestnuts in the Fire 210
O f  T M f E 4 R J M , ' TME W O R IÆ R S 
I S F tlE v r  if^E U IM E ?
R E N D E Z V O U S
F i g .  6 . 6
continued to detest what the other r e p r e s e n t e d . 2 2 7  another cartoon on 4 November, 
"Someone Is Taking Someone for a Walk", Low showed both dictators walking 
together, apparently in agreement over the division of Eastern Europe, though each man 
had a pistol secretly held behind his back ready for use.228
Following the Red Army's invasion of Poland, the Beaverbrook and Rothermere 
press criticised the Soviet Union but did not return to the harsh ideological condemnation 
which had existed in these papers prior to April 1939. Although the Daily Express 
believed Stalin remained intent on defeating Germany, the paper suspiciously alleged that 
the Soviet Government would like nothing more than to see a communist revival in 
Germany and possibly the destruction of the British Empire. Because "Russia was a 
puzzle in peace... and an enigma in war", the Daily Express expected Moscow to "carve 
a slice for herself off the Polish j o i n t " . 229 Though the Daily Express's first impression
Walk".
227 Figure 6.6. The Evening Standard, 20 September 1939, "Rendezvous".
228 Figure 6.7. The Evening Standard, 4 November, "Someone Is Taking Someone For a
229 The Daily Express, 16 September 1939. Leading article, "The Enigma".
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suggested the Soviet Union was helping itself and not Britain or G e r m a n y ,230 the paper 
altered its opinion and alleged that the Red Army's invasion had come as a surprise to 
Hitler and would, therefore, keep the Germans occupied to Britain's b e n e f i t .2 3 i  Even 
though the Daily Mail accused the Soviet Union of betraying the Poles by "stabbing them 
in the back" and called the invasion an "act of treachery" using Nazi t e c h n iq u e s ,2 3 2  the 
paper suggested Stalin held the diplomatic initiative over Hitler since the Soviet Union’s 
Polish acquisition contained o i l - f i e ld s .2 3 3
Although the Manchester Guardian and the News Chronicle reported that the 
partition of Poland had been p r e a r r a n g e d ,2 3 4  the latter maintained that the Soviet Union 
had been forced to invade as a result of the rapid advance of German troops. However,
230 The Daily Express, 18 September 1939. Leading article, "Two Questions".
231 The Daily Express, 21 September 1939. "Russia's Drive Will Keep Big Nazi Army Busy 
in Poland" by G. Eden.
232 Tbe Dai/y Affli/, 18 September 1939. Leading article, "Betrayal".
233 The Daily Mail, 27 September 1939. "Ribbentrop Flying to Moscow Today". The Daily 
Express, 23 September 1939. Leading article, "Uneasy Conquest".
234 The Manchester Guardian, 19 September 1939. "The Consequences of Russia's 
Aggression" by the Diplomatic Correspondent. The News Chronicle, 15 September 1939. "Berlin 
Expects Soviet to Join in Partition" by the Special Correspondent in Copenhagen; 18 September 1939, 
leading article, "Russia Marches In".
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the News Chronicle condemned the Soviet Government's "flagrant act of aggression" 
and called Molotov's pretext, the protection of the Belorussian and Ukrainian minorities, 
"cynical".235 The Spectator likewise condemned the Soviet Union’s invasion as a
treacherous and cynical attack, heralded by the contemptible and threadbare 
pretence, invoked with sickening monotony by the Nazis in like conditions rather 
than for an oppressed minority, which occasioned generally as much surprise as it 
did anger and disgust... Stalin's crime is only a few shades less black than 
Hitler’s.
In the view of the Economist, the "morality of the Russian act is inexplicable". The 
journal believed there had to be a lack of mutual trust between the "Nazi lion and the 
Bolshevik jackal" if the Soviet Government, as it alleged, was forced to act to prevent 
Germany from using the minorities in Poland as a springboard for an invasion into the
Ukraine.^37
A difference of opinion arose amongst the liberal press's estimation of British 
responsibility for the invasion of Poland. In the opinion of the News Chronicle, the 
"real tragedy" was Britain's mistreatment and scorn of the Soviet Government’s 
proposals which encouraged Moscow to look elsewhere.^^ The Spectator, however, 
refused to blame the British negotiators and Government because "Germany and Russia 
lack British morals".^^
The labour press was similarly divided amongst itself concerning the Soviet 
Union's role in the defeat of the Poles. With the Red Army invasion of Poland, the Daily 
Herald denounced the Soviet Government for embarking on war for territorial gain, 
which demonstrated how far Stalin’s Russia had deviated from Lenin's. The paper noted 
the cynicism of the Soviet Government's decision "clothed in phrases struck directly
Th&News Chronicle, 18 September 1939. Leading article, "Russia Marches In".
236 Thg Spectator, 22 September 1939, "The Unholy Alliance".
237 The Economist, 23 September 1939. Leading article, "Red Nazis".
238 The News Chronicle, 19 September 1939. Leading article, "The Russian Enigma".
239 The Spectator, 22 September 1939. "The Unholy Alliance". See Also, the Manchester 
Guardian, 18 September 1939. Leading article, "A New Partition".
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from the Nazi mint". Most significantly, the Daily Herald admitted that it would no 
longer be deluded by the belief that the Soviet Union "set examples to the world in social 
justice and international fair d e a l in g " .2 4 0  N. Ewer, the Diplomatic Correspondent for 
the paper, suggested Stalin was an imperialist who did not place the welfare of his people 
first and therefore, his "hero is now Peter the Great rather than Lenin.
In a contrasting attitude, the New Statesman and Nation, though displeased by 
the Nazi-Soviet pact, did not feel the Red Army's occupation of Poland was necessarily a 
bad circumstance for Britain and the Allies. As a result of the Soviet Union preventing 
Hitler from acquiring important resources and the Baltic states, the journal continued to 
believe Moscow was essentially helping Britain.2^2 This point of view was very similar 
to the Daily Worker which stressed that the Soviet Government was forced to act quickly
The Daily Herald, 18 September 1939. Leading article, "We Shall Not Fail".
2^ *1 TheDazVy Herald, 21 September 1939. "Russian Riddle Solved" by Ewer. Also see the 
cartoon by Low, Figure 6.8. The Evening Standard, 26 October 1939, "Russian Lake".
2 4 '
Revenged".
‘^2 The New Statesman and Nation, 23 September 1939. Leading article, "Brest-Litovsk
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as the Nazis "rapidly swept" through Poland to the border o f the Ukraine and 
Belorussia.243
C onclusion
The tripartite negotiations represented the first event which had positively united 
the British press towards the Soviet Union. All newspapers and journals demanded an 
agreement between Britain and the Soviet Union. Even though The Times was 
unenthusiastic, the rest of the quality conservative press urged the British Government to 
display more interest in an alliance with the Soviet Union by increasing the pace of the 
negotiations. Criticism of the Soviet Union occurred regularly, though it was balanced 
by disapproval with the British Government's failure to make significant attempts to 
secure an agreement. Only the Scotsman repeatedly and blatantly criticised the Soviet 
Union for demanding too much.
The popular conservative press recognised that an isolationist policy was useless 
in the crisis facing Europe in 1939 and accepted that the British people wanted an alliance 
with the Soviet Union. Thus the Rothermere and Beaverbrook newspapers called for the 
British Government to reach an honourable alliance quickly and not necessarily all on 
Soviet terms. Most unusual for the popular conservative press was their restraint from 
bitter criticism towards the Soviet Union as these papers recognised that Britain needed 
Soviet assistance regardless of differences in ideology.
Initially, the liberal press focused its criticism on the British Government for 
failing to advance the negotiations. However, as delays continued in the summer, 
disapproval of Soviet efforts became as frequent as criticism directed at Britain's 
endeavours. Thus the liberal press disappointingly suggested that neither wanted an 
alliance even though both would benefit immensely by the reciprocal demands.
In general, the labour press believed the Soviet Union was sincerely trying to 
secure an alliance, while the British Government, with its traditional Tory prejudices.
243 ThQ Daily Worker, 18 September 1939. "Soviet Counter-Blow Vs Nazis" and leading 
article, "Counter-Blow Vs. Nazis". See also, various articles on 19,20, and 22 September 1939.
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refused to reach an alliance. Thus the overwhelming majority of labour press criticism 
was focused against the British leadership, though on occasions, these papers were 
disappointed that the Soviet Government demanded so much.
It appeared that the British leadership was unconcerned with Fleet Street's 
demands for an alliance and the consequent criticism in newspapers of the Government's 
failure to negotiate with Moscow. When the Prime Minister pursued crucial talks with 
Hitler in September 1 9 3 8 ,  Chamberlain met with journalists to explain his moves and his 
expectations for s u c c e s s .2 4 4  However, there were no similar meetings between the 
Prime Minister and journalists during the long months of important negotiations between 
Britain and the Soviet Union. Furthermore, Seeds did not complain that the British press 
was ruining the discussions in Moscow, also a marked contrast from Sir Neville 
Henderson, the British Ambassador in Berlin, who repeatedly passed on the Nazi 
Government's criticism that British newspapers made the international situation worse in 
1 9 3 8 .2 4 5  Thus in 1 9 3 8 ,  the British Government exerted more influence over Fleet 
Street, whereas in 1 9 3 9 ,  the British press asserted its independence though not 
sufficiently to convince the British leadership to reach an agreement with the Soviet 
Government.
With the signing of the Nazi-Soviet pact, Fleet Street became perplexed rather 
than hostile towards the Soviet Union. Only the Scotsman was extremely critical of the 
Soviet Government while the rest of the British press retained a degree of optimism. The 
conservative newspapers, though in general concluding that it might be better for Britain 
to fight without the services of the unreliable Soviet Union, recognised that the British 
Government was responsible to an extent for Moscow choosing to side with Nazi 
Germany. There was as much condemnation directed at Hitler for allying with the 
communists as there was directed against Stalin for betraying the principles of collective 
security against aggression. Although none of the quality conservative press believed the 
Soviet Union had signed a pact with Germany primarily to hurt Britain, some of these
244 D.B.F.P., Third Series. Vol. II, Appendix III.
245 See for example, D.B.F.P., Third Series, Vol. I, nos. 252 and 269.
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papers suggested the British would do as well without the Soviet Union’s strength 
against Germany in Eastern Europe.
There was little disapproval in the popular conservative press of Britain's failure 
to reach an agreement since it was assumed the Soviet Government was simply 
untrustworthy. However, these newspapers continued to refrain from severe criticism of 
the Soviet Union, though there was disappointment, as these papers recognised that 
Britain and the USSR could eventually become allies since Hitler's aim ultimately 
remained the occupation of the Ukraine.
The liberal and labour press, however, were primarily disappointed with the 
British Government for failing to recognise that a Nazi-Soviet pact was a legitimate 
possibility. Though the Soviet Union was criticised for traitorously turning to Germany, 
the liberal and labour press admitted that the British Government had driven them to it. 
These papers, like the conservative press, retained the hope that the Soviet Union would 
not do anything which would cause the defeat of Britain in the war against Germany. 
Nevertheless, the Daily Herald found less to trust in the Soviet Union and became more 
sceptical of Moscow's aims. However, the most important circumstance for Fleet Street 
was not that the Soviet Union had defected to the enemy, but the fact that the Nazi-Soviet 
pact did not alter Britain's commitment to Poland.
Though British public opinion was dissatisfied by the Nazi-Soviet pact and the 
Red Army occupation of Poland, a large majority continued to hope for close, friendly 
relations between Britain and the Soviet Union. The public, though admitting "Russia 
was a dark horse", believed ultimately "Russia will come in on our side" to defeat Nazi 
G e r m a n y .246 The Daily Herald noted that although the British people were "hot with 
indignation" towards the Soviet Union, they were also bewildered by "peaceful Russia 
making w a r " .247 in September, a B.I.P.O. survey showed that the British population 
was confused by the effects of the Nazi-Soviet pact. When considering if the agreement 
helped or hindered Germany's efforts to make war against Britain, 30 per cent answered
246 Tom Harrisson, "Public Opinion about Russia", pp. 356-357.
247 The Daz/y Herald, 21 September 1939. "Russian Riddle Solved" by Ewer.
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"both" while 18 per cent suggested "neither". Only 32 per cent clearly believed the 
Soviet Government significantly helped G e r m a n y . 248 in November, a B.I.P.O. poll 
revealed that 68 per cent of people surveyed did not expect the Soviet Union to give 
sufficient support to Germany to cause a British d e f e a t .2 4 9  Thus The Times was not 
entirely correct in September when it alleged that "British public opinion is revolted, 
though not in the least dismayed, by these cynical exercises in the lower diplomacy".250 
Furthermore, in October, 47 per cent of those questioned wanted a British Minister to go 
to Moscow to discuss future relations with the Soviet Govemment.25i
The Soviet Union actively changed its foreign policy, not with the signing of the 
Nazi-Soviet pact, but with the invasion of Poland. The plan became one of security 
through strategic-political expansion through a series of ad hoc responses and reactions 
to events rather than planning. Poland was the first of many hesitant steps, in which the 
Baltic states, Finland and Rumania would f o l l o w .2 5 2  Though the British press noted the 
change from collective security to offensive action with the invasion of Poland, Fleet 
Street continued to hope the Soviet Government would not become an aggressor along 
the lines of Hitler. Therefore, the British press maintained a cautious, though friendly, 
attitude towards the Soviet Union until these newspapers and journals were given a 
stronger reason than Poland to alter their opinions. Such an event, the Winter War, 
which began on 30 November 1939, forced Fleet Street to form a more critical attitude 
towards the Soviet Union.
248 B.I.P.O., Gallup Poll, September 1939: "Do you think Russia's recent actions have helped 
or have hindered Germany in making war against us?" 32 per cent replied "helped"; 8 per cent replied 
"hindered"; 30 per cent replied "both"; 18 per cent replied "neither"; 12 per cent replied "don't know".
249 B.IP.O,, Gallup Poll, November 1939. 14 per cent believed Russian help would assist in 
a German victory over Britain while 18 per cent remained undecided.
250 The Times, 18 September 1939. Leading article, "Stalin Shows His Hand".
251 B.I.P.O., Gallup Poll, October 1939. 34 per cent were opposed to a Ministerial visit and 
19 per cent were undecided.
252 Roberts, Soviet Decision, pp. 69 and 74.
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Chapter 7 
British-Soviet cooperation?
On 3 September 1939, Britain declared war on Germany without the assistance of 
the Soviet Union. The British were unable to offer effective help to the Polish people 
who were defeated within a fortnight. The Soviet Union shared in the spoils and 
throughout the autumn there were signs that Moscow intended to seize further territory in 
Eastern Europe. When the Baltic States were forced to make military concessions in 
October to the Soviet Union, the British Government practically ignored their plight. 
However, when the Soviet Government accused the Finns of aggressive intentions and 
responded by attacking Finland, the British leadership was forced to react to such blatant 
aggrandisement, especially since the amount of protest by the British public and the press 
against the Soviet Union and sympathy for Finland was phenomenal. Although the 
British Government, already at war with Germany, sensibly refrained from taking 
military action against the Soviet Union, relations between the two countries grew even 
more strained since it was an action of significance as serious and threatening as the Nazi- 
Soviet pact. For example, the British Ambassador, Sir William Seeds, left Moscow at 
the end of 1939 and was not replaced until June 1940 by Sir Stafford Cripps. Britain 
remained unresponsive in the summer of 1940 when the Baltic states were integrated into 
the Soviet Union and Bessarabia was annexed from Rumania. By this time, France had 
fallen and Britain was preparing for a German invasion. Of further importance were the 
repeated rumours in late 1940 that Germany and the Soviet Union regularly disagreed 
over interests in the Balkans. It was at this point that the British Government began to 
make careful diplomatic overtures to Moscow in preparation for cooperation should 
Germany attack the Soviet Union as appeared increasingly likely in the spring of 1941. 
However, Britain was forced to wait as the Soviet Government preferred to accommodate 
the Germans to avoid military conflict. It was not until Germany invaded the Soviet
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Union, Operation Barbarossa, that the British and Soviet Governments became allies, 
thus removing the dislike of the previous eighteen months.
Although Fleet Street expressed concern for the Soviet Government's method of 
dealing with the Baltic states in the autumn of 1939, it appeared that these countries, 
despite coercion and intimidation, were able to retain their sovereignty by making 
concessions. 1 However, it was the Soviet Government's attempts to coerce Finland into 
conceding territory and islands for military bases which caused the British press to focus 
intensely on the tactics of the Soviet Union. The attack on the "poor but brave and heroic 
Finns"2 led to a large degree of antipathy in British press coverage of the Soviet Union at 
the time. The only exceptions were the Daily Worker and, most surprisingly, the New  
Statesman and Nation which accepted the invasion for the reasons given by Molotov. It 
was remarkable that one incident could occupy so much coverage in the British press, 
especially when newspapers were greatly reduced in size with the start of the war to 
ration paper and newsprint.
Furthermore, the Winter War was not officially the British Government's concern 
since Britain was at war only with Germany. However, the conflict in Finland occurred 
during the Phoney War so the British press had the time to report events in Scandinavia. 
Nevertheless, it was the intensity of the daily condemnation for the Soviet Union by Fleet 
Street which made the war in Finland so important to British people. The press also 
decided that the true circumstances o f the Nazi-Soviet pact were again being 
demonstrated. British press and public opinion concerning the Soviet Union reached an 
unprecedented low in the winter of 1939 and 1940 which took a long time to mend. In a 
B.I.P.O. poll conducted in November 1939, 42 per cent of people questioned wanted
 ^ See for example, The Times, 7 October 1939. "Russia's Grip on Baltic" by the Moscow 
Correspondent. The Daily Express, 27, 29 and 30 September 1939. The Daily Mail, 10 October 1939. 
Leading article, "Red Baltic".
2 Nearly the entire British press used this phrase or variations of it between December 1939 and 
March 1940.
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British military assistance sent to Scandinavia if the area became involved in war with the 
Soviet Union.3
Such bitter condemnation of the Soviet Union was the reverse of the previous 
nine months and was especially notable when compared to the lack of criticism and even 
interest in the Soviet Union's expansionist aims against the Baltic states and Rumania in 
the summer of 1940. By this time, the British press, first, was far more interested in 
events in Western Europe - the Low Countries and France were defeated in May and June 
and thus Fleet Street was naturally more concerned about the impending German attack 
on Britain. Secondly, as Soviet interests turned towards the Balkans, it became obvious 
to the British press that Germany and the Soviet Union would have to settle a conflict of 
interest as both countries coveted South-Eastern Europe. The awareness by Fleet Street 
of the potential clash and crisis in cooperation led British newspapers to report with 
caution and a degree of hope on the issues affecting Germany and the Soviet Union. 
Though most papers were unable to forget the attack on Finland, Fleet Street was 
sufficiently realistic to recognise that Britain's survival depended on the German and 
Soviet Governments seriously d is^ rem g  so that Moscow would become the ally of 
Britain. Thus press coverage concerning the Soviet Union in the second half of 1940 and 
the first half of 1941 was devoted to explaining the increased conflict between Germany 
and the Soviet Union and expressing the hope that Britain and Moscow would work 
together.
Nevertheless, the British press was forced to exhibit patience as the Soviet Union 
constantly stated relations between Moscow and Berlin were very amicable. Thus, at 
times, Fleet Street was justifiably critical of the Soviet Government. However, at no 
point in 1940 or 1941 did any newspaper or journal lose sight of the fact that Germany 
was the enemy and therefore, if an alliance with the Soviet Union, despite its dubious 
history of relations with Britain in the 1930s, was necessary to defeat Hitler, then the 
British press was determined to support the Government's efforts to secure such an ally.
3 British Institute of Public Opinion (B.I.P.O.), Gallup Poll, November 1939. 42 per cent 
replied "yes"; 38 per cent replied "no"; and 20 per cent replied "no opinion". This poll shows that a 
significant number of people were willing to believe the Soviet Union was also an enemy of Britain.
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"The Crim e against F in land"4
In October, the quality conservative press reported indifferently on Finland's 
discussions with the Soviet Union while the liberal and labour press displayed more 
concern. The quality conservative press was merely reflecting the British Government's 
lack of interest in an area which appeared to have little effect on the war against Germany. 
Furthermore, to avoid another area of conflict, the British Government encouraged the 
Finns to accept the Soviet terms as they were not entirely unreasonable.^ Thus The 
Times assumed Finland would peacefully hand over the territory which the Soviet 
Government demanded as there was "no justification in Finland holding these islands if it 
threatens peace". The paper further conceded that the Finnish frontier was close to 
Leningrad and perhaps ought to be revised^ The Observer stated there would be no war 
over Finland because "Soviet policy is too astute to incur the world's ill-will", thus 
demonstrating how little Garvin understood the Soviet Union. The paper indifferently 
reported that the Baltic states were again "Russian provinces with local governments" but 
acknowledged that Finland was different because it was "the Switzerland of the North". 
Therefore, in Garvin's view, even though the Finns would have to make some 
concessions to Soviet naval interests in the Gulf, Finland would remain "strong and 
free".7 In contrast, the liberal and labour press recognised the signs of an aggressor, 
whose "ominous" threats to Finland sounded "Germanic".^ The Manchester Guardian 
and the News Chronicle warned that the Finns remained isolated against "Russian 
imperialism" since the Baltic states only retained nominal independence after making 
concessions to Soviet demands.^
4 Title of a leading article in the Sunday Times, 3 December 1939.
5 Anthony Upton, Finland, 1939-40, pp. 27 and 39. Gabriel Gorodetsky, The Impact o f the 
Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact on the Course o f Soviet Foreign Policy, p. 29. Sir Llewellyn Woodward, 
British Foreign Policy in the Second World War, p. 38. Bayer offers an opposing view: some in the 
British Government encouraged Finland to resist though the Foreign Office saw the Finnish position as 
one of "sheer folly". It was suggested that Finnish resistance might help Allied interests against 
Germany as a war involving the Soviet Union would prevent Russian supplies from reaching Germany, 
hinder Swedish trade with Germany, and could ultimately lead to war between Germany and the Soviet 
Union. See J. A. Bayer, British Policy Towards the Russo-Finnish War, 1939-1940. pp. 28-33.
 ^The Times, 21 October 1939, "The Finnish Problem".
7 The Observer, 15 October 1939. "War and Policy - Finland Stands Fast" by J. L. Garvin.
 ^The Daily Herald, 4 November 1939. Leading article, "Threat to Finland".
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W E L L ,  I T ’S  T R U T H ,  I S N T  I T  ?
Fig. 7.1
With the renouncing of the Soviet-Finnish Non-Aggression Pact by the Soviet 
Government and the bombing of Helsinki on 30 November, the British press 
immediately and unanimously, with the exception of the New Statesman and Nation and 
the Daily Worker, condemned the Soviet Union for taking belligerent action. Most 
significantly, Fleet Street drew comparisons between German and Soviet methods of 
aggression^® though the conservative press believed the Soviet Union's "hypocritical" 
action was far worse than any of Germany's invasions. The Soviet Government 
denounced the Soviet-Finnish Non-Aggression Pact because there was allegedly a 
concentration of Finnish troops along the frontier of the two countries, in the 
"neighbourhood of Leningrad", which the Soviet Union called an act of hostility. In 
addition, the Soviet Government declared Finnish soldiers had fired into Russian 
territory, though evidence at the time proved that most shots were fired into Finland.
 ^The Manchester Guardian, 9 and 12 October 1939. Leading articles, "The Baltic States" and 
"Russian and Finland". The News Chronicle, 16 October 1939. Leading article, "Finland Stands Firm".
See Figure 7.1 for a cartoon by Low on the similar methods employed by the Soviets and the 
Nazis in telling the "truth". The Evening Standard, 23 December 1939. "Well, It's Truth, Isn't It?".
 ^^  Upton, p. 47. D. W. Spring, "The Soviet Decision for War Against Finland, 30 November 
1939". p. 219.
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Thus The Times and the Scotsman sarcastically pointed out that the "world" was 
"ludicrously" asked to believe the Finns shot at t h e m s e l v e s . ^ 2  the opinion of the 
Sunday Times, "even against the sombre background of recent history, Russia's crime 
against Finland stands out with peculiar blackness". The paper accused the Soviet Union 
of cruelty more "odious because of its hypocrisy" for past pretences of peace and for 
being the alleged friend of "small n a t i o n s " . ^ 3  The Scotsman claimed there was universal 
condemnation by the civilised world for the "contemptuous" attack and accused the 
Soviet Government of "nauseous hypocrisy" after years o f protesting against
aggression. ^ 4
The Daily Telegraph admitted that it had thought the Soviet Union exemplified 
peace and believed in self-determination of states until it "swallowed" half of Poland, the 
Baltic states and "arrogantly and deliberately" picked a quarrel with Finland. Thus the 
paper recognised Moscow's "sheer passion for aggrandisement" and sarcastically pointed 
out that the Soviet Government had borrowed from Berlin the "whole brutal and 
unconscionable" technique of aggression, 5^ The Observer alleged "Adolf Molotov"^® 
had "demonstrated further gratuitous illustrations of what to expect from a reign of brute 
fo rce" .17 Like Hitler blaming the Poles, Stalin accused the Finns of being the 
aggressors, though The Times believed "this trick is so stale, we wonder why any war­
monger still troubles to employ it."i^ Even though the paper was not surprised by the 
Soviet Union's decision to invade Finland, The Times admitted to "being amazed by 
Stalin's slavish fidelity in following Hitler's technique".!^
Unlike the rest of the British press, the popular conservative newspapers reported 
that Finland surrendered without fighting, basing its news on the fact that the Finnish
12 The Times, 30 November 1939. Leading article, "Finland and the Soviet"; 1 December 
1939, article by the Moscow Correspondent. The Scotsman, 30 November 1939. Leading article, 
"Finland's Peril".
13 The Sunday Times, 3 December 1939. Leading article, "The Crime Against Finland".
14 The Scotsman, 2 December 1939. Leading article, "Finland's Ordeal ".
15 The Daily Telegraph, 30 November 1939. Leading article, "Menaced Finland".
1^  The Observer, 3 December 1939. Leading article, "Adolf Molotov".
17 The Observer, 10 December 1939. Leading article, "What We Fight For".
The Times, 1 December 1939. Leading article, "The Invasion of Finland".
1® The Times, 4 December 1939. Leading article, "Kommissar into Gauleiter".
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Government resigned on 1 December.2® These papers could be excused for reporting 
inaccurately since the Foreign Office also believed the resignation of the Finnish 
Government heralded Finland's capitulation.2i For example, the Evening Standard 
justifiably wrote that because there were so many victims, Finland had no choice but to 
sue for peace since becoming a vassal to the Soviet Union was better than being a 
corpse.22 However, once the popular conservative press realised the Finns intended to 
resist, these papers regularly described the "heroic" and determined effort by Finland.
As with the quality conservative press, the Beaverbrook and Rothermere 
newspapers made parallels between German and Soviet styles of aggression. The 
Evening Standard suggested the Soviet Union would suffer a blackened record from its 
adventure because after twenty years of boasting it opposed "imperialist cravings", it 
adopted, "sickeningly and servilely", Hitler's technique.23 The Evening News reported 
that the free nations of the world watched "with nausea the tragedy of Poland enacted 
again". Owing to the fact that Finland had not agreed "instantly and abjectly like serfs" to 
the brutal demands of the Kremlin, the paper alleged that Molotov wanted to "teach these 
instigators of war a lesson".24 The Daily Mail pointed out that Stalin was adding to his 
criminal record by "murderously assaulting" a victim whose only offence, in the paper's 
view, was to be the weak neighbour of a predatory power. Thus Stalin had proved to be 
the "assiduous pupil" of the Nazi leader, though the paper accused Stalin of being "less 
adroit" because his "trumped-up" excuses were "even flimsier" than Hi tier's.25 In the 
opinion of the Daily Express, it was unreasonable to suggest that a country whose 
population was only four million, the size of the Soviet Union's peace time army, would 
start a w a r .2 6
2® See for example, the Daily Mail, 1 December 1939. Leading article, "Murder of Finland". 
Daily Express, 1 December 1939. Leading article, "Murdered".
21 Bayer, p. 34.
22 The Evening Standard, 1 December 1939. Leading article, "One Day".
23 Ibid.
24 The Evening News, 30 November 1939. Leading article, "The Finnish Tragedy".
25 The Daily Mail, 1 December 1939. Leading article, "Murder of Finland". See also, the 
Daily Express, 1 December 1939.
26 Th& Daily Express, 30 November 1939. Leading article, "The Lamb is Accused".
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The liberal and labour press believed Soviet foreign policy had reached the end of 
an epoch by "wantonly, inexcusably, openly and unashamedly" invading Finland, thus 
demonstrating that the Soviet Union valued collective security less than its private 
ambitions. These papers watched the Soviet Union cynically forfeit the respect of the 
world thereby undoing all its "splendid years of work".27 The Daily Herald accused the 
Soviet Union of copying "absolutely" the tactics of Hitlerism thereby turning the "laws of 
civilisation into jungle law" .28 The News Chronicle suggested the Soviet Government 
lacked a case against Finland since it was "nonsense and fantasy" to allege that the Finns 
posed a threat to the Soviet Union's security.29 The Manchester Guardian similarly 
stated that the Soviet Government's reasons for invading Finland were as "flimsy" as 
Germany's with Poland since it was inconceivable that a country of four million, "an 
aggressive pigmy",.wished to attack Leningrad.^® Although the Economist suggested 
that "not even the Nazis were so flagrant" in the quarrels they deliberately picked, the 
journal, nevertheless, retained a greater "hatred" of the Nazis.31
The New Statesman and Nation curiously expressed an opinion opposite to the 
rest of the British press, an opinion which was surprisingly similar to that of the Daily 
Worker. The New Statesman and Nation did not condemn the Soviet Union's attack on 
Finland but actually stated that Stalin had no choice but to assume that the Finnish refusal 
to reach an agreement showed the Finns had aggressive intentions. The journal 
suggested that Stalin could reasonably expect Germany to use Finland as a springboard 
for an i n v a s i o n .3 2  More habitual was the Daily Worker's condemnation of "those 
people" who believed the Soviet Union "threatened poor little Finland" because the paper 
stated that in reality, Finland had been on a "war footing for months". Thus the paper
27 The Manchester Guardian, 1 December 1939. Leading article, "The War on Finland". The 
News Chronicle, 30 November 1939. Leading article, "Finland's Crisis"; 1 December 1939, leading 
article, "The Invasion of Finland". The Daily Herald, 1 December 1939. Leading article, "Wanton 
Attack".
28 The Daily Herald, 2 December 1939. Leading article, "Ruthless War"; 28 November 1939, 
leading article, "More Provocation"; 30 November 1939, leading article, "Imperial Threats".
29 The //gwj Chronicle, 28 November 1939. Leading article, "Russia and Finland".
3® The Manchester Guardian, 29 November 1939. Leading article, "Threats to Finland".
31 The Economist, 9 December 1939. Leading article, "Stalin's Aggression".
32 The New Statesman and Nation, 2 December 1939. "Comments - Russia's Patience".
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was not entirely surprised that the Finns had refused to reach an "honomuble" agreement 
like the Baltic states. The communist paper, therefore, argued that the Soviet 
Government was simply looking to protect itself since Finland was a convenient 
"jumping-off point for the West against the Soviet U n io n .3 3  In another leading article, 
the Daily Worker claimed "Chamberlain engineered the war in Northern Europe through 
a Finnish puppet government". Thus the fight in Finland was not a conflict between a 
"wolf and a lamb", but between the Western imperialist powers using Finland as their 
outpost against the socialist state which "defends the interests of the world's w o r k e r s " .3 4
G erm any 's  influence
Not only did the British press discuss how similar Stalin's methods were to 
Hitler's, but Fleet Street also addressed the issue of whether or not Germany and the 
Soviet Union were in agreement over the attack on Finland. Initial reports by the 
conservative press suggested Hitler did not support the Soviet Union's invasion of 
Finland. The Times and the Daily Express alleged that one reason for the attack on the 
Finns was that Stalin feared a German invasion through F in la n d .3 5  Thus the Observer 
believed Germany's prestige was weakened by the Soviet in v a s io n ^ ^  and in the opinion 
of the Yorkshire Post, the attack could not be agreeable to Germany regardless of what 
Berlin s a id .3 7  The Daily Mail disclosed that the German radio reported Finnish victories 
to the extent that "one might think Germany did not want Russia to w in " .3 8
At the beginning of December, the liberal and labour press similarly suggested a 
conflict of interest between Germany and the Soviet Union. The News Chronicle 
suggested that the Germans "did not favour" the Soviet Union's a t ta c k ,3 9  while the Daily
33 The Daily Worker, 30 November 1939. Leading article, "Finland".
34 The Daily Worker, I December 1939. Leading article, "Finland - The Facts".
35 The Times, 1 December 1939. Leading article, "The Invasion o f Finland". The D aily  
Express, 1 December 1939. Leading article, "Murdered". In this belief, the conservative press was 
similar to the New Statesman and Nation, 2 December 1939. "Comments - Russia's Patience.
36 The Observer, 3 December 1939. "Soviet Act a Blow to Berlin" by the Diplomatic 
Correspondent.
37 The Yorkshire Post, 1 December 1939. Leading article, "Brutal Russia".
38 The Daily Mail, 9 December 1939. Leading article, "Germany and Finland".
The News Chronicle, 4 December 1939. Leading article, "Finland Fights On".
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Herald alleged Stalin had ignored the Nazi Government's warnings against an 
i n v a s i o n . ^ ®  Although the Spectator acknowledged it was possible Germany and the 
Soviet Union were cooperating to conquer all of Scandinavia,4i the journal argued 
German prestige suffered by Stalin's m o v e . 4 2  The Economist also believed the Soviet 
Union's attack strained the new relationship first, because the Nazi Government 
supported Finland and secondly, the Red Army's probable success in Finland presented a 
threat to Germany's access to Swedish ore.43
However, the British press soon suggested the opposite as newspapers alleged 
the occupation of Finland was a condition of the Nazi-Soviet pact. Fleet Street was 
correct since in the first paragraph of the Secret Additional Protocol o f the Non- 
Aggression Treaty, the Soviet Government was given as its sphere of interest "the 
territories belonging to the Baltic States (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania)".44 The 
Times and the Sunday Times reported that "recent events" showed Germany, "which 
lacks scruples over the independence of nations", was responsible for the Soviet Union's 
invasion of Finland.45 Yet The Times claimed that this support for the Soviet Union 
was hypocritical since in 1938 the German Government had boasted of its role in 
liberating Finland from communist rule in 1918.46 Furthermore, The Times and the 
Manchester Guardian alleged Germany was "embarrassed" by the Soviet Union's war of 
expansion especially since it caused problems between Hitler and Mussolini as the latter 
wished to offer assistance to the Finns. In addition, the Soviet Union's blockade of 
Finland prevented Scandinavian supplies from reaching Germany while the Soviet war 
effort required the use all resources, even those promised to Germany.47 However,
4® Th&DaUy Herald, 4 December 1939. "Stalin's Blow to Hitler Shocks Nazi Chiefs".
41 The Spectator, 8 December 1939. "Where Will Russia Stop?".
42 The Spectator, 8 December 1939. "The War Surveyed: Finland and Beyond" by Strategicus.
43 The Economist, 9 December 1939. Leading article, "Stalin's Aggression". See also, the 
Evening Standard, 1 December 1939. Leading article, "One Day".
44 D.G.F.P., Series D, Vol. VII, no. 229, "Secret Additional Protocol".
45 The Times, 4 December 1939. "Moscow Bargain with Berlin" by the Diplomatic 
Correspondent. The Sunday Times, 3 December 1939. Leading article, "The Crime Against Finland".
46 The Times, 14 December 1939. Leading article, "Germany's Lebensraum".
47 The Times, 20 December 1939. "Nazi Concerns at Soviet War" by the Brussels 
Correspondent. See also, 10 January 1940. The Manchester Guardian, 15 December 1939. Leading 
article, "Germany and Russia". See also, the Sunday Times, 3 December 1939.
British-Soviet Cooperation? 228
because of the Nazi-Soviet pact, regardless of the economic implications, and despite 
popular opinion in Germany, Hitler refused to order the Soviet Government to stop the 
invasion and maintained a neutrality which unsurprisingly favoured the USSR. 
Nevertheless, in later stages of the war when the Allies threatened to intervene, Germany 
encouraged Moscow and the Finns to end the conflict.48
Britain's response
The criticism in the conservative press for the Soviet Government was 
interspersed with pity for the soldiers of the Red Army who were allegedly forced to fight 
by the communist dictatorship. The Sunday Times's Special Correspondent for the 
Finnish War, Virginia Cowles, reported that captured Russian troops had been told by 
their leaders that the Finns would welcome them as liberators.49 The Stockholm 
Correspondent for The Times called the Red Army "clumsy"50 as a result of poor 
equipment and especially because the leadership was deceived into believing the 
invincibility of their army regardless of the heavy purges in the military which not only 
decreased the number of competent leaders, but also ruined morale.51 The Daily Express 
admitted that although the "Russians were notoriously brave", they were not fighting 
with modern tactics and were "badly-led, ill-clad, and supplied with poor quality 
arms".52 The Evening News sarcastically suggested that the efficiency of Stalin’s forces 
had not been improved by the systematic shooting of all his good generals.53 At the end 
of December, the paper accused Stalin of carrying through the theory of dictatorship to 
its "logical and cold-blooded conclusion" as Russian bodies were found without 
identification badges thus signifying that they were merely the "unknown slaves of the
48 Upton, pp. 78-79.
49 The Sunday Times, 18 February 1940. "Red Army's Race Against Time" by Virginia 
Cowles. The Times, 4 January 1940. Leading article, "The Fighting Finns".
5® The Times, 12 December 1939. "Finns Recapture a Town" by the Stockholm 
Correspondent. See also, 4 January 1940.
51 The Times, 21 December 1939. Leading article, "Finland's Heroic Stand".
52 The Daily Express, 4 December 1939. "Russians Using Out of Date Tactics" by the 
Military Correspondent; 9 December 1939. Leading article, "Courage of Despair".
53 The Evening News, 7 December 1939. Leading article, "David and Goliath".
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K r e m l i n " . 5 4  Three weeks into the fighting, the quality conservative press reported the 
Red Army was retreating everywhere and that the soldiers of the Red Army were losing 
c o n f i d e n c e . 5 5
The Times's denunciations of the Soviet Union intensified daily while its 
admiration of Finland correspondingly increased. The Times supported "gallant" 
Finland's decision to fight for its "life and liberty" rather than the servitude which the 
"self-seeking Soviets" wished to i m p o s e . 5 6  The Daily Telegraph and the Scotsman 
expressed great satisfaction that, contrary to the belief of many western military experts, 
"heroic" Finland survived three weeks of fighting, fought "magnificently", and thus 
"drew the admiration of the world". However, the Scotsman was worried that such 
success could not hold out indefinitely even though the Red Army was in retreat, suffered 
great losses and abandoned e q u i p m e n t . 5 7  This encouraged debate in the British press 
over the possibility of British aid to Finland and the threat of Britain becoming involved 
in a war against the Soviet Union.
Although the Sunday Times recognised that the world, apart from Germany and 
the Soviet Union, sympathised with Finland, the paper wondered how far that would 
transform into action.5 8 in the first days of fighting. The Times pointed out that 
although Finland's friends were "outraged" by the use of force against the "small nation", 
the Finns were "not in a position to be helped" as Germany and the Soviet Union were 
the closest countries to Scandinavia. Chamberlain's expressions of sympathy and 
condemnation of the attack were thus sufficient for The Times.^^ The Daily Telegraph 
likewise offered its sympathy with that of the "rest of the world" but made no suggestion
54 The Evening News, 28 December 1939. Leading article, "The Rights of Man".
55 The Times, 28 December 1939. Leading article, "A Valiant Defiance"; 30 December 1939, 
"Doubts among Russians" by the Stockholm Correspondent. The Daily Telegraph, 23 December 1939. 
Leading article, "Finland Fighting Back". The Scotsman, 23 December 1939. Leading article, "Finnish 
Resistance".
56 The Times, 2 December 1939. Leading article, "Moscow without the Mask"; 4 December 
1939, leading article, "Kommissar into Gauleiter"; 8 December 1939, leading article, "A Gallant 
Defense".
57 The Dcdly Telegraph, 22 December 1939. Leading article, "Finland's Heroic Struggle". The 
Scotsman, 23 December 1939. Leading article, "Finnish Resistance".
58 The Sunday Times, 24 December 1939. Leading article, "Aid for the Finns".
The Times, 1 December 1939. Leading article, "The Invasion of Finland".
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of sending assistance.^® The Yorkshire Post regretted that the Soviet Union would 
probably succeed all too quickly since the Scandinavian countries were virtually 
powerless, and despite sympathy in the United States, the Americans stressed their 
neutrality. Similarly, though the British felt great compassion, they were already 
occupied against Germany and the Yorkshire Post specifically claimed Britain was not 
responsible for Finland.61
However, in mid-December, the Yorkshire Post accepted that Britain would send 
some aid but warned that the Germans remained Britain's chief enemy.62 The Times 
also gradually changed its attitude towards assistance when it reported that because 
Britain "so admired" the Finns, the British wanted to help.63 Thus at the end of 
December, The Times and the Daily Telegraph were urging that greater assistance be 
given to support the "outpost of democracy withstanding the menace of barbarism" 
because Finland's cause "is the cause of the whole civilised world". Therefore, these 
papers supported the release of munitions by the British and French Governments despite 
the need for weapons against Germany.64 The Daily Telegraph pointed out that 
diplomatic support alone was not enough to sustain miracles and Finnish heroism 
deserved help. The paper argued that the West could not afford to allow Finland to fall to 
a tyrant's ambitions and therefore, more was needed than a few thousand Swedish 
volunteers.65 Furthermore, Germany was reportedly attempting to help its partner by 
warning the neutral states of Scandinavia not to assist Finland.66 As the Soviet Union's 
success increased against the Finns in February, The Times and the Daily Telegraph
6® The Daily Telegraph, 1 December 1939. Leading article, "Freedom's Last Martyr"; 2 
December 1939, leading article, "World Conscience Shocked".
6^  The Yorkshire Post, 1 December 1939. Leading article, "Brutal Russia".
62 The Yorkshire Post, 15 December 1939. "British Supplies for Finland".
63 The Times, 21 December 1939. Leading article, "Finland's Heroic Stand".
64 The Times, 28 December 1939. Leading article, "A Valiant Defiance". The D a ily  
Telegraph, 28 December 1939. Leading article, "Finland Continues Her Struggle".
65 Daily Telegraph, 23 December 1939. Leading article, "Finland Fighting Back"; 22 
December 1939, leading article, "Finland's Heroic Struggle"; 28 December 1939, leading article, "Finland 
Continues Her Struggle"; 20 January 1940, leading article, "World Sympathy for Finland"; 27 January 
1940, leading article, "Finland's Fight". The Times, 18 January 1940. Leading article, "Finland's 
Cause".
66 ThQ Daily Telegraph, 9 January 1940. Leading article, "Neutrals Stand Firm".
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extended their calls for assistance to reverse the trends.67 The Daily Telegraph urged the 
"friends of freedom" to help as there should be no "delay in payment" since every nation 
was in Finland's debt.68
However, the popular conservative press was convinced that although the Finns 
fought bravely and deserved help against the Soviet Union, it was inappropriate for 
Britain to send aid. Thus the Beaverbrook and Rothermere newspapers most closely 
reflected the attitude of the British Government which believed that because the Winter 
War was not a threat to the Allies, Britain should not enter the conflict unless the Soviet 
Union threatened Sweden and Norway.69 The Evening News called Finland's fight 
"gallant", similar to "David fighting Goliath", because the "3,670,000 free people of 
Finland are fighting 180 million slaves of Russia".7® Nevertheless, the Daily Express 
believed the outlook was "black" as there was "only one end" .71 The paper 
acknowledged that there were people in Britain and abroad, specifically mentioning Italy, 
who asked why the British did not declare war on the Soviet Union, to which the Daily 
Express replied "One [war] is enough". The Beaverbrook paper did not want Britain to 
become "side-tracked" or to spread itself too thinly as the focus of conflict had to remain 
against Hitler.72 The Evening Standard recognised that the war in Finland was 
overshadowing the hostilities in the West, with the result that British people were 
allegedly asking if Britain was fighting the correct enemy. Though the paper felt the 
Soviet Union's "wanton and brutal assault" was worse than Germany's, the Evening 
Standard, however, warned that it was Hitler's "dearest wish" for the British to fight the 
Soviet Union thereby relieving the Germans of the pressure of having to attack Britain.
67 The Times, 15 February 1940. Leading article, "Volunteers for Finland". The D aily
Telegraph, 15 February 1940. Leading article, "Finland's Urgent Need".
68 The Daily Telegraph, 29 February 1940. Leading article, "Finland Fights On". See also.
The Times, 26 February 1940. Leading article, "The Cause of Finland".
69 Upton, p 79.
7® The Evening News, 30 November 1939. Leading article, "The Finnish Tragedy"; 7 
December 1939, leading article, "David and Goliath".
71 Tho Daily Express, 2  December 1939. Leading article, "Treachery"; 9 December 1939, 
leading article, "Courage of Despair".
72 The Daily Express, 1 December 1939. Leading article, "Murdered".
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Therefore, in the paper’s view, it was essential that the British population remember who 
the enemy w a s  7 3
Although the Daily Mail offered its "profound sympathy" for the Finnish people, 
the paper believed nothing could be done by Britain to lessen Finland's plight 74 Thus 
the Evening Standard suggested Finland look to the United States, who was not 
involved in the war against G e r m a n y . 7 5  The Daily Express additionally argued that 
Sweden and Norway had a duty to enter the war with F i n l a n d 7 6  and therefore, in 
January, could not understand why the Swedish Government had not "rallied" to the 
Finns as the Swedish population d e m a n d e d . 7 7  Massive air raids on Finland at the end of 
January led the Daily Express to state that Finland's plea for help "must surely be 
heard", but "across the A t l a n t i c " . 7 8  The paper even disagreed with the Archbishop of 
Canterbury, who called for British help, and argued that Britain required every gun and 
plane at home, even though the paper acknowledged that the majority of British people 
agreed with the Archbishop and not the Daily Express?^
In February, the Daily Express reported that as a result of the Soviet Union's 
success, the British Government was disturbed and thus the paper's attitude altered 
enough to suggest Britain should make a limited contribution to Finland in materials and 
volunteers.8® Though not expressing enthusiasm, the Beaverbrook newspaper did not 
object to British volunteers enlisting to fight in Finland, but British troops were required 
first against Hitler.^i However, in March, the Daily Express reported that the agitation 
for Britain to help the Finns continued though the paper believed there was no 
justification for it. The newspaper pointed out that Britain already had enough to do, "it
73 The Evening Standard, 6 December 1939. Leading article, "Which Enemy?"; 2 December 
1939, leading article, "Heroes of England".
74 The Daily Mail, 1 December 1939. Leading article, "Murder of Finland"; 2 December 1939, 
leading article, "US and. Finland"; 27 December 1939, leading article, "The Finns Fight On".
75 The Evening Standard, 27 December 1939. Leading article, "Finland".
76 Tho Daily Express, 27 December 1939. Leading article, "Bombs for Christmas".
77 The Daily Express, 19 January 1940. "Rally to Finns’ Is Battle Cry" by the Stockholm 
Correspondent
78 ThQ Daily Express, 30 January 1940. Leading article, "Murder Marches On".
29 The Daily Express, 2 February 1940. Leading article, "Help for Finland".
8® The Daily Express, 19 February 1940. Leading article, "Troops for Finland".
81 The Daily Express, 7 February 1940. By a Staff Reporter.
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can't police the world", and that those who urged war on the Soviet Union were 
"unsound advisers".82
As with conservative newspapers, the liberal and labour press reported with 
surprise the failure of the Red Army to defeat Finland quickly. The Spectator wrote that 
the small Finnish army was "taking apart the large Russian army" because of the 
weakening effect of the purges.83 The Daily Herald believed that Stalin had lost the 
legend of the Red Army's invincibility as it was forced to retreat repeatedly and thus the 
paper suggested that even if the USSR won, its enemies would not fear the Soviet Union 
as they had prior to December 1939.84 The News Chronicle, though acknowledging 
Finland's heroic resistance, admitted that the world's sympathy should not lead to 
expectations that Finnish success would be more than temporary for the simple reason 
that Finland was too small. 85 The Spectator also pointed out that the Soviet Union was 
able to replace its troops with fresh men even though they were like "sheep driven to the
slaughter".86
In contrast to the rest of the British press, the New Statesman and Nation 
provided excuses for the Soviet Union when the Red Army did not succeed as quickly as 
expected. For example, the journal suggested that unfavourable weather could account 
for the Red Army's slow progress.87 In December, the journal pointed out that the 
Soviet Union was adapting its tactics for a larger offensive88 and believed Moscow had 
merely underestimated its adversary in the beginning. Though failing to note the irony.
82 ThQ Daily Express, 5 March 1940. Leading article, "War for Finland?". However, papers 
like the News Chronicle refuted the Daily Express's claims that the News Chronicle "supports a move 
to send this country into war against Russia on behalf of Finland": 6 January 1940, leading article, 
"Finland".
83 The Spectator, 8 December 1939. "The War Surveyed: Finland and Beyond" by Strategicus; 
15 December 1939, "The War Surveyed: The Finnish Campaign" by Strategicus.
84 The Daily Herald, 28 December 1939. Leading article, "Growing Dim". The Manchester 
Guardian, 29 December 1939. Leading article, "Finland's War".
ThQ News Chronicle, 4 December 1939. Leading article, "Finland Fights On".
86 The Spectator, 26 January 1940. "The War Surveyed: Finland and Morale" by Strategicus.
87 The New Statesman and Nation, 9 December 1939. "Comments - The Attack on Finland".
88 The New Statesman and Nation, 16 December 1939. "Comments - The Finnish 
Campaign".
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the New Statesman and Nation indicated that the Soviet Union was finally paying the 
Finns the "compliment" of using better troops.89
Though recognising that a significant proportion of the British population wished 
to send aid, the liberal press pointed out that British help would naturally be limited by 
geography and the fact that Britain was at war with Germany. Therefore, the News 
Chronicle believed it would be of no service to Finland to raise false hopes of 
assistance^® and the Economist condescendingly stated Britain could only promise the 
Finns that they "would not be forgotten".9i Despite the courage and skill employed by 
the Finnish troops, the Spectator and the Manchester Guardian recognised that unless 
outside help arrived, there was only one outcome in F i n l a n d . 9 2  Therefore, Sweden and 
Norway were encouraged by the liberal press to send help especially since Finland's 
success ensured the safety of S c a n d i n a v i a . 9 3  However, the M anchester Guardian 
recognised that Germany's attitude was critical of any aid for Finland, especially if from
Sweden.94
Towards the end of December and early January, some of the liberal press 
changed its attitude concerning British aid to Finland. The News Chronicle and the 
Manchester Guardian recognised that Finland's heroism could not last for ever. 
Although "Russia had never been famous for its military brilliance", there was a 
"doggedness" in its troops in the opinion of the Manchester Guardian, therefore, 
Finland required immediate aid from the West, at least as a gesture of humanity.95 The 
News Chronicle did not believe that sending arms to Finland required a British
89 The New Statesman and Nation, 23 December 1939. "Comments - The Finnish War".
9® The News Chronicle, 30 November 1939. Leading article, "Finland's Crisis".
91 The Economist, 9 December 1939. Leading article, "Stalin's Aggression".
The Spectator, 8 December 1939. "Where Will Russia Stop?". The 2
December 1939. Leading article, "The Fate of Finland"; 22 December 1939, leading article, "Finland 
and Beyond"; 11 December 1939, leading article, "Finland's Fight". See also, the News Chronicle, 23 
December 1939. Leading article, "Finland Holds On".
93 The News Chronicle, 11 December 1939. Leading article, "Safety in Numbers". The 
Manchester Guardian, 29 November 1939. Leading article, "Threats to Finland".
94 The Manchester Guardian, 5 December 1939. Leading article, "The War on Finland".
95 The News Chronicle, 20 December 1939. Leading article, "Now or Never"; 11 January 
1940, leading article, "Now Is the Time"; 22 January 1940, leading article, "Finland's Need". The 
Manchester Guardian, 29 December 1939. Leading article, "Finland's War"; 2 January 1940, leading 
article, "Ways to Finland".
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declaration of war on the Soviet U n i o n . 9 6  In contrast, the Spectator and the Daily 
Herald, though acknowledging "Europe’s lasting debt to the Finns", believed that troops 
could not be sent to Finland as that would mean going to war against the Soviet Union 
while Britain was already struggling against a "more formidable a g g r e s s o r "  .9 7  However, 
in January, the Spectator suggested that "brilliant as Finland's victories are, it would be a 
delusion to suppose a nation of four million could stand indefinitely against 180 million 
unless powerful help is sent to t h e m . " 98 Therefore, the journal altered its attitude and 
wanted the Allies to do all they could for "heroic" Finland's "glowing passion for 
f r e e d o m " . 9 9
At the end of January, the Manchester Guardian believed the British and French 
Governments had much to fear if  Finland was defeated and therefore, the paper 
suggested there should be less talk of Finland's heroic resistance, "since history would 
safely deal with that", and more thought on how to help the F i n n s .T h u s  the calls for 
aid to be sent to Finland increased in urgency in February as the liberal press, and finally 
the Daily Herald, clearly understood the Soviet Union would win if Britain and France 
continued to ignore the situation. The News Chronicle demanded that Finland not 
become another Poland or Czechoslovakia and urged the Allies to enter the conflict in 
Finland, regardless of cost, thereby making it the turning point in Europe's war.^®i The 
Manchester Guardian wanted volunteers sent to relieve the small Finnish forces, arguing 
that Britain and France would suffer if Finland fell.^®2 The Spectator demanded that 
every necessary effort be made without delay since "honour and interest alike" dictated 
that British support ought only to be limited by its capacity. The journal believed there 
was a terrible danger that "we should send too little or too late... And thus add to
The News Chronicle, 6 January 1940. Leading article, "Finland".
9 7  The Spectator, 22 December 1939. "News of the Week - Finland's Struggle"; 29 December 
1939, "News of the Week - What Help for Finland?". The Daily Herald, 28 December 1939. Leading 
article, "Growing Dim"
98 The Spectator, 12 January 1940. "News of the Week - Finland's Need of Help".
99 The Spectator, 26 January 1940. "The War Surveyed: Finland and Morale" by Strategicus.
100 The Manchester Guardian, 23 January 1940. Leading article, "Raiders over Finland"; 31 
January 1939, leading article, "North of Lake Ladoga".
101 The News Chronicle, 3 February 1940. Leading article, "Finland Must Not Lose"; 14 
February 1940, leading article, "Help for Finland".
102 The Manchester Guardian, 10 February 1940. Leading article, "Aid for Finland".
British-Soviet Cooperation? 236
Finland's s u f f e r i n g . "  103 The Daily Herald urged the British population to help since the 
Finns "hold the frontier of European democracy" and that despite the stresses of the 
British war effort, Britain could afford to make a "tangible token of sympathy".i04 
When the British Government permitted volunteers to register in February to fight in 
Finland, the New Statesman and Nation remembered with bitterness a totally different 
attitude by the Government towards Spain. 105 The Daily Worker reported with similar 
criticism of foreign aid to Finland, though the paper stated that it was all in vain as the 
Red Army was successfully a d v a n c i n g .  i ^ 6
The Soviet Union's victory?
In March, the tide of success turned decisively towards the Soviet Union so that 
The Times stated time was running out, not only for Finland, but for Northern 
E u r o p e .  1®2 The British press simultaneously reported that the Finnish Government was 
considering peace terms from Moscow, thus creating a "state of collective insanity" 
among the A l l ie s . i® *  Without consulting Britain, the French unrealistically offered to 
send men and supplies, with no means of providing them, and thus the British 
Government recognised that France was attempting to lay the blame for Finland's defeat 
on Britain. Though the British Government eventually made similar frantic offers, to 
convince the people at home and abroad that the Allies wanted to help Finland, they were 
delayed long enough to convince the Finnish Government that it would be better to end 
the war.i®9
103 The Spectator, 9 February 1940. "News of the Week - Help Finland Now" and "The War 
Surveyed: Finland’s Hour of Need" by Strategicus. See also, the Manchester Guardian, 17 February
1940. Leading article, "Finland's Crisis"; 23 February 1940, leading article, "Finland and Beyond". The 
News Chronicle, 17 February 1940. Leading article, "Neutrals and Aggression".
104 The Daily Herald, 15 February 1940. Leading article, "Help the Finns".
105 The New Statesman and Nation, 17 February 1940. "Comments - Two Kinds of
Volunteers". The International Brigades, who fought in the Spanish Civil War, had been formed by
volunteers who did not have the official sanction of the British Government.
106 The Daily Worker, 8 December 1939. "New Finnish Government Faced with British 
Armed Intervention; Planes To 'Fight Hitler' Diverted To Fight Red Army"; 5 January 1940, "Wall 
Street's £25,000 To Aid Mannerheim". See also, 16 and 17 February 1940.
1®7 The Times, 5 March 1940. Leading article, "The Fate o f Viipuri". The M anchester 
Guardian, 4 March 1940. Leading article, "At Viipuri".
1®8 Upton, p. 130.
109 Ibid, pp. 131-133. Bayer, pp. 54-57.
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Contrary to the British Government's expectations, there was no significant 
public protestai® since Fleet Street primarily suggested Sweden and Norway were 
responsible for Finland's d e fe a t^  and thus Allied prestige survived. In March 1940, 
with the war in Finland resolved, the British population remained uncertain and generally 
hostile towards the Soviet Union. Although 41 per cent of those questioned in a 
B.LP.O. poll wanted the British Government to try to establish friendly relations with 
Russia, 47 per cent did not. Even more indicative of the British mood was that 41 per 
cent of those questioned believed that one day Britain would have to fight Russia though 
29 per cent remained "undecided".
Surprisingly, only The Times harshly criticised the lack of assistance by the 
Allies. Although the paper had argued against British aid at the outset of the conflict. The 
Times alleged Britain and France could have acted more positively had they so wished, 
especially in the first weeks of fighting. Therefore, the paper warned that Britain could 
not afford to make the same mistake against aggression in the future if other neutrals were 
to s u r v iv e .  113 Thus The Times appeared to believe Britain had a duty to protect Europe, 
a remarkable change in attitude from September 1938.n^ Though other newspapers 
recognised Britain's failure to help Finland, most accepted that the British Government 
had not acted d is h o n o u ra b ly .T h e  Sunday Times's main criticism was centred on 
Chamberlain's failure to form an alliance with the Soviet Union in August 1939 which
11® Bayer, pp. 63-64.
I l l  The Scotsman, 9 March 1940. Leading article, "Finnish Problem"; 12 March 1940, 
leading article, "Finland's Choice”. The Daily Telegraph, 11 March 1940. Leading article, "The Two 
Wars". The Times, 11 March 1940. Leading article, "Finland and Europe". The Sunday Times, 10 
March 1940. Leading article, "Sweden and the Fight to Save Finland". The Daily Express, 11 March
1940. Leading article, "Diplomats in a Hurry". The DaiZy Mail, 8 March 1940. Leading article, "Peace 
in the North?"; 11 March 1940, leading article, "Finnish Peace Moves"; 12 March 1940, leading article, 
"Sweden's Folly". The Spectator, 1 March 1940. "News of the Week - Sweden's Choice"; 15 March 
1940, "Finland and the Great War". The Manchester Guardian, 11 March 1940. Leading article, 
"Finland"; 14 March 1940, leading article, "The Moscow Peace". The News Chronicle, 9 March 1940. 
Leading article, "Critical Days"; 11 March 1940, leading article, "Russia Must Give Proof; 13 March 
1940, leading article, "One War Ended ". The New Statesman and Nation, 16 March 1940. "The Moral 
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B.I.P.O., Gallup Poll, March 1940.
113 The Times, 14 March 1940. Leading article, "Finland".
11  ^See the leading article in The Times, 7 September 1938.
11^  See for example, the Sunday Times, 17 March 1940. "Finland and After Hitler's Game" by 
Scrutator. The Daily Telegraph, 14 March 1940. Leading article, "Finland's Cruel Fate".
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would thus have prevented any such diplomatic defeat for Britain.n^ The popular 
conservative press believed the British Government had a duty to its country first and 
therefore was in no way to blame for Finland's c o l l a p s e . Nevertheless, the Daily 
Express suggested Britain could learn a lesson from the Winter War; "defeat is bitter and 
the victor's terms are humiliating",
The Soviet Government was heavily criticised for attacking Finland and the harsh 
terms which were imposed on the Finns. Low suggested on 27 February that the "First 
Casualty" of the European war was "idealism" as the Soviet Union defeated democratic 
Finland, thereby proving it had significant aggressive intentions.!!^ The Sunday Times 
was critical of the "Asiatic despot"!2® and The Times alleged only Stalin could be
! !  ^The Sunday Times, 17 March 1940. "Finland and After Hitler's Game" by Scrutator. Sec 
also, the Daily Telegraph, 14 March 1940. Leading article, "Finland's Cruel Fate"; 19 March 1940, 
leading article, "The Allies and Finland".
!!2 The Daily Mail, 8 March 1940. Leading article, "Peace in the North?"; 11 March 1940, 
leading article, "Finnish Peace Moves"; 14 March 1940, leading article, "Finland - and After".
! !  ^The Daily Express, 13 March 1940. Leading article, "Russia Gets Her Way".
!!^ Figure 7.2. The Evening Standard, 27 February 1940. "First Casualty".
!2® The Sunday Times, 10 March 1940. Leading article, "Sweden and the Fight to Save
Finland".
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satisfied with the terms of peace even though it had not been the quick war he had 
e n v i s a g e d . Thus the Scotsman and The Times argued there was no military glory for 
the Soviet Union after the "reckless sacrifice of lives", m iscalculation and 
mismanagement. These papers suggested that the harsh and oppressive terms of peace 
were Stalin's revenge for the Red Army's humiliating d e f e a t s . ^ 2 2  Nevertheless, the 
Manchester Guardian believed Moscow had been taught a lesson!23 and the News 
Chronicle wondered how long it would take for the Soviet Union to replace its lost 
r e s o u r c e s .  1 2 4  The Daily Telegraph believed the chaotic blunders of the Red Army would 
become more exposed and that the Soviet Government could not expect further success in 
expansion since Finland was only a very small, isolated v i c t i m .  ! 2 5
The Daily Express was the only paper to suggest that the Soviet Union had 
received all its d e m a n d s . ! 2 6  However, though accepting that Moscow secured its 
immediate aims, the Daily Herald believed that the Soviet Union had not obtained every 
goal it wanted and the paper was, therefore, concerned that the Soviet Government would 
attack Finland again, much as Germany had occupied Prague despite the Munich 
settlement. !27 The News Chronicle likewise wondered if the Soviet Union was really 
ready to abandon f o r c e .  1 2 8  The Daily Mail was even more astute when it questioned if 
"Russia's appetite is sated by the meal of Finnish territory" or if  Stalin would demand 
Bessarabia from R u m a n i a .  ! 2 9  The New Statesman and Nation, though failing to 
condemn the Soviet Union's attack on Finland, finally recognised that the Soviet Union's 
motives were questionable and therefore stated that the peace terms were "far reaching
121 jh e  Times, 14 March 1940. Leading article, "Finland". See also, the Daily Telegraph, 
15 March 1940. Leading article, "The Crack in Joy-Bells".
122 The Scotsman, 14 March 1940. Leading article, "A Russian Peace". See Upton, pp. 94- 
95 for a similar suggestion.
123 The Manchester Guardian, 13 March 1940. Leading article, "Finland's Position ".
124 The News Chronicle, 14 March 1940. Leading article, "Finland’s Great Example".
125 The Daily Telegraph, 14 March 1940. Leading article, "Finland's Cruel Fate".
126 The Daily Express, 13 March 1940. Leading article, "Russia Gets Her Way".
127 The Daily Herald, 14 March 1940. Leading article, "Peace". See also, the Manchester 
Guardian, 11 March 1940. Leading article, "Finland". The C/jr<?n/c/e, 9 March 1940. Leading 
article, "Critical Days".
128 The News Chronicle, 11 March 1940. Leading article, "Russia Must Give Proof.
129 The Daily Mail, 15 March 1940. Leading article, "Stalin's Programme". See a similar 
suggestion in Daily Express, 16 March 1940. "Hitler Fears Stalin Attack in Balkans" by S. Panton.
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and exceedingly u n p l e a s a n t " .  1 3 0  Thus only thQ Daily Worker supported the Soviet 
Government's success in securing peace terms suitable to Stalin. 131
In reality, the result of the Winter War was that although the Soviet Union 
dictated the terms of the peace, it was not a total victory over Finland. The Red Army's 
weaknesses were exposed and the new territory did little to help Leningrad in the war 
against G erm any. 132 The invasion of Finland marked a further change in Soviet policy 
as it publicly abandoned the image which it had created in the 1930s, of a commitment to 
collective security and non-aggression, since neither could protect Soviet interests. 133 
The Soviet Government instigated the W inter War not because the Finns were 
insufficiently conciliatory, but because the Soviet leadership felt it was in a position to 
pursue its diplomatic demands successfully with force. Furthermore, in view of the fact 
that Moscow wished to avoid appearing subservient to Germany, the Soviet leadership 
found it necessary to impose its will on smaller states thus leading to the attack on 
Finland. 134 New demands were presented to Finland in June 1940 when the Baltic 
states were annexed, increasing Finnish suspicions of the Soviet Union’s aims and as a 
result, Finland accepted a role in Germany's attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941.135 
Britain recognised that the only reason the Soviet Government was able to impose 
such harsh terms on Finland was because no foreign aid had been sent to assist the 
Finns. This caused some concern in the British Government, which expected Germany 
to attack eventually the Soviet Union, because it was unlikely that the Red Army would 
be capable of surviving against the impressive German military might. Nevertheless, the 
British Government declined to antagonise the Soviet Government in 1940, even despite 
further expansion by Stalin, in recognition that London and Moscow might become allies 
against Germany.
130 The New Statesman and Nation, 16 March 1940. "The Moral of Finland".
131 IhQ Daily Worker, 12 March 1940. Leading article, "Finland and Peace"; 14 March 1940, 
"Soviets Defeat Cabinet's War Plans in North".
132 Upton, pp. 149-153,
133 Spring, p. 207.
134 Ibid, pp. 220, 221-222. Upton, pp. 94-95.
135 Upton, pp. 153-157.
British-Soviet Cooperation? 241
Further Soviet expansion
Virtually the entire British press accepted without objection the Soviet 
Government's annexation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in June 1940. Though most 
newspapers and journals expressed concern for the loss of independence of the three 
Baltic states, criticism of the Soviet Union was limited because the British Government 
was occupied in conflict elsewhere and unable to make an effective p r o t e s t .  1 3  6  Fleet 
Street generally expressed the same attitude towards the Balkan region and though there 
was slightly more criticism for the Soviet Union's aggressive ambitions, the majority of 
the British press did not express concern for Rumania or Bessarabia. Furthermore, I
newspaper coverage of the Balkans increasingly focused on whether or not the Soviet !
r/vcij IUnion and Germany would clash over p e r^ n a l interests in South-Eastern Europe. j
Unlike the emotion caused by the Red Army's attack on Finland, public opinion in j
Britain was not angered by the Soviet Government's annexations in Eastern Europe and !1
remained hopeful that a Soviet-German conflict would erupt, though confidence in iiMoscow's intentions varied between June 1940 and June 1941.^37 prom September to I
December 1940, signs of strain between Berlin and Moscow increased but were never j
sufficiently critical to cause a definitive rupture in relations.
When, in June 1940, the Soviet Union occupied the Baltic states and incorporated |
them into the Soviet Union, The Times speculated that the lack of German protest i
probably meant the annexation was a stipulation of the Nazi-Soviet pact. However, the !
paper thought Stalin's efforts "to regain the territory of Tsarist Russia" might be contrary 
to Hitler's w i s h e s . ^ 3 8  The Daily Telegraph and the Observer suggested that the 
incorporation of the three states was a defensive move by the Soviet Government against 
Germany whose rapid success in the West forced the Soviet Union to move in Eastern 
E u r o p e .  ! 3 9  For a paper which had never trusted the Soviet Union and communism. The
136 Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War, p. 475. The British 
Government refused officially to recognise the Soviet Union's acquisition, but that was as far as Britain 
responded.
137 Tom Harrisson, "Public Opinion About Russia", p. 360.
!38 The Times, 3 July 1940. Leading article, "The Balkan Cauldron".
!39 The Daily Telegraph, 17 and 18 June 1940. Articles by the Stockholm Correspondent. 
The Observer, 23 June 1940. "Russia's Plan in Eastern Europe" by the Diplomatic Correspondent
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Times curiously conceded it was better for the Baltic states to lose their independence to 
the Soviet Union rather than Germany, the "arch enemy". The paper also pointed out that 
since Britain and France could do nothing, the Baltic states were left with no choice but to 
accept Moscow's pressure. 140 This demonstrated a most remarkable change in attitude 
from the previous year when The Times stated that Britain had no right to force the Baltic 
states to accept a guarantee by the Soviet Government, thus contributing to Moscow's 
decision to sign the Nazi-Soviet pact.^^41 However, the Scotsman was far more 
contemptuous of the Soviet Union and claimed Moscow could only act with German 
approval since the Red Army was too weak and could not afford a war against
Germany. 142
Neither the Beaverbrook nor the Rothermere press expressed surprise, "after all j
other events in Europe were considered", that the Baltic states came under the protection
iof and lost their independence to the Soviet Union in June 1940.143 Furthermore, in I
view of the fact that there were other issues of greater importance, such as the war in j
France, none of these papers protested as they would certainly have done in the previous |
year. Also, the Daily Express suggested that Britain and the Soviet Union would |
eventually become allies since Hitler's focus of conquest would move to Eastern I
Europe. 144 i
Even the liberal press was only marginally concerned for the fate of the Baltic I
region. There was a degree of sarcasm in the reporting of the Manchester Guardian in I
July when the paper acknowledged the Baltic states had become not only republics of the 
Soviet Union, but also the outer layer of a "fortress" in the country's d e f e n c e .  1 4 5  
However, the paper did not protest the lost independence of the three states. The News 
Chronicle and the Economist similarly accepted without objection the change in status of
14® The Times, 25 July 1940. Leading article, "Russia on the Baltic".
141 See for example. The Times, 5 July 1939. Leading article, "The Talks with Russia".
142 The Scotsman, 28 June 1940. Leading article, "Russian Moves".
143 The Daily Mail, 20 June 1940. "Soviet Leaders in Estonia"; 15 July 1940, "Three States 
Vote Communist".
144 The Daily Express, 18 June 1940. Leading article, "Russia in Danger".
145 The Manchester Guardian, 2 and 22 July 1940. Leading article, "Russia's Gains" and an 
article by Reuters.
British-Soviet Cooperation? 243
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania and suggested the Soviet Government's decision was due 
to the rapidity of Germany's victory over F r a n c e .  146 in the autumn of 1939, the 
Spectator had suggested that the Baltic states were "easy victims" to the "German type 
bloodless victory" and therefore, these states would only retain their independence as 
long as the Soviet Union tolerated it. 147 Thus the journal, from an early date, noted 
Moscow intended to incorporate the Baltic countries into the Soviet Union and was 
therefore not surprised when it happened. 148
Though the Daily Herald made no protest against the Soviet Union's occupation 
of the Baltic region, the paper suggested the Soviet Government had the support of 
Germany in redrawing the map of Eastern E u r o p e .  149 in contrast, the New Statesman 
and Nation believed the Soviet Union was looking to its own security when it annexed 
the Baltic states since the Nazi-Soviet pact would not continue when Germany decided to 
occupy Eastern Europe. Furthermore, the journal expressed satisfaction that there was 
no bloodshed in the Soviet Government's annexation primarily because the N ew  
Statesman and Nation naively accepted that the Baltic states had "asked to join" the 
Soviet Union. 150 Thus the journal, ignoring the implications of lost sovereignty and 
continuing to support the Soviet Union unlike any other member of the British press, 
except the Daily W o r k e r , welcomed the Soviet Government's actions towards the 
Baltic states because the New Statesman and Nation believed it provided them with 
protection from Germany. 152
146 The News Chronicle, 18 June 1940. "2,000 Soviet Tanks Are Massed on Germany's 
Doorstep". The Economist, 22 June 1940. "Russia's Baltic Policy" by a Correspondent The Spectator, 
21 and 28 June 1940. "News of the Week".
142 The Spectator, 13 October 1939. "News o f the Week - Russia and the Baltic". For similar 
warnings see also, the News Chronicle, 18 September 1939. Leading article, "Russia Marches In". The 
Economist, 23 September 1939. "The Fourth Partition". The Daily Herald, 30 September 1939. 
Leading article, "What the Pact Means".
148 The Spectator, 21 June 1940. "News of the Week - Russia Shares the Spoils?"; 28 June 
1940, "News of the Week - Russia in the Background".
149 The Daily Herald, 19 June 1940. "Redrawing Europe: Stalin's Aims" by W.N.E.
150 The New Statesman and Nation, 22 June 1940. "Comments - Stalin Takes Precautions"; 
27 July 1940, "Comments - Stalin Alone".
151 The Da//y Worker, 23 July 1940, "Three States Ask To Join USSR" by the Moscow 
Correspondent
1^2 The New Statesman and Nation, 22 June 1940. "Comments - Stalin Takes Precautions".
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The attitude of the British press towards the Soviet Union's demands on the 
Balkan region, and especially Rumania, was nearly identical to its attitude towards the 
fate of the Baltic states. The majority of British newspapers were uninterested in the fate 
of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. Instead, Fleet Street devoted its coverage of the 
Balkans to the far more crucial factor in Britain's war effort - would German and Soviet 
interests in South-Eastern Europe reach such a high degree of tension as to incite war 
between the two countries? It was assumed by the British press that Rumania's 
concessions to the Soviet Union would be the last time Germany accepted Stalin's 
expansion in the Balkans.
ThQ Daily Telegraph attached great importance to the Soviet Union's acquisition 
of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina as it showed the Soviet Government's revived 
interest e d  influence in Balkan a f f a i r s .  1 5 3  As with the Baltic states. The Times accepted 
the eessatknr of Bessarabia to the Soviet Union since Rumania was too weak to fight the 
Red Army and especially since "negotiation is out of fashion on the continent".i54 Of the 
quality conservative press, only the Scotsman expressed significant contempt for Soviet 
demands on Rumania and wondered if Germany supported Moscow's activity in the 
Balkans. The paper expected the Soviet Government, since its "appetite was whetted", to 
"try for a great amount" in South-Eastern Europe,i^^ though the Sunday Times 
suggested that the Soviet Union was in reality too afraid of Germany to seize all it 
wanted.i^^
However, further comment by the quality conservative press was reserved to the 
aspects of the Balkans which suggested a conflict of interest between Germany and the 
Soviet Union. The Times entitled one of its leading articles "The Balkan Cauldron" 
which aptly described the tense situation in South-Eastern Europe. The paper believed 
that Hitler had intended to immobilise the Soviet Union with the Nazi-Soviet pact while 
Germany defeated Western Europe. This, however, did not comply with Stalin's
153 The Daily Telegraph, 29 June 1940. Leading article, "Russia's Latest Stroke".
154 The Times, 29 June 1940. Leading article, "Rumania Cedes Bessarabia".
155 The Scotsman, 28 June 1940. Leading article, "Russia Moves"; 29 June 1940, leading 
article, "Russia Marches In".
1^  ^The Sunday Times, 4 August 1940, "Molotov's Aims" by the Diplomatic Correspondent.
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intentions which were to strengthen his country's western defences while Germany was 
occupied elsewhere. In the opinion of The Times, although Hitler ignored the Soviet 
Union's invasion of Finland, the paper alleged that Berlin could not afford to ignore 
Stalin's ambitions in the Balkans as the Soviet Union could materially affect Hitler's 
dreams of "Hungarian wheat, Yugoslav minerals, and Rumanian oil". Therefore, the 
paper argued that the annexation of the Baltic states and parts of Rumania were not really 
to restore the old Russian Empire, but to keep Germany a safe distance from the Soviet 
U n i o n .  1 5 7  The Daily Telegraph and the Sunday Times similarly suggested that although 
Germany accepted the Soviet Government's aims in Rumania, these papers believed 
Hitler would neither welcome a rival in the "Danube region" nor the effective barrier 
against Germany in the East which Stalin was b u i ld in g .  158
Although the Observer expected a "flare-up" in the Balkans as a result of the Red 
Army's advances in R u m a n ia ,  159 the majority of the quality conservative press reported 
that Germany and the Soviet Union were attempting to play down the strains in their 
relationship despite the increased tension.i^^i The Times especially felt the Soviet 
Government was attempting to maintain good relations with Germany until the outcome 
of the German attack on Britain was more clear.i^i Thus the "marriage of convenience" 
c o n t i n u e d i ^ 2  and the Daily Telegraph believed the chance of a British-Soviet alliance in 
the summer of 1940 was minimal especially when the paper also considered Britain's 
past hostility towards M o s c o w . ^ ^ 3
The popular conservative press took a more disapproving interest in "Russia's 
grab" of Bessarabia, "the richest land on e a r t h " . However, though critical of the
!^7 The Times, 3 July 1940. Leading article, "The Balkan Cauldron".
158 The Daily Telegraph, 29 June 1940, Leading article, "Russia’s Latest Stroke". The Sunday 
Times, 30 June 1940. Leading article, "Russia's Move".
159 The Observer, 23 and 30 June 1941, by the Diplomatic Correspondent.
160 See for example. The Times, 5 July and 3 August 1940.
1^1 The Times, 13 August 1940. "Russia Watches and Waits" by the Special Correspondent
in Sofia.
162 The Daily Telegraph, 29 June 1940. Leading article, "Russia’s Latest Stroke". The Sunday 
Times, 30 June 1940. Leading article, "Russia’s Move".
1 3^ The Daily Telegraph, 2 August 1940. "Russia Reaffirms Her Neutrality" by the Moscow 
Correspondent
The Daily Express, 29 July 1940. "Carol: Stop the Grabs" from a Belgrade dispatch. The 
Daily Mail, 28 June 1940. "King Carol Asks for Talks".
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Soviet Union's methods, these papers did not care about the fate of Bessarabia or 
Northern Bukovina. Like the quality conservative press, the Daily Express was far more 
interested in the emerging conflict between Germany and the Soviet Union over the 
"grabbing" of territory in the B a l k a n s .  1 ^ 5  Low's cartoon in the Evening Standard on 23 
July 1940, "Uneasy Nights in the Balkans", showed Stalin encroaching on Hitler’s half 
of a bed thus demonstrating the strained partnership in South-Eastern Europe.!^
The liberal press expressed no surprise over the Soviet Union's ultimatum to 
Rumania and the subsequent occupation of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. Thus 
there was no protest as to the fate of these regions by these papers which, like the 
conservative press, focused on the emerging crisis between Germany and the Soviet 
Union. The Manchester Guardian and the News Chronicle believed Moscow had acted 
following France's rapid collapse to Germany. Both papers thus acknowledged that it 
was clear the Soviet Government was determined to do all it could for its own protection
!^5 The Daily Express, 11 July 1940. "Hiller Tries to Halt Balkan Grabbing Game" by Sefton 
Delmer; 27 July 1940, "Stalin Surprises Hitler" by a Special Correspondent; 14 September 1940, 
"Moscow Warns Nazis" by A. P.; 16 October 1940, "Moscow Not Told".
166 Figure 7.3. The Evening Standard, 23 July 1940. "Uneasy Nights in the Balkans".
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and therefore, the occupation of territory in Rumania was part of a plan to strengthen the 
Soviet Union against the West.^^7 The Manchester Guardian suggested that Moscow 
felt the situation in Europe had changed because the ultimatum to Rumania by the Soviet 
Government was "very brusque" and the occupation "vigorous". Thus the paper 
believed there was an urgency which had been absent in the demands to the Baltic states 
and the leisurely approach against Finland. In addition, the Manchester Guardian argued 
that the Soviet Union's entry into the Balkans was in opposition to German expectations 
for economic gains in that area.!58 However, though noting the mutual distrust between 
Germany and the Soviet Union concerning ambitions in the Balkans, the liberal press 
recognised that neither country was prepared for war against the o t h e r .  1^ 9
The Daily Herald was also neither surprised by the Soviet Union's occupation of 
Bessarabia nor concerned with the fate of Rumania or other countries in the Balkans.^^o 
The paper, however, alleged that Hitler was forced to accept Stalin's "redrawn map of 
Eastern Europe" as an accomplished fact.^71 As with comment on the annexation of the 
Baltic states, the New Statesman and Nation believed the Soviet Union's pressure on 
Rumania was simply a precaution to protect the USSR against the increasing power of 
the Axis. Thus the journal argued that Stalin, though hoping for the best from the Nazi- 
Soviet pact, was preparing for the worst. 172 The Daily Worker also maintained that the 
Soviet Government was forced to prepare for war against the "imperialist-capitalists" by 
occupying Bessarabia, though the paper was unique in stating that the people of northern 
Rumania welcomed their incorporation into the Soviet Union and felt liberated. !73
1^7 The Manchester Guardian, 28 June 1940. Leading article, "Russia Moves Again"; 2 July 
1940, leading article, "Russia's Gains". The News Chronicle, 28 June 1940. Leading article, 
"Realistic".
!58 The Manchester Guardian, 2 July 1940. Leading article, "Russia's Gains"; 23 July 1940, 
leading article, "Russia Moves Again".
The Newj: Chronicle, 11 July 1940. "Moscow Suspects German Ambitions" by the 
Diplomatic Correspondent; 30 July 1940, leading article, "Future of Balkans". The Economist, 6 July
1940. "Russia Takes Another Outpost".
!70 The Daily Herald, 28 June 1940. "Rumania Accepts Soviet Ultimatum on Bessarabia" by
W.N.E.
!7l The Daily Herald, 19 June 1940. "Redrawing Europe: Stalin's Aims" by W N.E.
172 The New Statesman and Nation, 22 June 1940. "Comments - Stalin Takes Precautions". 
!73 The Daily Worker, 29 June 1940. Leading article, "Rumania".
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"Russia must toe the l i n e ” 7^4
Despite Molotov's speech to the Soviet Parimment on 1 August 1940 which 
firmly stated Soviet-German relations were very good,i75 within two months, the British 
press devoted significant coverage to Moscow's irritation with Berlin for not being 
invited to the Danubian Conference hosted by Germany in September 1940.176 The 
Scotsman speculated that the Soviet Union's exclusion from the Danubian Conference 
and subsequent protest to Berlin was the first open sign of a rift between Germany and 
the Soviet Union. However, the paper recognised that the conflict of interest between the 
two dictators was unlikely to result in a war which neither wanted at the time. 177 jh e  
Times and the Observer similarly maintained that neither country was prepared to fight 
the other and therefore, the Soviet Government's note was merely intended as a reminder 
to Germany not to ignore Moscow in the future. 178
The Manchester Guardian found the Soviet Union's exclusion from the Danubian 
Conference a "strange interpretation of the pledge of a year ago" which insisted on 
consultation on all common interests. The paper wondered if the omission was 
intentional, thus suggesting that the Soviet Government had a right to be wary of its 
ally, 179 The News Chronicle pointed out that it was the first time since the signing of 
the Nazi-Soviet pact that the Soviet leadership had sent a "frigid" note to its partner and 
therefore, the paper wondered if Germany could placate the Soviet Union.i^^) Even the 
Daily Worker's leading article on the Soviet note to Germany, though scorning the hopes 
of the capitalist press of a failing relationship, sounded a warning to the German
174 Title of an article in the Daily Herald, 2 October 1940.
175 The Manchester Guardian, 3 August 1940. Leading article, "Molotov’s Speech". The 
News Chronicle, 2 and 3 August 1940, by Vernon Bartlett. The Economist, 10 August 1940. 
"Molotov’s Speech". The Daily Herald, 2 August 1940. "Molotov Predicts A World War".
176 See for example, the Daily Telegraph, 14 September 1940. "Soviet Calm in Danube" by 
the Diplomatic Correspondent. The Daily Herald, 18 September 1940. "Germany Tells Russia ’Hands 
Off Balkans'" by W.N.E. Germany held the Danubian Conference in order to explain to the states along 
that river what Berlin expected of them economically and politically and what these Balkan countries 
could look for in return.
177 The Scotsman, 17 September 1940. Leading article, "Danubian Rivalry".
178 The Times, 14, 16, 17 September 1940. Leading article on 16 September, "The Lower 
Danube ". The Observer, 15 September 1940. "The World's Week - The Russian Sphinx".
179 The Manchester Guardian, 16 September 1940. Leading article, "Russa Protests ’.
1^ 11 The News Chronicle, 14 September 1940. Leading article, "Annoyed".
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Government that the Soviet Union could not be ignored in an area which it considered it 
had a vital interest.
Further protest by the Soviet Government in October of German high-handedness 
in Rumania was another signal to the British press of differences between the two 
c o u n t r i e s . 1 ^ 2  The Economist suggested that the tension over Rumania was such that a 
breach between Moscow and Berlin might be unavoidable though the journal continued to 
believe the Soviet and German Governments wished to avoid war.i83 Nevertheless, the 
Daily Herald and the Economist surmised that "Germany was turning the diplomatic 
screws" on the Soviet Government. Both papers suggested that Hitler was no longer 
afraid of the Soviet Union, that "Russia will be squeezed hard", and "will have to toe the 
line" especially in the Balkans, since the Red Army was too weak to fight G e r m a n y .  1 8 4  
With the announcement of Molotov's visit to Berlin in mid-November 1940, the 
British press believed Germany and the Soviet Union were attempting to repair their 
differences. Nevertheless, The Times sarcastically noted that Molotov's first visit since 
the signing of the Nazi-Soviet pact was "unrushed" - the Soviet statesman took the train 
to Berlin whereas Ribbentrop always flew to Moscow. The paper was, however, more 
concerned about the possible inducements Germany was going to offer to Molotov and 
what the Soviet Union was expected to give in return. 185 Though a "spectacular" 
agreement was e x p e c t e d ,  i  ^ 6  with the conclusion of the talks, the British press expressed 
surprise that nothing of great advantage to either state had allegedly been reached. 
Nevertheless, The Times and the Scotsman suggested the Soviet Government was
The Daily Worker, 16 September 1940. Leading article, "On the Danube".
182 The Manchester Guardian, 16 October 1940. "Nazi Moves in Rumania"; 17 October 1940, 
leading article, "Germany in the East". The Times, 1 and 25 October 1940. The Daily Telegraph, 15-17 
October 1940,
183 The Economist, 19 October 1940. "Russia's Dilemma".
184 The D aily Herald, 2 October 1940. "Russia Must Toe the Line, Say Nazis" by W.N.E. 
The Economist, 19 October 1940. "Russia’s Dilemma".
185 The Times, 12 November 1940. Leading article, "Active Diplomacy". For example, the 
British press and Government speculated that Germany would offer the Soviet Government a "New World 
Order" in which the Soviet Union would be given control of the Bosphorus Straits and the Near East in 
exchange for a German sphere of influence in South-Eastern Europe and increased economic aid from the 
Soviet Union.
186 The Daily Express, 13 November 1940. Various articles. The Daily Mail, 13-15 
November 1940. Various articles.
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playing for time despite heavy German pressure. 187 in addition, the Daily Telegraph 
suggested that regardless of the apparent lack of a result, mutual concessions would 
continue since neither country was ready for war.^88
The Spectator was more interested in what the invitation denoted and suggested 
the military and diplomatic situation was not satisfactory to Berlin because when "things 
go well. Hitler has no use for Russia". Thus the journal believed the Soviet Union 
would be forced to end its role as the traditional protector of the Slavs. 189 The 
Manchester Guardian similarly questioned why the Soviet Government, in visiting 
Berlin, allowed the Germans such a diplomatic success and demonstrated Stalin's 
acceptance of the Soviet Union's weaknesses. 19® The Economist sarcastically wrote that 
if the situation in Europe was not so important, there would be something "comic" about 
Molotov's visit to Berlin since it was his first trip abroad. Furthermore, despite the 
Soviet Government's statements of "complete unity", the journal believed that the visit 
demonstrated Germany was stronger and allowed Hitler to protest against the Soviet 
Union's encroachment on his new world order.i9i Low's cartoon on 4 October, "Orders 
and Decorations", showed that Hitler no longer cared for Stalin's friendship since his 
new world order was sufficiently strong without the Soviet dictator. However, Low 
sardonically hinted of the impending Nazi invasion of the USSR by portraying 
Ribbentrop promising Stalin that Hitler would soon give his attention to the Soviet
Union. !92
!87 The Times, 13 November 1940. Various articles by the Diplomatic Correspondent. The 
Scotsman, 15 November 1940. Leading article, "Molotov's Visit".
188 The Daily Telegraph, 15 November 1940. Leading article, "Wooing Moscow".
!89 The Spectator, 15 November 1940. "News of the Week - Berlin and Moscow".
!90 The Manchester Guardian, 15 November 1940. Leading article, "Home to Moscow". The 
News Chronicle, 12 November 1940. Leading article, "Molotov's Visit"; 15 November 1940, "Nazis 
Warn Turkey After Molotov Goes Home".
!91 The Economist, 16 November 1940. Leading article, "Molotov in Berlin".
192 Figure 7.4. The Evening Standard, 4 October 1940. "Orders and Decorations".
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C onclusion
The invasion of Finland by the Soviet Union ruined any possibility of an 
immediate improvement in British-Soviet relations. The British Government would have 
preferred to ignore as far as possible the Winter War, but public opinion and Fleet Street 
were irrepressibly hostile towards the Soviet Union. In addition, Finland appealed to the 
League of Nations to denounce and take action against the Soviet Government. Thus it 
was impossible for Britain to refrain from issuing formal condemnation of the Soviet 
attack. !93 This was an instance of the British press encouraging the Government to react 
and yet the reaction was ultimately insufficient in the opinion of the majority of Fleet 
Street. As a consequence, press coverage of the Winter War frequently diverged from 
the official policy of the British Government. His Majesty's Government realise that 
Moscow was intent on avoiding action which might help Germany or Britain and thereby 
hasten the victory of either side. Therefore, the British leadership refused to jeopardise
!93 Woodward, British Foreign Policy in Second World War. Vol. I., p. 40.
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the precarious position which Moscow had assumed by declaring war on the Soviet 
Union over Finnish i n t e r e s t s .  ^ 9 4
Due to the same motives, the British Government similarly responded to the 
annexation of the Baltic states. Halifax neither refused to acknowledge the Soviet 
Union's acquisition nor offered hope to the three states that Britain would assist them in 
regaining their independence. Already at this time, the British Government strongly 
believed Hitler was contemplating his invasion of the Soviet U n i o n .  1 9 5  The failure of the 
British press to react to the annexations of the Baltic states thus reflected the attitude of 
the British Government and indicated that by the summer of 1940, Fleet Street was 
significantly influenced by Government policy.
Though the British press expressed a degree of criticism of the Soviet Union's 
aggression in Eastern Europe during 1940, in 1941 the past was not allowed to hinder the 
necessity of Britain and the USSR becoming allies. Fleet Street noted that the Soviet 
Government admitted admiration for Britain's resistance of Germany's attack in the air 
and of British efforts in the Mediterranean. Thus The Times suggested the Soviet 
Government's statements of friendship with Germany "rang h o l l o w " .  1 9 6  The British j
press in 1941 also recognised that Germany had resumed a hostile attitude towards the 
Soviet Union since Stalin was either unable or unwilling to make further concessions to j
H i t l e r .  ! 9 7  Thus it became obvious to the West that the Soviet Union would be attacked |
by G e r m a n y ! 9 8  and the Daily Herald unnecessarily suggested that the "German-Russian j
situation is beginning to figure quite importantly in the general picture of w a r " .  1 9 9  i n  a i
194 Ibid, p .  108.
195 Ibid. p. 475.
196 The Times, 14 January 1941, Leading article, "Russia and Germany". There were also 
reports of praise in October 1940. See for example, the News Chronicle, 18 October 1940. "Red Army 
Praises Our Planes" by the Moscow Correspondent.
197 The Times, 1 May 1941. "May Day at the Kremlin" by the Diplomatic Correspondent. 
The Sunday Times, 11 May 1941. "Nazi War of Nerves on Russia". The Daily Express, 5 March
1941. Leading article; "Lovers' T if f .  The Daily Telegraph, 5 March 1941. Leading article, "The 
Russian Oracle". The Manchester Guardian, 4 and 5 March 1941. "Russian Disapproval o f Nazi Move" 
and leading article, "Russia and Bulgaria". The Scotsman, 14 April 1941. Leading article, "Russia's 
Feare".
198 Woodward, p. 598.
199 The Daily Herald, 8 May 1941. "Nazis Don't Trust Stalin" by W.N.E.
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B.LP.O. poll in April 1941, 70 per cent of those questioned wanted to see Great Britain 
and the Soviet Union become friendlier towards each other.200
The tmth was that German-Soviet friction throughout 1940 had meant that Britain 
and the Soviet Union would become allies. Therefore, despite Fleet Street's 
overwhelming hostility towards the Soviet Union's invasion of Finland, which occupied 
a staggering amount of press coverage, within months, British newspapers realised their 
country’s survival depended on the opening of a second front in Europe. If the invasion 
of Finland had occurred when Britain was not fighting Germany in the Second World 
War, it would have been unlikely that the British press would have ignored so rapidly 
such aggression. Neither would Britain's newspapers have offered to support an alliance 
with an aggressor. Despite the critical attitude which Fleet Street developed for the Soviet 
Union as a result of the Winter War, the British press noted, with varying degrees of 
hope and confidence, that Hitler was displeased with Stalin's moves in the Balkans. 
Thus the newspapers carefully watched for signs that the Soviet Government accepted 
Britain as its parmer against Germany. This, however, did not happen, despite the 
British Government's efforts, until Germany invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941.
200 B 
opinion".
.I.P.O., Gallup Poll, April 1941. 13 per cent replied "no"; 17 per cent replied "no
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Chapter 8 
Epilogue: "War Today Is Indivisible"i
When the attack on the USSR came in June 1941, the Soviet Union proved that 
although it had not completed the efforts to rebuild its military power and economy, the 
Red Army and industry were mobilised sufficiently to prevent Germany from securing 
the quick victory which Hitler sought. Most importantly, the German attack opened a 
second European front, one which the British Government was keen to retain. 
Therefore, in spite of previous hostilities and differences in ideology, Winston Churchill 
immediately offered the Soviet Government British arms, planes, and manpower. Fleet 
Street was nearly unanimous in giving its support to the British Government's policy of 
assistance to the Soviet Union, though there was the occasional murmur of concern that 
Britain had to retain enough for its own war effort. This was predominantly the case in 
the first weeks of the conflict when some papers, primarily the Scotsman and the Daily 
Mail, wondered how long it would be until the Soviet Union, due to its weak army, was 
forced to surrender. Therefore, in the view of these papers, it would be foolish to send 
supplies which Britain would require against a Germany materially stronger from the 
conquest of Russian agricultural, industrial, and natural resources. However, once the 
Red Army appeared to show signs of withstanding the onslaught, those papers 
expressing uncertainty conceded that some aid ought to be sent. In general, however, the 
British press of all political persuasions accepted that the Soviet Union was fighting not 
only for itself but also for Britain. Thus Fleet Street welcomed the British-Soviet Mutual 
Aid Agreement of 12 July 1941. In the autumn, the British press demanded supplies be 
sent more rapidly to the Soviet Union and there was overwhelming relief in the success of 
the Beaverbrook-Harriman mission which British and American war supplies
to the USSR.
I Comment in a leading article of the Daily Herald, 28 August 1941, "Do It Now!".
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The invasion of the Soviet Union was the event which united the British press, 
the population, and the Government in support for the USSR. As The Times pointed 
out, the attack on the USSR even rallied the "tiny minority of [British] Communist 
dissidents" to the national cause.2 However, this unity did not persuade the British 
Government to drop the ban on the Daily Worker which had been enforced since the 21 
January 1941. In addition, though the Daily Worker was supported by other members 
of the British press, especially the News Chronicle,^ in its campaign to resume printing 
once Britain and the Soviet Union were allies, the ban was not officially lifted until 
September 1942.
In contrast to the years before the war when some editors refused to send 
correspondents to Moscow because of censorship, with the invasion in June 1941 all 
newspapers were represented by a resident correspondent since the British public wanted 
detailed knowledge of the conflict in the USSR.4 However, Sir Stafford Cripps, the 
British Ambassador in Moscow, did not believe that the Soviet Government would be 
more forthcoming in supplying news. Cripps was correct since during the war only the 
Soviet Government's view of events was allowed to be reported in the West while a 
correspondent's independent judgement was forbidden by the censor.5 The Times called 
for the Soviet Government to open up to the press, first so that news beyond official 
announcements was communicated and secondly, to satisfy the British people who were 
"intensely interested" in the Soviet Union's struggle and "wished the Red Army well".6 
However, no matter how sympathetic a correspondent might be to the Soviet Union or 
communism, including the Daily Worker, he or she was not accorded special treatment.^
2 The Times, 14 July 1941. Leading article, "Britain and Russia".
3 William Rust, The Story o f the Daily Worker, p. 86. The News Chronicle, 22 January
1941. Leading article, "End of the Rope".
4 The number of Western correspondents had increased in May 1939 as a result of one of the first 
acts by the new Foreign Commissar, Molotov, who ended censorship. However, he restored censorship 
in 1940.
5 Richard Cockett, "In Wartime Every Objective Reporter Should Be Shot", pp. 517-520.
6 The Times, 26 June 1941. "Work of the Red Army; Need More News" by the Moscow 
Correspondent
7 Cockett, "In Wartime Every Objective Reporter Should Be Shot", p. 526.
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Thus daily coverage in the British press concerning the war in the USSR was often 
repetitive and newspapers usually printed very similar reports.
Barbarossa
Prior to the invasion. Fleet Street pointed out that Stalin, "in typical fashion", was 
unwilling to believe that Germany would invade the Soviet Union. For example, the 
News Chronicle reported that Stalin went to the theatre to prove he was not concerned 
with the movement of German troops into Eastern Europe.8 The press admitted that 
Stalin might choose to "appease" Hitler with offers of oil though it seemed doubtful that 
the Soviet leader would be able to provide enough to satisfy German needs.9 The 
Yorkshire Post pointed out that appeasement was a poor option, as the British had 
discovered, since Stalin would have to fight Hitler and therefore, the paper suggested 
"sooner was better than later". The Scotsman betrayed a lingering bitterness towards 
the Soviet Government, which the rest of the quality conservative press did not express, 
when the paper suggested Stalin was "outpowered and outwitted" and would have to 
yield to Germany to save his "ramshackle" regime.!! The popular conservative press 
similarly feared that the Soviet Union was not sufficiently strong to fight the Germans 
and that Stalin would thus prefer to make concessions to Berlin even if it weakened the 
Soviet Union.!2 Furthermore, although the Evening Standard believed that British and 
Soviet interests were interlocked, the paper was not sure the Soviet Union realised that.!3
8 TheNewj Chronicle, 20 June 1941. "Russians Silent as Tension Grows" by the Diplomatic 
Correspondent.
9 The Times, 16 and 18 June 1941. Various articles. The Daily Telegraph, 14 June 1941. 
The Sunday Times, 15 June 1941. The Manchester Guardian, 12, 14,18 June 1941. Various articles. 
The News Chronicle, 17 June 1941. Leading article, "Stalin's Dilemma". The, Daily Herald, June 1941. 
Various articles.
!(! The Yorkshire Post, 16 June 1941. Leading article, "Hitler's Needs from Russia". See also, 
20 June 1941. Leading article, "The Russian Enigma".
!! The Scotsman, 14 June 1941. Leading article, "Germany's Plans".
!2 The Daily Express, 13 June 1941. Leading article, "Russia in Chains"; 18 June 1941, 
leading article, "Eighty Days". The Daily Mail, 13 June 1941. Leading article, "Stalin v. Hitler"; 18 
June 1941, leading article, "Russia on the Verge".
!3 The Evening Standard, 20 June 1941. Leading article, "Rumours and Facts".
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Though Fleet Street expected the invasion, the Yorkshire Post admitted it was 
surprised by the suddenness of the attack. !4 The majority of the quality conservative 
press supported Churchill's offer of aid to the Soviet Union based on "mutual and 
reciprocal" cooperation.!^ However, the Scotsman only grudgingly accepted sending 
assistance to the Soviet Union as there was "no other course possible" and because both 
Britain and the USSR faced a common enemy whose destruction "is the overriding 
consideration, transcending all ideological arguments". Unlike other quality conservative 
papers, the Scotsman emphasised that "Russia was not a saint in knightly armour" as it 
was responsible for the "blood of Finland and the Baltics". However, by supporting the 
Soviet Union, Britain could "hasten the downfall of the Nazi regime... We would be 
fools to let any scruple stand in the way". Even though the Scotsman acknowledged that 
the Soviet Union could give Britain a respite from fighting to rebuild and become 
stronger, in view of the fact that the paper distrusted Stalin, it wanted British aid to rest 
chiefly in bombing the enemy in the West.!6 This attitude by the Scotsman, a formerly 
trusting and supportive newspaper, was surprisingly harsh towards the Soviet Union at a 
time when formerly indifferent newspapers, such as The Times, or especially hostile 
papers, like the popular conservative press, ignored past difficulties.
The Daily Express and the Evening News were very quick to support 
Churchill's call for aid to the Soviet Union since "every Russian shot and bomb helps 
Britain". The deeper Hitler advanced into the USSR, the more time Britain had to recover 
and thus the Beaverbrook newspapers believed that Britain and the Soviet Union were 
"pulling each other's chestnuts out of the fire".!7 In contrast to the Daily Express's 
almost unconditional support, the Daily Mail reflected on Stalin's changes in policy 
during the previous years and called for Britain to remain "cool and objective". Stalin 
was finally "paying the price for a policy of brutal cynicism and a series of shattering
!4 The Yorkshire Post, 23 June 1941. Leading article, "The Enemy of Mankind".
!5 The Times, 25 June 1941. Leading article, "Aid to Russia". The Daily Telegraph, 23 - 25 
June 1941,
!6 The Scotsman, 23 June 1941. Second leading article, "British Aid to Russia".
!7 The Daily Express, 23 June 1941. Leading article, "Our Pledge"; 24 June 1941, leading 
article, "Ain't Life Grand!". The Evening News, 23 June 1941. Leading article, "The Russian March".
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political blunders" of which the Nazi-Soviet pact had especially "alienated the whole 
democratic world in one stroke".!® Though the Daily Mail admitted that the "courage of 
the Russian soldier is proverbial", the paper believed it would take more than courage to 
defeat Germany and based on the Soviet Union's record, the paper was not sure the Red 
Army could win or even survive until the winter. !9 Thus, in an attitude similar to the 
Scotsman, the Daily Mail wanted Britain to be responsible for the war in the West, 
leaving the Soviet Union responsible for fighting in the East. British help should, 
therefore, be restricted to bombing Germany from the West and offering the Soviet 
government "valuable" advice.20
The liberal and labour press ironically stressed that Britain's chances of success 
had significantly increased with the attack on the Soviet Union and thus expected "great 
things" from Churchill's offer of assistance.^! In addition, the liberal press was almost 
enthusiastic in its expressions of relief that Hitler had returned to his original principles 
against "Bolshevism". For example, the News Chronicle suggested it was "great news" 
that Hitler had "taken the plunge" by invading the USSR. Furthermore, the paper 
supported British aid to the Soviet Union and stated that Stalin did not have to worry that 
British resolve would decline "because Hitler spits his venom at the East". The News j
IChronicle recognised that although "Stalin actually fed the mad dog, it has bitten him just I
the same". Thus the paper alleged that the Soviet leader, like others before him, was j
deceived and betrayed by H i t l e r .22 Such a statement showed the large degree of support j
iwhich the News Chronicle believed was owed by Britain to the Soviet Union despite the j
fact that Stalin had chosen Germany as his first ally in the war. In contrast, the |
Manchester Guardian stated that British-Soviet cooperation, vital though it was, could j
never change Britain's feelings on the Soviet Government's role in the Winter War. The !
!8 The Daily Mail, 23 June 1941. Leading article, "Russia".
!9 The Daily Mail, 28 June 1941. Leading article, "Russia's Hard Fight".
29 The Daily Mail, 24 June 1941. Leading article, "Stalin's Reply".
2! The Ngwf Chronicle, 24 June 1941. Leading article, "Britain's Chance". The Manchester
Guardian, 23 June 1941. Leading article, "Hitler and Russia" The New Statesman and Nation, 28 June
1941. "Comments - Our Great Opportunity".
22 The News Chronicle, 23 June 1941. Leading article, "The Greatest Clash". The Manchester 
Guardian, 23 June 1941. Leading article, "Hitler and Russia".
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paper even felt some sympathy for the Finns caught between the traditional enemy of the 
Soviet Union and Germany which used Finland as a springboard against the USSR in 
June 1941.23
By July, the general approach of the British press was to describe the "Russian" 
war effort in positive and heroic terms. The Times admired Stalin's appeal to his people 
to fight for the freedom of their country, an appeal which did not disguise the seriousness 
of the situation as the Soviet leader admitted that Germany had made substantial gains in 
Lithuania and the Ukraine. In the opinion of The Times, Stalin's speech reflected the 
spirit of determination which deserved the moral and physical encouragement of Britain 
and the United States.24 The Daily Telegraph and the Observer were similarly amazed 
and gratified by the resistance of the Russian people to the German invasion, supported 
Stalin's efforts to unite his people and encouraged the British population to respond to 
"Russian" needs.25 The Manchester Guardian also admired the Soviet leader's truthful 
appeal to his people which admitted there had been German success but expected 
"Russian" victory through self-sacrifice, while the Economist appreciated the way the 
Soviet Government adapted the economy to war needs.26
The Daily Herald's approach to reporting the war in the East was slightly 
different to that of the rest of the British press, as it primarily focused on Britain's failure 
to help the Soviet Union in its hour of need. The Daily Herald acknowledged that the 
Red Army was a questionable factor after its unimpressive fight against Finland and 
therefore, Britain had to help before the army was defeated. In view of the fact that the 
USSR's resistance helped Britain, rather than peace being indivisible, the paper 
suggested that "war is indivisible". Furthermore, the people of the Soviet Union were
23 The Manchester Guardian, 25 June 1941. Leading article, "Britain and Russia"; 27 June 
1941, leading article, "Sweden and Finland". The Newj Chronicle, 28 June 1941. Leading article, "No 
Neutrality".
24 The Times, 4 July 1941. Leading article, "Stalin's Appeal".
25 The Daily Telegraph, 4 July 1941. Leading article, "Russia's Firm Resolve". The Observer, 
6 July 1941. "The Battle of Russia" by J.L. Garvin.
The Manchester Guardian, 4 July 1941. Leading article, "Stalin's Speech". The Economist, 
26 July 1941. "The Russian Home Front" by a correspondent. The News Chronicle, 8 July 1941. 
Leading article, "Thanks to Russia".
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not fighting for ideological reasons but for the survival of the Fatherland.27 The Daily 
Herald applauded the spirit of the British people in their desire to help the Soviet Union 
but warned that the British Government did not appear to realise speed was necessary. 
Therefore, the paper felt responsible for making the British leadership understand that the 
population demanded rapid and large scale aid to the Soviet Union.28 Throughout July, 
the Dcdly Herald stated that the British Government had become complacent and was not 
doing enough for the Soviet U n io n .2 9
Thus the entire British press welcomed the announcement of the British-Soviet 
Mutual Aid Agreement on 12 July 1941 in which both governments promised to "render 
each other assistance and support of all kinds" and to refrain from negotiating or 
concluding a separate peace.39 The Times alleged the pact would be "rightly and 
unanimously welcomed by responsible opinion in Britain"^! while the Daily Telegraph 
stressed that it had only taken three weeks for Churchill's declaration of assistance to be 
officially turned into an agreement.32 The News Chronicle expressed relief that the pact, 
which "many hoped for two years ago", was signed, though the paper recognised that 
ironically it had only been made possible by Hitler.33 The Daily Herald welcomed the 
fact that ideological differences were sensibly forgotten by both sides in the effort to 
defeat Nazi Germany.34
However, the British press, despite its praise for the Soviet war effort, did not 
ignore the fact that the Red Army was retreating and that Leningrad was in serious danger 
of falling to the Germans but at the same time. Fleet Street pointed out that Germany was
27 The Daily Herald, 30 June 1941. Leading article, "Russia"; 23 June 1941, leading article, 
"Full Speed Ahead"; 24 June 1941, leading article, "To the Government". See also, the Manchester 
Guardian, 4 July 1941.
28 The Daily Herald, 1 July 1941. Leading article, "Co-operation"; 8 July 1941, leading 
article, "Work and See".
29 The Daily Herald, 9 July 1941. Leading article, "The Supreme Problem"; 18 September 
1941, leading article, "Are We doing Enough?".
39 Curtis Keeble, Britain and the Soviet Union, 1917-1989, p. 169.
3! The Times, 14 July 1941. Leading article, "Britain and Russia".
32 The Daily Telegraph, 14 July 1941. Leading article, "Our Joint Action with Russia". See 
also, the Daily Express, 14 July 1941. Leading article, "Fruits of Conquest".
33 The News Chronicle, 14 July 1941. Leading article, "Pray Silence". See also, the 
Spectator, 18 July 1941. Leading article, "London, Moscow, Paris". The Manchester Guardian, 14 July 
1941. Leading article, "The Agreement with Russia".
34 Th& Daily Herald, 14 July 1941. Leading article, "The Treaty".
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being made to fight long and hard.35 in September, the Sunday Times warned against 
British complacency and the tendency to forget there was great sacrifice of Russian lives 
for Britain as well as the Soviet Union.36 The Scotsman became less critical and 
increasingly impressed with the self-sacrifice of the Russian people and the Soviet 
Government, especially when the Dneiper Dam, the USSR's "engineering masterpiece", 
was blown up.^^ Articles in the Daily Express stated only admiration for "great Russian 
feats and cunning" against G erm any.^* In view of the fact that the paper's proprietor, 
Beaverbrook, became the Minister of Supply, the Daily Express was extremely 
supportive of aid for the USSR.^9 The Daily Mail also dropped its remaining criticism 
of the Soviet Union by September in response to the Red Army's efforts and endorsed 
whatever assistance the British Government chose to send to the USSR/^
See leading articles in The Times, 19, 24, and 29 July, 12 and 22 August 1941.
The Sunday Times. 21 September 1941. Leading article, "Positive Policy". See also the 
Manchester Guardian. 29 August 1941. "Dneiper Dam Blown Up by Russians".
The Scotsman. 30 August 1941. Leading article, "The Russian Front".
See for example articles in July and September 1941.
The Daily Express. 22 September 1941. Leading article, "Tank Week". See Low's cartoon. 
Figure 8.1. The Evening Standard. 9 July 1940, "How Doth the Busy Little B".
See for example, the Daily Mail. 4 and 14 September and 2 October 1941.
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Fleet Street welcomed the announcement of the Beaverbrook-Harriman mission to 
Moscow to organise the amount of supplies necessary for the Soviet Union and the 
method of sending them. However, the majority of the British press was disappointed 
with the amount of time it took the mission actually to reach Moscow. Only the Spectator 
believed that the delays prior to holding the meetings were necessary and had met with 
"unreasonable" criticism since the advanced preparation had ensured a rapid and 
successful conference."^! in contrast, the Scotsman believed there was "excusable 
criticism" for the delay in starting the discussions though the paper admitted that the time 
had been used to ensure the conference moved swiftly when it convened."!^ The Daily 
Herald was bluntly critical of the British Government for ignoring the demands of the 
British people and the press and in the failure to react sufficiently fast to help the Soviet 
Union."!^
Despite the delays, the quality conservative press offered congratulations for the 
way in which the mission got to work and provided supplies for the Soviet Union."!^ The 
Observer appreciatively noted that banquets had been "cut in favour of efficiency" so 
that work was completed in half the time expected."!^ However, the liberal and labour 
press, though relieved by the rapidity of the Moscow Conference, expected British 
Ministers to match their words with deeds and wanted to see stronger British-Soviet 
cooperation."!^ Thus, despite progress the News Chronicle accepted the British 
population’s "mood of anger" towards the British Government for not helping the Soviet 
Union more in the first three months of fighting"*^ and the Daily Herald refused to be 
entirely satisfied until aid actually reached the Soviet Union."!®
Spectator, 3 October 1941. "News of the Week - Allied Conference in Moscow". The 
Manchester Guardian, 3 October 1941. Leading article, "The Alliance".
"!2 The Scotsman, 30 September 1941. Leading article, "Moscow Conference".
"!3 The Daily Herald, 19 September 1941. Leading article, "Our Ally".
"!"! The Times, 6 September 1941. Leading article, "Help for Russia"; 24 September 1941, 
leading article, "A Call for Aid"; 3 October 1941, leading article, "The Moscow Meeting". See also the 
Daily Telegraph, 3 October 1941.
"!^  The Observer, 5 October 1941. "The Moscow Pact" by Garvin. The Scotsman, 3 October 
1941. Leading article, "Aid for Russia". See also, the Daily Express, 1 - 3  October 1941.
The News Chronicle, 24 September 1941. Leading article, "Maisky Speaks".
"!^  TheiVewj Chronicle, 2 October 1941. Leading article, "Hustle in Moscow"; 11 October 
1941, leading article, "Britain's Disquiet".
"!® The Daily Herald, 4 October 1941. Leading article, "Winter Help".
War Today Is Indivisible 263
Conclusion
Thus the British press accepted that Britain and the Soviet Union were allies. One 
of the most noticeable changes by Fleet Street was the dropping of "Soviet Russia" for 
the less accurate but also less ideologically motivated term "Russia". There were 
occasional exceptions, such as the Daily Express, which continued to report in terms of 
"Reds" and "Soviets" though with far less frequency."!^ Quality conservative and liberal 
newspapers immediately accepted that past differences and ideologies had to be forgotten 
in an effort to defeat Hitler and that issues other than the most effective means of 
overwhelming Germany ought to be ignored until later. The only significant exception to 
this attitude was the Scotsman which encouraged its readers to remember that the Soviet 
Union had abandoned Britain in 1939 and chosen to ally with Hitler, and therefore 
deserved to struggle to a degree. The paper also believed that Britain, regardless of an 
alliance with the Soviet Union, had to consider the fate of Eastern Europe where the 
Soviet Union had ignored the sovereign rights of Finland, the Baltic states, and 
Rumania.^® However, the Scotsman's attitude changed in the late summer of 1941 
when it appeared the Soviet Union was resisting the German advance and when it 
emerged that the British and Soviet Governments were committed to working together.^!
The popular conservative press also readily approved the British-Soviet alliance 
against Germany. The Daily Express was especially supportive of British aid to the 
Soviet Union since that would help Britain's efforts in the long term against Germany, 
The Daily Mail, however, was more circumspect towards British aid to the Soviet 
Union. The paper recognised that although it was a good thing for the British and Soviet 
Governments to cooperate, it was unfortunate that Stalin had avoided such an alliance for 
so long. Thus the Daily Mail remained slightly critical and suspicious of the Soviet
See for example, the Daily Express, 23 June 1941. "Red Cities Blitzed" and "All Aid for
Soviets".
The Scotsman, 23 1941. Leading articles, "Road to Moscow" and "British Aid to Russia"; 
25 June 1941, leading article, "Aid for Russia".
The Scotsman, 30 September 1941. Leading article, "Moscow Conference".
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Union though gradually the paper came to support the "truly courageous" effort of the 
"Russians" and advocated large scale British supplies for the USSR.^^
The labour press warmly welcomed the fact that Britain and the Soviet Union had 
become allies. Although recognising that it was Stalin who had avoided Britain in the 
first two years of the war, the Daily Herald constantly urged the British Government to 
provide better and faster help for the Soviet Union and recommended less complacency 
by Britain, The paper rarely relaxed its reproofs which was in noticeable contrast to the 
near constant positive comment by the conservative and liberal press after 21 June 1941. 
The Daily Herald felt justified in its criticism because it was supported by the British 
public which did not believe their Government was acting sufficiently to help directly the 
Soviet Union or indirectly Britain. In August, a B.I.P.O. poll reported that 30 percent of 
those questioned did not believe the British Government was providing enough military 
help for the Russians.^^ Despite the British-Soviet Mutual Aid Agreement in July 1941 
and the Beaverbrook-Harriman Mission in September, a B.I.P.O. poll conducted in 
October stated that 49 per cent of those surveyed thought the British Government had not 
taken full advantage of the opportunities offered by the German attack on Russia.^"! 
Furthermore, a year later in September 1942, the British public still believed that Britain 
could have taken more advantage of the German attack on Russia.^^
Though there was a small degree of smugness in the British press in June 1941 
because the newspapers and the Government had warned of the coming invasion of the 
Soviet Union, which Stalin had ignored, this almost immediately disappeared as the crisis 
recalled Fleet Street to its purpose of promoting the war against Germany. Hostility, 
indifference and ideology were ignored in the struggle against a common enemy and not 
until the end of the war were any of those three issues allowed to resurface as a hindrance
The Daily Mail, 4 September 1941. Leading article, "Battle of Leningrad".
B.I.P.O., Gallup Poll, August 1941. Only 37 per cent believed Britain was doing enough 
while 33 per cent expressed "no opinion".
5"! B.I.P.O., Gallup Poll, October 1941. Only 29 per cent believed Britain had taken advantage 
of the German attack while 22 per cent offered "no opinion".
B.I.P.O., Gallup Poll, September 1942. Of those questioned, 44 per cent believed Britain had 
not done enough as a result o f Germany's attack on Russia, 28 per cent thought Britain had done enough, 
while 28 per cent had "no opinion".
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to cooperation between Britain and the Soviet Union. This style of collaboration was 
inevitably going to encourage the problems that occurred in the post-war conferences 
which were meant to resolve the problems of Europe but which led to the end of 
cooperation and the beginnings of the Cold War. However, before those problems 
occurred, "Uncle Joe’s" reputation was created and subsequently supported by the British 
press.5^
In 1941, the majority o f press coverage concerning the Soviet Union was devoted to the 
conflict on the Eastern Front. However, there was some evidence that the conservative press was eager to 
promote the good reputation of Stalin even before he "officially" became known as "Uncle Joe". See for 
example, the Daily Mail, 24 June and 2 October 1941; the Daily Express, 23 June, 14 July, 2 October 
1941; The Times, 4 and 14 July, 7 November 1941.
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Chapter 9 
Conclusion!
An examination of British press attitudes in the 1930s concerning the Soviet 
Union provides insight into two main issues. First, Fleet Street allowed people to 
discover what the Soviet Union, an alien and far away country, was like. Very few 
people in the 1930s could afford the journey and therefore, few had first hand knowledge 
of such a vast and potentially important country. Thus the press was in a position to 
inform the British pubhc about subjects of which the people knew little, though often the 
newspapers themselves chose not to provide entirely accurate information.^ The Soviet 
Union was one such topic which was often misrepresented, either through ignorance or 
deliberate distortion of facts, by the majority of the British press in the 1930s. However, 
the reason for examining newspaper coverage of the Soviet Union in the 1930s, as 
compared to articles of other little known countries and peoples, was because the USSR 
had a significant degree of influence on British foreign affairs, whether or not the British 
Government wished to acknowledge that was the case. Thus an examination of British 
press attitudes towards the Soviet Union secondly provides insight into British views 
towards the Soviet Union and reveals why th^British and the Soviet Governments did 
not establish a better relationship before 1941. ^  9 ^
The failure to work together was all the more surprising when the main aim of the c ^  
two countries in the 1930s was considered. Both countries were determined to maintain c- 
peace in Europe. It was, therefore, disappointing that such an important goal could not 
be achieved by two very influential states, a point which liberal and labour newspapers
! The majority of articles sighted in the conclusion have already been used in previous chapters. 
Furthermore, they are a limited selection representing a far greater number of articles.
2 Kingsley Martin, The Press the Public Wants, p.93. Martin argued that it was against the 
commercial interests of the proprietor to print too much information of a potentially negative aspect 
A.J. Cummings, The Press and a Changing Civilisation, pp. 2-3. Cummings believed that the people 
were "greedy" for news and learned much from newspapers, though he admitted that some articles could be 
falsified and thus misleading.
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noted, though few conservative papers conceded.^ For a period between 1934 and 1935, 
and again in 1939, it appeared that Britain and the Soviet Union were collaborating and 
yet ultimately, the two governments moved with different methods in the pursuit of 
peace. The press of the 1930s provided a good indication of why and how cooperation 
failed because newspapers reflected the attitudes of the British Government, whether or 
not the press intended to do so. This included those liberal, labour, and some quality 
conservative newspapers which frequently reported favourably on the Soviet Union.
An examination of Fleet Street attitudes concerning the Soviet Union in the 1930s 
establishes three predominant and interlocking reasons for the failure to improve British- 
Soviet relations before 1941. First, the British press acknowledged that the Soviet Union 
in the 1930s was internally changing very rapidly. Despite recognition of economic 
advances under the Five Year Plans, there were far more articles concerned with the 
failures of harvests and the suffering of the people."! There was also as much 
disillusionment and criticism directed at the Soviet Government because the Soviet 
population lived under an inhumane and barbaric regime. These views hindered further 
confidence in the Soviet Union since any benefits which the press reported were 
inevitably negated by the far greater coverage of the cruel and repressive nature of Soviet 
justice which came under intense scrutiny in the 1930s. For example, the liberal press 
had welcomed the growth of the economy but these papers believed the show trials 
caused fear amongst the Russian people and therefore hindered social and economic 
growth.5 The labour press, the firmest supporter of the "socialist experiment", was 
disappointed that large scale repression was deemed necessary by the Soviet Government 
when domestically the country appeared to be advancing favourably.^ The conservative
 ^See for example, the Manchester Guardian, 2 April 1935; 10 February and 18 July 1936. The 
News Chronicle, 28 January 1939. The Daily Herald, 28 March, 1 April, and 9 December 1935; 21 
January 1939. The Scotsman, 1 April 1935. The Daily Telegraph, 2 April 1935.
"! See for example. The Times, 29 May 1934; 18 February 1935. The Daily Telegraph, 4 
September 1936. The Daily Express, April 1933; 29 December 1934. The iVew  ^Chronicle, 17 May 
and 19 June 1933. The Manchester Guardian, 9 September 1935; 20 February 1936. The N ew  
Statesman and Nation, 20 July 1935.
 ^ The Economist, 22 August 1936. The Manchester Guardian, 6  March 1935; 1 February 
1937. See also, the Yorkshire Post, 24 August 1936.
 ^The Daily Herald, 1 April 1935; 2 September 1936; 10 June 1937. The New Statesman and 
Nation, 30 January 1937.
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press, regardless of any economic advances, believed the purges were a clear sign that 
internally the Soviet Union was "barbaric" and therefore, the country was not as socially 
advanced as the West or worthy of improved relations with Britain.^
Thus all newspapers and journals contained suspicion, scepticism or 
disappointment with the Soviet Union's internal developments. Such feelings were 
conveyed to the British public causing uncertainty in the beliefs o f many people that 
Britain and the Soviet Union should cooperate. Furthermore, although the press was 
technically independent of the British Government, newspapers always noted and often 
reflected the feelings of the Government which was itself suspicious and sceptical of the 
domestic affairs of the Soviet Union. Thus the Government preferred to watch the 
USSR's internal developments to see if the Soviet Government was sufficiently stable 
and strong to provide the foreign assistance it offered. While it was possible that traitors 
were at large in Moscow or that the Soviet Government was corrupt, the British 
Government cautiously chose to wait for a time when the Soviet Union would become 
constant and reliable. The conservative press willingly accepted that policy and discussed 
in detail the negative aspects of the show trials.® The liberal and labour press, though 
accepting the logic of such a policy, nevertheless felt that foreign circumstances were not 
conducive to such waiting and argued that the Soviet Union's internal policy, deplorable 
though it was, should not interfere with the Soviet Government's peaceful foreign policy. 
Nevertheless, such concessions to the alleged disgracefulness o f Soviet judgement 
allowed a degree of suspicion which reduced the emphasis of the liberal and labour 
press's full encouragement of improved British-Soviet relations.^
As the domestic affairs of the Soviet Union were rapidly evolving, so too was the 
Government's foreign policy which ironically contributed to the second failure to improve 
British-Soviet relations. The Soviet Government in the 1930s abandoned its policy of 
remaining isolated from foreign affairs, to taking an active position in promoting
 ^ The Scotsman, 10 March 1938. The Daily Express, 24 December 1934. The Sunday 
Times, 31 January 1937. The Times, 1 February 1937. The Daily Telegraph, 28 January 1937.
® See especially discussion in June 1937 of the Red Army purge. Also, The Times, 13 June 
and 24 October 1938.
 ^Again see particularly June 1937 for discontent with the Red Army purge.
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collective security in Europe, or what Litvinov called "the indivisibility of peace". The 
Soviet Union was responding to the changing situation in Europe as a result of Hitler's 
rise to power in Germany in 1933. In the first years o f Hitler's rule, Britain was 
similarly concerned by Hitler's expansionist aims and thus accepted the apparently 
peaceful intentions of the Soviet Union. The British Government, therefore, approved 
Litvinov's collective security plans and supported the Soviet entry into the League of 
Nations in September 1934. In addition, the British Government endorsed an Eastern 
Locarno plan, though with no desire to join it, to guarantee the sovereignty of Eastern 
Europe. To show commitment to the plan, Eden was sent to Moscow in March 1935, 
and yet at this point, the signs were evident that Britain was more anxious to cooperate 
with Germany. Eden was merely a minor member of the Government, with no real 
authority, and as Hitler refused to join the Eastern Locarno plan, British enthusiasm 
towards working with the Soviet Union declined.
In these issues, the British press again reflected the British Government. It is 
notable that the quality conservative press between, 1934 and 1935, was at its most 
complimentary towards the Soviet Union. These were the years in which the British 
Government was clearly weighing up the advantages of better relations with the Soviet 
Union against the rising influence and strength of Germany. Thus, following the British 
Government's lead, these papers supported the Soviet entry into the League, the plan for 
an Eastern Locarno, and Eden's visit to Moscow. Nevertheless, there remained a 
significant degree of s u sp ic io n .F o r  example, some papers only supported Soviet entry 
into the League because it might encourage Germany to re-enter as continued voluntary 
isolation from that organisation showed an intransigent attitude by Hitler towards 
cooperation.!! Quality conservative press support for an Eastern Locarno plan was only 
conditional on German support, and in addition, the Observer and the Daily Telegraph 
failed to recognise Aat the project originated with Litvinov as much as with the French
!!^  See quality conservative newspapers in September 1934 which, though welcoming Soviet 
membership into the L^gue of Nations, retained suspicion of Soviet motives.
!!  The Scotsman, 11 September 1934,
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Government.!^ Finally, support for Eden's visit to Moscow was given primarily because 
it was not the Foreign Secretary, Simon, making the journey,!® and The Times 
especially reduced the importance of the event by disguising the significance of Eden's 
meetings behind a great deal more coverage devoted to Simon's visit to Berlin a few days 
before.!"!
As it became more evident that Germany refused to join any plan conceived by the 
Soviet Government, the quality conservative press lost interest in such projects. 
Increasingly, these newspapers saw Soviet plans as intending to encircle Germany or 
unwarranted "meddling" in Europe, and therefore were very dangerous proposals for 
Britain to consider. Thus there was a suspicion that the Soviet Union's foreign policy 
was intended only for the Soviet Union's benefit rather than Europe's or Britain's.!® 
This was ironic since Britain's reason for adopting the policy of appeasement was for 
British security, though Eastern Europe was sacrificed to Germany. As the British 
Government preferred appeasement of Germany, so too did the quality conservative press 
and thus coverage of the Soviet Union’s role in Europe decreased in importance though 
not necessarily frequency. What became apparent was that Germany was more often in 
the headlines or leading articles of the quality conservative press than the Soviet Union, 
unless there was a show trial.
The popular conservative press was even less receptive to the Soviet Union's 
efforts to become involved in Europe's affairs. Those papers believed the Soviet 
Government intended to weaken Europe by causing conflict between Britain and 
Germany so the Soviet Union would be the leading force in Europe. Therefore, the 
Beaverbrook and Rothermere newspapers wanted the British Government to avoid any 
efforts by Moscow to entangle Britain in a disagreement with Germany.!® Thus these
The Observer, 15 July 1934. The Daily Telegraph, 14 July 1934. ^
!® See articles in March 1935.
!4 The Times, 4 April 1935.
!® For example, the Daily Telegraph, 15 May 1935; 24 October and 30 November 1936. The j
Observer, 25 October and 29 November 1936; 7 November 1937. The Times, 9 July 1936. I
!® See for example, the Daily Express, 23 May , 14 and 17 July, and 13 September 1934; 20 j
March and 11 April 1935; articles on Spanish Civil War. The Daily Mail, 6 and 12 September 1934; 23 I
and 26 March 1935; articles on Spanish Civil War. I
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papers criticised the British Government for supporting both the Soviet entry into the 
League and the Eastern Locarno plan, and also believed Eden had no business in 
Moscow. However, in contrast to the quality conservative press, the popular 
conservative newspapers also had no desire for Britain to become more involved with 
Germany. These papers preferred that the British Government remain uncommitted to 
Europe's affairs.!^ Though the majority of articles in the popular conservative press 
were concerned with Britain's domestic issues,!® Germany received a significant degree 
of coverage. The only issues concerning the Soviet Union which received detailed 
attention, and all of it negative, were the show trials and communist involvement in 
Spain.
As Hitler's expansionist aims became more apparent, the liberal and labour press 
believed that Europe had to work together to maintain peace and these papers, therefore, 
welcomed the Soviet Union's efforts towards collective security. Thus the Soviet 
Union's entry into the League was heralded as a step in that direction and Litvinov's 
Eastern Locarno plan was also seen as an opportunity for Europe to collaborate against 
aggression. When Hitler refused to join a security scheme for Eastern Europe, the liberal 
and labour press pointed to his "obvious" desire to divide Europe. These papers called 
for the British Government to admit that the Soviet Union's method of securing peace 
was more beneficial because membership was open to all whereas Germany's plans 
wanted to exclude the Soviet Union. !9 Thus when Eden was sent to Moscow rather than 
Simon, there was dissatisfaction that the Foreign Secretary had not gone, though there 
was also a hope that at least efforts were being made towards improving British-Soviet 
understanding for Europe's benefit. Criticism for the failure to secure a better 
relationship primarily focused on the British Government, though the liberal and labour
!^ R. Allen, Voice o f Britain, p. 56. See for example, popular conservative press articles in 
September 1934, and March and April 1935.
!® Martin, The Press the Public Wants, pp. 58-61. Allen, p. 64.
!9 The Manchester Guardian, 11 September 1934; 2 April 1935; 10 February, 18 July and 26 
August 1936. The News Chronicle, 28 March 1935. The Daily Herald, 24 November 1934; 1 April 
1935. The New Statesman and Nation, 30 March 1935.
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press also acknowledged that the Soviet Union was partly to blame.^o However, during 
the Spanish Civil War, these papers expressed dissatisfaction with the British 
Government for avoiding cooperation with the Soviet Union over non-intervention plans.
The liberal and labour press disliked appeasement and yet there was a degree of 
acceptance as long as peace was secured. Although these papers criticised the British 
Government's appeasement of Germany, at the same time, these papers welcomed the 
British leadership's initiative and hoped for "peace in our time". This was especially true 
when Europe came under the shghtest threat of war. The liberal and labour press failed to 
support Litvinov's calls for collective action against aggression, claiming that the British 
people did not wish to fight for the Rhineland, Austria, or Czechoslovakia.^! Despite 
protest at the exclusion of the Soviet Union from the Munich Conference, it was relatively 
feeble when compared to the support which these papers accorded to the Soviet Union's 
complaints against the failure of non-intervention in the Spanish Civil War. Thus even 
the liberal and labour press, despite their belief in collective security, listened to what the 
British Government suggested concerning Europe's safety and occasionally agreed to 
ignore suggestions for peace by the Soviet Union.
Finally, press coverage of the Soviet Union’s internal and external developments 
was affected first by the suspicion and prejudice expressed against communism by the 
conservative press, and sometimes liberal papers, and secondly by the disappointment 
voiced by the liberal and labour press because the communist leadership had failed in the 
socialist experiment. These expressions of suspicion, prejudice, and disappointment led 
to a lack of trust between the two countries and thus contributed to the failure by the 
British and the Soviet Governments to improve relations prior to 1941. The suspicions 
and prejudices displayed by the conservative press were again a reflection of the British 
Government, as there were many conservative party members who could not hide their 
dislike and distrust of communism. Chamberlain particularly had a deep aversion to it
See for example, press coverage of the Soviet note to Italy prior to the Nyon Conference: the 
Manchester Guardian, 7 September 1937. The News Chronicle, 8 September 1937.
^! The Daily Herald, 13 and 14 March 1936. The Manchester Guardian, 18 March 1938. The 
News Chronicle, 30 September 1938.
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and for that reason would not accept the Soviet Government as a partner against 
aggression. Churchill also suspected communist intentions, though he was able to see 
beyond his dislike to recognise that Britain needed the Soviet Union's strength against 
Germany to survive.^^ Communism allegedly threatened what most people in Britain 
wanted, peace, and there was a fear that communism would spread into Britain. 
Therefore, one reason why the British Government wanted General Franco to succeed in 
Spain was to prevent a Soviet base from developing in south-west Europe from which 
communism would spread to the rest of the continent.^
Thus there was little support by the conservative press for the Republicans in 
Spain, even though they had been democratically elected, because they were supported by 
communists throughout Europe. The popular conservative press was especially critical of 
the "Red" threat to Spain, criticism which was unjustified since these papers failed to take 
the same negative attitude towards fascism in Spain. Thus ideological differences 
prevented British-Soviet cooperation in S p a i n . 2 4  However, even more important to 
Britain, because it was closer to matters at home, was the trial of six British engineers in 
1933 in Moscow which led to frenzied hatred and prejudice against communism and the 
Soviet Union in the conservative press, which alleged both were totally rotten if British 
citizens could be tried.2® The prejudice led the conservative press to demand the most 
damaging and useless reprisals, from economic embargos to the severing of diplomatic 
relations.^® Again the conservative press reflected the questionable and hysterical activity 
of the British Government, though the newspapers were actually less reserved than the 
Government. Such ideological hatred could have caused greater damage, though common
Michael J. Carley, "'A Fearful Concatenation o f Circumstances': the Anglo-Soviet 
Rapprochement, 1934-1936", p. 30. RichsadCockeit, Twilight o f Truth, p. 115.
2® Douglas Little, "Red Scare, 1936: Anti-Bolshevism and the Origins of British Non- 
Intervention in the Spanish Civil War", p. 297 and 299. Cattell, Soviet Diplomacy and the Spanish Civil 
War, p. 11. D.BF.P., Second Series, Vol. XVII, no. 78 and Vol. XVIII, no. 34. Carley, "'A Fearful 
Concatenation of Circumstances'", p. 50.
24 See for example, a large amount of ideologically motivated reporting in the popular 
conservative press in August 1936. Less obvious, but nevertheless negative, was the quality conservative 
press criticism of communism compared to the failure to criticise nationalist help. The Sunday Times, 
11 October 1936. The Observer, 30 August and 25 November 1936. The Times, 8 October 1936.
2® The Daily Express, 16 and 17 March 1933. The Daily Mail, 4 April 1933. The Times, 16 
March 1933. The Yorksfdre Post, 4 April 1933.
2® The Yorkshire Post, 20 April 1933. The Daily Mail, 13 and 19 April 1933.
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sense by both governments, and especially by Litvinov, prevented severe damage to 
relations.
The liberal and labour press, though anxious about communism, were able to 
accept the Soviet Union's difference in ideological views because Britain and the Soviet 
Union both desired peace. However, the liberal press occasionally made ideological or 
racial references to the Soviet Union similar to those of the quality conservative 
newspapers. For example, the liberal press found that the "Eastern" or "Oriental" blood 
of the Soviet people provided a convenient excuse for some of the ills in the Soviet 
Union, such as show trials.2? These papers also regretted that communism hindered a 
more western approach to governing the Soviet Union.2®
However, these references did not prevent the liberal press from rationally 
judging the Soviet Union's peaceful foreign policy. Thus the difference between 
conservative and liberal or labour press attitudes was that the former expressed prejudice 
towards communism and therefore found it difficult to advocate British cooperation with 
such a state. The latter newspapers expressed disappointment with what communism 
achieved or how communist leadership excesses prevented the Soviet Union from making 
true socialist gains. During the Metropolitan-Vickers trial, the liberal and labour press 
failed to comprehend why the Soviet Government threatened British-Soviet relations by 
trying British citizens on flimsy e v id e n c e .2 9  Likewise, during the Moscow show trials, 
these papers questioned why the Soviet leadership held trials, again with poor evidence, 
at a time when Britain and the Soviet Union needed to show unity of purpose against 
aggression. These papers regretted that the Soviet Government thus gave the British 
leadership an excuse for avoiding closer contact with Moscow. There was profound 
disappointment that socialism was not strong, had proved so unstable, and that the
22 The Spectator, 20 August 1937. The News Chronicle, 4 April 1933. The M anchester 
Guardian, 5 April 1933.
2® The Manchester Guardian, 6 March 1935; 16 June 1936; 18 December 1937. The Daily 
Herald, 6 and 13 June 1936; 10 June and December 1937. See also the Yorkshire Post, 19 September 
1934.
29 See liberal and labour papers, March and April 1933. The quality conservative press also 
questioned the timing of the trial.
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communists failed to see the damage the purges caused to their prestige.®® The show 
trials contributed to a firm suspicion in all the British press that communism was 
wrecking the Soviet Union®! not only because there were apparently so many traitors, but 
because it seemed as likely that there was significant corruption in the Soviet 
leadership .®2
As Europe moved closer to war, ideology continued to encourage suspicion or 
disappointment, especially at the Munich Conference when the Soviet Union was 
ignored. The lack of trust between the British and Soviet Governments, aggravated in the 
1930s, came to a crisis in 1939 when the two countries, with France, tried to reach an 
agreement on how to protect Europe from German aggression. Ideological differences 
were finally ignored by the majority of the press®® in 1939 in an effort to assist the British 
Government in securing an alliance with the Soviet Union against Germany. It was the 
first time the British press had been so positively united towards the Soviet Union though 
these attitudes were not rewarded by the British or Soviet Governments, much to the 
dismay of many newspapers.®"! British efforts at appeasement brought only war while 
the Soviet Union, looking for the best option as was Britain, found Germany a willing 
partner and thus avoided war.
Prejudice and suspicion contributed to the British-Soviet failure to cooperate 
between 1933 and 1939. From 1939 to 1941, the legacy of distrust between the two 
countries, as demonstrated by the British press, could not be overcome until Germany 
invaded the Soviet Union. Fleet Street recognised that the British Government had 
missed an opportunity for advancing British-Soviet relations and possibly deterring Hitler 
from war. Thus despite the Winter War, when British newspapers resumed criticism of
®0 For example, the Manchester Guardian, 17 January 1935. The Spectator, 28 August 1936. 
The Dcdly Herald, 2 September 1936.
®! See articles in June 1937 following the Red Army purge.
The Sunday Times, 31 January 1937. The Daily Telegraph, 28 January 1937. The Times, 
1 February 1937. The Daily Express, 22 August 1936. The News Chronicle, 11 June 1937. The 
Spectator, 28 August 1936. The Economist, 29 August 1936.
®® The Times was the exception.
®"! The Scotsman, the Daily Mail and The Times were the most critical o f the Nazi-Soviet 
pact though other newspapers expressed disappointment with the Soviet and British Governments.
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the Soviet Union on a grand scale, some of which was ideologically motivated,®® the 
British press soon recognised that Britain’s survival required a second front in Europe 
and thus the Soviet Union as an ally. It was notable that the press’s desire to assist 
Finland against the Red Army was not matched by the British Government and thus press 
opinion towards the Soviet Union was not necessarily reflecting the aims of the War 
Cabinet. However, criticism by the British leadership and press of the Soviet Union’s 
expansionist goals in Eastern Europe was reserved, compared to condemnation during the 
Winter War, as both newspapers and the Government focused on the rising conflict of 
interest between Berlin and Moscow. Thus hope that Britain and the Soviet Union would 
become allies grew, but press expectations were not realised until June 1941.
British-Soviet cooperation did not fail as a result of favourable or unfavourable 
comment concerning the Soviet Union by the British press. Newspapers did not have 
that type of influence, regardless of British or Soviet Government complaints that the 
press damaged relations.®® Fleet Street’s ability in the 1930s was in reflecting 
Government opinion to help lead public opinion, though the press also reflected public 
opinion to ensure that the Government was acting in the public’s interest. Thus the 
amount of coverage devoted to the Soviet Union in the 1930s demonstrated that Britain 
was aware of the growing significance in Europe of that country. While the liberal and 
labour press, occasionally supported by some of the quality conservative newspapers,®^ 
believed the British should work with Moscow for Britain's benefit, the conservative 
press was more sceptical and chose what it considered to be a more sensible, though 
cautious, route to peace. The press was a valuable means of showing the divisions which 
existed in Britain amongst those who preferred to see the advancement of British-Soviet 
relations and those who opposed such beneficial relations. The prejudice, suspicion, and 
disappointment expressed by Fleet Street help to explain why Britain and the Soviet 
Union failed to cooperate against aggression before 1941.
®® See for example, the Sunday Times, 18 February 1940. The Times, 4 January 1940. The 
Evening News, 28 December 1939.
®® Carley, '"A Fearful Concatenation o f Circumstances'", pp. 37 and 39. D.B.F.P., Second 
Series, Vol. VII, nos. 597 ,602 ,606 ,608 , and 611.
®2 Usually it was the Scotsman, the Yorkshire Post, and occasionally the Sunday Times.
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